# IQBAL
AND
# POST-KANTIAN VOLUNTARISM

BY

BASHIR AHMAD DAR
FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC CULTURE
ASST. EDITOR, 'Iqbal'

★

BAZM-I-IQBAL
2, NARSING DAS GARDEN
CLUB ROAD - LAHORE

# IQBAL AND POST-KANTIAN VOLUNTARISM

*By the same author :*

A STUDY IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

# IQBAL
### AND
# POST-KANTIAN VOLUNTARISM

BY

BASHIR AHMAD DAR

FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC CULTURE

ASST. EDITOR, *'Iqbal'*

★

**BAZM-I-IQBAL**

2, NARSING DASS GARDEN

CLUB ROAD - LAHORE

*Second Edition 2000* *1965* *Price Rs. 6/-*

*Published by*
Bazm-i-Iqbal
Club Road, Lahore



*Printed by*
Enfine Printing Press
15, Patiala Ground
McLeod Road, Lahore.

# LIST OF CONTENTS

## FOREWORD

*by*

PROF. M. M. SHARIF

It can justly be said that Iqbal is the greatest thinker that the Muslim world has produced during the last six centuries. But even this statement does not do justice to his place in history. The six centuries preceding the close of the nineteenth century cover the period of Islamic Decadence and to consider one the greatest man of such a period is not to pay a great complement to him. But there have been clear signs of revival in all Muslim lands since the beginning of this century. Of the many pioneers of this revival Iqbal is undoubtedly the greatest. Therefore, he should be viewed not as the greatest thinker of a period of Islamic Decadence but of a period of Islamic Renaissance.

The author of this book, Mr. B. A. Dar, who is an eminent scholar of this country and is well-known for his philosophical writings, studies the western background of Iqbal's speculation. There is an eastern background of his thought as well. But, as Mr. Dar rightly points out in the preface, this latter field requires a separate study. It is hoped that he will soon find time to place before his readers the results of that supplementary study as well.

*Published by*
Bazm-i-Iqbal
Club Road, Lahore



*Printed by*
Enfine Printing Press
15, Patiala Ground
McLeod Road, Lahore.

## LIST OF CONTENTS

# FOREWORD

*by*

PROF. M. M. SHARIF

It can justly be said that Iqbal is the greatest thinker that the Muslim world has produced during the last six centuries. But even this statement does not do justice to his place in history. The six centuries preceding the close of the nineteenth century cover the period of Islamic Decadence and to consider one the greatest man of such a period is not to pay a great complement to him. But there have been clear signs of revival in all Muslim lands since the beginning of this century. Of the many pioneers of this revival Iqbal is undoubtedly the greatest. Therefore, he should be viewed not as the greatest thinker of a period of Islamic Decadence but of a period of Islamic Renaissance.

The author of this book, Mr. B. A. Dar, who is an eminent scholar of this country and is well-known for his philosophical writings, studies the western background of Iqbal's speculation. There is an eastern background of his thought as well. But, as Mr. Dar rightly points out in the preface, this latter field requires a separate study. It is hoped that he will soon find time to place before his readers the results of that supplementary study as well.

Since the beginning of the eighteenth century to the twenties of the twentieth, western thought was mainly romantic and vitalistic. In his acute analysis, the author has traced the devolopment of this romanticism and vitalism from Kant down to Bernard Shaw, and has shown with remarkable accuracy the influences wich Iqbal, consciously or unconsciously, received from the chief representatives of this great movement.

To show the influences of others on a thinker is not to minimise his importance. Much of the material with which a genius builds a masterpiece is supplied by the accumulated heritage of the past, embodied in the life and literature of his time and no one can see the full stature of a genius without the study of this heritage. Mr. Dar has done a great service to Iqbal's admirers by presenting to them the fruits of his masterly study in such a clear and polished style.

Mr. Dar has not only brought into bold relief those ideas which Iqbal shared with others but has also done full jnstice to those in which he differed from them, and has thus given a clear picture of his entire system, relating it to and differentiating it from all other vitalistic thought constructions. He deserves our thanks.

# PREFACE

This book is an attempt to study in detail only one aspect of the devolopment of Iqbal's thought, without implying the absence of other equally important aspects. Nobody—not even a genius—can be expected to steer clear of the contemporary life in which he is born and moves. It serves as the warp into which he weaves the rich patterns of the woof, peculiarly his own. To understand and appreciate the real contribution of a thinker—the woof—it is essential to have a look at the warp which serves to give a peculiar colour and setting to the original patterns with which he embellishes and decorates the canvas of his thought. The present study is the result of this attempt.

The Western thought is only one part of the influence which helped Iqbal to formulate his peculiar theory of life. The major part, qualitatively of great importance, he got from the ancient tradition of Muslim thought, a cultural heritage to which great thinker, great mystics and poets had equally contributed. In the introduction (Urdu) of the first edition of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Iqbal explicitly expresses his indebtedness to it. I have referred to some of these influences here and there but full justice to it can be done only in a separate independent study.

The present book grew out of the different

essays which were written during the long period extending from 1951 to 1955. The first three essays on Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer, were prepared under the guidance of Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim (1951-52) at whose suggestion the scheme of philosophical studies of Iqbal was started by the Bazm-i-Iqbal. The remaining six were the result of Professor M. M. Sharif 's guidance and criticism, to whom I owe almost everything that is of worth in them, though I alone am responsible for the views expressed therein. I must also express my gratitude to him for agreeing to write a foreword to the book.

B. A. DAR

# INTRODUCTION

With the dawn of the modern period of history the problems of philosophy assumed a complexion different from what they had in the Middle Ages. The philosophy of Plato with its belief in the capacity of reason to apprehend Reality and solve the problems of philosophy replaced the authority of the Church and Aristotle. Descarts, the French philosopher, who first tackled these problems was as much interested in philosophy as in the new sciences that were soon to overshadow and set a pattern to all other branches of human learning. Being a scientist-philosopher he was most fitted for the job of resolving the conflict between the claims of philosophy and those of science—between the claims of God, soul and immortality on the one hand and those of the world of nature on the other. He tried to uphold the validity of both. But in the last analysis the orderliness and uniformity of nature—the basic fact with which science starts—was attributed by him to the arbitrary will of God. Like the Ash'arites whom he followed in this new task he resolved everything—the individual as well as the objective nature—in the omnipotent Will of God. Reason was given an undue emphasis to the exclusion of experience as the source of knowledge. As

a reaction to his a-priorism appeared the emprical school of Locke and Hume who rejected the universals of Plato and innate ideas of Descartes and confined themselves to particulars, the units of sense-experience. The human self, the sense of freedom, the idea of God and other values were all dissolved into thin air by the logic of empiricism and there remained nothing but particular sense-impressions that follow one another with apparently no extra-empirical relations. Knowledge implies universals as well as particulars and without a system that gives due place to both, no problem of knowledge or reality can be adequately solved. This was the main thesis of Kant who brought into philosophy a new outlook and is therefore legitimately looked upon as herald of Copernician revolution in thought.

Kant justified the validity of the laws of science as well as our belief in soul, God, freedom of will and immortality by limiting the extent to which our understanding and reason can go. To him the world of nature obeyed the laws of understanding because it was our mind that supplied the moulds in which it worked. Beyond this sphere of phenomenon. human reason is incapable of going. The world of values, of self and freedom is beyond its grasp. This was the first important step—albeit a negative one—which changed the shape of things. The way was now open for thinkers to tap other sources —feeling and action—to tackle the metaphysical

problems.

In Fichte the fundamental reality is the ego viewed not as a rational but as an active and creative centre of force. "Free activity rather than knowledge defines for him the original nature of the ego." It truly expresses itself when it is face to face with the opposing forces of the non-ego and from this conflict arises the moral duty of man. The political downfall of Germany in his days added zest to Fichte's message and he became the staunch advocate of activitist attitude towards life. With Schopenhauer, however, the true tradition of voluntarism begins. He was perhaps the first thinker in modern Western thought to conceive Will to be the fundamental reality which can be grasped not by reason but though intuition. The Will expresses itself in every phenomenon of nature.

What is this Will? Unfortunately. partly under the influence of Upanishads and partly as a result of his own personal history, Schopenhauer viewed the Will as totally diabolic. When we pierce the veil of *maya*. he says, we behold not God but Satan, the wicked omnipotent Will, perpetually busied in weaving a wed of suffering for the torments of its creatures. Terrified by this diabolical vision, Schopenhauer sought refuge in non-existence, *fana* or self-annihilation. He could not see, as Fichte had done before him, that in the opposition of man and Satan, the ego and non-ego. there is a fruitful field of activity which results in moral

and spiritual expansion of the individual. This problem of evil was discussed by his contemporary. Goethe, in *Faust* and before him by Milton in *Paradise Lost.* None of them denied the existence of evil or the prevalence of strife and discord in the life of nature or of individual. But they followed the age-long theistic tradition supported by Fichte that ultimate and absolute good comes out of and depends upon this element of evil.

Bergson and Nietzsche are directly related to this anti-intellectual voluntarism of Schopenhauer. To Bergson intellect is the tool which *elan vital* produces for dealing with matter while the true nature of reality can be grasped only by intuition. a sort of mystic insight. But the original force or *elan vital* of Bergson is without any ultimate goal; the creative force is creative as if in a vacuum. without end, without object and without purpose. To Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's Will to Live is transformed into Will to power as the sole criterion in our iudgments of value. With this standard he wants to transvalue the prevalent values and establish a new order of society to replace the dacadent society of modern industrial era—a society of unique individuals, the Supermen.

But unfortunately this ideal society of Nietzsche was godless and the Superman a thorough atheist. This irreligious development of voluntaristic thought was countered by James Ward who while keeping faithful to this tradi-

tion, developed a theory of pluralistic theism. In Naturalism, there is no room left for the individual and his power of freedom and initiative. Nor is the position of the individual any better in Idealism which theoretically assigns him a high position in the universe. But he is, as a matter of fact, reduced to be a mere theatre or medium for the manifestation of the Absolute. He is a mere tool and enjoys no real freedom. Ward repudiated both Naturalism and Idealism in order to save the freedom and initiative of individual human beings. To sacrifice God for preserving the independent existence and significance of the individual—as Nietzsche, *e.g.*, had done—was as unacceptable to Ward as to sacrifice the individual for the sake of God as Absolutists often did. To him both are necessary in the co-operative undertaking, the commonwealth or the realm of ends.

This tradition of voluntarism was not unknown in the history of Muslim thought. After the failure of Rationalism in Islam, the Ash'arite speculation naturally took the direction of Will in opposition to reason. To them Will rather than Reason represented the nature of God. Their atoms possessed *hayyiz* and *jiha* (direction), the qualities that denote the inherent power of development towards a particular direction. In Ghazali this tradition developed its anti-intellectual tendency. In his controversy with the philosophers, he was led to assert the primacy os mystic intuition in understanding

the mysteries of Reality and faith though he did not deny the efficacy of reason within the sphere of natural phenomena.

But the primary interest of the Ash'arites was theological and in defending the omnipotent Will of God they reduced the individual to be a mere tool in the hands of fate. His power of freedom was apparently admitted under the guise of what came to be called the doctrine of *kasb* but in reality it was nothing short of full-blooded determinism which they shared with pantheistic mystics like Ibn-i-'Arabi, 'Aftar and Mahmud Shabistri. They saved God's will and omnipotency at the cost of the individual.

The evolutionary aspect of this tendency was first noticeable in Ibn-i-Maskawaih who propounded the doctrine of the Perfect Man which is more in consonance with the theistic trend of thought than one advocated by Ibn-i-'Arabi and Jilli. This movement culminated in Rumi in whom we meet anti-intellectualism of Ghazali, evolutionism of Ibn-i-Maskawih and defence of freedom for the individual after the manner of Rationalists. In his system we see Bergson, Nietzsche and Ward all combined and coalesced and it was due to this universality and modern appeal in his works that Iqbal always looked up to him as his guide and true predecessor.

چون رومی در حرم دادم اذان من

ازو اموختم اسرار جان من

به دور فتنۂ عصر کہن او
به دور فتنۂ عصر روان من

I called men to their faith like Rumi,
From him I learnt the mysteries of the heart.
He appeared at a critical period of history,
So have I.

At the present stage of our knowledge about the development Iqbal's thought, it cannot be definitely asserted whether it was through a study of Voluntarism as represented in the Western thought that he was able to discover Rumi or whether it was through Rumi that he came to appreciate these thinkers. This much can be safely asserted that it was his dissatisfaction with pantheism which dates from 1907 while he was still in Europe which led him to Rumi and Western Voluntarism. The first book that he wrote after his return from Europe—*Asrar-i-Khudi*—unmistakably show the influences of Fichte, Bergson and Nietzsche. Several anecdotes are reproduced from *Thus Spake Zarathushtra* with minor changes, the chapter on the exposition of the names of 'Ali expounds his doctrine of Will to Power ; the doctrine of time as pure Duration and the distinction between a Free Man and Bondman are echoes from Bergson ; the strife between the self and not-self is after the pattern of Fichte. But none of them is mentioned by name. To Rumi, however, he expresses his indebtedness in no unmistakable words.

Inspired by the genius of the Master of Rum,
I rehearse the sealed book of secret lore.
The Master of Rum transmuted my earth to gold
And set my ashes aflame.
I who am drunken with the wine of his song
Draw life from the breath of his word. (p. 5.)

Notwithstanding the great debt which Iqbal owes to Rumi, there is no denying the fact that he was equally, if not more, influenced by the prevailing tendency of Western thought since the time of Kant as expressed in some of its best exponents. The points of agreement and disagreement will throw into relief the real position which Iqbal occupies in the context of modern thought and will help in evaluating his contributions in true perspective.

# IQBAL AND KANT

Iqbal was born at a time when the Muslim world had lost its political power. Islamic culture and civilization had ceased to be a living force. He was brought up in a religious environment of the last decade of nineteenth century India. The West had attained supremacy in the political field as well as in the cultural sphere. Only twenty years before his birth, the fate of the Moghul Empire had been sealed in India, In other countries, European powers were equally successful in subjugating the Muslim population. These successes naturally brought many important questions to the forefront. How have these westerners succeeded in attaining this superiority ? Is there anything wrong in our mode of living and thinking ? How can we regain our lost position ? Answer to the last question depended on how the first two questions were answered. What is the significance of the new forces that have overwhelmed the Muslim world in so short a time ? Again, what is the cause of our decline, both politically and culturally ? These questions led Iqbal to a deeper study of history.

Immediately after the failure of the revolution of 1857, Muslim thinkers had begun to

ponder over these questions. On the one hand, there was the religious school. It emphasised revival of religious spirit which had lost its hold on the people due to certain causes. This school preached a total boy-cott of the foreigner and his institutions. On the other hand there was the progressive school which advocated a total adaptation of our life and views to the ideals of the West. It was headed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the most controversial personality of his times. Books of Altaf Husain Hali, one of the progressives, invariably began with the words : Move along with the current of time, a maxim which if interpreted too literally may imply a complete creak with the past. It must be admitted that there was truth in both of these schools. Muslims wanted to regain their lost position as Muslims and so revival of true religion was the first prerequisite. But the religious school could not appeal to the imagination of the people because its leaders failed to appreciate the real significance of the new forces which the arrival of foreigners in this sub-continent had released. They refused to look at the facts in their totality. To the progresssives, on the other hand, total adaptation of our life and outlook to those of the foreigners was the *sine qua non* of real regeneration of Muslim society. They forgot that these westerners had a cultural background which was totally materialistic and hence anti-religious and, therefore, any total adaptation advocated by this school would naturally lead the Muslim society to a tragic

crisis. In the political field, this school advocated complete co-operation with the foreigner; in cultural sphere, its activities were assimilative. Books upon books were written to introduce new learning of the west to the people. There were good as well as bad points in these two movements. Had they worked in close liaison with each other, the fate of the Muslims in this sub-continent might have been quite different. But unfortunately a great antagonism arose from the very beginning between the two groups. Each was suspicious of the other and in this conflict the main object before them—the regeneration of Muslim society—was lost sight of. For the common man there seemed no way out and the confusion became worst confounded.

At this critical stage in our history. Iqbal began to ponder over this problem. Fortunately, he was progressive by his education. He had learned the knowledge of the west at first hand. He was fully qualified to understand the significance of the new forces. During his sojourn in the West he realized fully that the western culture was not the harbinger of peace and security as advocated by our progressives nor was it the embodiment of the highest aspirations of man. His early training in religious atmosphere stood him in good stead and being disillusioned from the west he turned his face towards the east for inspiration. He looked deeper into the fluncuating history of the Muslim people. This study revealed to him

certain factors which, according to him, were the main cause of bringing about decay in our society. The first was the influence of Greek philosophy. Iqbal thinks that this philosophy was in essence contradictory to the real spirit of Islam. It laid emphasis on the abstract instead of the concrete. It was dualistic in spirit and tended towards a bifurcation of life into matter and spirit. But the worse came to worst when this philosophy reached the Muslims in its neo-platonic garb which emphasised out of all proportion the mystic and subjective aspect of man's life and totally neglected the collective problems of human society. Thus mysticism, and particulary pantheistic mysticism, was, according to Iqbal, the second main cause of decay. Very late in our history, Mujaddid-i-Sirhindi tried to reform it. But being a mystic himself, he unconsciously compromised in several respects. He revolted against Ibn-i-'Arabi's heresies but then suddenly and quite inconsistently he stops short and holds his judgment against him. Iqbal was, however, ruthless in his attack against pantheistic mysticism. It was, in reality, a negation of moral and religious values for which Islam stood and if unnerved the whole world of Islam. Greek philosophy no doubt influenced not a few, but pantheistic sufism had destroyed the vitality of the whole people.

After diagnosing the disease, Iqbal boldly took the next step. He looked around himself and found that the political superiority of the

West had overawed almost all his contemporaries in this sub-continent. What was the real cause of this superiority ? It lay in the progress of natural science and this scientific progress in the west went hand in hand with denial of religion, morality and of God. It was materialistic. The world of nature became totally irreconciliable to the world of spirit. The new science had done wonders. It had yielded a rich world of brute, inevitable and scientific facts and these stood in absolute fundamental contrast to the world of spiritual facts. Science asserted that nature explains itself ; its events are necessary and machine-like. The law of nature was mechanical causation, If this was correct, and every evidence showed that this result could not be refuted, then what of the omnipotence of God and free will of the individuals, on which the whole structure of religion and morality rests ? Biology, psychology and physics in the nineteenth century all led to the same result—denial of God, moral values, our innermost aspirations and deals and resolved them into the play of mechanical forces and chain of causation. Everything that happens here on this earth, the scientists triumphantly asserted, could be explained by reference to these laws. Nothing else is necessary. Matter and its mechanical causation is primary ; life and its accompaniments are mere epi-phenomena, by-products of matter. It was in reality going too far. Knowledge that would have enabled man to live a life of peace and security, brought forth

most bitter fruit in the form of hunger, unemployment, exploitation of the poor by the rich and continuous warfares.

علم اشیا خاک مارا کیمیاست
آه در افرنگ تا ثیرش جداست
علم از و رسواست اندرشهر و دشت
جبرئیل از صحبتش ابلیس گشت

(پس چه باید کرد ، صفحه ۵۲)

'Knowledge of things' is elixir for our clay,
But alas ! its effect in Europe is quite different.
Knowledge in her hand is humiliated every where
Gabriel in her company becomes Iblis.

This was a great challenge of modern scince to religion. It had shaken the beliefs of many. Iqbal met this challenge in a bold spirit. His position was truly apostolic for the Muslims of this sub-continent. Very early in the history of Islam, Christian and Jewish critics, who were well-versed in Greek philosophy an logic began to raise objections against the validity of Islam. Muslim theologians could not meet the situation. They could only quote from the Quran and the traditions and therefore brought all the more ridicule. The Mu'taziltes came forward. They employed the technique of their opponents and defeated them. When rationalism reached its logical conclusion and identified itself with free thought, al-Ash'ari appeared and called people back to the way of fathers. When Kalam degenerated into mere sophistry, al-Ghazali brought new life to the world of Islam. He introduced a new way of looking at religion. He canonised the mystic approach and made

it possible for every man to relive the religious experience in his person. When mystic life degenerated into ecstatic revelries, Ibn-i-Taimivya sounded a clarion call. He derived inspiration directly from the Quran and the traditions. His approach was, like Iqbal's, purely theistic. Each rendered an inestimable service to the Muslim world of his time in meeting different forms of challenges thrown against Islam. In our time it was the privilege of Iqbal to defend Islam and to re-interpret it in the light of present circumstances. In him fortunately the two tendencies of thought, revivalism and progressivism, mutually antagonistic so far, met with most fruitful results, He met the challenge of the West with its own weapons. His apostolic insight brought to the forefront the inherent weakness of the Western culture and in contrast emphasized the real superiority of Islamic idealogy.

دیار مغرب کے رہنے والو ! خدا کی بستی دکاں نہیں ہے
کھرا جسے تم سمجھ رہے ہو وہ زر کم عیار ہوگا
تمہاری تہذیب اپنے خنجر سے آپ ھی خود کشی کرے گی
جو شاخ نازک پہ آشیانہ بنے گا ناپائیدار ہوگا
(بانگ درا)

> O people of the West ! God's world is not a shop,
> What you think to be a legal tender will soon
> become base.
> Your culture will commit suicide by its own sword,
> The nest built on a weak branch will soon come to
> ground.

It brought back to the new generation the confidence in our culture and a will to recreate

before our eyes the glorious civilization that was once a blessing to the world. He sung a song of hope and trust to a people who had been demoralised after vears of failures and frustrations. He told them that on the ashes of the doomed culture of the West lasting and better culture can be created.

صد جہان تازہ در آیات اوست
عصرہا پیچیدہ در آنات اوست

یک جہانش عصر حاضر را بس است
گیر اگر در سینہ دل معنی رس است

چون کہن گردد جہانے در برش
می دہد قرآن جہانے دیگرش

(جاوید نامہ ، صفحہ ۷۲-۷۳)

A hundred new worlds lie implicit in its (Quran's) verses,
Worlds are hidden in its moments.
Out of these one world will suffice the present age,
Get it if you have a discovering heart in your bosom.
When one world becomes obsolete,
The Quran gives another.

The same problem—conflict of religion and science—appeared in the early modern period when the discoveries of Copernicus (1473-1543), Kepler (1571-1630) and Galileo (I564-1641) created a great wave of indignation in the church. For the first time, the western world was brought face to face with a new problem of great magnitude, Scholasticism had given a rational explanation of dogmas of church and the people were satisfied. But now when that faith was shaken to the bottom, people were amazed. New science divided the traditional unity into

two parts, opposed to each other, the world of nature and the world of grace. The basic principle of science, mechanical causation, implied the denial of God, of life after death, of soul, of morality. This problem was taken up by rationalists, Descartes and Leibniz. Both were scientists of the first rank. But at the same time, they were brought up in a tradition which could not accept the denial of religious values with equanimity. So they tried to bridge the gulf between the two spheres and reconcile the new world of nature with the world of grace without giving up the conception of God as a Rational Being and without depriving the soul of the power of initiative. Rationalism was a new science as well as a new theology. Descartes introduced the conception of innate ideas which were *a priori* and did not derive their existence from experience. God, spirit and matter were the examples of these ideas. Spirit and matter worked parallel to each other without meeting anywhere and yet were somehow brought under the over-all supervision of God, who was the Creater of all. Leibniz, similarly, wanted to find a principle which would preserve the spiritual as well as the material aspects of the universe. He like Descartes left the idea of mechanical causation intact and went behind it in search of a theological principle. He dug beneath the physical ideas of motion and material atom and brought forth a metaphysical atom—called monad—which possesses force and thus bridged the gulf. The material atom is

not the reality ; beneath it lies the immaterial and indivisible unit, the monad, the principle of action, alive, resistant and reproductive. The monad becomes in his hand a soul-atom, a meeting ground of both spiritual and physical realms. There is a pre-established harmony which God in His grace has created and which makes possible for men to live in a world of mechanical necessity and yet retain their spiritual life of freedom and morality.

To the empiricists, however, the existence of innate ideas was doubtful. Descartes had started with three innate ideas, Spinoza had based all his philosophy on the innate idea of Substance and to Leibniz all ideas were innate. Locke revolted against it and asserted that all our ideas which matter are derived from experience. But he was not logical in his assertions. He accepted the reality of material as well as spiritual substances. Berkeley rejected the material substance as inconsistent with the empirical approach but retained the spiritual substance. Hume was most consistent. He rejected both. If what we get is derived exclusively through experience, then we cannot accept spiritual or material substances.

The one important contribution of empirical school was to show the inadequacy of innate ideas to explain the problems of philosophy. But the scepticism of Hume equally showed the inadequacy of the empirical method, of exclusively starting with experience. It was left to Kant (1724-1804) to shake off this dogmatism

of the empirical school. But it equally helped him in freeing himself from the dogmatic assertions of rationalism. Like the early rationalists, Kant was well versed in new sciences. He studied Newton and was an authority in physical geography and anthropology and therefore he was no less interested in resolving the conflict of science and religion.

His scientific interest enabled Kant to see that rationalism was inadequate. It was mere logical operation of abstract concepts without any reference to concrete experience and real relations. Such a rationalism as an ally of religion instead of doing any useful work invariably ends in utilitarianism, This was the state of theological speculation in Germany at the time of Kant. Similar was the case in the history of Islam when rationalism, which started as an ally and defender of religion, ended in denial of religious values and became an ally of free-thought.[1] But Hume's dialectic had shown Kant that empirical approach was equally inadequate, for though real enough as dealing with experience, yet it was not true. So this inadequacy brought forth for Kant his problem of epistemology, the relation between the logical process of thought and the reality of things. What can we know of the external world ? Kant

---

[1]Iqbal has well put it : "... his (Kant's) *Critique of Pure Reason* revealed the limitations of pure reason and rendered the whole work of rationalists to a heap of ruin. And justly has he been described as God's greatest gift to his country" *(Lectures*, p. 5.*)*

refused to follow the dogmatic method of discussing the origin and development of konwledge. To the rationalists this origin lay in innate ideas, while to the empiricists it was sensation. Opposed to it, Kant employed the transcendental or critical method, a study of the nature of reason itself. Kant's answer is expounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason* which reveals the limitations of human thought. It examines pure reason to see if its judgment possesses a universality beyond human experience which empiricists denied and the rationalists asserted and yet at the same time are necessary to human experience. The logic of such judgments must be absolutely reliable and at the same time the judgments must be applicable to the world of things.

This task revealed to Kant the distinction of two worlds—the world of phenomena and the world of reality. The old rationalists had admitted this distinction while the logic of the empiricists led to a denial of the world of reality as a separate entity from the world of experience. But Kant affirmed that the world of reality is beyond our reason to grasp and understand. It is futile to probe beyond the curtain of the phenomenal world. If, however, we do, we fall into antinomies and contradictions from which we cannot escape. In knowing, mind is actively cannot in collecting and relating its ideas. This activity of mind is called synthesis. What the world of reality is, we cannot know. What we know and experience is

the result of mental synthesis. The world of experience obeys the laws of mind because it is the creation of our minds. The laws of nature are not the laws of absolute reality, but the laws of human interpretation of reality.

The first synthetic activity of mind is the view of the world under the forms of perception. When we experience the external world, what is given to us is formless stuff which is apprehended under these forms as a result of which objects appear to us to be in space and time. They are necessary presuppositions to which every experience must conform. Space is the form of perception within the sphere of outer experience, time, the form of preception within the sphere of inner experience, Whatever is given in experience is spatial and temporal It is this fact which gives to mathematics its validity. Although it rests on pure reason (*i.e.*, it is independent of experience) yet it is valid for all experience because it follows the laws of space and time. Whether these laws are valid for things as they really are, is not known. Space and time hold without exception for all objects of perception but for nothing beyond. They are empirically real and ideally transcendent.

The second synthetic activity of mind is the view of the world under forms of understanding or the categories. It is due to these categories that everything we know possesses certain universal attributes. This function of understanding supplements that of sense. A mere sensation would be a mere isolated occurrence in

consciousness. Without conception, perception would be blind. It gives meaning and significance to our view of nature. Some of the categories are quantity, substance and causality.

If nature were to be independent of our mind, then we could only observe and experience and never predict and generalise. But we do both. This is possible only because, according to Kant, what we see in nature is given to it by mind. If nature prescribed laws for our understanding, we should have only empirical and inadequate knowledge. An *a priroi* knowledge of nature is possible only because our understanding prescribes laws to nature. Like the forms of perception, categories apply only to phenomena and not to things as they really are. Thus Berkeley's dictum of *esse ist percipi* is admitted by Kant so far as the world of nature is concerned. Same seems to be Iqbal's view. The act of knowledge according to him is a constitutive element in our perception of the world of nature. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, in answer to the second question about the nature of knowledge, he says :

برون از خویش می بینی جہاں را
در و دشت و یم و صحرا و کاں را

دل ما را بہ او پوشیدہ راہے است
کہ ہر موجود ممنون نگاہے است

کمال ذات شئے موجود بودن
برائے شاہدے مشہود بودن

جہاں غیر از تجلی ہائے ما نیست
کہ بے ما جلوۂ نور و صدا نیست

(صفحہ ۲۱۲-۲۱۳)

You look upon the world as existing outside you :
These mountains and deserts, oceans and mines.
Our heart has a secret gateway to it,
For existent depends for its existence upon our perception.
The perfection of the being of a thing lies in being present,
In becoming an object for an observer.
The world is nothing but the manifestation of ours,
For without us there would be no scenes of light and sounds.

In the third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant discusses the *a priori* forms of reason and shows why they have no validity in knowing. The ward reason is here used in a narrow sense as if it were a special faculty like perception or understanding. Just as the categories are the forms of understanding and space and time, the forms of perception, so the synthetic form of special faculty of reason is Idea—here used in the Platonic sense, an ideal, something which ought to be. These ideas are God, the soul, the world. Kant thinks that human mind is not satisfied unless it can get greatest possible unity. The syntheses achieved by perception and understanding are partial and do not tell us anything about God, soul and the world. Yet all these ideas have great importance for us. So reason leaps over the boundaries of experience and begins to deal with the unconditioned. However justified we may be in our unconscious desire to reach the absolutely unconditioned, yet it is a fact that it is beyond the sphere of our experience.

All thinking implies the unity of our consciousness, a transcendental unity never realised in the empirical consciousness. This unity of the self is an idea of reason and if we hypostatise our ideal and make it the basis and not the goal of knowledge, we get paralogism or false reasonings of rational psychology. On the side of the objective, our judgments imply a system in which objects have their determined place. The ideal of such a comprehensive and all-inclusive system governs our judging. If we hypostatise this ideal, we get antinomise of pure reason. Uniting both these ideals is the ideal of a complete unity of experience, including in itsef lboth subject and object, the complete whole of existence. This is the ideal of pure reason *par excellence*, the idea of God.

Rational psychology starts with the identity of the thinking subject and then by a wrong inference argues that the self as subject is a simple substance, unchanged by and independent of bodily processes and therefore not subject, like the body, to dissoluion. Kant argues that by the very arguments put forward this soul is beyond our experience and therefore there is no need to assert its existence so far as the phenomenal existence is concerned. When reasoning is applied to the sphere of the world as a totality, contradictions make their appearance which are called antinomies by Kant. Teey are four in number.

1. Antinomy of creation.

thesis : The world has a beginning in

time and is limited as regards space.

antithesis : The world is eternal and infinite.

2. Antinomy of immortality.

thesis : The world is ultimately divisible into simple parts which cannot be further divided.

antithesis : The world is composed of parts subject to further division, and no simple thing exists in the world.

3. Antinomy of freedom.

thesis : There is freedom ; there are phenomena that cannot be accounted for by necessity.

antithesis : There is no freedom, everything takes place entirely according to the necessary laws of nature.

4. Antinomy of theology.

thesis : There is a necessary being either as part or as cause of the world.

antithesis : There exists neither within nor without the world an absolutely necessary being.

These antinomies show that both rationalism and empiricism are defective as metaphysical theories. The real solution, according to Kant, lies in the doctrine of Critical Idealism. It asserts that so far as the first two antinomies are

concerned, space and time are the forms of our perception, pertaining to things as they appear and not to things as they are and therefore we have no right to apply categories of space and time to an object which is beyond experience. With regard to the last two antinomies, both thesis and antithesis may be true if we refer to things in themselves or things as they appear. In experience the causal series is always continuous. But this continuous conditionedness does not hold good of the thing in itself. Man, as an empirical being, is subject to the laws of causality but as a thing-in-itself, as regards his intelligible character, he must be regarded as free. Similarly with regard to God, Kant thinks that it is not possible to prove the existence of a God as a personal being. The idea of God is to Kant the expression of the need of reason for a perfect unity. But it is difficult for him to accept the traditional methods of proving His existence, for, according to him, we thereby overstep the limits of experience. What is not the object of experience cannot be known or proved to exist. He takes up all the three forms of proof for the existence of God and refutes them one by one and arrives at the conclusion that mere conceptual thought cannot give us any knowledge of the reality of soul, God and the world. Still, he adds, these ideas of reason are an integral part of the human mind and they have their purpose. If they cannot be verified by experience, they can regulate it. They are regulative ideas in that our experience is better governed if we act

as if there were a soul, as if God exsited and as if the world were a totality of related things. If our speculation caunot prove the existence of God, freedom of will or immortality of soul equally unable it is to prove their contraries.

This criticism of human reason came from the pen of a man who was not a theologian, nor a religious apologist, but from one who was well versed in the physical sciences of his days. Kant had studied Newton and most of the early writings were devoted to positive sciences. And yet his deep insight helped him in gaining a true perspective of life. He revolted against the cheap metaphysical devices of rationalists to defend religion and morality by means of pure reason which it is incapable of doing.[1] He accepted the guidance of Intellect so far as the world of nature was concerned. But beyond this sphere he realized its weakness and gave it up for faith. But the Western scientists did not take this lesson to heart. The triumphant success of science in different spheres aggravated the situation. Human reason was thought to be supreme in everything. Nothing else mattered. Darwin had proved that evolution of life on this

---

1. Iqbal says, "In Germany (of Kant's days) rationalism appeared as ally of religion, but she soon realised that the dogmatic side of religion was incapable of demonstration. The only course open to her was to eliminate dogma from the sacred decord. With the elimination of dogma came the utilitarian view of morality and thus rationalism completed the reign of unbelief." *Lectures*, p. 5.

earth proceeded by variations which were due to chance. Man himself is the result of a series of variations. There is no play of any exteranal cause or force, God, mind or spirit. The process of evolution does not unfold any design or end. Dealing with the problem of body and mind, the psychologists asserted that body, being material, obeyed the laws of nature and, therefore, must be looked upon as primary and mind as derived from body. It was a subtler form of matter ; a by-product of the functioning of the material processes. Physics was the main science. It dealt with matter, which was hard, solid and tangible. Matter alone was real and whatever lacked the qualities of matter was unreal and so unworthy to be given any place in the consideration of the scientists. All these views combined to give a materialistic view of the universe. It prevailed in the West in the nineteenth century. The scientists were so sure of their method that they were pleased to assert that everything could be explained by the principle of mechanical causation. Our belief in God, our hopes and aspirations, our aesthetic taste and love, all can be accounted for. Only two years before the birth of Iqbal, Prof. Tyndall, speaking at a meeting of the British Association (in 1874), grandiosely summed up the position when he prophesised that science would one day be able to envisage and to explain all that has happened and does happen in terms of the 'ultimately purely material aud inevitable march of evolution

from the atoms of the primeval nebula to the proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.'[1]

The attitude of mind expressed by these words of a great scientist of the nineteenth century clearly proves that the attempts of people like that of Kant had proved fruitless in bridging the gulf between the worlds of nature and grace, of appearance and reality, of matter and spirit. Nineteenth century was the maturing of Renaissance. It resolved the conflict by totally denying the reality or value of the world of grace. It was of no use. Matter and everything material was real and nothing else was of any significance. And this hypothesis was backed up by wonderful inventions and discoveries with an undeniable proof that human reason was supreme and everything must be judged by it. It denied values of religion and morality. It upheld the ideal of selfishness in individual life and economic exploitation in social life. Capitalism and communism, both based on a materialistic interpretation of life, made their appearance and the world had to suffer most miserably for missing the lesson taught so early by Kant that human reason cannot be our sole guide in determining the true values of life. Iqbal had, therefore, to redeliver that message. The Western culture that came to this sub-continent as a result of English rule was materialistic in

1. Quoted in C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 39.

spirit and antireligious in its expression. The progressives could not look beneath the usrface and fell a prey to its dazzling exterior.

Their books reflected subservience to the same Western ideal of supremacy of human reason in every field which, as we have seen, had failed to account for our religions aspirations. They abound in over-emphasis of the natural over non-physical categories, of material over spiritual values. It was Iqbal's mission to counteract these one-sided tendencies and provide a metaphysical basis for a balanced life in which natural and spiritual, religious and secular aspects could each have its legitimate use and be harmonised in a higher synthesis. He agrees with Kant that human reason has its utility within the sphere of natural world but as soon as it oversteps these limits, it falls into traps and the result is tragic. It should therefore be brought back within its own legitimate sphere of activity. Whenever Iqbal condemns intellect in his books, his critism is directed against that method and attitude of mind which extends the ues of principles of physical science beyond the purely material world. For such an extension means nothing less than the inclusion of all man's life, moral as well as physical, within the realm of nature and necessity. In other words, it leaves no room for 'God, freedom and immorality' and it explains away all religious and moral experiences.

خرد واقف نہیں ہے نیک و بد سے
بڑھتی جاتی ہے ظالم اپنی حد سے
(بال جبریل صفحہ ٦٥)

Intellect is not aware of good and evil,
It is transcending its proper limits.

Similarly in the conversation between Rumi and his disciple, he clarifies the position :

مرید : چشم بینا سے ہے جاری جوئے خوں
علم حاضر سے ہے دیں زار و زبوں
پیررومی : علم را برتن زنی مارے بود
علم را بر دل زنی یارے بود

Disciple :
River of blood issues forth from the eyes of the wise.
The present knowledge has brought disgrace to religion.
Rumi :
If you confine knowledge to body, it becomes snake ;
If it moves to heart, it becomes friendly.

In most of the verses where he condemns reason, he identifies it with Europe, thereby specifying that this denunciation of intellect is not against this important faculty of man but against that particular use of it which European thought made of it in undermining moral and religious values of life.

عشق ناپید و خرد می گزدش صورت مار
عقل کو تابع فرمان نظر کر نہ سکا
ڈھونڈنے والا ستاروں کی گزرگاہوں کا
اپنے افکار کی دنیا میں سفر کر نہ سکا
اپنی حکمت کے خم و پیچ میں الجھا ایسا
آج تک فیصلۂ نفع و ضرر کر نہ سکا
جس نے سورج کی شعاعوں کو گرفتار کیا
زندگی کی شب تاریک سحر کر نہ سکا

Love is absent and Intellect bites him (the Westerner)
like a snake,

He could not subject his intellect to intuition.
He who scans the courses of the stars
Could not traverse the inner world of his thoughts.
He got so much entangled in the intricacies of his wisdom.
That he could not deci le the question of good and evil.
He who entrapped the rays of the sun
Could not bring light to the dark night of life.

It is here that Iqbal's main point in criticising reason comes out most clearly. In spite of allthe wonders of inventions, the Western world has failed miserably in the sphere of life. But the whole point of Iqbal's criticism would be misunderstood if it is applied to the use of the rational power of man as such. Based as his views are on the Quran, he could not denounce reason. It has its merits and these are immense. Like Kant, Iqbal was a thorough-going empiricist so far as the objective would was concerned. It is real and should not be denounced as meaningless and an illusion as the mystics did.

اے که از تاثیر افیوں خفتۂ
عالم اسباب را دوں گفتۂ
خیز و واکن دیدۂ مخمور را
دوں مخواں ایں عالم مجبور را
(رموز بے خودی صفحه ۹۱-۹۲)

O you who are intoxicated into sleep by opium,
And call this world base ;
Rise and open your intoxicated eyes,
Don't call this world base.

"In the words of the Quran, the universe that confronts us is not *batil* (باطل) It has its uses; and the most important use of it is that the efforts to

overcome the obstacles offered by it sharpens our insight and prepares us for an insight into what lies below the surface of phenomena."[1] It was due to the presence of these obstacles that human self comes to realise its selfhood and infinite potentialities, Iqbal refers to three different points mentioned in the Quran. First, there is a story where God establishes the superiority of Adam over angels because of his faculty of naming things.[2] In other words. man is endowed with forming concepts. To form concept is to 'grasp' them in the literal sense of the term grasp. With this ideational capacity of mind, of the ability to form images and ideas, and to weave the latter into trains of thought, man approaches the objective world of nature in order to control and master it. Thus the kind of knowledge that gives man his superiority over angels and which, according to Iqbal, is the very characteristic of self, is based on sense-perception elaborated by understanding.[3] This point is emphasised by Iqbal in reference to the Quranic legend of what is commonly known as the Fall of Adam.

The kind of knowledge most suitable for man's temperament was one which required of him patient labour of observation and inference and sifting of truth from error after constant trials and errors.[4] Man was placed in an en-

---

1. Iqbal, Self in the Light of Relativity. (An article).
2. The Quran, 2 : 28-31.
3. *Lectures*, pp. 13-14.
4. Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. 86-7.

vironment which was not easily amenable to his control and was often hostile to his aspirations. His success in life depends on a growing knowledge of this environment. With the expansion of knowledge, based on actual experience, man not only is able to control nature and expand his intellectual faculties, but thereby he gains spiritual elevation. Thirdly, Iqbal refers to Quranic emphasis on observable aspect of reality and its insistence that man should reflect upon it. The real purpose of the Holy Book was to awaken in man the consciousness of that of which nature is regarded as a symbol, a movement from without to within. Reflective observation of nature is an essential step in the spiritual development of man.[1] In the light of these observations it is evident that Iqbal's criticism of reason was motivated for the purpose of recognising its limits within which it should be allowed to work. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he says:

زمانے با ارسطو آشنا باش
دمے با ساز بیکن هم نوا باش

و لیکن از مقام شاں گزر کن
مشو گم اندریں منزل ، سفر کن

به آں عقلے که داند بیش و کم را
شناسد اندرون کان و یم را

جهان چند و چوں زیر نگیں کن
بگر دوں ماه و پرویں را کمیں کن

و لیکن حکمت دیگر بیا موز
رهاں خود را ازیں مکر شب و روز

(صفه ۲۸۱)

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. 14-15.

For a while familiarise yourself with Aristotle,
For another while sit in the company of Bacon.
But you must pass beyond their attitude,
Don't get lost in this stage ; journey on.
With the aid of that intellect that knows more and less
Probe the depths of mines and oceans ;
Master the world of how and why,
Catch the moon and pleides from the sky.
But then learn wisdom of another sort,
Free yourself from the snares of night and day.

He thus accepts the value of scientific reason as a means of conquering the world of nature. But there is a limit to it. It is only a stage on the journey of our life towards a goal. It must be given up later for something better :

گذر جا عقل سے آگے کہ یہ نور
چراغ راہ ہے ، منزل نہیں ہے

Pass beyond intellect, for this light
Illumines the path but is not the goal.

That something better is what he calls 'a different wisdom' which releases us from the cycle of day and night, the mechanical chain of causation and logical necessity. When, however, these limitations were not recognised and human reason was made absolute and final criterion of every kind of truth, a tragic crisis of first magnitude made its appearance in modern society. Human history records several such tragedies in the past. The Pharaohs of Egypt were the embodiments of this materialistic outlook and brought about a major crisis which was resolved by Moses. The same drama is being enacted before our very eyes. The only possible recourse, therefore, according

to Iqbal, is to adopt the method of Moses.

تازہ پھر دانشِ حاضر نے کیا سحر قدیم
گزر اس دور میں ممکن نہیں بے چوب کلیم

Modern science has once again revived the old magic,
It is not possible to pass life in this epoch without
the Staff of Moses.

The purely intellectual approach when stretched to its limits leads to the recreation of a veritable hell, the fire of Nimrod. The only safety for modern society lies in what he calls 'different wisdom' in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* or Moses' Staff.

What is this 'different wisdom' or 'Staff of Moses' which, according to Iqbal, can break the spell of the destructive forces of modern culture? To Kant whose purpose was similar to Iqbal's. this new wisdom lay in asserting that moral nature of man is real alongside the physical and the laws governing the latte have no application in the moral sphere. *Critique of Pure Season* denied the possibility of knowing the reality only in order to make room for faith and the realm of faith is the realm of moral law where we can have a glimpse of reality. In the sphere of physical science we deal only with appearances of the ultimate reality whose vision we can get only in our moral consciousness.

If we analyse the ordinary moral consciousness, we feel that the ethical value of an action does not depend on its external effects; it depends on the inner will. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or

even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." The fundamental proposition from which Kant starts is that goodness has to do with willing, that if other things are called good, it is in relation to the will that they are good. In other words, good is to be found not without but within the acting personality. Accordingly that action alone is good which springs from duty or out of regard for the moral law. By subjecting ourselves to the law of our own will we become independent of experience and authority. In the words of Kant, the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. This worth lies only in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by action.

The study of moral consciousness also reveals that this good will is almost always in conflict with inclinations and desires. Man as a member of the phenomenal world is subject to certain limitations. Biology, anthropology and psychology look upon him as possessing certain inherent tastes, likes and dislikes. These determine him to a great extent, and all his actions, so far as he is working within the sphere of phenomena, are motivated not by reason but by desires and therefore cannot be called moral. Yet the presence of this empirical element in man enables him to reach a higher stage of development. The conflict between desire and

will produces the motive of obligation. A holy will entirely inspired by reason would be a stranger to obligation as would be a purely animal will. Man alone, being possessed of two conflicting principles, is capable of understanding *ought* as distinguished from mere *is*. If man acts according to his impulses, he is acting under what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative. Such an action has no moral worth. Here reason is subordinate to desire. When we act in accordance with the demands of our rational will, we act under the categorical imperative. The most obvious mark of the principle of will is its universality. He thus formulates it : "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." But just as the dignity of my personality lies in my capacity for following the universal law, similarly it is my duty to respect the capacity of the human individual for autonomy. So Kant formulates the categorical imperative in the second form : "So act as to treat humanity, whether in your person or in that of any other, in every case as an end as well as means, and never as means only." Thus two formulations of the categorical imperative are supplementary. The nature of the rational will is not adequately expressed in the obedience to law as such, nor in the pursuit of an end. It has in it both elements. Besides these two, there is a third element also, *viz.*, the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will. The will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it

must be regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject to the law With the help of all these formulations, Kant derives the last one : A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as a member or as a sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will. This, in brief, is, according to Kant, the content of the categorical imperative.

In a brilliant passage at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant says, "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them : *the starry heavens above and the moral law within* . . . I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins from the place I occupy in the outer world ; it enlarges the connections in which I stand in that world to an unbounded range with worlds upon worlds and systems upon systems, with limitless time of their periodic motion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality. It sets me in a world which has true infinity, but is discoverable only by the understanding ... In the former case, the view of these galaxies of worlds annihilates my importance as a part of my animal creation, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital power, it knows not how, must again give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it inhabits, and that a mere speck in the universe. But when I consider again, my worth as an

intelligent being is raised to infinity through my personality. For then the moral law reveals to me a life independent of my animal nature and all the world of the senses, so far at least as follows from the fact that my being is designed to follow this law, which is not limited by the condition and limits of this life but reaches to infinity."[1]

This classic passage sums up Kant's ethical position. For him study of science as represented by starry heavens was as important as the study of moral law and yet the spheres of will and nature are different. Man by his peculiar nature belongs to both the worlds. We are bound by a rational will and yet we are members of the sensible world, with our desires and interests determined by that membership. We cannot escape this dualism if we are to be true to facts. In the world of nature, causation and logical necessity reign ; in the world of will, man is free and spontaneous. To explain this distinction. Kant distinguishes between the time series which is necessitated and the moral world which is timeless. He explains it thus, "When the law of our intelligible existence (moral law) is in question, reason recognises no distinction of time, and only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and then always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has happened just now or long ago. For, in reference to the super-sensible conciousness ef its existence (*i.e.*,

---

1. *Vide* A. D. Lindsay, *Kant*, pp. 198-99.

freedom), the life of sense is but a single phenomenon, which, in as much as it contains merely manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral law (*i.e.*, of the character), must be judged, not according to the necessity that belongs to it as phenomena but to the absolute spontaneity of freedom . . ."[1]

Kant thus succeeded in his main ojective, *viz.*, in assigning an independent position to morality. The negative conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has significance for us not only in its making explicit the exact limitations within which pure reason works but also in paving the way for the positive contribution of the *Critique of Practical Reason* in which Kant affirms the role of faith in distinction from knowledge. This faith, according to some commentators, is not something less ihan what is meant by knowledge, but something more. 'Knowledge, in the sense of physical science' is based on an abstraction which we transcend in referring objects to the conscious self ; and by integrating the knowledge of objects with this new element we already win a larger knowledge of them . . . Just as in the theoretical (*i.e.*, rational) consciousness we are not simply taking in information about a world which is alien and external to the self but really coming to a consciousness of the self in the object, so in our practical (*i.e.*, moral) consciousness we are not simply forcing the self upon an external and alien world, but determining and developing the

---

1. A. D. Lindsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-99.

self in an element which is essentially related to it."[1] The faith here set in opposition to knowledge can only mean the correction of our first dualistic view of the relation of self and not-self. In this sense faith is in reality the culmination of knowledge.

But the more important question is : Can moral ideal as soch resolve the antagonism in our life between our inclinations and duty, between our animal nature and rational nature ? Kant has drawn a sharp distinction between these conflicting tendencies of our nature. So far as we follow our desires and likes an ddislikes, we live in the world of necessity and cannot be called free. Our moral this level and follow the moral law which is an expression of inner self. But the question is : Can this antagonism be adequately resolved by following the moral law as Kant asserts ? Leaving aside the point often emphasised by the critics about the excessive formalism of Kant's formulation of moral law which ignores the psychological importance of feeling as well as the ends, we are to see how far morality can succeed in the purpose which Kant assigns to it.

That moral life can solve the contradiction between the natural and spiritual, the actual and the ideal, the individual and universal natures of man, cannot be denied. But this solution is only partial and incomplete, which

---

1. E- Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Vol. II, pp. 169-170.

is due mainly to the fact that though morality aims at the realization of an infinite ideal, it can attain only a never-ending approximation to that ideal. It gives us, instead of the infinite, only the endless negation of the finite. Our spiritual life has two aspects—the assertion of our own self, having its will and its thought and yet regarding all other individuals not as distinct from overselves but a part of higher nature and it is in the unity of this manifold that the infinitude of man's spiritual nature consists. But in moral law we cannot attain identification of our individuality with the infinite. Social morality, love and self-sacrifice of the best form fall far short of the highest ideal. "The individual, at any period of history, may identify himself by absolute self-devotion with the life of the family, the state, with the organic life of the world. but that life itself is ever far short of perfection. Beyond the corporate life of mankind there is a wider life of which all nature and history, all finite existences present and future, are the manifestations. Beyond the highest point to which the moral life of our age has attained there is ever a far off goal which recedes as we advance. There is thus an infinite ideal which neither society nor the individual who reflects its moral life, has attained—an ideal which it would seem to be man's everlasting destiny to pursue, and which therefore must remain for

ever unrealized."[1] It is only in religious experience that man is able to break this chain of limitation and attain his ideal. The essential characteristic of religion as contrasted with morality is that instead of leaving man in the interminable pursuit of a receding ideal, it makes him the actual partaker of a divine or infinite life. Whether we look at religion from the human side or the divine, as the surrender of soul to God or life of God in the soul, as the elevation of the finite in the finite in each case the infinite ceases to be far off a vision: it is a present reality. It is here that religion supersedes morality. The ideal of morality is only progressively realisable while the ideal of religion is realised here and now. "In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life—call it faith or trust or self-surrender, or by whatever name you will—there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realised."[2]

Kant's moral approach for the satisfaction of our higher aspirations and as a corrective to the materalistic outlook engendered by over-emphasis on scientific reason, was thus not a proper solution of the problem. He made room for faith but it was faith in a contentless and formal law which could not achieve its ideal. It was due to this defect, *viz.*, impossibility of

1. J. Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, (1898 pp. 279-40.)

2. Ibid., p. 384.

complete realization of moral in this finite life, that Kant was led to the three postulates of morality, the freedom of will, the immortality of soul and the existence of God. It was only, as some critics call a *deus ex machina*. There was in reality no logical necessity in his system for a belief in God or immorality of soul which are introduced merely to overcome the inherent defect of his moral approach. The sharp dualism of will and reason, world of phenomena and the world of noumena, marred his view of ultimate destiny of man. He could not rise to the higher unity where this world of phenomena is seen not as a sphere hostile to man's spiritual progress but as a stepping-stone to the realization of infinite possibilities of man when God becomes his co-partner. Iqbal's approach was more thorough. For him the true corrective to over-emphasis of the use of scientific reason is faith based on religious experience which he calls by different names, *'ishq*, *nazar*, *'irfan* etc., terms which he borrowed from the mystic literature but which, in his system, have far deeper significance.

To Iqbal, then, the Staff of Moses or "different wisdom" is faith not in a moral law which has no sanction behind it but faith in religious values which form the most sacred heritage of the Islamic people as derived from the teaching of an illustratious line of holy prophets. According to Kant existence of God cannot be proved but we must act as if there

were God. Logically there cannot be convincing proofs of the freedom of will or immorality and yet we should act as if these were valid dogmas of faith. This principle of "as if" cannot be the basis of a richer spiritual life. It is only when we are convinced of the existence of God, on whom we can trust and rely, that we can realise the infinite possibilities of our spiritual nature.

What are the religious values of Islam? Islam is a philosophy of life which is based on certain fundamentals. It starts with the basic assumption that there is God who is not only the Creator of the universe of which man is a part but also its real sovereign. This sovereignty is universal and none can escape it. The whole physical realm, organic and inorganic, lower animal and man, all follow the same natural laws. On the strict following of these laws depends their life and existence. This submission of all (including man) to the natural physical law is described by the Quran in the following verses:

"And unto Allah fall prostrate whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth, *willingly or unwillingly.*" (13 : 15).

"Have they not observed all things that Allah has created, how their shadows incline to the right and to the left making prostration unto Allah and show their lowliness? And unto Allah make prostration whatsoever is in the heaven and in the earth, of living creatures and the angels, and they do not disobey Him. They fear

their Lord above them, and do what they are bidden to." (16 : 48-50).

"Have you not seen that unto Allah pay adoration whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth, and the sun and the moon, and the stars and the hills and the trees and beasts, and many of good men and many of those men who have become worthy of punishment on account of their evil deeds ?" (22 : 12).

As a logical consequence, the fruit of this submission, continuance and preservation of life, is equally universally distributed and there is no distinction of higher and lower in this. Those who follow it enjoy the fulness of life and those who are indifferent, tend to be eliminated from the struggle of existence, In this respect man has no qualitative superiority over lower creatures. Man, as studied by the paycho-physical sciences, is as determined in his behaviour as animals, organic or in organic beings.

But alongside this belief in the universal sovereignty of God in the physical realm, there is the belief in God as the final source and ground of all moral values. It demands loyalty of, heart, will and thought to God and His ultimate moral law. Man is born free and rational and religion demands that he should freely and willingly submit himself ot the divine law. He should live as if he is ultimately responsible for all his deeds to Him. This voluntary submission of man is the first and foremost demand which religion makes. In it lies, according to lqbal, the only way of escape from the materialistic outlook

of the modern thought. Islam contended successfully the forces of *Jahliyya* in the past and it alone can successfully combat the modern anti-religious attitude which is the old *Jahliyya* in a new garb.

بدل کے بھیس زمانے میں پھر سے آتے ہیں
اگرچہ پیر ہے عالم، جواں ہیں لات ومنات

They appear in new disguises again and again,
Although the world is old, idols of *Lat* and *Manat* are ever young.

Thus the real disease from which the modern culture of the West is suffering is the emphasis it lays on the material to the exclusion of the spiritual, and in this respect communism or socialism is not a whit better than capitalism or other modern creeds of the West.

هر دو را جاں نا صبور و نا شکیب
هر دو یزداں ناشناس آدم فریب
غرق دیدم هر دو را در آب و گل
هر دو را تن روشن و تاریک دل
(جاوید نامه ، صفحه ۷)

Both lack patience and gentleness,
Both deny the existence of God and indulge in deceiving man.
Both are engrossed in water and clay,
Both have a bright exterior but a dark heart

As a consequence of this one-sidedness the modern world had to suffer much. The unparalleled mastery over nature achieved by modern science, in the absence of moral and spiritual development in consonance with that mastery, constitutes the most powerful menace to the future existence of human race on this planet.

یورپ از شمشیر خود بسمل افتاد
زیر گردوں رسم لا دینی نہاد
عقل و فکرش بے عیار خوب و زشت
چشم او بے نم، دل او سنگ و خشت
(پس چه باید کرد، صفحه ۵٦)

Europe fell a prey to its own sword,
It set up the law of secularism.
Its wisdom is unaware of good and evil,
Its eye knows no tears, its heart is like a stone.

In another place in the same book he describes the consequences of the modern culture and then prescribes the remedy.

آمتے بر آمتے دیگر چرد
دانه ایں کارد و آں حاصل برد
از ضعیفاں ناں ربودن حکمت است
از تن شاں جاں ربودن حکمت است
شیوهٔ تهذیب نو آدم دری است
پردهٔ آدم دری سوداگراں است
تا ته و بالا نه گردد ایں نظام
دانش و تهذیب و دیں، سودائے خام
شرع بر خیزد ز اعماق حیات
روشن از نورش ظلام کائنات
گر جهاں داند حرامش را حرام
تا قیامت پخته ماند ایں نظام
(بس چه باید کرد، صفحه ۳۸-۴۰)

One nation preys on another,
This reaps the field, the other takes away the harvest.
It is wisdom to snatch away food from the weak,
And to take away life from their body.
The characteristic of the new culture is to exploit man,
This exploitation is euphemistically called trade.

Unless this system is rooted out,
True wisdom, culture and religion cannot be realised.
Shari'a takes its rise from the depth of life,
The darkness of the world is illuminised by it.
If the world follows its injuctions and prohibitions,
It will survive for ever.

Thus the only way out of this crisis lies, according to Iqbal, in giving to religion its due place as a guiding light and fighting against the secularisation of our life by the Western culture.

اے کہ جاں را باز می دانی ز تن
سحر ایں تہذیب لا دینی شکن

(ایضاً، صفحہ ۸۵)

O you who separate soul from body.
Break the spell of this secular culture,

Human reason must work within the limits imposed by the overriding considerations of religion. Act of mind must be supplemented by the act of heart. Iqbal says, "The naturalism of the Quran is only a recognition of the fact that man is related to nature and this relation, in view of its possibility as a means of controlling her forces, must be exploited in the interest, not of unrighteous desire for domination but in the nobler interest, of a free upward movement of spiritual life. In the interest of securing a complete vision of Reality, therefore, sense-perception must be supplemented by the perception of what the Quran describes as '*fuad*' or '*qalb*' *i.e.*, heart. The heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-

perception,"[1]

Iqbal does not suggest that scientific pursuit should be abandoned. To him it is indispensable for the healthy growth of society. But this intellectual activitity must not be allowed to lose sight of the ultimate spiritual reality.

چوں نہال از خاک ایں گلزار خیز
دل بہ غائب بند و با حاضر ستیز

(رموز)

Rise from the soil of this garden like a tree,
Be attached to the unseen and fight with the present.

The modern scientific observer of nature is unfortunately exclusively busy with the act of mind and neglects to look after his 'heart': the fiirst gives rise to power, dominance and control over nature, while the second gives rise to a beautiful vision of the total infinite which philosophy seeks but cannot find. Vision without power does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity.[2] A culture that is based on the synthesis of the two elements, mind and heart, reason and love, *'ilm* and *'ishq*, can alone aspire to survive.

دلبری بے قاہری جادوگری است
دلبری بے قاہری پیغمبری است

(زبور عجم ، صفحہ ۲۶۳)

Vision without power is magic,
Vision with power is prophetic.

---

1. *Lectures*, pp. 15-16.
2. *Lectures*, p. 92.

## IQBAL AND FICHTE

Kant's treatment of Reason in the first Critique and of Will in the second, left reason and will as standing apart. He could not bring about reconciliation between the two. Human reason has its limitations thought it always strives to go beyond them .Our will, however, as expressed in the Categorical Imperative, has the power to reach the ultimate reality. Man being morally free endeavours to rise above the world of phenomena and gets a glimpse of the Reality. In whatever light we may study Kant, we see that from the point of view of our search for the Reality, will is given a higher place than reason.

Thus among the successors of Kant we have Fichte who started his speculation with self-consciousness as the ultimate ground. To Fichte, this self-consciousness is the key to the most baffling problem of reconciling the world of nature, where necessity and mechanism reign supreme, and the world of will, where freedom is the reality. To Schopenhauer, on the other hand, Will—unconscious and irrational—is the Ultimate Reality.

When Fichte (1762-1814) began to ponder over the problems of thought, Spinoza's philo-

sophy was the most popular in Germany and naturally Fichte studied it and became enamoured of it. There was a logical consistency in his system which appealed to Fichte. Spinoza was a pantheist and so all the characteristics of pantheism were there. He starts with a spiritual God where God is everything and ends by asserting that everything is God. Being modes of God, nature as well as man has no freedom: every thing is determined and there is no scope of free moral activity for man. This doctrine of necessity was accepted by Fichte as unanswerable but in his heart, he felt it to be intolerable. If I am not free, what is this whole system of justice, morality, social justice, love, sympathy for ? There arose in him a deep conflict between the two modes of approach to the human problem. There is the world of nature where scientific research sees nothing but total determinism, rule of complete mechanical necessity. But, on the other hand, when we look inside individual consciousness, we feel that it is contingent and voluntary. The main problem for Fichte, therefore, was to decide which was primal. Spinoza, no doubt, as all other pantheists, belonged to the category of those who looked upon the world of necessity as the only reality, who reduced voluntary ideas, which compose our individual consciousness, to the necessitated series of the objective nature. To Fichte it was an intolerable position. A philosophical system is not a bag of goods to be acquired or disposed of at will. It has its source in the depth of one's

soul. To Fichte, *Ethic* of Spinoza appeared to be logically consistent and therefore unanswerable and yet in his heart he wanted to escape it and find a solution whereby he could vindicate the autonomy of a free moral individual in his endeavours towards a particular end. At this moment in his inner conflict, Fichte, by chance, came upon Kant's *Critique*. It was a new revelation for him. It afforded him much-sought-for answer to the riddle of Spinoza. In Kant's books, he found the means of reconciling the world of necessity in nature and the world of freedom within our self-consciousness. Beyond the sphere of necessitated events, Kant held, there lies the world of free spirits. Human ego has the unique role of creating his own world. This became the starting point for Fichte's philosophy. That there is always lodged in me a duty to perform, shows that I am superior to phenomena, that I am a citizen of the supersensuous world. This 'heaven does not lie beyond the grave, but already encompasses us, and its light dawns in every human heart.' The world cannot contain man and compel him. Iqbal very beautifully expresses this truth in the following verses of *Javid Nama* :

آنچه در آدم بگنجد عالم است
آنچه در عالم نگنجد آدم است

بندهٔ آزاد را آید گران
زیستن اندر جهان دیگران

درشکن آن را که ناید سازگار
از ضمیر خود دگر عالم بیار

That which is contained in man is the world,
That which cannot be contained in the world is man.

A free man does not like to live
In a world created by others.
Break to pieces the world that does not suit you,
Make another world out of the depth of your heart

Fichte divided all philosophical systems into two broad categories—what he calls dogmatism and idealism. In our consciousness, we often make a distinction between two orders of phenomena, inner and outer experience. Inner phenomena are characterised by free mental activity while the outer seem to belong to an order independent of us, accompanied by a feeling of necessity. This is the distinction that is often made between the ego and non-ego, subject and object, thought and being. If we explain experience as the product of non-ego, we have dogmatism and if we explain it as springing from the ego, we have idealism. According to Fichte, from the pure thing, empty being, we can never deduce an idea, a consciousness of the thing and of being.[1] Dogmatism is inconsistent because, though a system of thought itself, it can never explain the possibility of the existence of ideas. Hence he rejects dogmatism as an impossible system. Under dogmatism he includes materialism, spiritualism, Spinozism.

It is not strange that Iqbal in his early

1. *Cf.* Iqbal, *lectures*, p. 51 : " ...the notion of 'thing' is derivative. We can derive 'thing' from movement ; we cannot derive movement from immobile things."

philosophical period was an adherent of pantheism. In one of the letters written by Dr. McTaggart to Iqbal (in 1920) he says, "Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a pantheist and mystic." Pantheism has indeed fascination for some intellectual minds. But when looked from moral point of view, the bankruptcy of pantheism becomes apparent. Even its spirituality is in reality nothing religious. Some have seen fit to call it a " romance of atheism. " Iqbal soon realized the potential danger in accepting it. In the Introduction to the first edition of the *Asrar-i Khudi* (1915) he wrote, "In Hindu thought we find a strange mixture of theory and practice. Some of theoaitrgrt thinkers have deeply thought over the na freeu human capacity for action. They arrived at the conclusion that the continuity in the life of self, which is at the root of all pain and suffering, is achieved through activity...When it is found that the nature of self is activity, then the logical conclusion to be derived, if one wishes to be free from the cvcle of self's existence, is to abhor activity. This conclusion was harmful for individuals as well as societies. . . . Sri Krishna pointed out that to abhor activity does not mean complete inactivity. To abhor activity means to be indifferent to the deed and its consequences... In Western Asia, Islam also gave the world a message of activity . . . But unfortunately, the point of view adopted by Sankara in the interpretation of the Gita was followed by Ibn-i-Arabi in the

interpretation of the Quran. The deep erudition and charming personality of the Shaikh-i-Akbar made the doctrine of pantheism an indispensable element of Muslim thought . . . But while in India, pantheism was a philosophical doctrine with its appeal to human reason, in Iran it went beyond its limits and in the hands of the poets it began to appeal to the heart, with the result that it reached every nook and corner of the Islamic world and *became the main cause of social and political decay . . .*"

Opposed to the dogmatic approach, which results in the disintegration of human society, there is, what Fichte calls. idealistic outlook which starts from thought itself, the ego, as the ultimate datum. It is the task of Fichte's *Wissenschaf tslehre* to show that our ideas of things are produced by the activity of thought. It proceeds on the assumption that there can be nothing in the ego which is not the product of the ego's own activity. But an imperfect Idealism, says Fichte, regards the Ego as merely subject and from it the attempt is made to deduce the multiplicity of experience. But the result would be as disastrous as in the case of dogmatism. "In vain shall we look," says Fichte, "for a link of connection between subject and object, if they are not the first and simply apprehended as a unity . . . The Ego is not to be regarded as subject merely, but at once as subject and object."[1]

---

1. R. Adamson *Fichte* (Philosophical Classics), p. 128.

To start with consciousness as a ground of explanation, according to Fichte, then, is not a true procedure. Consciousness that which is immediately and directly known to us, as a series of states, can give us nothing. It is only the Critical Idealism that takes the right step—recognises the truth that all consciousness is determined by self-consciousness and so acknowledges the due limits of thought. It alone can explain how in consciousness there appears the opposition between the Ego and the non-Ego. To popular thinking, self-consciousness is identical with individuality—with the knowledge of self as personal, active being, related to others, and to a universe of things. The ego which we know in experience is always limited, enclosed in a system of limitations, has objects (non-egos) outside it which it has not itelf produced. There must, therefore, be active in consciousness some principle more comprehensive than the finite ego. He says, "The ego of real consciousness is always particular and isolated : it is a person among other persons, each of whom describes himself as an Ego ; and *Wissenschaftslehre* must develop up to a point consciousness is explained. Totally distinct at which such from this is the Ego from which *Wissenschaftslehre* starts ; for this is nothing but the identity of the conscious subject with that of which it is conscious."[1] Fichte calls it the pure or infinite or Absolute Ego.

———

1. I.R. Adamson ; Fichte (Philosophical classics), p. 149.

This unity of subject and object, thought and being, ideal and real—the Ego—is the starting point both of Fichte and Iqbal. It is perfectly an incorrect point of view which looks upon thought as an agency working upon things from without. As soon as we enter the sphere of mind, we, at once, see that "though thought be distinguishable from its objects, it is not divisible from it ; the thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other, they are twain and yet one ; the object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object; they have no meaning or existence taken individually, and in their union they are not two separate things, stuck together, but two that have absolutely lost or dissolved their quality in a higher unity."[1] Further on he argues that "the unity of subject and object, of the self and the world which is opposed to it, is implied in every act of thought ; and though I can distinguish the two, I can no more divide them or conceive of their separate and independent existence, than I can think a centre existing without or independently of a circumference."[2] According to Iqbal, it is possible to look upon thought "not as a principle which organises and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its materials. Thus regarded, thought or idea

1. J. Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 188. The following paragraph mainly follows the argument presented in this book.

2. Ibid., pp. 148-49.

is not alien to the nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being."[1] The logical understanding, however, is incapable of rising to this height and therefore cannot appreciate this unity. It bifurcates it into a self that knows and a confronting 'other' that is known.

ابد را عقل ما نا ساز گار است
"یکی" از گیرو دار او هزار است

Eternity is not a fit subject for our intellect,
'One' becomes 'many' under its analysis.

It is due to this defect of the ordinary thought that "we are forced to regard the object that confronts the self as something existing in its own right, external to and independent of the self whose act of knowledge makes no difference to the object known."[1] Self-consciousness is unity in difference: a self which is conscious and a self which is the object of consciousness, ego and non-ego, both elements in inseparable correlation. The very life of the ego consists in taking into itslf that outside world which it at first opposes to itself. The very beginning of that life consists in the awakening of consciousness in one and the same indivisible act, of a self and a not-self, of a world without as opposed to a world within. The subsequent development of the ego consists in reclaiming into itself the rich content of that world which it first posits as foreign or external

---

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 31.
2. Ibid., p. 31.

to itself, or to express the same idea from the opposite side, in the unfolding or evolution of the consciousness of the self through the mediation of the nature and other spiritual beings.

Iqbal thinks that it is possible to show that thought and being are ultimately one, "only if we carefully examine and interpret experience, following the clue furnisned by the Quran which regards experience within and without as symbolic of a reality described by it as 'the First and the Last, the Vissible and the Invisible.' "[1]

Fichte starts with the consciousness of the Ego as the ground of all explanation. He expresses the contents of this consciousness in three principles. The first is that the Ego originally posits absolutely its own being. The Ego is because it posits itself as being; it posits itself as being because it is. The fundamental activity of all consciousness is thus the affirmation of itself by the Ego. This first principle is, strictly speaking, concerned not with a fact but with an act or as Fichte cals it, a deed-act, as Descartes intimated by his *Cogito, ergo sum.* When I say 'I am,' I affirm, in consciousness, my existence ; and this affirmation of consciousness is the condition of my existence.

اگر گوئی کہ "من" وهم و گمان است
نمودش چوں نمود ایں و آں است

————

1. Iqbal, *Lectures,* See also article by Iqbal, *Self in the Light of Relativity.*

بگو با من که دارائے گمان کیست ؟
یکے در خود نگر ، آن بے نشان کیست ؟
(گلشن راز جدید ، جواب به سوال هشتم)

If you say that 'I' is a mere imagination
And its manifestation is a mere 'appearance,'
Then tell me, who is it that entertains these doubts ?
Just look within and think what this "appearance" is!

This deed-act, which is the presupposition of all knowledge, can only be discovered by means of reflection, a kind of higher intuition. Fichte called it intellectual intuition but later gave it the name of free activity. This innermost active essence of our being can only be discovered by means of spiritual energy and self-dependence. In the words of Iqbal, love alone can hope to reach the real.

خودی از کائنات رنگ و بو نیست
حواس ما میان ماو او نیست
نگه را در حریمش نیست راهے
کنی خود را تماشا بے نگاهے !
(گلشن راز جدید ، صفحه ۲۳۶-۳۷)

Self does not belong to this world of phenomena,
Our senses do not come between us and it.
Our eyes have no access to its secret chamber,
You see the 'self' without the help of the (physical) eye.

As an antithesis to the positing of the Ego, we notice that a non-ego is also posited along with the first act. This non-ego is not something outside me existing *per se,* as Kant's thing-in-itself This non-ego is, according to Fichte, nothing but a postulate of our reason, a product of the ego. It is the Ego which thus creates

the necessity for a non-ego; it is the Ego which thus, answering to the necessity, creates the non-ego wanted. The Ego in postulating its own existence, necessarily assumes the existence of a non-ego. Iqbal has incorporated this point of view of Fichte in *Asrar-i-Khudi* in the following verses:

پیکر هستی ز آثار خودی است
هر چه می بینی ز اسرار خودی است
خویشتن را چون خودی بیدار کرد
آشکارا عالم پندار کرد
صد جهان پوشیده اندر ذات او
غیر او پیداست از اثبات او
در جهان تخم خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیر خود پنداشت است

The form of existence is an effect of the self,
Whatsoever you see, is a secret of the self.
When the self awoke to consciousness,
It revealed the universe of thought.
A hunderd worlds are hidden in its essence;
Self-affirmation brings not-self to light.
By the self the seed of opposition is sown in the world:
It imagines itself to be other than itself.

The non-ego thus postulated is not alien to the knowing ego; it is intimately related to it. The world of objects of which we are immediately aware, is part and parcel of ourselves.

Iqbal echoes this idea in the following lines:—

برون از خویش می بینی جهان را
در و دشت و یم و صحرا و کان را
جهان رنگ و بو گلدستهٔ ما
زما آزاد و هم وابستهٔ ما

خودی او را به یک تار نگه بست
زمین و آسمان و مهر و ماه بست
جهان غیر از تجلی هائے ما نیست
که بے ما جلوۂ نور و صدا نیست
(گلشن راز جدید ، صفحه ۲۱۲ - ۱۳)

You look upon the world as existing outside you ;
These mountains and deserts, oceans and mines.
This world of colour and smell is our nosegay ;
It is independent and yet intimately related to us.
The ego bound them all by its one glance :
The earth and the sky, the moon and the sun.
The world is nothing but the manifestation of ours,
For without us there would be no scenes of light and sound.

The third step taken by Fichte was to reconcile the thesis and antithesis in a higher synthesis. It was that the ego posits a limited ego in opposition to a limited non-ego. When I am determined by the external world, I am passive and receptive. As such I am, in Fichte's words, theoretic. But so far as I act, being determined by myself, I am an active and practical being. Our immediate consciousness can be explained neither by the assertion that the ego is absolutely posited, nor by the assumption that the non-ego is absolutely posited, but only by the assumption of a mutual limitation—a reciprocal action between the ego and the non-ego. If there were no ego to do the experiencing, there would no non-ego to be experienced. On the other hand, if there were no non-ego for the ego to experience as something different from itself, there would be no object distinct from the thinking subject. Both are

necessary for each other, and to the existence of a self-consious experience.

خودی تعویذ حفظ کائنات است
نخستیں پرتو ذاتش حیات است
حیات از خواب خوش بیدار گردد
درونش چوں یکے بسیار گردد
نہ او را بے نمود ما کشودے
نہ ما را بے کشود او نمودے

(گلشن راز جدید ، صفحہ ۲۲۳)

Ego is the amulet for the protection of the universe,
The first ray of its essence is Life.
Life awakens from its sweet dream,
Its inside which is one becomes many.
Neither does it develop without our expansion,
Nor do we expand without its development.

The development of self-knowldge proceeds by a succession of definite act called *Anstoss* or thrusts. The first step creates mere unreflective sensation which is a step above unconsciousness. As soon as sensation appears, the ego has limited itself by creating a definite and restricted content of consciousness. The second thrust take place when the ego, in becoming aware of the fact that it is perceiving, differentiates itself from its perceptions and thus turns them into a non-ego other than itself. The third step is taken when the ego, by the help of memory and imagination, turns its perceptions into a world of objects. It is now aware of them as things. At this stage categories appear. The non-ego appears to be the *substance* of which different things are the modifications, and also seems to be the *cause* of subjective images of the external world. Here

also we get space and time. The fourth anstoss occurs when the ego reflects upon the subjective images in consciousness, classifies them, abstracts general ideas from them, and thinks about them in general terms. The fifth anstoss takes place when the ego again reflects upon these concepts and by the exercise of the faculty of judgmént arranges them in logical relations to one another.

می شود از بہر اغراض عمل
عامل و معمول و اسباب و علل

خیزد ، انگیزد ، فتد ، تابد ، دمد
سوزد ، افروزد ، خرامد ، پر زند

وسعت ایام جولانگاہ او
آسمان موجے ز گرد راہ او

شعلۂ خود در شرر تقسیم کرد
جزو پرستی عقل را تعلیم کرد

خود شکن گردید و اجزا آفرید
اندکے آشفت و صحرا آفرید

باز از آشفتگی بیزار شد
و ز بہم پیوستگی کہسار شد

قوت خاموش و بے تاب عمل
از عمل پابند اسباب عمل

(اسرار خودی)

Subject, object, means and causes—
All these are forms which it assumes for the purpose of action.
The self rises, kindless, falls, glows, breathes,
Burns, shines, walks and flies.
The spaciousness of Time is its arena,
Heaven is a billow of the dust on its road.
It divided its flames into sparks,
And taught the understanding to worship particulars.
It dissolved itself and created the atoms.

It was scattered for a little while and created the sands.
Then it wearied of dispersion.
And by re-uniting itself it became the mountains.
Power that is unexpressed and inert
Chains the faculties which lead to action.

In the last anstoss, the ego reflects upon its power of judgment, recognises itself as the originator of the laws that govern its thinking, and knows itself to be the basis of its own knowledge. If I could accomplish this step. I should know the whole truth about the universe, the whole universe would be wholly within my experience, the distinction between the ego and non-ego would disappear, and I, the finite ego, should have becomé identical with and indistinguishable from the Absolute Ego. But in that case, I and the universe, and consciousness itself, would have disappeared, since all are dependent for their existence on an opposition between an ego and a non-ego.

خودی را زندگی ایجاد غیر است
فراق عارف و معروف خیر است
جدائی خاک را بخشد نگاهے
دهد سرمایۂ کوهے به کاهے
جدائی عشق را آئینه دار است
جدائی عاشقاں را ساز گار است
(گلشن راز جدید ـ جواب به سوال چهارم)

The life of the ego is to bring non-ego into existence.
The separation of the knower and the known is good.
Separation gives to this handful of dust an insight,
Gives the weight of a mountain to a straw.

Separation is a token of love.
It agrees with the nature of a lover,

The ego is in essence activity and at the same time it must posit itself, or be aware of its own activity. Under what conditions can the ego be conscious of itself? Only in so far as it is a striving force, only in so far as it is will. This striving of the ego is only possible for consciousness in so far as it is limited or opposed. Thus the answer to the question : Why does the ego posit a non-ego within itself ? can be understood if we regard the ego, not as a resting being but as in its nature infinite activity or impulse. For since all action is directed towards an object in connection with which it develops, so the ego, which finds its object not given to it, must, in order to remain impulse and action, set objects for itself. The actual world of experience, with all its things, is only the material for the activity of the ego. The non-ego is essential to the ego but at the same time thwarts the ego's full knowledge of itself. So long as non-ego exists, no complete knowledge is possible. The ego cannot attain to obsolutely free activity without putting an end to that struggle towards freedom which is its essence. In the act of winning, it would do away with itself, since its very self is a process and a striving an attempt to win. Duty calls upon us to perform a task but under conditions such that it cannot be performed. Moral progress is endless but that only shows how contented we must be with the process of

striving and not with some static condition. To strive morally is reality : the goal is nowhere. And Iqbal fully agrees with this conclusion.

اگر چشمے کشائی بر دل خویش
درون سینه بینی منزل خویش
سفر اندر حضر کردن چنین است
سفر از خود بخود کردن همین است
مجو پایاں که پایا نے نداری
بپایاں تا رسی جانے نداری
بپایاں نا رسیدن زندگانی است
سفر ما را حیات جاودانی است
(گلشن راز جدید ، جواب به سوال هفتم)

If you direct your eyes on your heart,
You will find your distination within your bosom.
To travel while at rest is this,
It is to travel from self to self.
Don't seek the end of the journey, for you he note.
As soon as you reach the end, you lose your self.
Not to reach the end is life ;
Immortal life for us lies in constant travelling.

Life of the ego consists in the eternal struggle to realise the ideal of absolute freedom and the equally eternal failure to do so. Life is cruel and harsh. At every step we meet opposition, obstacles, antagonism. Our struggle with our environment and our fellow-men appears to be a struggle against necessity. We cannot remove these limitations, for their disappearance would amount to our own destruction. Our life consists in opposition. We can, however, discipline ourselves to regard suffering and failure and misfortune and defeat, not as a thwarting of

liberty by necessity but as incidents in a struggle that we welcome and freely accept. This self-discipline is a moral process. The ego *wills* freely the deterministic order that limits it. The moment it does that it becomes wholly aware that the activities of the deterministic order originated in the ego itself and thus will succeed in overcoming the conflict between freedom and necessity in a consciousness of its self-determination. It would then feel thoroughly at home in the world. This was thus the final problem of morality—to remake our actual world into a new world to our liking and aspirations, where the ideal and the real become one, to remodel our environment after a pattern of an ideal spiritual kingdom of ends. As moral beings we have tasks. There is a continuous chain of tasks before us. We strive to win and yet it goes on. There is no end to tasks and no end to our strivings. We have an ideal and as soon as it is realised, we have another and thus life goes on. The phenomena that so trouble us because we think them necessitated are only contingent upon the performance of our duty. The existence of one thing is not to be explained by the existence of another, but by the existence of the ego Phenomena are little steps towards great ends. When I rethink the world I see no casual relationship but the telological means for the achievement of purposes by a striving soul. History and nature—those are the materials created by men for their own activity. It is not that Being is the cause of Doing. All that is, is only to

be explained from the point of view of that which *ought to be*.

Such was the message of Fichte to the German nation when it was suffering under the heels of foreigners. He called the people to rise and shake off the bonds of slavery. Be up and doing. for reality is not static. Environment only appears to be independent of us, beyond our control. We need only rethink and make it dynamic. Not being but acting and free acting is reality. Existence is derived from thought in action and thus our existence and our environment may be shaped by us. The same was the message of Iqbal.

How is it possible, asks Iqbal, for man to realise his freedom from the universe as a confronting other' and thus reach the divine point of view ? To some this is possibe through mystic discipline. But the mystic tries to achieve this object by escaping from the conditions which maks the movement of intellect possible. This method, therefore, Iqbal thinks, is detrimental to a wholesome growth of the individual. The arduous task of the conquest of nature through intellect is an indispensable stage in the life of contemplation and the mystic method totally ignores it. The Reality lies in its appearances and the surest way to reach the core of it lies through these very appearances. Opposed to the mystic method, the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the divine stand-point, to attain the ideal of freedom from the oppression of the necessitated

series of the objective world. It is " mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation."[1]

---

1. Iqbal, *Self in the Light of Relativity.* (An Article).

## IQBAL AND SCHOPENHAUER

Fichte and Schopenhauer were both influenced by Kant and yet they traversed along different paths, reaching conclusions which were poles as under. Fichte, as we have seen, influenced by the doctrine of Will as developed by Kant in his *Critique of Practical Judgment*, preached a message of fruitful activity so as to bridge the gap between the self and not-self. Activity of the ego was to him the *sine qua non* of a true spiritual life. He took active part in the struggle of liberation of his motherland against the onslaughts of Napoleon. But Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a man of a different temperament. Amidst the stormy atmosphere of the times in which Fichte had flung headlong, Schopenhaur sought refuge in a lonely town, far away from the tumultuous dins of big cities and there tried to gain peace of mind by passive contemplation of the big problems of life. His philosophy had its origin in Kant's emphasis on Will, from which reason had been most scrupulously excluded. The colour which his philosophy took was mostly determined by his personal opposition to Hegel whose system was most popular at the time. He represents a reaction against the absorption of everything in Reason. Opposed to it, he urged the primacy of will as a fundamental factor in human life. Will, according to Schopenhauer,

is the reality and intellect is only a tool in the service of will. To Hegel, the historical development of the cosmos is the struggle of reason, which with all its essential contradictions, is striving to come to itself. To Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the history of the cosmos is also an endless struggle, although a struggle in which all reason is absent. Hegel conceived the history of the cosmos as a development worthy of investigation. To Schopenhauer, history was meaningless. To examine things historically is to look along a horizontal line. To think philosophically is to look along a vertical line. "What history narrates, in fact, is only the long, heavy and confused dream of humanity." History is not a record of the creative activity of man but the ever-recurring events which do not change with the passage of centuries. "If one has read Herodotus," he says, "then in philosophical regard one has read enough history. For everything is already there that makes up the subsequent history of the world." This view of Schopenhauer, as Nietzsce's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, was influenced by Greek thought which could not conceive history as a continuous dynamic movement which traverses ever new and original stages. To them life moved in a circ lar and ever-recurring line, having no goal and no object. On such a view, life has nothing to offer to man as an inspiration for ceaseless activity towards higher ends and ideals.

The very first part of Schopenhauer's book *The World as Will and Idea*, starts with the

proposition : the world is my presentation. It is, he thinks, true for all living and knowing beings, although man alone can make it a subject of reflected, abstract consciousness through philosophical speculation. Everything which exists for cognition, and hence this entire world, is objective only with reference to the knowing subject ; it is the perception of the percipient, or an idea. Everything which belongs to the world is inevitably subject to this dependence on the knowing subject, for whom only it exists. So far he agrees with Kant. In the analysis of experience, Kant asserted two elements, synthetic activity of the mind and the thing-in-itself which is unknowable. To Schopenhauer, noumena may not be known through reason or ideas, yet it is knowable. For, he held, that which is not in our experience is not outside us altogether, as Kant maintained. This thing-in-itself is within ourselves ; it is the only real and essential part of our nature, and we have a direct knowledge of it. This reality is Will. It is the real, inner nature of everything in the world. It affords the key to the knowledge of the inner being of the whole of the nature. It is the kernel of every individual thing, and also of the whole universe. It is known through intuition and not through any rational ratiocination. The world as Will is the reality while the world as Idea, as represented in the categories of our reason, is an appearance. Reasoned knowledge, even in its most perfect form, *viz.*, science, is under the law of cause and effect and

therefore can reveal nothing absolute. Science never gets, nor can it ever hope to get, below phenomena. We can get at the reality by immediate perception, intuition, by 'the look of genius.'

Unlike other thinkers of his age, Schopenhauer belittled the value of reason in unravelling the secrets of reality and in this respect he was a forerunner of Bergson and modern Vitalists who see in instinct a higher faculty that gives a direct and immediate contact with the inner nature of everything. For him, it is not the highest function of man to think and to understand, but to feel and to live. We must exchange *head* knowledge for *heart* knowledge ; head knowledge is concerned only with that part of reality which rises above the threshold of consciousness. Our total sense of reality is broader and deeper than merely intellectual knowledge. It includes the subconscious depth of our personality, making up a whole which is far richer in content that mere surface life which we know in consciousness. This aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy has much in common with Iqbal's conception of love in contrast to intellect, "In the interest of securing a complete vision of Reality sense-perception must be supplemented by the perception of what the Quran describes as *qalb i.e.*, heart . . . The ' heart ' is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to

sense-perception."[1] It was from this point of view that Schopenhauer criticised Socrates who started a systematic misuse of general conceptions. We have an immediate experience of the will and therefore we may be said to have an immediate knowledge of the nature of reality. Here lay the main contribution of Schopenhauer; he insisted that philosophy must be brought back to the recognition of the richness of an immediate and direct knowledge of reality. The intuitive insight of a genius is a far higher form of knowledge than that of an abstract thinker. In this respect Iqbal, as we have seen, fully agrees with him.

Another corollary of Schopenhauer's doctrine was his insistence on action as the proper sphere of man, as contrasted with the mere life of thought. It was this aspect which appealed to Nietzsche. To both, a life of passivity and detachment from actual life is meaningless. The philosoper must, therefore, be before all things 'a real man,' a guide to fine living. He brought philosophy into relation with life; he drew it down from the icy heights where abstract concepts alone can flourish, to the sunny plains below. Schopenhauer's criticism of Socratic love for abstract thinking is re-echoed in Iqbal's criticism of Plato on account of the same tendency.

بسکه از ذوق عمل محروم بود
جان او وا رفتهٔ معدوم بود

---

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. 15-16.

قومہا از سکر آو مسموم گشت
خفت و از ذوق عمل محروم گشت

Since he was without any taste for action,
His soul was enraptured by the non-existent.
The people were poisoned by his intoxication :
He slumbered and took no delight in deeds.

If reason is not the proper guide in apprehending the true nature of reality, then what does intuition reveal to us about it ? Schopenhauer, here, follows in the footsteps of Fichte and Hegel in accepting the analogy of a human career in describing the character of the Real, the same method which Iqbal followed in Lecture 2 for determining the true nature of Reality. He says. " . . . This possible only if we carefully examine and interpret experience, following the clue furnished by the Quran, which regards experience within and without as symbolic of a reality described by it as the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible."[1]

When we look inside ourselves, we seem to be phenomenon like everything else and yet I can have an inner view of myself which is neither perceptual nor conceptual. It is a living, glowing, dynamic experience. It is what Schopenhauer calls Will. Man finds, first, the will to be in himself. He finds it objectified in his body and in its members. Will and the action of the body are not two different states known objectively and connected by the chain of casuality ; on the contrary, they are one and

———

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 31.

the same, differing only in the completely different ways in which they are presented to the percipient. The action of the body is simply the objectified act of the will. The whole body is nothing but the will objectified. All different members of the body are structures of some functions. Every part is the visible expression of some desire. Hunger, speed, locomotion, have their different instruments. Our will to live has devised all these different things for its manifestation and expression.

In the Introduction to the English translation of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Iqbal says "Its (*viz.*, Life's) essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals, and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion it has invented or developed out of itself certain instruments, *e.g.*, senses, intellect, etc., which help it to assimilate obstructions."[1]

چیست اصل دیدۂ بیدار ما ؟
بست صورت لذت دیدار ما
کبک پا از شوخیٔ رفتار یافت
بلبل از سعیٔ نوا منقار یافت
بینی و دست و دماغ و چشم و گوش
فکر و تخییل و شعور و یاد و ہوش
زندگی مرکب چو در جنگاہ یافت
بہر حفظ خویش این آلات ساخت

(اسرار خودی)

What is the source of our wakeful eye ?
Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape.

---

1. pP. xx (Revised Edition, Lahore, 1944) .

The patridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait.
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing.
Nose, hand, brain, eye and ear,
Thought, imagination, feeling, memory and understanding—
All these are weapons devised by life for self-preservation
In its ceaseless struggle.

What is the Will? Schopenhauer uses it in a much wider sense than is commonly employed. It includes not only conscious desires but also unconscious instinct and the forces of inorganic nature. All nature manifests it. The impulse with which waters hurry to the ocean, the persistence of the magnet for the pole, the perennial push of vegetation, the motivation of animal, show that the reality of the world is fundamentally will. The word will, like a magic spell, he says, reveals the inmost being of all nature. Spinoza says that if a stone, which has been projected through the air, had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its own will. Schopenhauer adds that the stone would be right. The impulse in the stone is for the stone what motive is for us.

Will, thus, for Schopenhauer, is the real thing-in-itself, transcending the world of phenomena. It is above space, time and causality which are the forms of its objectified aspects. As will, all are identical. It is the same force in every manifestation of Nature. It is one while multiplicity arises due to the spatial and temporal conditions of existence. There is

only one Will and so the world is in reality a unity. In essence, all things are the same ; in appearance they are different. It is everywhere one and the same, "just as the first dim light of dawn must share the name of sunlight with the rays of the full midday."

Absolute, according to Schopenhauer, then, is Will rather than Reason. In order to determine its relation, he analyses human individual experience as well as world process. To Fichte and Hegel the world process was through and through moral and rational. Its aim was the expression of moral freedom. The Fichtean Ego never swerved from its lofty moral purpose. To Schopenhauer, the moral character of the Absolute did not appeal. To him it was blind and non-moral. There is struggle and conflict everwhere in nature as well as in the inner life of each man. Each preys on the other. Animals make vegetable kingdom as their food and even within the animals, every beast is the prey and the food of another. Man looks upon all nature as a manufactory for his own use. The whole world process is one of endless strife, conflict and alteration of victory. The Absolute, therefore, is blind, irrational and unmoral. It is a will to be, a will to live, no matter how. Its essence is simply to affirm itself. In such a will there can be no purpose, no morality, no happiness, no good.

The way of escape from this ever-recurring strife and misery lies, first and temporarily, in artistic contemplation and, secondly and per-

manently. in moral deliverance. We must kill the will to live. We must stop desiring anything, willing anything, stop struggling, stop striving, in short, cease from progressing. Thus alone can suffering be destroyed and peace attained.

The phenomenal world in which we live and which alone is responsible for our constant striving, is the cause of all suffering and therefore for salvation we must turn ourselves away from it. With this attitude, it was not strange that Schopenhauer turned to Plato for inspiration whom Iqbal has fitly called the prime ascetic and one of the ancient flock of sheep. Schopenhauer employs Platonic Ideas for aesthetic contemplation. These Ideas are eternal, changeless and above causality. They are beyond strife, harmonious with each other, and far removed from the misery of the phenomenal world. The man who is seeking salvation must look to art which is a contemplation of the world of reality. Science deals with phenomena, changing stream of appearances and therefore cannot help us. It can never reach the final goal of salvation any more than by running we can reach the place where the clouds touch the horizon. Art, on the other hand, by its contemplation of the eternal, unchanging reality, holds out a hope of salvation, though only a temporary one. It is a bridge between the two worlds ; from the things as they seem to things as they really are. Thus art succeeds in delivering us from the slavery of the Will. In the contemplation of beauty in art, we are lifted, for the time being,

above all willing, beyond all wishes and desires. We are freed from ourselves. To Schopenhauer, this is the way of temporary salvation. Art affords self-forgetfulness. The permanent way of escape lies in the total self-negation of extreme mystic type which demands complete mortification of flesh, Schopenhauer particularly emphasises the repression of the sexual instinct which he thinks, is the most dangerous form of all the affirmations of the Will to Live. In this way alone there is a possibility that the human race may die out. Thus total *fana* could be attained. "In thy Nothing I hope to find All."

گفت سر زندگی در مردن است
شمع را صد جلوه از افسردن است
عقل خود را بر سر گردون رساند
عالم اسباب را افسانه خواند
کار او تحلیل اجزائے حیات
قطع شاخ سرو رعنائے حیات

"To die," said he, "is the secret of Life:
The candle is glorified by being put out."
He soared with his intellect to the highest heaven
And called the world of phenomena a myth :
'T was his work to dissolve the structure of Life
And cut the bough of Life's fair tree asunder.

Iqbal agrees that the world-process exhibits an unending itruggle and conflict in which hundred of things are preying on one another. Dealing with the Quranic legend of Adam he says. "Yet the emergence and multiplication of individualities, each fixing its gaze on the revelation of its own possibilities and seeking its own dominion, inevitably brings in its wake

the awful struggle, of ages. 'Descend ye as enemies of one another,' says the Quran. This mutual conflict of opposing individualities is the world pain which both illuminates and darkens the temporal career of life."[1]

خود فریبی هائے او عین حیات
همچو گل از خون وضو عین حیات
بهر یک گل خون صد گلشن کند
از پئے یک نغمه صد شیون کند

Its self deceptions are the essence of Life ;
Like the rose, it lives by bathing itself in blood.
For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred rose-gardens
And makes a hundred lamentations in quest of a single melody.

But to Iqbal this constant struggle and strife, this preying of one on the other, is not purposeless. Reality is not blind, insane or non-moral. Reality, in the words of Iqbal, is a pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. It is a rationally directed creative life.

عذر این اسراف و این سنگین دلی
خلق و تکمیل جمال معنوی
حسن شیرین عذر درد کوهکن
نافهٔ عذر صد آهوئے ختن
خامهٔ او نقش صد امروز بست
تا بیارد صبح فردائے بدست
شعلهٔ او صد ابراهیم سوخت
تا چراغ یک محمد بر فروخت

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 88.

> The excuse for this wastefulness and cruelty
> Is the shaping and perfecting of spiritual beauty.
> The loveliness of Shirin justifies the anguish of Farhad,
> One fragrant naval justifies a hundred musk-deer.
> The pencil of the self limned a hundred todays
> In order to achieve the dawn of a single morrow.
> Its flames burned a hundred Abrahams
> That the lamp of one Muhammad might be lighted.

The moral purpose behind this struggle and strife, according to Iqbal as to Nietzsche, is the creation of a superman in whom the values of life are concentrated in its highest form. It struggles and strives to create a Muhammad, the true Perfect Man, the acme of life, Schopenhauer derives a totally wrong conclusion from the all-pervasive struggle and conflict in the world process and reaches a negative result. To him the end of life should be to deny life, to neutralise the never-ending struggle. Neitzsche accepted the fact of pain and struggle as does Iqbal. But here both part company with Schopenhauer and boldly assert that we should says 'yes' to life in spite of all the sufferings and pain that it brings with it. "Shall we, then, say no or yes to the trust of personality with all its attendant ills? True manhood, according to the Quran, consists in 'patience under ills and hardships.' "[1]

In *Piyam-i-Mashriq*, Iqbal has very beautifully illustrated Schopenhruer's correct analysis and wrong inference.

---

1. Ibid, p. 88.

مرغے ز آشیانه بسیر چمن پرید
خارے ز شاخ گل به تن نازکش خلید
بد گفت فطرت چمن روزگار را
از درد خویش و هم ز غم دیگراں تپید
گفت اندریں سرا که بنایش فتاده کج
صبحے کجا که چرخ درو شامها نه چید
سوز فغان او به دل هدهدے گرفت
با نوک خویش خار ز اندام او کشید
گفتش که سود خویش زجیب زیاں برآر
گل از شگاف سینه زر ناب آفرید
درماں ز درد ساز اگر خسته تن شوی
خوگر به خار شو که سراپا چمن شوی

A bird flew from his nest to the garden ;
A thorn from a rose ran into his delicate body.
He spoke ill of the nature of the garden,
He bewailed about his own as well as of other's griefs.
Said he, "In this world whose foundation has been laid amiss,
There is no morning which is not followed by evening."
His bewailing reached Hoopoe.
He removed the thorn with his beak,
He said, "Get your gain out of the pocket of loss ;
Rose got pure gold from the opening of his breast.
If you are grief-stricken, try to get cure out of your miseries ;
Familiarise yourself with thorns so as to blossom into a flower."

## IQBAL AND MILTON

The voluntarism of Schopenhauer unfortunately culminated in stark pessimism and the total negation of life. It did succeed in refuting the complascent and hollow optimism of the times but thereby it robbed life of all its significance and value. It focussed the attention of the thinkers on the acute problem of evil—and the role of Satan, as the embodiment of that principle—and its place in the over-all economy of life. His voluntarism may be acceptable but it must be freed of its pessimistic consequences to make it compatible with the inherent significance of life.

What is, then, the role of Satan or Iblis—the source of evil—in our life ? The character of Satan as depicted in Iqbal's works has two aspects. In its first aspect, it represents the forces of evil and in its second, the active dynamism of life itself.

(1) First, Iblis is the Satan of the scriptural text, the seducer of Adam from the path of rectistude, who resides in Hell and is condemned for ever. As such he is the principle of Evil. The concern of Iblis as evil incarnate raises the most thorny problem of good and evil which has taxed the brains of innumerable thinkers of all ages and which, as Mr. Taylor says, no

religion can claim to explain to the satisfaction of man who undergoes untold suffering and pain, both physical and moral.[1]

There have been some periods in the history of the world when evil has been most obstrusive in the form of constant wars, abrupt changes in governments, resulting in insecurity of life and honour, evils of cruelty, savagery, oppression, violence, egotism, and lust for power. And it is in such periods of predominance of evil that men have turned unconsciously towards faith in God and religion. Rationally it is difficult to argue that a God who is benevolent and good could allow the existence of evil in a world claimed to be the best of all possible worlds. How is it, then, possible to reconcile the goodness and omnipotence of God with the immence volume of evil in His creation ? This obstrusivéness of evil, says Iqbal, is the most thorny problem of Theism[1] and yet paradoxically it is the same obstrusiveness of evil that léads men to the path of God, religion and morality[2].

In the nineteenth century when Europe achieved greater control over the forces of nature, certain thinkers came to hold the opinion that evil could be totally eliminated if certain social reforms were introduced. Some

---

1. *Problem of Evil*, p. 29.

1. *Lectures*, p. 112.

2. Joad, *God and Evil*, Chapters I and II. See also Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. III ff.

socialist writers regarded economic inequality and injustice as the root cause of evil. Bernard Shaw, for instance, very forcefully and eloquently asserted that poverty was at the root of all misery and pain. If society, by concerted effort, succeeded in providing to every individual at least Rs. 15 a day, there would be no disease, no exploitation, no cruelty, no oppression, in short, no evil. Then psycho-analysts came forward with a new solution. Evil in their view, is the result of early psychological maltreatment and consequent maladjustment. The Unconscious the hidden spring of all our conscious activities, it is alleged, takes its shape in the early years of life and if a child at the tender age is left at the mercy of ignorant parents, nurses and teachers, he is sure to develop a perverted personality and his criminal actions will recoil on the society which neglected his healthy growth. You need only bring up a child in a free environment, without any over-emphasis or under-emphasis, and you will get a right type of men and women who shall be the embodiment of all good. Then evil will die its natural death.[1]

But it is difficult to believe that all the cruelties in the modern world, let alone the past, have been due to untoward circumstances, or to psychological maladjustment of the people. In the course of thousands of centuries, have all men been the victims of psychological mal-

---

1. Joad, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

treatment ? Rich and poor, strong and weak, rulers and ruled, have alike, when chance came to them, contributed their mite to the total evil that one meets everywhere in the world. Evil there is no doubt, but these are mere superficial accounts of it, touching only a fraction. Its roots are much deeper and it needs moral and religious treatment rather than social, psychological or economic. Obstrusiveness of evil in almost every period of history has led thinkers and reformers in different climes to look to moral and religious values to solve this problem and herein lies only the possible solution.

Early Greek thinkers were interested in the study of the world of nature. But soon Socrates appeared. He focussed the attention of the people of his age on their inner selves. And so did Plato. This transition from outside to inside, from the world to self, from the physical to the psychological, was the result of the after-effects of the troubled times through which Greece was passing. Corruption, cruelty, injustice, ignorance, intrigue and egotism, were prevalent everywhere. To remedy this state of affairs Socrates preached that salvation lay only in pursuing the path of wisdom and truth, and Plato took pains to define and illustrate the true nature of justice. Amid the moral and political chaos of the age, when traditional religious values were being destroyed by sophistry and when economic and political stability were being shattered to pieces by bloody wars, both Socrates and Plato strove hard to find a

way out. They found it in moral regeneration of man.

In the history of Muslim thought, there have been two types of solution of this problem of evil. Pantheists like Ibn-i-Arabi and his followers represent one school of thought, while Rumi stands out as a representative of the other school which, in this context, may be called theistic. Ibn-i-Arabi was a man of great calibre. Temperamentally he was a philosopher but due to the demands of the age, and partly through his early training, he gave the exposition of his philosophy in mystic terminology. To a true pantheist, there is no question of good and evil or moral values. But Ibn-i-Arabi discusses it and, as is his usual practice, his statements are often confusing. As there is nothing real but One and that One is Absolute Good, there can be no evil at all. Yet in the phenomenal world, he says, there are both good and evil. Good is from God and evil from man, not in the sense that man actually does evil but because his actions are judged to be good or evil.[1] Not only evil but also good, according to him, are relative. What appears to us as evil is in reality good in itself. What is good according to one standard may be evil with regard to the other and *vice versa.*[2] Jami, a disciple of Ibn-i-Arabi, has put the matter more clearly. Though attributes and actions of

---

1. Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy of Ibn-ul-Arabi*, pp. 156-7.
2. Ibn-i-Arabi, *Fasus* (Urdu text), pp. 285-6.

men are all God's who is manifested in them, yet it is not proper for us to attribute evil, that follows from our actions, to God : for Being *qua* being is absolute Good. Evil arises on account of absence of something else. Everything that is evil is due to lack of some inherent capacities of the *'ayn* (عين). Take, for instance, the case of cold. It destroys fruit and so is evil in that particular respect. Its evil element arises because it does not allow the fruit to ripen. Similarly slaying is evil. But its evil character is not due to the power of the slayer or the capacity of the physical limb to be cut off from the body but to the disappearance of life, and that is the negation of something positive. Being, wherever it is, is good without doubt. Every evil is due to non-being.[3]

Among Western thinkers, Spinoza, being a pantheist, held the same view. According to him, our æsthetic conceptions (like beauty and ugliness) and moral standard (like good and evil), freedom of man and teleological conception of the universe, are all so many ways of imaginative thinking which we erroneously ascribe to Reality. "... The nature of things is neither good nor bad, neither well-arranged nor disordered. It has neither beauty nor ugliness ; it does not strive to realise our ends, nor fight against them. Sweet tastes and sounds, virtuous conduct and good intentions, no more belong to things as they really are than the

---

3. Jami, *Lawa'ih*, No. 30.

iniquities of the criminal or the horrors of putrefaction."[1] He held that the evil element in Nero's matricide was not positive but negative, not reality but defect of reality, *viz.*, want of natural affection and pity.

Pantheism has been a hopeless philosophy when confronted with this problem of evil. It throws overboard all moral considerations. It denies the objective reality of evil and tries to create a mood of false optimism. But when we come into contact with actual reality, the hard facts of life shake our complacency. We may say that evil is due to man as a relative non-being and not to any action of God, but the question still remains: How is the world to be relieved of it? Pantheism affords no solution. The only logical position for a consistent pantheist is to renounce the world. Theism, with the basic conception of man's freedom of choice, offers a better solution. This was the point of view adopted by Rumi. Unlike the majority of mystic writers, Rumi was a great advocate of the moral freedom of man and waged a relentless war against determinism and life of renunciation and quietitude. Struggle against what lies across our path towards the goal is the very part and parcel of our fate, and "this endeavour is not a struggle against Destiny because Destiny itself has laid this (endeavour)

---

1. H. H. Joachim, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 169-70.

upon us."[1] The advantage of this struggle against odds, according to Rumi, is that it actualises the hidden potentialties of man. "The High God lays upon our body, O man of fortitude, heat and cold, grief and pain. fear and hunger and impairment of wealth and body, all for the sake of the riches of the soul being brought into sight."[2] This aspect of Rumi's throught is allied to Fichte's Ethical Monism, according to whom resistance offered by the non-ego (which in one respect has its source in the ego itself) helps in the development of the ego.[3] It is in constant creation of resistance and then overcoming it that the human ego can aspire to achieve its destiny.

Rumi, no doubt, concedes that everything is not good on this earth, but, unlike Buddha and Schopenhauer, he holds that man, by his nature, is capable of overcoming evil. We find both good

---

1. با قضا پنجه زدن نبود جهاد زانکه این را هم قضا بر ما نهاد
(دفتر اول - شعر ۹۷۶)

2.
حق تعالیٰ گرم و سرد و رنج و درد
بر تن ما می نهد اے شیر مرد
خوف و جوع و نقص اموال و بدن
جمله بهر نقد جاں ظاهر شدن
(دفتر دوم - اشعار ۲۹۶۳-۶۴)

3. *Cf.* the following verses of *Asrar-i-Khudi* of Iqbal :
صد جهاں پوشیده اندر ذات او
غیر او پیداست از اثبات او
در جهاں تخم خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیر خود پنداشت است
سازد از خود پیکر اغیار را
تا فزاید لذت پیکار را
(صفحه ۱۸-۱۹)

and evil intermixed[1] in the world, and this presence of evil is essential for the appreciation and realization of value. When foolishness and vice disappear, there can be no wisdom and virtue. It is the resistance of the air which enables a bird to fly. Good and bad, true and false, are mixed by God with the purpose that man may create within himself a touchstone. When there is no enemy, the Holy War is inconceivable ; if you have no lust, there can be no obedience to the Divine Command.[2] Man has no right to complain of evil, because it is the presence of evil that has raised man to be the paragon of creation.[3]

Iqbal accepts this theistic interpretation of Rumi. He says that we can fully agree neither with optimists like Browning nor pessimists like Schopenhauer. The Quran teaches neither of these but meliorism, which recognises a growing universe and is antimated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil.[4] The best possible

---

1
آنکه گوید جمله حق است ، احمقے است
زانکه گوید جمله باطل ، او شقے است
(دفتر دوم - اشعار ۲۹۳۹-۲۹۴۲)

2
چوں عدو نبود جہاد آمد محال
شہوت از نبود نباشد امتثال
(دفتر پنجم - اشعار ۵۷۵ - ۷۶)

3
در حقیقت ہر عدو داروئے تست
کیمیائے نافع و دلجوئے تست
زیں سبب بر انبیا رانج و شکست
از ہمه خلق جہاں افزون تراست
(دفتر چہارم - شعر ۹۴،۹۷ - ۱۰۰)

4. *Lectures*, pp. 112-13.

explanation of this problem is given in the legend commonly known as the Fall of Adam. The Quranic description of the event, according to Iqbal, does not deal with the first appearance of man on the earth. It rather refers to the primitive state when was practically unrelated to his environment, and, consequently, did not feel the sting of human want, the birth of which alone marked the beginning of human culture. It depicts a stage when man comes to possess a free self capable of doubt and disobedience. An unrestrained devil whom God allows free scope is the symbol of man's liberty and freedom. In no case does it symbolise fall to moral depravity. It is rather transition from simple consciousness to the first flash-consciousness, and with its appearance man for the first time felt the throb of the freedom of choice, though his very first act turned out to be an act of disobedience. It was forgiven merely because the power of choice given to man involved this risk. We cannot expect goodness from an individual who is moved from outside. It is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal, and arises out of a willing co-operation of free egos. Goodness without freedom is impossible. But where freedom leads to good, it may often lead to what is the opposite of good. The fact that in spite of this risk man was given the freedom of choice, proves that God had full faith in the capacity of man to resist evil and

1. The Quran 21 : 36.

overcome it. It is now for man to justify this faith. "Perhaps such a risk alone makes it possible to test and develop the potentialities of a being who was created of the 'goodliest fabric' and then 'brought down to be the lowest of the low.' As the Quran says: 'And for trial will We test you with evil and with good.'[1] Good and evil, therefore, though opposites, must fall within the same whole."[1] Thus Iqbal reaches the same conclusion as Rumi, God's trial of man through misfortune as mentioned in the Quran is interpreted by both as a means of actualizing the possibilities of man. Such being the case, Satan as the embodiment of all that is not good, as the enemy of man, becomes indispensable for the moral development of man.[2] It is our duty to fight Satan of every step and Satan in this context stands for all those forces in life which tend to loosen the tension of personality, which lead to its relaxation and utter dissolution.[3] Adam

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 118.
2. Cf. Rumi, *Mathnavi*, IV, 94.

در حقیقت هر عدو داروئے تست
کیمیائے نافع و دلجوئے تست

and Ipbal, *Asrar-i-Khudi*, (p. 88).

راست میگویم عدو هم یار تست
هستئی او رونق بازار تست
کشت انسان را عدو باشد سحاب
ممکناتش را بر انگیزد ز خواب
سنگ ره گردد فسان تیغ عزم
قطع منزل امتحان تیغ عزم

3. Introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi* (Eng. Tr.), Lahore Ed.pp. xxi-xxii.

was placed, after his first act of disobedience, in an environment which is extremely painful. It was not the result of punishment for Adam's sin, but an act of favour pregnant with untold possibilities for his future benefit. It was done "to defeat the object of Satan, who, as an enemy of man, diplomatically tried to keep him ignorant of the joy of perpetual growth and expansion. But the life of a finite ego in an obstructing environment depends on the perpetual expansion of knowledge based on actual experience. And the experience of finite ego to whom several possibilities are open, expands only by the method of trial and error. Therefore, error which may be described as a kind of intellectual evil, is an indispensable factor in the building up of an experience."[1] Thus according to Iqbal, the only way to meet the challenge of Satan to adopt a way of life which keeps the tension of personality alive and which fortifies it. It lies in the scientific attempt of the modern man to overcome material obstructions.[2]

ماسوا از بہر تسخیر است و بس
سینۂ او عرضۂ تیر است و بس
هر که محسوسات را تسخیر کرد
عالمے از ذره اے تعمیر کرد
غایتش توسیع ذات مسلم است
امتحان ممکنات مسلم است
اے که از تاثیر افیون خفتۂ
عالم اسباب را دوں گفتۂ

---

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 120.
2. Introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi* (Eng.), p. xxiii.

خیز و وا کن دیدهٔ مخمور را
دون مخواں ایں عالم مجبور را
(رموز بے خودی)

The non-ego is meant only to be conquered,
Its heart is only to be the target of our arrows.
He who controlled the se se objects,
Created a world out of a dust particle.
Its object is the expansion of the personality of a Muslim,
To put his potentialities to test.
O you who are asleep due to the effect of opium,
And call this world of causal chains as base ;
Rise and open your intoxicated eyes,
Don't call this determined world as base.

The path of the mystic has proved ineffective to meet this challenge of evil forces. The Quran testifies to the futility of this approach.[1] A mystic forgets that the surest way to reach the core of reality lies through its appearances. Islam raises a strong voice against this unhealthy mysticism. Study of empirical science is the indispensable stage in the moral evolution of man. But this scientific study should be only for 'moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes, and it is thus only that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes[2] united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and

---

1. The Quran, 57 : 27. See *M'arif al-Quran*, Vol. II (Delhi) p. 84.

2. Iqbal. *Self in the Light of Relativity*. (An Article). See the writer's *A study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, pp. 399-401.

time. Action is the highest form of contemplation." Thus, in empirical study and creative and dynamic action can we meet the challenge of Satan most satisfactorily.

جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی بے نمود
کہ خالی نہیں ہے ضمیر وجود
ہر اک منتظر تیری یلغار کا
تری شوخئ فکر و کردار کا
یہ ہے مقصد گردش روزگار
کہ تیری خودی تجھ پہ ہو آشکار

(بال جبریل - صفحہ ۱۷۳)

There are as yet many worlds to be manifested,
For the womb of Being is not empty.
Every world is waiting to be attacked by you,
To feel the sharpness of your thought and deed.
This is the object of the revolutions of day and night
That your self may reveal itself to you.

(2) But, as already stated, in the works of Iqbal we meet with another Iblis who is not a hideous personality of the traditional scriptures, who may or may not have seduced our first parent, but who no doubt rebelled against the "tyrannical" rule of the All-powerful monarch of the Heaven. His a charming personality, a creature of heroic blood the personification of forceful, abundant and ever-growing life, who rebels against authority with the sole object of enabling man to enjoy abundance of life, rich and invigorating. He is not condemned to eternal perdition in Hell, but enjoys the company of Ghalib and Hallaj, roaming restlessly in the vastness of the celestial sphere, with a soft corner in his heart for the 'wretched and writh-

ing worm' called man.[1]

Unlike Dante's Satan who is hideous and static, immersed in ice up to the waist, Iqbal's Iblis is all aflame, clad in black and surrounded in a cloud of smoke. Rumi introduces him to Iqbal as an outlaw and *mulla*, a philosopher and mystic, active and dynamic. His figure is quite unlike the Satan of the traditional religion and is more like a being of iron will and constant dynamic activity, the sole object of whose creation seems to lie in awakening mankind to the realization of higher ideals.[2]

This description of Satan as a heroic figure, for whom we have nothing but sympathy and admiration, is not peculiar to Iqbal. Before him some mystic writers in the East had adopted a similar attitude towards him. To them, Satan was not a wretch eternally damned for his disobedience to God, but a hero to emulated for his constancy in belief in the Unity of God.[3] They acted as the advocates of the Devil, "sometimes ranking the Devil with the prophets and sometimes placing him even above them. In his dialogues Hallaj triumphantly asserts the Devil's superiority to Adam and to Moses, though he has made a concession to orthodoxy by raising Muhammad above him—but a later Persian poet had the boldness to assert their equality."[4]

1. See Iqbal, *Javed Nama*, pp. 133-161.
2. Iqbal *Javed Nama* pp. 133-161.
3. Affifi. *op. cit.*, p. 161, footnote 4.
4. Kh. Abdul Hakim, *Metaphysics of Rumi*. (Lahore, 1933). p. 69.

در مذهب عاشقان یک رنگ    ابلیس و محمد است هم سنگ

In the West, a similar tendency to idolise Satan is noticeable to Milton and particularly in Goethe. This transformation in the traditional role of Satan took place under the influence of Mani.

Mani's new religion which he began to preach about 242 A.C. in Western Asia, was eclectic in character, based mostly on Zoroastrianism and Christianity. He started with a dualism of Light and Darkness and ended in a moral system of extreme form of renunciation and self-mortification. On one side, there is the realm of Light, and, on the other, the realm of Darkness, both existing eternally apart. In the past, Darkness invaded the realm of Light and thus Evil began. The great event, to the issue of which is due the existence of this world, came to pass through the unlicensed activity of the Powers of Darkness. The dynamic principle, therefore, is supplied by the forces of evil. "In Darkness—the feminine principle of nature—were hidden," according to Mani, "the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil—the principle of activity."[1]

It is due to the activity of Satan that Adam came into being.[2] Adam was engendered by Satan in conjunction with 'sin', 'cupidity' and

---

1. Iqbal, *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. 15.

2. F. C. Burkitt, *Re'igious of the Manichees*, (London, 1925), pp. 22-30.

'desire'. But the spirit of darkness thrust into his being the stolen portions of light in order to dominate them. Hence Adam is a discordant being created in the image of Satan but carrying within him the stronger sparks of light.

Mani had before him the eternal problem of good and evil and gave a bold answer. His dualism and moral ascerticism had a great appeal to the people of the age, and in spite of severest persecutions Mani's followers flourished for about one thousand years. Mani's religion influenced almost all religious fraternities. Muslim sufis, too, owe a great deal of their practical asceticism to this religion which advocated celibacy and other forms of extreme renunciation.

According to Christianity and Islam, God created all things, both men and angels, including Satan. But in practice Satan was believed as an independent power, who own victories among men against the will of God, and was destined to live for ever in the company of those souls whom he had dragged down to Hell, God created Satan, no doubt, and afterwards Satan rebelled. But who created the impulse which led Satan to rebel? Was it eternally there? It is impossible to argue further, and there seems to be much in common view which resembles Mani's dualism, Schopenhauer's conclusions were allied to Mani's thought. When we pierce the veil of *maya* he says, we behold not God but Satan, the

wicked omnipotent Will, perpetually busied in weaving a web of suffering for the torture of its creatures. Terrified by this diabolical vision, Schopenhauer sought refuge in non-existence *fana*, or self-annihilation.[1] Mani held Satan to be independently co-existent with God, while Schopenhauer thought that the principle of objectification (the 'sinful bent' of the will to life) existed in the very nature of the Primal Will and not independent of it.

Even before Schopenhauer, al-Jilli, in his famous book, *al-Insan al-Kamil*, had looked upon the Principle of Evil as a part of the Godhead, "God", said hé, "created *Nafs-i-Muhammadiyya* from Himself and God is a unity in diversity. From Him were manifested two opposite tendencies, The Angels of Light reflected the attributes of Beauty (*jamal*), Light and Righteousness, while Satan and his host reflected His Attributes of *jalal*, Darkness and Vice (*dhalal*)."[2] Mani's influence is easily discérnible here. In the Kabaalist literature of the Jews we meet with the same view. The authors of Kabaala look upon God as having an evil side. Evil exists as a possibility in God Himself. When God abandons certain parts of Himself to their latent impulses, evil is expressed. "There existed in the Infinite a sort of latent

---

1. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1947) p. 786.

2. Urdu Translation of *al-Insan-al-Kamil* by M. Fazal Miran, p. 240.

life which God has liberated, given over to its own forces, and which developed and expressed itself, in the good towards joy eternal in the evil towards pain eternal. God has intensified His own existence, raising to glory the good parts of Himself.'"[1]

The Manichee creed influenced Christendom through the person of St. Augustine, who for nine years was a follower of this religion. The imprint of Manichaenism on his mind was so strong and enduring that its relics can still be seen in his books. "He carried about with him more Manichee ideas than he was conscious of. Those who look for it can still trace the Manichaean imagery in the 11th book of Augustine's great work. Augustine knew that Darkness was no more than the absence of Light, but for all that when in XI, 33, he is making a contrast between the two Angelic Societies, the one *tranquil* in its *luminous* piety, the other *turbulent* with its *dark* cupidities and *smoking* with the unclean mouth of its own loftiness, he uses language with a curiously Manichaean ring. And while he was doing this he was binding the imagination of fifty generations to come."[2]

It was mostly through Augustine and other Manichee missionary activities and partly through Kabaalist literature that the figure of Satan assumed a form different from one depicted in the religious literature of Christianity

---

1. Denis Sauret, *Milton : Man and Thinker*, p. 110.
2. F. C. Burkitt, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

and Islam. In Muslim thought this heroic concept of Satan remained confined to a very few mystic writers like Hallaj and Ibn-i-Arabi who were greatly influenced in their speculations by Christian philosophic thought. In the West, however, the fascinating figure of Satan, as an embodiment of power and eternal struggle of good and evil, became the theme of several poems. A poet dealing with this theme writes : "Out of all (the angels). He (God) gave him (Satan) the greatest power in mind and body. In the heavenly kingdom, he was the highest in authority after Him. He was made very bright. His figure, which God gave him in the Heaven, was exceedingly majestic. He was like shining stars". Satan's revolt is described in the poem under the title : Why should I toil ? He says, "I need no lord. I can perform as many miracles as He whom people call their Lord. I have power enough to build a throne better than His in Heaven or even above that. Why should I look up to His grace ? Why should I prostrate before Him in such humility? I can be a Lord as He is . . . "[1]

Milton was definitely influenced by all these currents of thought. His *Paradise Lost* bears ample testimony to all these diverse influences. Referring to the evil aspect of God he says :

> Evil into the mind of God or man

---

1. *Cf.* Mr. Aziz Ahmad, *Iqbal, A New Interpretation* (Urdu), p. 240.

May come and go, so unapproved, and leave
No spot or blame behind.

(*Paradise Lost*, V, 117-9)

Satan confirms it when he says :

The son of God I also am.

(*Paradise Regained,* IV, 518)

The common religious tradition attributes the fall of Satan to pride, and it is pride and self-conceit that mark the character of Milton's Satan. But in the *Paradise Lost* this pride loses its immoral significance. It stands rather for self-confidence and self-reliance :—

seek
Our own good from our selves, and from our own
Live to our selves. (*Paradise Lost*, II, 252-4)

In such a mood of self-confidence Satan says in another place :

We know no time when we were not as now,
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised.
By our own quick'ning power.

(*Paradise Lost*, V, 859-61)

Satan is all-powerful and denies that there is another being who can be more powerful than he :

while they feel
Vigour Divine within them, can allow
Omnipotence to none. (*Paradise Lost*, VI, 157-9)

He is a rebel, no doubt, but a rebel who refuses to recognise defeat, and is willing to go down fighting for a cause which is hopeless. He is the personification of high ambition, undying spirit which fears no opposition. What do failures and the triumphs of the enemy matter, if one is resolved not to submit? None is

vanquished who remains strong in his own spirit. Passion and ambition form the very core of his character. In self he finds the sole motive of action. It is the character so often seen on the political stage. It exhibits all the restlessness, temerity and cunning which have marked the mighty hunters of mankind from Nimrod and Chengiz Khan to Hitler and Mussolini. They are looked upon as great men and their greatness arises from the fact that their personalities are dynamic and they act from some great motive. Milton's Satan represents absolute power in its naked form, and his sole motive of action is intense selfishness, the alcohol of egotism. He would rather reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.[1] (*Paradise Lost*, I, 252).

This fascinating figure of Satan had a great appeal to Iqbal. He was a prophet of power and for him power ultimately decides the values of good and evil. In *Asrar-i-Khudi*, he says :

زندگانی قوت پیداستے
اصل او از ذوق استیلاستے

ناتوانی زندگی را رهزن است
بطنش از خوف و دروغ آبستن است

با توانائی صداقت توام است
گر خود آگاهی همیں جام جم است

زندگی کشت است و حاصل قوت است
شرح رمز حق و باطل قوت است

مدعی گر مایه دار از قوت است
دعوئی او بے نیاز از حجت است

---

1. A. H. Gilbert, *On the Composition of Paradise Lost*, pp. 55-56.

باطل از قوت پذیرد شان حق
خویش را حق داند از بطلان حق
از کن او زهر کوثر می شود
خیر را گوید شرے ، شر می شود

Life is *power* made manifest,
And its mainspring is the desire for victory.
Weakness is the plunderer of Life,
Its womb is teeming with fears and lies.
Strength is the twin of Truth ;
If thou knowest thyself, strength is the Truth-revealing glass.
Life is the seed, and *power* the crop :
Power explains the mystery of truth and falsehood.
A claimant, if he be possessed of power,
Needs no argument for his claims.
Falsehood derives from power the authority of truth.
And by falsifying truth deems itself true.
It says to Good, "Thou art bad", and Good becomes Evil.[1]

It was as symbols of such power that Iqbal refers favourably to Napoleon[2] and Mussolini.[3]

---

1. *Cf.* Nietzche : "What is good ? All that increases the feeling of power, will for power, power itself in man. What is bad ? All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness ? The feeling that power increases—that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness, but more power ; not peace at any price, but warfares, not virtue, but capacity." See the writer's *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. 86.

Rumi has given expression to such power :

به زیر کنگرهٔ کبریاش مردانند
فرشته صید و پیمبر شکار و یزداں گیر

2. راز ہے راز ہے تقدیر جہان تگ و تاز
جوش کردار سے کھل جاتے ہیں تقدیر کے راز
جوش کردار سے شمشیر سکندر کا طلوع
کوہ الوند ہؤا جسکی حرارت سے گداز
جوش کردار سے تیمور کا سیل ہمه گیر
سیل کے سامنے کیا شے ہے نشیب اور فراز

3. ندرت فکر و عمل سے معجزات زندگی
ندرت فکر و عمل سے سنگ خاره لعل ناب

His eulogies of Mussolini have led certain critics to accuse him of Fascist tendencies, as his references to Lenin and Marx have led others to charge him with Communistic leanings. As a matter of fact he has neither. He was a Muslim, and wherever he saw an expression of certain Islamic values, he did not fail to appreciate it. A study of his books will reveal that his praises of Mussolini did not at all imply any apology for his misdeeds. He refers to him only as a symbol of power just as Satan stands for him as a representative of Power. In a letter to Dr. Nicholson he refers to the criticism of Mr. Dickenson about his views expressed in *Asrar-i-Khudi*. He claims that by power he does not mean physical power or brute force but spiritual and moral power. As a matter of fact, however, Iqbal believes in both and here he seems to be under the influence of Nietzsche. In the verses quoted from *Asrar-i-Khudi* (p. 98) he seems to have made power the sole criterion of moral values and the trend of the argument and spirit of the language lead definitely to the view that Iqbal had physical power in mind. Like Nietzsche, he believed that it was necessary to be physically strong and hard.

در صلابت آبروئے زندگی است
ناتوانی ، نا کسی پختگی است

In solidity lies the honour of Life ;
Weakness is lowliness and imperfection

And

تقدیر کے قاضی کا یہ فتویٰ ہے ازل سے
ہے جرم ضعیفی کی سزا مرگ مفاجات

It is the eternal decree of the Judge of Destiny :
The punishment for the crime of weakness is death.

In another place he says :

اگر لہو ھے بدن میں قو خوف ھے نہ ھراس
اگر لہو ھے بدن میں تو دل ھے بے وسواس

If there is blood in the body, there is no fear or danger,
If there is blood, the heart is without any misgiving.

Power represented by a Chengiz or a Mussolini may lead to the release of evil forces of destruction. But to Iqbal this misuse of power serves to bring into relief the forces of good. The death of one thing means the birth of a new and perhaps of better one :

گفت رومی هر بنائے کہنہ کآ بادان کنند
می ندانی اول آن بنیاد را ویران کنند ؟

Rumi said : if there is a desire to rebuild an old building,
Don't you know that first it is dismantled ?

Without this conflict between these two forces, it is impossible to conceive progress and development. Reality, says Iqbal, is a sum of parts which are in perpetual conflict with one another, and are yet progressing gradually in a collective form towards a whole. This conflict results inevitably in their mutual integration.[1] Without this ever-recurring strife and constant struggle, it is impossible for man to rise higher in the scale of life and attain the goal of immortality. Man is a candidate for immortal life

1. *Cf.* Letter of Iqbal to Dr. Nicholson referred to above.

which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego :[1]

دوام حق جزائے کار او نیست
که او را این دوام از جستجو نیست
دوام آن به که جان مستعارے
شود از عشق و مستی پائدارے

(گلشن راز جدید)

The eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His actions.
That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wins for herself by love's frenzy.[2]

Thus power such is an as ideal for which one must be ready to fight. This is possible, according to Iqbal, through the conquest of matter, or control of the physical forces of nature. The material world is a field where the battle for the integration of self and its evolution is to be fought and won. Without attaining this power which is the result of mastery over nature, it is impossible to establish a durable civilization. "The cultures of Asia and, in fact, of the whole ancient world failed, because they approached Reality exclusively from within and moved from within outwards. This procedure gave them theory without power, and on mere theory no durable civilization can be based."[3] Iqbal's criticism of Plato and pantheistic mystics, in short, all the philosophies of life which taught contempt for material

---

1. Iqbal, *McTaggart's Philosophy.* (An article).
2. Iqbal, *McTaggart's Philosophy.* (An article).
3. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 19.

aspect of the universe, rose out of the conviction that without a proper adjustment to our physical environment, it was impossible to establish a lasting civilization.

Thus, Satan, the personification of power is identified with intellect because attainment of power is the result of our intellectual efforts. But power without some controlling principle is sure to assume such proportions as would make it destructive of all human values. We need Satan to a certain limit. He stands for passion, self-sufficiency, self-confidence, even denial of gods. But then this association must come to an end. If we go full length with him, he is sure to lead us into chaos and destruction. A stage comes when we must leave his company. It is then love which comes forward and helps us in scaling new heights. The demon of absolute and godless power is controlled by the angels of love. Satan helps us in giving power without which life of an individual would not be free in the real sense. God could have protected man from the guiles of Satan, had He wished : but He preferred to leave him his independence and free will to choose good or evil as he would. An unrestrained Devil is the symbol of man's true freedom. But then this power must be controlled by the moral force called love.

Milton's *Paradise Lost* revolves round the same conflict, between love which delights in desiring from some one else and ultimately from God, and pride or self-love, which clamours for

personal independence. Thie conflict is indeed human and contemporary and has a great deal of interest for us.[1] Our age is full of stories of intellectual exploits of the modern man, but of what we seldom hear is the conquest of love. We have enough and even to spare, of reason and conquest of matter, and the result of all this is disharmony and chaos in our lives. Everybody is yearning for an escape. The only way lies in surrender of oneself to love's frenzy.

If we go through *Paradise Lost*, we seem to feel that Milton stresses the role of reason to a degree which to our present generation seems excessive. One of his critics, for example has pointed out that 'mind and understanding is all; heart and will little spoken of.' In his faculty psychology, reason dominates and directs the will.[1] Thus *Paradise Lost* is considered to be a record of the conflict of passion *vs.* reason. The greater your victory against Satan, the embodiment of passion, the nearer you reach the ideal of reason. To a certain degree we must give allowance to Milton for the demands of his age. It needed more of reason's coolness and clarity rather than faith, and therefore Milton's emphasis on reason. But if we plunge deeper into it, we discover that he acknowledged the will's conformity with divine Love to be indispensable for attaining what he calls 'para-

---

1, Hamilton. *Hero or Fool? A Study of Milton's Satan* pp. 40-41.

2. M. M, Mahood, *Poetry and Humanism*, p. 222.

dise within.' (*Paradise Lost*, XII, 587). Love, rather than reason, resolves the seeming contradiction between free will and a created condition. "Freely we serve," the angels say, "because we freely love.," (*Paradise Lost*, V. 538-9).

To Satan, it is servitude of the worst sort to serve somebody other than one's self, an attitude of mind which has become the characteristic of the man of the modern age of intellectualism. But Abdiel, the loyal angel, replies that it is no servitude to serve whom God ordains. Servitude is when you serve your baser self.

> This is servitude
> To serve th' unwise, or him who hath rebelled
> Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee,
> *Thy self not free, but to thyself enthrall'd.*
>
> (*Paradise Lost*, VI, 178-81)

The lost line brings to the forefront the contradiction in Satan's character. The revolt of the angels was a movement of self-fulfilment and Satan at first appeared to be completely fulfilled. Satan and his followers had all the virtues of courage, loyalty and pity, and at first their intellectual powers remained undiminished in Hell. But then Milton compares them to giant trees withered by lightning. (*Paradise Lost*, I, 612-15). It signifies that all intellectual and moral qualities suffer sterility, when they are divorced from the source of all life. Cut off from the Good, Satan suffers in his creative and dynamic potentialities. Satan once claimed :

To mind is its own place, and in its self
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.
(*Paradise Lost*, I, 254-5)

But soon he realizes the futility of breaking away from the Good. He feels frustrated :

Which way I fly is Hell ; myself am Hell.
(*Paradise Lost*, IV, 75)

At a later stage the realization of barrenness and absence of self-fufilment dawns on him in all its nakedness.

Bane, and in Heav'n much worse would be my state.
(*Paradise Lost*, IX, 122-3)

No better words can describe the state of mental confusion into which man of the modern age has brought himself. Like Satan he revolted against the 'tyrannical' authority of God's sacred law and started on what he proudly claimed to be a career of self-fulfilment. But after every decade he began to feel that something was amiss and each day added to the anguish of his heart. It is this sterility of power divorced from love, from 'vision', which Iqbal wanted to bring home to his contemporaries. Satan, as an embodiment of Power, must not be allowed to pursue a course totally cut off from Love, the source of all life. Both must combine to give stability, security, peace and harmony to the life of the modern man who has made a hell for himslf on every side. Iqbal has described this condition of the modern man in the following words : "The modern man with his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism finds himself in a strange predicament. His naturalism has given him

an unprecedented control over the forces of nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future . . . . Wholly over-shadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, (he) has ceased to live soulfully, *i.e.*, from within. In the domain of thought, he is living in open conflict with himself, and in the domain of economic and political life, he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless energy and infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness."[1] The only way to counteract this life-weariness, this tendency in the modern man to meet undeserved death, is to develop what Iqbal calls the 'perception heart,' of to look to religion so as to restore the equilibrium in life which he is yearning after.

یورپ از شمشیر خود بسمل فتاد
زیر گردوں رسم لا دینی نہاد

عقل و فکرش بے عیار خوب و زشت
چشم او بے نم ، دل او سنگ و خشت

علم ازو رسواست اندر شہر و دشت
جبرئیل از صحبتش ابلیس گشت

دانش افرنگیاں تیغے بدوش
در ہلاک نوع انساں سخت کوش

عقل اندر حکم دل یزدانی است
چوں ز دل آزاد شد ، شیطانی است

(پس چه باید کرد)

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 103.

Europe has fallen a prey to its own sword,
It has set up the law of secularism ;
Its philosophy is without any standard of good and evil,
Its eye is never wet, its heart is like a stone ;
Knowledge has been made vile throught it,
Gabriel turns into Satan in its company.
Wisdom of the West is a naked sword,
Bent on the destruction of human race.
Intellect when subject to heart is divine,
When freed from heart, becomes Satanic.

Milton's interpretation of the story of the Fall and the part played by Satan as dealt with in *Paradise Lost*, is similar in several respects to that of Iqbal. In the Christian West, Adam's fall is looked upon as a sort of punishment for his disobedience, and, therefare the cause of all our woes and miseries. We cannot run away from it. The whole thing is inevitable. Yet Milton made the same story the theme of his poem which he claimed to be "an elaborate song to generations," and a poem "doctrinal to a nation." Wherein, then, lies this new doctrine which he offers "to a nation" ?

"Milton," says Basil Willey, "was a Promethean, a Renaissance humanist, in the toils of a myth of quite contrary import, a myth which yearned, as no Milton could, for the blank innocence and effortlessness of a golden age." This quotation sums up the significance of the attempt made by Milton in presenting the traditional story of the Fall of Adam in *Paradise Lost*. He totally reversed the ideal so commonly cherished by pious Christians of all ages,

of a return to a life of primitive innocence untouched by evil, sufferings and woes. To him the action of Adam and Eve was *not* a lapse, since its result was the coming of thought into the world.[1] The act was in reality a brave vindication of Reason's freedom to choose. Satan seduced Eve and Adam, and thereby became a means, not of inflicting any punishment on mankind by driving them out of Paradise to this hell of earth but of untold blessings in the form of giving them an opportunity to exercise freedom of choice by which he has the opportunity to create a "paradise within happier far." (*Paradise Lost* XII, 587).

The Fall, therefore, according to Milton's new doctrine, is a crossroad of the mind at which its love of learning, like other impulses, takes the wrong direction. But this going astray is involved in the very nature of free-will given to man. Only a being capable of sin could know the real meaning which Milton attached to the notion of spiritual freedom. Thus the Fall was logically a necessary stage in the evolution of man.

In one of his prose works, Milton writes, "Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably ; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be

———

1. *The Seventeenth Century Background* as quoted in M. M. Mahood, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed upon Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder, were not more intermixed. It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is the doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil ; that is to say, of knowing good by evil.

"As therefore the state of man now is, what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of evil ? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguished, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we brings not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather ; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary."[1]

In *Paradise Lost*, therefore, Milton does not intend to cry over spilt milk, nor does he wish to put the milk back in the bottle by a resort to fugitive and cloistered virtue. He is

---

1. F.A. Patterson, *The Student's Milton* p. 738 as quoted in M. M. Mahood, *op. cit.*, p. 246. *Cf.* Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp 113-122.

ready to acknowledge Divine mercy which brought good out of evil. God created man free with the gift of reason and yet He has arranged everything so that His total plan may be realised. Satan himself, the great Rebel, the free-will that opposes the Creator, is only an instrument in the carrying out of the ultimate Plan. God speaks of his rebellion as :

My damage fondly deemed. (*Paradise Lost* VII, 152)

What Satan foolishly thinks he has done against God, has been done, of Satan's own free will, in fulfilment of God's decree. God has used evil, has used even Satan, to fulfil His purpose. That is why Adam, when the plans of God are revealed to him in the end, after having seen all the evil, crime and suffering that are to be, understands the Will of God and cries :

O goodness infinite, goodness immense ;
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good ; more wonderful
Than that which by creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness ! full of doubt I stand,
Whether I should repent me now of sin
By me done and occasioned, or rejoice
Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring,
To God more glory, more good will to Men
From God, and over wrath grace shall abound.
(*Paradise Lost*, XII, 469-78).

Thus the Fall is a matter not of repentance or regret but of rejoicing. It is not a punishment for an original act of sin.[1] To both Milton

---

1. Milton did not believe in the theory of original sin. See Denis Sauret, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

and Iqbal it was a Fortunate Fall in that it brought to mankind the gifts of freedom of choice and an opportunity for the exercise of reason. In this very fall lies the seeds of regeneration of man.

In *Javed Nama*, Iqbal expresses the significance of the fall for man. Iblis addresses Zinda Rud as follows:—

در گذشتم از سجود اے بے خبر
ساز کردم ارغنون خیر و شر
تا نصیب از درد آدم داشتم
قہر یار از بہر او نگداشتم
شعله ها از کشت زار من دمید
او ز مجبوری به مختاری رسید
زشتئی خود را نمودم آشکار
با تو دادم ذوق ترک و اختیار

(جاوید نامه - ۱۵۸-۱۵۹)

O ignorant man ! I bade farewell no prostration ;
And started the organ of good and evil.
As I had sympathy for the agony of Adam,
For his sake I did not forego the wrath of my friend.
Sparks of fire grew out of my field,
But Adam marched from bondage to freedom.
I manifested my evil nature,
And gave to you the pleasure of choice.

It is through this freedom of will and exercise of reason—the gifts of Satan to man—that man succeeds in mastering the forces of nature and thus brings under his control the forces of evil.

عقل بدام آورد فطرت چالاک را
اهر من سعله زاد سجده کند خاک را

Intellect ensnares the clever Nature,
The fiery Iblis prostrates before Dust (man).

The lesson we learn from the legend of the Fall, therefore, is that it was not Adam's birth but the disobedience of Satan that brought this universe of manifold charm and beauty into existence. The Fall has turned out to be fortunate due to the 'sacrifice' of Satan. Had Satan not disobeyed God and not succeeded in seducing Adam, man would have continued to live in a state of pure and unalloyed innocence, unaware of the pangs of love and separation, and of eternal conflict of good and evil, in a condition of total passivity and inactivity. It was really the 'no' of Satan that brought dynamism and charm into the life of man. Into the unperturbed calm of the universe[1] at the time of the birth of Adam, Iblis threw the stone of denial and everything began to feel the throb of life. His was a creative dynamic force which gave meaning and significance to the existence of man.[2] In the words of Mani, the realm of Light was exclusively self-contained and utter passivity. All of a sudden the realm of Darkness invaded the realm

---

1. کسقدر خاموش ہے یہ عالم بے کاخ و کو !

How noiseless this dull world is !

2. ابلیس : ہے مری جرأت سے مشت خاک میں ذوق نمو

میرے فتنے جامۂ عقل و خرد کا تار و پو

It was through my daring (to say no) that this handful of earth (*i.e.*, man) came to possess the ambition of expression. My activities alone constitute the warp and woof of the garment of intellect and reason.

of Light and lo ! everywhere there was activity, life, movement. The silence of death all at once changed into a roar of life.[1]

من 'بلے' در پردۂ 'لا' گفتہ ام
گفتۂ من خوشتر از نا گفتہ ام

(My 'no' was in reality an affirmation. It is better that I said 'no'.)

It was in this 'no' of Iblis, this 'invasion' of light of darkness, that not only man but the universe came to their own. Addressing God, Iblis justifies his 'no' :

پیکر انجم ز تو ، گردش انجم ز من
جاں بجہاں اندرم ، زندگی مضمرم
تو بہ بدن جاں دہی، شور بجاں من دہم
تو بہ سکوں رہ زنی ، من بہ تپش رہبرم
آدم خاکی نہاد ، دوں نظر و کم سواد
زاد در آغوش تو ، پیر شود در برم

(پیام مشرق ، صفحہ ۱۴۰)

You created the stars : their movement is due to me,
The hidden life of the universe is through me (and not through you).
You blew your breath into the body (of man) ; but it became dynamic through me.
You walk on the path of passivity, while I lead all to activity.
This Adam of clay, lacking in vision and narrow in outlook,
Was born in your lap, but will mature under my care.

---

1. جبریل - ہمدم دیرینہ! کیسا ہے جہان رنگ و بو؟
ابلیس - سوز و ساز و درد و داغ و جستجو و آرزو

*Gabriel* : Old comrade ! How do you find this world of charm ?

*Iblis* : It is a world of songs and cries, pains and torments, strife and ambition.

## IQBAL AND GOETHE

The eighteenth century in Europe—the Age of Enlightenment—was characterised by rationalism in philosophy. Reason became the sole standard of judgment and religious dogmas therefore began to be questioned. In the psychology of the time, the place of vantage was given to intellect while feeling and will were neglected and given a subordinate place in the economy of mind. But, in reality, this intellectualim was negative in its effects. It started only as a reaction against the religious exclusiveness and theological bigotry of the Church. It made no positive contribution to the cultural development of Europe. In the last decade of the century, Kant (1724-1804) and Rousseau (1712-78) succeeded in bringing down the whole edifice of rationalism. Now attention began to be diverted to non-intellectual modes of thought, to will and feeling. Kant's position in this revolt against intellectualism was only preparatory. His *Critique of Pure Reason* clearly and finally demonstrated the limitations under which human intellect worked and beyond which it was incapable of going. He broke the spell women by the rationalists round the 'all-powerful' reason. But it was left to Rousseau to give some positive content to this revolt.

To him feeling better expressed the nature of man than reason, and, therefore, he strove hard to focus the attention of his contemporaries on the unsophisticated life of the primitive man in whom feeling alone reigns supreme. He became the philosophic guide of the new movement. In his system the notion of nature became the absolute norm by which all things were to be measured. It was the antithesis of all that modern culture with its scientific advance stood for and it was to this urbane culture that the woes and ills of Europe were due. The only path of safety, according to him, lay in return to nature. Man was born free, but now he is everywhere in chains. By nature he is good and peaceful, but intellectual culture has made him unhappy and evil. In nature there is harmony, in the life of man nothing but confusion and disorder. He emphasised man's original oneness as a positive ideal against the sophisticated divisions of mankind into different classes. He pleaded strongly that emotions, passions, instincts and intuitions should be given a due place along with reason.

Rousseau's criticism of European culture, his rehabilitation of emotional and irrational forces, his ideal of a natural humanity, and especially his vague, but for that very reason useful, notion of nature as the supreme value, all laid the foundation for the new doctrines of life and art which arose Germany under Herder's leadership.

Herder made a great impression on Goethe

and it was through him that Goethe became familiar with the intellectual currents which flowed together in Europe from diverse sources and converged to form a mighty stream of anti-rationalist doctrines and tendencies. The greatest defect of rationalism is that it views the human mind as static and uniform and ignores its historical development and its variegated nature. It taught that the principles of human life formulated in the light of reason were valid for every nation and for every age. Herder protested strongly against this view. He could not understand how Germans could follow French cultural traditions in all aspects of life and still retain their peculiar national character. Historically and geographically the two peoples were different and hence their literature must reflect their own national aspirations. His revolt against rationalism, therefore, became a revolt against supremacy of French hegemony in culture and literature. He did much in reviving the German folk songs (Herder was the first to give them this name), which, according to him, were the timeless modes of true poetry.

It was under the influence of Herder's personality that Goethe, during the storm and stress period, joined the new romantic movement. Nature and human feelings began to be idolised. Life itself seemed to awaken from the spell which an age of reason had cast over it. Herder once wrote: "Has anything ever been seen more wonderful than a pulsating heart with

its unlimited stimuli? An abyss of mysterious inward forces, the true images of organic omnipotence . . . . With all his mysterious powers, stimuli, and impulses, inner man is nevertheless whole . . . . Our thought depends upon feeling.'"[1] Goethe, in one of his poems, wrote:

> Wide, high, glorious the view
> Gazing round upon Life,
> While from mount unto mount
> Hovers the spirit eterne,
> Life eternal foreboding.[2]

Individual's life, according to the new ideal, was rooted not in thought or opinion but in the depths of the unconscious ego, in personal feeling and in the mysterious urge of an individual's will. For Goethe the power of art lay not in conformity to classicist aesthetics and criticism but in a demonstration of the true expression of an independent creative individuality.

> And Nature, teaching you, will fill
> Your soul with power.[3]

This Romantic movement was useful in emphasising the role of feeling, emotions and passions in human life. In its essence it aimed at liberating human personality from the fetters of social conventions and social morality. When passions are roused, the prudent restraint of social behaviour becomes difficult to endure. When these restraints are thrown off under the

---

1. Karl Vietor, *Goethe the Poet* (Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 12.
2. Ibid. p. 3.
3. Karl Vietor, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

storm and stress of passions, a man often acquires a new energy and sense of power. But if this 'sense of godlike exaltation', 'this life intense, this godlike ecstasy, is not circumscribed by some kind of restraint,' it tends to be destructive.[1] So Goeth's genius very soon learned the limitation of this romantic movement. His visit to Italy helped him to free himself from the merely subjective and solipsistic tendency of romanticism.[2] He now looked towards the Greek models and saw for the first time a new significance in their creation. He achieved a clear insight into the objective norms of beauty. For him it was a matter of freedom under law and his originality in no way suffered by adopting norms of classical traditions. He no longer agreed with the romantic point of view that the poet's caprice could tolerate no constraining law. He could not now rest in the subjective alone. To him forms of art, like the laws of nature, must be produced in accordance with eternal laws, if they are to be beautiful, objective and true and these laws can be attained, Goethe realised, only through classical traditions. He held that "a synthesis of the ethical culture of Christianity with the aesthetic culture of antiquity, and a super-national world-wide humanity as the fruit of this alliance was the ideal goal for which the creative spirit of all nations must

---

1. Bertrand Russel, *History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 701-10.

2. Ibid., p. 707.

collaborate."[1]

Goethe's *Faust* is the mirror through which we can see the eternal conflict between these two forces in human life in every age. The first knows no restraint and no limitation. For it moral, religious and social values are meaningless in the face of passionate and vigorous life. It stands for absolute power, enjoyment pure and simple, denial of all that is not subjective and individual. It tends to the development of a lawless ego in man. It likes to have richness and abundance of life in all its aspects without any thought of consequences. And yet it gives to man energy for constant activity and wings to his ambitions. Day and night, he is on the move. Goethe's Egmont is one of the best characterisation of this spirit (in the play of the same name). Egmont walks with free stride, as if the world were his. He leads a beautiful and self-contained life in which there is no anxiety for future and no brooding over the past. To him pure joy of the present is everything." If you take life too seriously," he asserts, "what is its use ? If the morning does not arouse us to new joys, and we can hope for no pleasures in the evening, is it worthwhile to dress and undress ?"[2] To him life itself is actually life's sole purpose.

The second force represents the tendency in man to understand the nature of reality, to make it objective in the light of his innermost

---

1. Karl Vietor, *op. cit*, p. 308.
2. Ibid., p. 129.

experiences and to attain a sort of union with it. In this process of understanding he becomes so much engrossed in the fantasy of his creation that he is totally cut off from the actual reality and takes pleasure in withdrawing into the narrow shell of his imaginary world. Within the four walls of his inner world, he seems to attain self-fulfilment. But when he comes into contact with the actual reality outside, he proves misfit, a tragic figure. He is divorced from all fruitful activity. All his learning becomes barren and unproductive. Goethe's *Tasso* illustrates such a character. Tasso is a poet who lives in the world of his creation and to whom this world of nature and men has no meaning. He exists in the dichotomy between fantasy and reality, idea and deed freedom and law, the self-created world of poetic dreams and the assured world of general normal life. Tasso refuses to compromise and the result is disaster. Tasso's antagonist is Antonio who stands on the polar opposition to him, the man of practical understanding of constant activity. Antonio in the hour of crisis advises Tasso to turn outward to the world. He answers that a life in which he did not dream and compose would no longer be life to him.

> Dost thou the silkworm e'er forbid to spin
> Because he spins himself more near his death ?

Tasso expresses this eternal conflict. If he compromises with society, he loses his power of creative art. Without social humanity which demands discipline of the individual, peaceful

communal life is not possible; without the creative personality, all culture would stiffen and decay. Life requires the deeds of the men of action as much as the visions and works of the artist. This higher unity in the life of the individual is the ideal which Goethe wished to present in the *Faust*. Mephisto represents the first tendency while Faust stands for the second. When Faust signs his pact with the Devil with his blood, it illustrates the ideal of Goethe to see the two forces combined in one individual who thereby attains the highest stature in life. *Faust* in reality is a picture of the individual of the new age. It depicts the eternal conflict which goes on in the soul of man between two opposing forces each of which is striving for mastery. Though the book specifically refers to Europe and its problems, yet, as a matter of fact, it is a mirror in which man of the modern age can see his spiritual history written in very bold letters. Goethe tried most successfully to bring to light the aspirations and hopes, shortcomings and drawbacks of man and suggested some ways and means to meet the challenge of the new age.

Goethe was the product of his age but, like all great men, he was also the creator of his age. In the beginning he was at one with the romantic movement of his time, but very soon he realised its shortcomings, and carved for himself a new path. He is no longer a poet of mere emotions and passions. To him this universe ceases to be a fantasy of imagination or a place where he can quench his thirst for sensual

enjoyment. It becomes a system serving some higher purpose. This life is not something to be played with, but a stage in the spiritual development of the individual. *Faust* represents this change, and through it Goethe wanted to convey the new message of hope to his contemporaries as well as the future generations.

Iqbal, like Goethe, was the child of his age and for some time he treaded along the beaten track but his visit to Europe changed his outlook. With a penetrating eye which is the privilege of a great seer, he understood the potentiality of the 'inward change' that was taking place in the man of the new East. He saw the problems facing him as well as the new world that Life was creating for him on the ashes of the old.[1] The modern Asian is placed amid two conflicting forces that pull in opposite directions. On the one side is his traditional loyalty to the world of spiritual reality. This force had lost its charm and had become totally reactionary. Instead of helping him in meeting the challenge of the new world, it was leading him to close his eyes to the ever-changing phenomenon of life. It was unnerving the whole of society. On the opposite pole stood the new heaven created by the machine culture of the West. It was progressive and promised easy success and sure prosperity. On the one side is spiritual yearnings of man which demand selfdenial and discipline; on the other, stand total and complete enjoy-

---

1. Introduction to Iqbal's *Piyam-i-Mashriq*.

ment, self-fulfilment and abundance of life. On one side, in the terms of Goethe, is Faust with a dim flicker of true religious and spiritual light which is burning itself out for lack of proper oil ; on the other hand stands Mephisto, with a charming 'heaven' of hypersensual pleasures made accessible to everybody, thanks to modern scientific advance. Will the spiritual light get replenishment? Or will the Satanic forces succeed in blowing it out ?

In the beginning of the play, Faust is represented by Goethe as a man of great learning who had spent the greater part of his life in intellectual pursuits but who had remained unsatisfied. He is unaware of love, of beauty in nature or of active life among men. All his life he desired to know the secret of nature and at last realised that he had failed miserably.

> That we in truth can nothing know !
> That in my heart like fire doth burn.[1]

Mere intellectual knowledge does not and cannot lead man to the attainment of his higher ideals. It was the realisation of this truth that agitated the mind of Faust and this was in reality the main problem of Goethe's age—over-intellectualism which weakens the vital energies of man. As a reaction to this, Faust is represented as passionately longing for the simple vigour of nature, for warm sensual experience. Herder expressed the same revolt against intellectualism

---

1. Goethe's *Faust*, translated by Anna Swanwick (London, 1915), p. 15, lines 10-11. All references are to this book.

of the age when he remarked that he did not exist in order to think, but 'to be, to feel, to live, to rejoice.'[1] Faust was after such a life. He was fed up with abstract concepts. He first turns to magic. For some time he is attracted by the sign of Macrocosm. He feels new rapture and ecstasy of joy, But the relief is only transitory. The revelation proves only illusory.

> A wondrous show ? but ah ! a show alone !
> Where shall I grasp thee, infinite nature, where ?[2]

Then Faust summons the Earth Spirit, the personification of creative forces in the earthly sphere. But Faust is yet immature and so the Spirit escapes him. He becomes hopeless. He decides to die. He is not willing to be only a "writhing worm."[3] It is better to have no life at all than a petty one. But the chiming of the Easter morning revives in him hidden springs of faith and love. Yet his longing to rise above his limitations and see the God who moves the world from within, once again makes its appearance and he is again overwhelmed with despair. In such a mood he takes up the Bible. He reads, "In the beginning was the Word." He thinks whether 'word' correctly conveys the idea of the original 'Logos.' He feels that it should be 'thought,' or 'power' and decides in favour of 'deed' : " In the beginning was the Deed."[4] Was it a foretaste of the change that

---

1. Karl Vietor, *op cit.*, p. 294.
2. *Faust*, p. 17, lines 102-3.
3. *Faust*, p. 24, lines 304-5.
4. Ibid., p. 41, lines 876-89.

was to take place in him ? As yet he has not learnt what a vigorous action can wrest from life.

Before Faust meets Mephisto he had fallen into the depths of despondency. He cursed almost everything in life. Cursed be the high ambition wherewith the mind deludes itself. Cursed be the lying dream's impression of name and fame and laurelled brow.[1] Then Mephisto's attendants by their song bring him back to life and he once again feels love for the pleasures and pains of the world.

> The Mighty Spirit deigns me no reply,
> And Nature shuts on me her gate.
> The thread of 'Thought at last is broken,
> And knowledge brings disgust unspoken.
> Let us the sensual deeps explore,
> To quench the fervours of glowing passion !
> Let every marvel take form and fashion
> Through the impervious veil it wore !
> Plung we in Time's tumultuous dance,
> In the rush and roll of circumstance !
> Then my delight and distress,
> And worry and success,
> Alternately follow, as best as they can :
> Restless activity proves the man.[2]

It was this dynamic ideal of restless activity that Iqbal's Iblis——as well as Goethe's Mephisto —places before Adam for his self-fulfilment. Man must plung himself into this sea of constant striving in order to relish the meaning of existence. Before Adam meets Satan, his

1. *Faust*, p. 52.
2. *Faust*, p. 56, lines 1392-1405.

was a life of complete inactivity. It was devoid of any charm. Adam never felt the throb of real surging life in his innermost heart nor did he ever move his finger to satisfy not-yet-felt sting of human wants that in course of centuries became the motive force of his ever-developing culture.

جہاں تا از عدم بیروں کشیدند
ضمیرش سرد و بے ہنگامہ دیدند

(ارمغان حجاز - ۱۷۷)

When the world was brought from non-being,
It was found to be cold and uneventful.

Iblis gives him a vision of a new world and promises him a life of tumultuous dance. He advises Adam to open his eyes and witness a new world ; to leave the role of a cringing worm and attain the heights of perfection, to show his mettle in fighting against difficulties that cross his path. Life of inactivity is tantamount to eternal death. Secret of Immortality lies hidden in undying striving.

زندگی سوز و ساز ، به ز سکون دوام
فاختہ شاهیں شود از تپش زیر دام
هیچ نیاید ز تو غیر سجود نیاز
خیز چو سرو بلند ، اے به عمل سست گام
خیز که بنمائمت مملکت تازهٔ
چشم جهاں بیں کشا ، بهر تماشا خرام
بازوئے شاهیں کشا ، خون تدرواں بریز
مرگ بود باز را زیستن اندر کنام
تو نه شناسی هنوز ، شوق بمیرد ز وصل
چیست حیات دوام ؟ سوختن نا تمام [1]

1. *Piyam-i-Mashrqi*, pp. 98-9.

A tumultuous life is better than perpetual peace,
A dove becomes a falcon due to agitation in being in a trap.
You are unfit for anything except to prostrate in submission ;
O you who are slow in activity, stand up like a cyprus !
Rise that I may show you the new Kingdom
Open your world-seeing eyes, just move about to see!
Spread your falcon-like wings, shed the blood of doves,
It is death for a falcon to sit confined in its nest.
You hardly realise yet, desire dies with union ;
What is everlasting life ? It is undying striving.

Faust had enough of knowledge and now he wishes to have within his heart " all of life for all mankind created". Mephisto describes this new ambition of Faust :

His food and drink are not of earth.
An inward impulse hurries him afar,
Himself half-conscious of his frenzied mood ;
From heaven claimeth he the fairest star,
And from the earth craves every highest good,
And all that's near, and all that's far,
Fails to allay the tumult in his blood.[1]

He wants to experience the highest and the lowest of life and to share the ills and joys of human race so that his individual self may expand to become one with the Universal Self. Mephisto laughs at his ambition and says that it is impossible to experience ; such a Universal Whole can be comprehended by a God alone while man is made for 'day and night' and not for the sake of enjoying in himself the Absolute.

1. *Faust*, p. 10, lines 59-60.

Faust with unflinching determination replies, "But I will." Rumi has described the story of a similar titanic personality who wanted to see with his own eyes the most uuique individual. He was advised not to ruin his life after this 'mirage'. But he answered like Faust. That which is impossible to attain I will wager my all to get it.

گفتم که یافت می نشود جسته ایم ما
گفت آنکه یافت می نشود ، آنم آرزوست

I said, " It is not attainable, we have already made an attempt "
He replied. " That which is unattainable is my object. "

The pact with Mephisto is concluded. Faust himself determines the terms. If the Devil succeeds in lulling to sleep his ' ideal strivings ' by means of pleasures which he is able to offer, then everything else may belong to him. If there can be a moment in life in which the fulness of existence were to be compressed, which would make all succeeding moments look empty and meaningless, then surely all eternity can be sacrificed for it. It is the very nature of man to move on from lower to higher planes and from there to still higher planes. Restless activity proves the man. With this view of himself, it is no unwise step for Faust to wager his soul to the devil. For it is impossible to imagine a state where man can say that he is satisfied, where the urge to life is stilled, where will in eternal dissatisfaction no longer strives for something higher and higher. If this is possible, then there

need be no further life, no eternity, no salvation ; for it itself is death and extinction.

> Canst thou with lying flattery rule me,———
> Canst thou with rich enjoyment fool me,
> Let that day be the last for me.[1]

Such an ideal places enjoyment not in the result but in the process of life's activity itself. The goal is not important but the striving for that goalr the energy for tireless movement, the courage fo, ever new beginnings. It does not count whether a man attains his goal or not. What makes man a man is always to be on the way. Faust represents in his life this new dynamic ideal of existence. To him the beginning and end of life is forever unsatisfied striving, eternal feeling of dissatisfaction. It is at once torment and happiness.

> To bear the woe of earth and all its joys,
> To tussel, struggle, scuffle with its storms,
> And not fearful in the crash of shipwreck.[2]

It is not in Faust's character to desire adjustment or demand harmony of existence. If the world does not adjust itself to his needs, he is ready to go to any length to create a new world for himself. With a mighty will, he is after probing the limits of humanity. His lofty vision transcends all limitations.

> To bare my breast to every pang,———to know
> In my heart's core all human weal and woe,
> To grasp in thought the lofty and the deep,
> Men's various fortunes on my breast to heap,

1. *Faust*, pp. 54-55, lines 1340-3.
2. Karl Vietor, *op. cit* , p. 48. See *Faust*, p. 18, lines 116-18.

And thus to theirs dilate my individual mind,
And share at length with them the shipwreck of mankind.[1]

Mephisto, according to Goethe, is the spirit of contradiction, a demon of negation. He is the enemy of all life and higher existence. He is represented as an advocate of philosophical materialism and nihilism. Everything that comes into being is worthy of being destroyed and hence it was better if nothing at all ever came into being. And yet he is not sure if he will ever succeed in his object of destruction.[2] In spite of all his efforts, earth and sea still hold together, and "that damned stuff, the brood of man and beast, still multiplies." "How many have I buried ?" he cries, "and still the fresh new blood circulates without a pause. It is enough to drive me mad."[3]

The Devil can 'make' nothing but he is involuntarily effective in another way. He is part of that power which always wills the evil and ever creates the good. He calls creative forces into life. In the Prologue in Heaven, the Lord explains: "Of all the spirits that deny, the rogue (*i.e.*, the Devil) is to *me* least burdensome. Man's activity can too easily run slack. He loves to sink into unlimited repose; and so I was glad to give him a companion who excites and works and must create, as Devil."[4]

---

1. *Faust*, p. 57, lines 1416-21.
2. *Faust*, p. 44, lines 990-3.
3. Ibid., p. 45, lines 1019-25.
4. *Faust*, p. 44, lines 987-8 ; p. 11, lines 95, 101.

The role of Iblis in the life of man as viewed by Iqbal is the same as Goethe's. Iblis does not look with favour at the birth of Adam. He is all the while aware of his own superiority and therefore refuses to prostrate before him. Being created out of fire he is all life turbulent, aggressive and active, ever striving to reach higher and yet higher. It is through him that life moves in the arteries of the universe. He lives in the thunder of clouds and the blast of the windstorms. He creates and destroys and from the ashes of the old he gives shape to ever newer forms. The Lord created the stars and sun but He imparts to them movement and constant revolutions. It is He who gives life and pulse-beat to the inert and dead matter. What is Adam, after all, as compared with his creative powers? A handful of contemptible earth who does not yet know the potentiality of his greatness. With all the care bestowed upon him by God, he is no more than a living automation. It is I, claims Iblis, and not the Lord, who will impart to him real and true pulsating lifa. In *Piyam-i-Mashriq*. Iblis says:

می تپد از سوز من ، خون رگ کائنات
من به دو صرصرم ، من به غو تندرم
رابطهٔ سالمات ، ضابطهٔ امہات
سوزم و سازے دهم ، آتش مینا گرم
ساختهٔ خویش را ، در شکنم ریز ریز
تا ز غبار کہن ، پیکر نو آورم
پیکر انجم ز تو ، گردش انجم زمن
جاں بجہاں اندرم ، زندگئی مضمرم

تو بہ بدن جاں دھی شور بجان من دھم
تو بہ سکوں رہ زنی من بہ تپش رہ برم

(صفحہ ۹۱-۸۹)

It is through me that blood in the ar'eries of the universe moves,
I am in the boisterous winds of the desert and in the noisy thunders,
I give organisation to the atoms and harmony to four elements,
I impart life and heat to everything ;
I break my idols into pieces
That I may create a new being out of the ashes of the old.
Your created the stars ; their movement is due to me.
The hidden life of the universe is through me.
You blew your breath into the body (of man) ; but it became dynamic through me.
You walk on the path of passivity, while I had all to activity.

In *Bal-i-Jibril,* Iblis justifies his 'denial' by referring to his creative activities in infusing a new life in man. To him alone is due the charm of this life. It is his sacrifice that gave meaning to human existence.

ہے مری جرأت سے مشت خاک میں ذوق نمو
میرے فتنے جامۂ عقل و خرد کا تار و پو
دیکھتا ہے تو فقط ساحل سے رزم خیر و شر
کون طوفاں کے طمانچے کھا رہا ہے میں کہ تو
گر کبھی خلوت میسر ہو تو پوچھ اللہ سے
قصۂ آدم کو رنگیں کر گیا کس کا لہو ؟

(صفحہ ۱۹۱-۳-۴)

It is through my boldness that the handful of clay has the ambition for growth,
My temptations form the warp and woof of reason.

You see the strife of good and evil from the shore,
Who is fighting the storm ? You or I ?
If you get private audience with God, ask Him,
Whose blood (sacrifice) adorned the story of Adam ?

Satan, according to Goethe, is a part of a force that creates and revels in pleasures of life and works in conjunction with the Spirit of the Earth. His primary object is to instil in man a love for life and an ambition for vigorous and creative activity. But being defective by nature, he cannot put limits to his action. He becomes an advocate of hyper-sensual material enjoyments and in his creative activity he aspires to be an equal to the Creator. He wishes to deprive man of the 'glimpse of heavenly light' which men call reason, by diverting his attention from the world of spirit to the sphere of flesh. Yet in spite of all his efforts, he feels within his heart that he has very little chance of success. He constantly excites man in order to stifle in his heart the spark of light but man walks along with him for some time. In the end the same love of activity, the gift of Satan to man, helps him break the develish charm. With the help of Satan, man succeeds in snatching victory and redeeming his soul. Thus the Evil One must serve the Eternal Becoming unwillingly and be cheated out of his destructive intentions.

The Devil promises to afford Faust every opportunity for sensual pleasures but in Faust there lives and grows a conception of true life which his materialistic companion is hardly able to comprehend. "A good man." says the

Lord, "in his darkest aberrations, has still the instnict of the one true way."[1] Every enjoyment which Mephisto offers Faust evokes in him a desire for still higher ideals. He erres but after every false step he turns to the right path. The aspirations and ambitions of Faust are never-ending and his will-to-activity incessant so that the Devil always lags behind. The Devil asks him what he wants—does he desire power ? Faust agrees but challenges him to divine the true nature of his desire. The Devil suggests the building of a great city, where people would crowd round Faust and honour him, where he would live in a castle built in glorious surroundings, with fair women for his companions. Faust smiles contemptuously at the Devil. Charms of flesh and eye have lost all power on him. He no longer feels any inclination towards sensual enjoyments offered by Satan. His meeting with Helen signifies that now he is capable of laying the foundation of an organised communal life. He has outgrown his individualistic outlook and is ready for a new social experiment. Mephisto feels puzzled at this change. He asks him whether he wants to possess the moon. To it Faust replies that this sphere of earthly toil gives him room quite enough room, for lofty deeds.[2]

---

1. *Faust*, P. 10, lines 86-7.
2. Ibid., P. 354, lines 143-6.

Upon this globe of ours
For grand achievement still there's space;
Something astounding shall take place.
For daring toil I feel new powers.

> The Deed is everything, the fame nothing.[1]

Faust wants power and dominion but he does not wish to inherit what others have created he wishes to create his possessions himself. It is in a mood of exultation that Faust sees a new field for the exercise of his newly won power. He wants to employ it not for the sake of self-glorification or for the satisfaction of his sensual impulses but for the good of the people, for the service of mankind. The sea ever and again attempts to drag the earth into its depths. Faust wishes to force it back, to give new land for new life. The creative spirit of man responds to the demon of nothingness with the vision of a will which is directed towards enriching life and expanding its scope. He wants to create a new land for free people. It may be surrounded by sea and therefore subject to constant dangers, yet to Faust life becomes significant only when there is an opportunity to fight against hostile elements.

> Freedom alone he earns as well as life,
> Who day by day must conquer them anew.[2]

It was in the beautiful vision of a society of free people toiling hard to wrest a free soil from an ever hostile nature, that Fasust found the realisation of his age-long ambition. It was the 'highest moment' for which he had bartered his soul,

The Devil has played his part, stiring the

1. *Faust*, p. 354, line 150.
2. Ibid, P. 401, lines 534-5.

heavy torpor of the world like leaven, lest man should fall into unlimited repose. But Faust had striven to the end, and had found no lasting satisfaction in the lust of flesh or the lust of the eye. Only in the possible fulfilment of a labour for the cause and welfare of mankind had he at last foreseen the moment which he might did stay. And the Devil himself had proved that he was after all the spirit who always wills the evil and always works the good. Thus Mephisto in the end serves the Eternal Becoming. Though opposed to the creative forces of life, he evokes the most positive of all things, the will to activity. He did not understand the Divine Purpose. He refused and sacrificed himself and yet this sacrifice was not in vain, It aided in the realisation of God's grand design and in enriching man's life.[1] In the words of Iqbal :

———

1. Satan is as titanic as Faust with whom he has to contend, In this contest between two equally great personalities, Satan feels at his best. He feels degraded in the presence of men of lesser calibre. He calls them " dead " and " mice." In the Prologue in Heaven, Mephisto says to the Lord :

> I find the dead no acquisition,
> And never cared to have them in my keeping,
> I much prefer the cheeks where ruddy blood is leaping.
> And when a corpse approaches close my house :
> I feel just as the cat does with a mouse.

(*Faust*, lines 76-80)

*Footnote continued on page 148*

In *Javed Nama* Iqbal's Iblis similarly expresses the same regret that the generality of mankind has grown so worthless that he no longer feels any enjoyment in fighting against them. He prays to God to create another Adam —a Faust—in fighting against whom he may be able to relish " failure."

اے خداوند صواب و نا صواب
من شدم از صحبت آدم خراب
این آدم چیست ؟ یک مشت خس است
مشت خس را یک شرار از من بس است

قصہ آدم کو رنگین کر گیا کسکا لہو ؟

Whose blood adorned the story of Adam ?

Iqbal viewed the destiny of man identically. Before Adam started on his new career, Iblis was chosen to be his companion. The Lord gave him His 'blessings' in his 'noble' mission of leading him astray. The angles in their farewell address eloquently refer to his humble origin as a handful of dust and then briefly map out the future course of his action, which will lead him to unravel the mysteries of the universe·

سنا ہے خاک سے تیری نمود ہے لیکن
تری سرشت میں ہے کو کبی و مہتابی

اندریں عالم اگر جز خس نبود
ایں قدر آتش مرا دادن چہ سود ؟
منکر خود از تو می خواہم ، بدہ
سوئے آں مرد خدا راہم بدہ
اے خدا یک زندہ مرد حق پرست
لذتے شاید کہ یابم درشکست

(صفحہ ١٦٠-١٦١)

O God of good and evil !
I am sick ef man's company.
Who is this man ?—a handful of straw
For whom one spark from my fire suffices.
If there were nothing but straw,
What was the use of giving so much fire ?
I demand from you one who denies me,
Guide me to such a one.
O God, give me a living, God-intoxicated man,
That I may enjoy my defeat.

گراں بہا ہے ترا گریۂ سحر گاہی
اسی سے ہے ترے نخل کہن کی شادابی
تری نوا سے ہے بے پردہ زندگی کا ضمیر
کہ تیرے ساز کی فطرت نے کی ہے مضرابی
(بال جبریل صفحہ ۱۷۹)

I have heard that you sprung out of dust, but
In your nature are combined light of the moon and the stars.
Your bewailing of the early morning is a valuable asset,
Through it your old tree will blossom forth.
Your cries will reveal the inner secrets of life,
For the nature of your song has guided you aright !

As Adam came down to his new abode, the Spirit of Earth welcomes him. In a strange environment, amidst lofty mountains, vast and limitless expense of the soil beneath his feet, roaring streams and thick forests, he stands alone and bewildered. The Spirit consoles him All these things are therefor his service. He has only to bring into play his hidden potentiality for vigorous deeds, and all this earth and

heaven will move at his order. The Spirit says that he was right in giving up a world—'heavenly abode he occupied before—that did not feel the impress of his creative mind and hands. This new world before which he was standing against would be moulded and recreated to suit his ever-developing needs and aspirations.

خورشید جہاں تاب کی ضو تیرے شرر میں
آباد ہے اک تازہ جہاں تیرے ہنر میں
جچتے نہیں بخشے ہوئے فردوس تیری نظر میں
جنت تری پنہاں ہے ترے خون جگر میں
اے پیکر گل ، کوشش پیہم کی جزا دیکھ
(بال جبریل - صفحہ ۱۷۹)

The light of the world-illuminating scene is in your sparks,
A new world is dependent upon your art.
Paradise made by others does not become you,
Your paradise is hidden in the blood of your veins.
O body of clay, see the result of constant striving.

In this constant striving (کوشش پیہم), in this undying spirit of man for fruitful and creative activity, lies his destiny and this ideal can be realised only through a never-ending struggle with and against Iblis. He supplies not only the motive force of action but also helps man in keeping this dynamic struggle alive. It was he who in the beginning of life lured man out of a "noiseless and dull heaven" (عالم بے کاخ و کو) and plunged him into the charming world of songs and cries, pains and torments, strife and ambitions" and thus opened before him a new

vista of opportunities. And then he comes to his rescue again whenever man feels an inclination to stupor. He whips him up into activity and thus the struggle goes on till man succeeds in the purpose which God set for him and for which He created Iblis.

پرسیدم از بلند نگاہے حیات چیست ؟
گفتا مئے کہ تلخ تر او نکو تراست
گفتم کہ شر بفطرت خامش نہادہ اند
گفتا کہ خیر او نشناسی ہمیں شراست

(پیام مشرق صفحہ ۱۴۶)

I asked from a wise man, "What Is Life ?"
He replied, "It is a wine whose bitterest drop is the best."
I said, "Evil lies hidden in its nature."
He replied, "You do not know, its good lies in this evil."

In this apparent evil lies the secret of all good. No evil, no good. No life is worth living where there is no evil and no struggle against evil. It would be to go back to the primitive state from which Adam started and thus defeat the great design of the Lord. In never-ceasing activity, in a will towards productive existence, lies the whole future of man. Only he who keeps moving will reach the house of God and Iblis, by his very nature, helps man in attaining this object. Without Iblis it would be impossible to reach our goal. Life without the presence of Satan would be no life but eternal death.

مزی اندر جہان کور ذوقے
کہ یزداں دارد و شیطاں ندارد

Don't live in an insipid world that has a God
but no Satan.

There are thus two forces in life which are working in opposite directions and yet ultimately they seem to co-operate in working out the Divine Purpose. They stand as two poles of a huge magnet. Life moves in a constant attraction and repulsion of these opposite poles. The process of formation and transformation continues incessantly. The Earth Spirit describes the working of the vital force which works rhythmically in bringing together and separating, of coming into being and perishing.

In the swirling of life, the storm of action,
I rise and fall,
Weave back and forth.
I am the womb and tomb,
An ocean eternal.
A changing, glowing
Life in ferment :
Thus working on the roaring loom of time,
I weave God's living garment.[1]

This polar opposition keeps the life process going. In a poem in the *Divan* Goethe translates a saying of Shaikh Sa'di in support of this belief. This opposition was the source of all of life's events.

Favour twofold in breathing see :
The air we draw, then set it free ;

---

1. Karl Vietor, *op. cit.*, p. 44. See *Faust* pp. 19. lines 151-161.

> One is constraint, the other bliss :
> So wondrously life mingled is.[1]

Goethe has explained this opposition in his different works. Faust and Mephisto, Egmont and Alba, Tasso and Antonio, all represent two poles of life and in their mutual attraction and repulsion the continuity of life process develops. Unlike most writers who represent evil forces as retarding the progress and development of the good hero, Goethe's characters work in collaboration. Their activities are complementary. They work in different and yet in sush a way that the greater whole of the action develops out of them and encompasses them all. Faust and Mephisto are the symbols of polarised dynamism greater whole of the action develops out of them and encompasses them all Faust and Mephisto are the symbols of polarised dynamism of life process. To Goethe there is no question of good and evil where the issue is a conduct of life. The Devil himself must assist in creation. Goethe never talked of good and evil in dualistic terms implying that these were independent realities. He quotes with approval the saying of certain philosophers that what we call evil is only the "obverse of the good," necessary of

---

1. *Faust*, p. 222. *West-Eastern Divan*, p. 7.

* ”هر نفس که فرد میرود ممد حیات است و چون بر می آید مفرح دات - پس بر هر نفس دو نعمت موجود و بر هر نفس شکر واحب “

(شیخ سعدی از گلستان)

moral life. In the course of a review, he says that no one knows whether that which we look upon as good and evil is also good and evil in the sight of God, "or whether that which is refracted into two colours be able to fuse into a single ray before Him."[1] Thus good and evil both form a higher unity.

An inclination to evil is as much inborn in man as inclination to virtue. Man is placed between the above and the below. He is both God and Satan, heaven and earth, all in one. If one wishes to be totally above all evil, one must renounce the world and all activity and that, Goethe says, does not seem to be the will of God. In the Prologue in Heaven, Faust is represented as a sort of sinner, subject to doubts and darkness and yet God is ready to wager on his behalf. He knows that truth and error are inextricably interwoven in the thoughts and actions of men. Whenever man determines to work and strive there is a possibility of his going astray. The Lord Himself refers to this possibility when He gives a long rope to Mephisto :

> Man still must err, while he doth strive.[2]

If, for fear of this error, man paralyses the will to activity, he is no longer a man but a beast, To Goethe cloistered virtue had no value. Without false steps it is impossible to reach

---

1. *Faust*, p. 320.
2. Ibid., p. 10, line 75.

good. In one of his letters he says, "Every return from error develops a man mightily in particular and in general, so that one can well understand how a repentant sinner can be dearer to the searcher of hearts than ninty-nine righteous men."[1] Man, despite his sins and follies, is directed by a higher hand. This 'higher hand' is a sort of inward urge residing in every man, which operates quietly like a necessity of nature. "A good man...is still conscious of the right path."[2] It means that man, in spite of his frailities, has a sort of unconscious urge to find the right path. Goethe says :

> Error will never desert us A craving for what is ennobling
> Urges, however, our constantly striving minds gently on wards towards truth.[3]

It is man's weakness that in his endeavour to bring *Would* and *Should* into harmony, he sometimes goes astray.

> So wondrously this human race is formed,
> So diversely connected. intertwined,
> That no man in himself. nor with others,
> Can keep his soul untangled. undefiled.[4]

Iqbal viewed this problem in a similar way. Good and evil, according to him, are not to be conceived as totally separate events but

---

1. Karl Vietor, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
2. *Faust* p. 10. lines 86-7.
3. Karl Vietor, *op, cit.*, p. 122.
4. Ibid, p. 326:

co-ordinate and inter-related moments in the life history of man. Elucidating the significance of the legend of Fall, he says that freedom of will granted to man was a double-edged weapon, which implied both the capacity to do good as well as a tendency to go astry. This risk could have been avoided if God had withheld this gift from mankind. But, as a matter of fact, the life of man as moral being began with the Fall if this involves evil, it must be viewed in the broader context of total good that it does to man. So "good and evil, therefore, though opposites, must fall within the same whole. There is no such thing as an isolated fact for facts are synthetic wholes the elements of which must be understood by mutual reference."[1] In *Piyam-i-Mashriq*. Iqbal expresses the same idea :

چه گویم نکتهٔ زشت و نکو چیست ؟
زبان لرزد که معنی پیچدار است
برون از شاخ بینی خار و گل را
درون او نه گل پیدا نه خار است

(صفحه ۵۳)

What should I say about good and evil ?
I tremble to express as the problem is knotty.
You see the flower and the thorn outside the twig,
While within it, there is nothing of the two.

In other words, according to Iqbal, good and evil are like flowers and thorns which together grow out of a single twig. Their

1. *Lectures*, pp. 85-6.

apparent diversity implies a basic unity.

The narration of the Quran about the emergence of Adam out of a primitive state brings out clearly that man, while capable of great good, is always liable to error and sin. At every stage of life, he is confronted with a choice of great import and more often he chooses to follow a wrong track. But this fact does not imply inherent sinfulness. It is a logical outcome of freedom and for this very reason Adam was forgiven his first act of disobedience. He soon realised his mistake and willingly came forward with his apology and sought God's grace and guidance in determining the future course of life. Man's originality and creativeness are the result of this gift of freedom and soon man was able to say to God :

گفت یزداں کہ چنیں است و چنیں خواهد ماند
گفت آدم کہ چنیں هست و چناں خواهد بود

God said that this is so and so will it remain.
Adam said : this *is* so but it *ought* to be so.

It was man who with all his weaknesses and frailities was able to resolve the conflict between 'is' and 'ought'. It was he who in spite of all his proneness to wrong ways was capable of bringing would and should into harmony. A man may not be able to keep himself undefiled, surrounded as he is by an environment that is always seducing him to the wrong path, yet he has been endowed with an ambition for the pursuit of higher ideals and if he falls a prey—though temporarily—to the attractions of flesh,

he is hopeful of God's guidance. God assured him of His constant help in the task of recreating the world on a new pattern which may be be conducive to the abundance of good. If evil, in the last resort, leads to the creation of good for the benefit of man, then the bresence of evil should in no way be allowed to stand in the way of our struggle for better ends.

The straying into a wrong path is no doubt a lapse but if ideal of cent per cent righteousness and rectitude becomes a sort of obsession and it stultifies all aspirations and results in sterility of all activity, then this impossible ideal tends to sap the healthy growth both of individuals and societies. Every active step taken towards higher ideals may involve man into bypaths of sin and guilt but this bypath is indispensable for reaching the destined goal. A man with a spark of divine light within him and guided by God's grace is sure ultimately to find his path after each aberration. In *Piyam-i-Mashriq*, Iblis tells Adam that there is no fun in resting on one's oars. One should be always on the move. Reposing on one's laurels means stagnation and every stagnation implies decline from the higher to the lower plane. Our destiny lies in ceaseless activity so that each tomorrow may find us farther than today and in this constant endeavour there should be no qualms of good and evil.

زشت و نکو زادۂ وہم خداوند تست
لذت کر دار گیر ، گام بنه ، جوئے کام

(پیام مشرق - صفحه ۸۹)

Good and evil are the products of the whims of your Creator,
Taste the pleasure of activity, take the step, *attain your success.*

Adam on the Day of Judgment pleads guilty before God for some time straying into the bypaths of sin but was it possible, he asks, to avoid these pitfalls ?

گرچه فسونش مرا برد ز راه صواب
از غلطم درگزر ، عذر گناهم پذیر
رام نگردد جهاں تا نه فسونش خوریم
جز بکمند نیاز ، ناز نگردد اسیر [1]
(پیام مشرق - صفحه ۹۱)

Though its charm led me astray from the right path,
Overlook my mistake, accept the excuse of my sins.
The world does not submit to our control unless we are beguiled by it,
For without the net work of entreaty, blandishment cannot be entrapped.

God accepts this plea for the occasional aberrations do not condemn a man to eternal punishment. God has full faith in man's inherent strength of character. Man's freedom of will

---

1. *Cf. Javed Nama* :

چوں بروید آدم از مشت گلے
با دلے ، یا آرزوئے در دلے
لذت عصیاں چشیدن کار اوست
غیر خود چیزے ندیدن کار اوست
زانکہ بے عصیاں خودی ناید بدست
تا خودی ناید بدست ، آید شکست
(صفحه ۲۱۲ - ۱۳)

implies this risk. But, as Iqbal has said, God purposely took this risk which shows that ultimately these errors and aberrations are all going to serve His purpose. So God may safely leave man to Satan who, in the end, must serve the Eternal Becoming. By his very nature of contradiction, he evokes in man the most positive of all things, the will to activity. Once Goethe said to Eckermann that it is contradiction that makes us productive. Casual error and guilt cannot condemn a man, provided he has lived his life fully and fruitfully. Faust, ever since his pact with Mephisto, has filled every moment of his life with incessant activity. He got entangled in guilt yet his life ended in a glorious deed of service to mankind. So the angels snatched away his entelechy from the hands of Satan and his accomplices, saying.

> Whose with fervent will strives on
> We angels can deliver.[1]

What is this striving with fervent will (کوشش پیہم) which saves a man in spite of his guilt ? "To obey the forward-impelling urge, the will to productive existence, to never-ceasing growth, and at the same time to follow that other impulse, the will to augmentation (of self), which seeks to lift itself up step by step to ever higher deeds and visions of deeds, to the ideal goal of self-perfection. He who has lived so has truly lived, and it is this that God desires of His creatures and for which He will forgive them

1. Karl Victor, *op. cit*, pp. 314-15,

the earthly frailty which attaches to all human beings and doings. Upon the ladder of deeds with which he fills the space of life man ascends to the divine. Error, guilt, and even sin will be forgiven him who strives unweariedly. Only he who keeps marching will reach the house of Father. The most active citizen of earth will be the best-loved son of heaven."[1]

It is in this sense that Iqbal holds that creative activity of the highest order will be able to wash off the blot of sin and guilt.

گر از دست تو کار نادر آید
گنا ہے ہم اگر باشد ثواب است
(پیام مشرق - صفحه ۶۲)

If you do any extraordinary (creative) act.,
It becomes a good work even though it is sinful.

But, can a sinful act be justified only because it is creative and original ? How can it become virtuous ? What is that transmuting force which brings about this miracle, which changes a base metal into gold ? Both Iqbal and Goethe believe that it can be so and it is love that performs this miracle. What is this love ? Goethe conceives it in a very restricted sense. and calls it "the eternal feminine". represented in *Faust* by the character of Gretschen, the noble and innocent woman who was seduced by Mephisto for Faust but who later becomes the symbol of true heavenly love. Mephisto drives Faust to the world of flesh, negation and destruction while Gretschen leads

1. Karl Vietor, op cit., pp. 326.

him to spiritualism. faith and eternal peace. She cannot bear the sight of Faust's companion who himself is afraid to look her in the face. In the last scene of the first part, Faust along with Mephisto visits her in the prison and entreats her to run away with him but she refuses: for she had realised that to go with Faust at this stage meant to traverse the path of evil. She dies and the angels of light take away her soul. Thereafter Faust never falls into the snares of flesh. Every day he marches to higher and still higher ideals. It is the never-dying spiritual influence of Gretsehen that sustains him throughout. At the time of death, when angels carry away the soul of Faust, it is the spirit of Gretschen that comes forward to lead his way. If it is essential for man to be a companion of the Devil for a while, it is only through love that he is freed from the snares of the Evil One. The passion of man for knowing the secret of reality is not satisfied by his increasing knowledge and incessant activity alone. It is love that can quech this eternal thirst. When Faust had enough of abstract knowledge and had not yet experienced the ecstasy of love, his was a life of bewilderment, doubts and darkness. With love, he found true self-fulfilment in a high ideal of self-less devotion to the service of mankind. If Faust can utilise the services of Mephisto and still keep him under his control, it is only through love. Without love, it would be impossible to control the forces of contradiction and nihilism. In spite of his pact with Mephisto,

Faust succeeds in attaining eternal heaven and immortality by a life of fruitful activity through love which knows no barriers and brooks no limitations. It is love that carries him away from pitfalls and snares of Satan to a glorious death and from death to an immortal life of eternal blessing.

But with Iqbal this love assumes very wide proportions. It is not love which man feels for the fair six however spiritualised. It is a cosmic force which moves heavens and stars. It is operative in all the universe :

به برگ لاله رنگ آمیزئی عشق
بجان ما بلا انگیزئی عشق
اگر زیں خاکداں را وا شگافی
درونش بنگری خونریزئی عشق

(پیام مشرق صفحه ۳۱)

It is love that imparts colour to the tulip,
It is love that agitates our souls.
If you open up the heart of this earth,
You will see in it the blood-stains of love.

All movement and push towards the high plane, in organic and inorganic sphere, in animal kingdom and man, is the result of this love. In short it is co-terminus with life. Life is love and love is life.

عشق کے مضراب سے نغمۂ تار حیات
عشق سے نور حیات ، عشق سے نار حیات

(بال جبریل صفه ۳۱)

The song from the strings of life is the result of the plectrum ef love
The light and flame of life are all due lo love.

It is the degree of this cosmic force which

determines the place of a being in the scale of life. Man being the greatest participant of love enjoys higher being and existence. His life becomes meaningful when this cosmic force of love is manifested in all his activities. In the words of Iqbal, "the striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non-existence and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes or, more properly, is made to assume by the inner force of love various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty . . . The same force of 'natural' or 'constitutional' love is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the First Beloved—the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle."[1]

This love or we may call it life or Khudi, is the basis of this universe. It is creative and dynamic. The categories of mechanism, space and time are the modes which it creates for apprehending the objective world of science.

خرد در لا مکاں طرح مکاں بست
چو زنارے زماں را بر میاں بست

(زبور عجم صفحه ۲۱٦)

---

1. Iqbal, *Development of Metaphysics*, pp. 39—41.

In non-spatial sphere intellect introduced spatial categories.
Like a belt it girdled time round its waist.

But this world which our intellect creates does not provide us with full opportunities for the expression of our personality. We need reason to a certain extent which helps us in overcoming the obstacles of the material world. But then we must go beyond it.

به آن عقلے که داند بیش و کم را
شناسد اندرون کان و یم را
جهان چند و چون زیر نگیں کن.
بگردوں ماہ و پرویں را کمیں کن
ولیکن حکمت دیگر بیاموز
رهاں خود را ازیں مکر شب و روز

(زبور عجم صفحه ۲۱۸)

With the aid of that intellect that knows more and less,
Probe the depths of mines and oceans ;
Master the world of how and why,
Catch the moon and pleides from the sky.
But then learn wisdom of another sort,
Free yourself from the snares of night and day.
Your real place is beyond this mundane world,
Aspire for a right that is without a left.

It is love alone that satisfies the real aspirations of man. Without love this universe would have been a dead, inert matter.

تہی از ها و هو میخانه بودے
گل ما از شرر بیگانه بودے
نبودے عشق و ایں هنگامهٔ عشق
اگر دل چوں خرد فرزانه بودے

The tavern would be without commotion,
Our clay would be without a spark
If there had been no love and its commotion,
If the 'heart' had been as wise as intellect.

According to Descartes, I am because I think; but, according to Iqbal, I am because I love.

در بود و نبود من اندیشه گما نها داشت
از عشق هویدا شد این نکته که هستم من

My heart had doubts about my 'being' and 'not being',
Love proved the fact that 'I am'.

This was Iqbal's answer to the challenge of the modern age. Ever since the rise of rationalism in Europe in the 18th century, reason alone had been the guiding principle of life which, in due course, led to a complete annihilation of moral and religious values. The contemporary man feels frustrated. He feels that reason is not the be-all and end all of life. He had much of the fruit of reason's search for the control of the forces of the world but then he comes face to face with a blank wall, from where he finds no way out. It was Kant who first struck a successful blow against the omnipotent reason and then Bergson rehabilitated intuition or love. According to Iqbal, this change-over is the real key to the solution of all modern problems. Human reason is good and useful but it is not the whole of reality. We must try to surpass it and reach the very core of reality which is love.

عشق کی گرمی سے ہے معرکۂ کائنات
علم مقام صفات ، عشق تماشائے ذات

عشق سکون و ثبات ، عشق حیات و ممات
علم ہے پیدا سوال ، عشق ہے پنہاں جواب

The whole campaign of the universe is by the heat of love,
Knowledge is the stage of attribute, love is the seeing of essence.
Love is peace and stability, love is life and death,
Knowledge is an open question mark, love is a secret answer.

This contrast of intellect and love is symbolically represented both by Rumi and Iqbal by Satan and Adam. Satan is personified intellect while Adam is personified love. Satan, as an embodiment of intellect, is materialistic and thus incapable of appreciating the eternal values without which man would lose his distinctive human character. Satan is also on the side of determinism as a natural corollary of his intellectualism. Adam represents love, freedom and moral values.

داند آن کو نیکبخت و محرم است
زیرکی ز ابلیس و عشق از آدم است

He who is aware of the mysteries knows,
Intellect is from Satan and love, from Adam.[1]

Our companionship with Satan is fruitful but to a certain extent only. We must take full advantage of the power and control which Satan—

1. Goethe also agrees with this point of view. In the *Prologue in Heaven*, Mephisto says to God about man, "He would live a little better had ye not given a glimpse of heavenly light : he calls it reason." *Faust*, p. 9, lines 42-43. *Vide* H. E. Nevinson, *Goethe Man and Poet*, p. 174.

reason—confers on us. But then we must leave him behind if we are to attain the ideal of rich and abundant life and this is possible only through love. So long as our vision remains clouded by the brilliance of reason's achievements, we shall be condemned to a life which has no prospect of survival after death. Modern world is being driven to pessimism and desperation only because of the absence of this higher vision which can never be had without love. This world of time and space and determinism is all right—the world of our companionship with Satan—but then we must step beyond it. We must rise above these categories of intellect and soar into the world of reality on the wings of love. This prospect alone can save us from the ills of the modern world. Love alone is that transmuting force which lifts us above all weaknesses and frailities that are bound up with a mortal being and save us for a higher life of eternal striving and immortality. Without love man is condemned to a life of total despair while with love his life has vast possibilities of evolution even beyond the grave.

عشق شبخونے زدن بر لامکاں
گور را نا دیدہ رفتن از جہاں

Love is to lay ambush against the invisible plane ;
To leave the world (*i.e.*, to die) without passing through the grave.

In one of his articles, Iqbal has raised the question whether it is possible for man to reach the divine point of view, *i.e.*, super-intellectual

standpoint, whereby he can realise his freedom from the limitations of this universe which confronts him as an independent 'other'. Mystics have developed a method by which they claim to attain this object. It is to escape from the conditions which make the movement of intellect possible. But Iqbal rejects this method as totally inadequate. To him it is not possible for man to ignore the world of matter without impairing other important interests of life. Association with the visible, or symbolically speaking, our companionship with Satan, is an indispensable stage in the life of contemplation. This universe, in the words of the Quran, is not *batil* (باطل) and therefore the power that this companionship places at our disposal has its use : for it thereby prepares us for an insertion into what lies below the surface of the phenomena.

In *Javed Nama*, he pursues this question further. There is a Quranic verse (55 : 32) where God addresses mankind and says that it is not possible for anyone to pass beyond the limits of this space and time except through what is calls '*sultan*'.

باز گفتم پیش حق رفتن چسان ؟
کوه و خاک و آب را گفتن چسان ؟
گفت اگر "سلطان" ترا آید بدست
می توان افلاک را از هم شکست

Then I asked : How to go before god ?
How to tear to pieces the mountain of water and clay ?
He said, "If you achieve '*sultan*' (power),
Even skies can be rent asunder."

This 'sultan', according to Ibbal, can be attained through a "new second birth" as a result of love. With the first birth man came into this four-directional (چار سوئے) world but with this second birth he becomes free from these limits. With his physical birth he became subject to this limitations of space and time but with his second birth he became free from these. What is the birth ? It is one mode out of hundreds which life manifests ; sometimes it is hidden and sometimes it is manifest ; sometimes it develops in seclusion and sometimes in open intercourse. This unity-in-difference, this new birth, is the result of first intellectal training and then going beyond it to the all-embracing sphere of love. Human reason helps us in breaking the chains of limitation and every hindrance in the way pushes it on step by step towards the ideal. But its movements are halting and so it is doubtful whether it will ever carry us to our object. Then love comes. In a leap it carries us to our destination. All chains fall and man feels that he is not only master of himself, his destiny, his environment, but he is the sole embodiment of all that God wished him to be. He has assimilated even God within himself.

عشق هم خاکستر و هم اخگر است
کار او از دین و دانش برتر است
عشق سلطان است و برهان مبین
هر دو عالم عشق را زیر نگین
چون خودی را از خدا طالب شود
جمله عالم مرکب، او راکب شود

(صفحه ۱۸)

Love is straw as well as burning ember,
It is far above conventional religion and reason.
Love is 'sultan' and a clear proof;
Both the worlds are in the grip of love.
When the ego demands of God,
The whole world becomes subject to it.

So long as we are within the sphere of intellect, we live in the world of down and above, here and there. But in love these distinctions vanish. Referring to the Holy Prophet's Ascension, Iqbal says that it proves that it is possible for man to rise above these limitations of intellect.

سبق ملا ہے یہ معراج مصطفے سے مجھے
کہ عالم بشریت کی زد میں ہے گردوں

The ascension of the prophet teaches this lesson
That the sky is within the reach of man.

We only need to revolutionise our intellectual point of view and then not only this mundane world but even what we call the world beyond is within our easy grasp. We become denizens of both world of matter and world of spirit.

از شعور است این کہ گوئی نزد و دور
چیست معراج ؟ انقلاب اندر شعور
انقلاب اندر شعور از جذب و شوق
وا رہاند جذب و شوق از تحت و فوق

The distintcion of 'near' and 'far, are due to intellect.
What is ascension? Revolution in this way of thinking.
This revolution is the result of love,
Which removes the distinction of 'up' and 'down'.

This new, second birth which brings about this revolution is the result of love (جذب و شوق) and it is love that carries us away from the pitfalls and snares of Satan to a glorious death and from death to an immortal life of eternal blessing.

There is a tradition of the holy Prophet about Satan. Once he said that every man on this earth had to contend against a devil deputed to lead him a stray. Someone asked him if there was any devil with him. He replied, "Yes, but I have made my devil a Musalman." This answer very beautifully illustrates the dual character of man's life as well as the way to resolve this conflict. Man cannot run away from it. Satan has been given full liberty to use his machinations against man till the end of earth[1]. If this is the case, then there can be no escape from Satan in a life of renunciation. The Devil lives not in towns, cities and villages but in the heart of man. Run away to unfrequented places and there it will follow you. The only way of ridding oneself of him is through love, which, according to Iqbal, is identical with Islam.

زندگی را شرع و آئین است عشق
اصل تہذیب است دیں و دین است عشق
(جاوید نامہ صفحہ۱۲۹)

Love is the law of life.
The basis of culture is religion and religion is love.

Man an devil must remain together. If you break this 'friendship', you destroy what is potentially good in man. They must be allowed

1. The Quran 15 : 36.

to live together. Faust, before his encounter with Mephisto, is a "writing worm," worthy of contempt, ill-suited for the trials of life, incapable of high creative activity. It was Mephisto who helped him in attaining the highest ideal of life dedicated to the selfless service of man, free, active, vigorous, enjoying an abundance of existence. But this companionship proved fruitful only through the influence of the 'eternal feminine', the force of love. The highest ideal, therefore, both according to Iqbal and Goethe lies neither in renunciation nor in a life of abstract thought, nor in a life of activity but in a life which is a consummation of thought, deed and love. Faust, Mephisto and Gretschen all have a part to play on the stage of this universe and the whole drama of life develops out of the mutual actions of the three forces. Iqbal has very beautifully expressed this idea in the following verses of *Javed Nama* :

علم را بر اوج افلاک ره
تا زچشم مہر بر کند نگه

چشم او بر واردات کائنات
تا بہ بیند محکمات کائنات

دل اگر بندد به حق، پیغمبری است
ور ز حق بیگانه گردد، کافری است

علم را بے سوز دل خوانی، شر است
نور او تاریکئی بحر و بر است

قوتش ابلیس را یارے شود
نور' نار از صحبت نارے شود

کشتن ابلیس کارے مشکل است
زانکه او گم اندر اعماق دل است

خوشتر آں باشد مسلمانش کنی
کشتۂ شمشیر قرآنش کنی
علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں
علم با عشق است از لاهوتیاں
بے محبت علم و حکمت مردۂ
عقل تیرے بر هدف نا خوردۂ
کور را بینندہ از دیدار کن
بو لهب را حیدر کرار کن

(جاوید نامه ، ۸۲-۸۳)

Scientific knowledge has access to the height of the skies,
So much so that it plucks 'sight' from the eye of the sun.
It observes the fluctuating experiences of the universe,
So that it may establish the fundamental laws of the universe.
If it is allied to the Truth, it becomes holy like prophets,
But if it is cut off from it, it becomes as detestable as unbelief.
Knowledge without the flame of the heart is evil,
Its light spreads gloom everywhere.
Its power becomes allied to Iblis,
Divine illumination in the company of fire (of Satan) becomes fire.
To kill Iblis is a difficult job,
For he lies deep in the recesses of your heart.
It is better that you make a Musalman of him,
Make him subject to the laws of the Quran.
Intellect without love is rebellious,
Intellect with love is angelic.
Without love knowledge and wisdom is dead,
Intellect is like an arrow that has not experienced target.
Heal the blind by giving the power of 'seeing',
Transform Bu Lahb into brave 'Ali.

But the age of Enlightenment was the age of reason *par excellence* and was soon to be followed by the age of deed and action which brought with it the maturing of rationalism into materialism. The claims of Love remained unrecognized. In spite of Kant's historic pronouncements with regard to the limits within which human reason works and Schopenhauer's emphasis on the supremacy of Will, the general trend of philosophical speculation in the West remained tied up with the exploits of intellect. Quite unexpectedly in the latter part of the 19th century—the period when materialism reached its highest pinnacle—a thinker of great eminence appeared who, setting his face against the current of the times, chalked out for himself a new path and chartered the sea of Love for the future wayfarer. In Bergson (1859—1942) the so far neglected claim of love found its greatest advocate. To this great French philosopher we owe the recognition of Love as a force of equal importance with reason. We shall see in the next chapter how he tried to arrive at a synthetic view of human life in which intellect and love, attachment and detachment, are the two poles round which the life of man must revolve,

## IQBAL AND BERGSON

Bergson's main contribution to the thought of the nineteenth century lies in his forceful attack against the mechanistic interpretation of life, against an over-emphasis on intellect and against dualism of body and mind, all of which had been the legacy of 17th century development of new scientific method introduced by Descartes and Galileo. At the present time when, not to speak of biology and psychology, even physics has abandoned its stands *vis-a-vis* materialism, we cannot imagine the magnitude of the task which Bergson was called upon by destiny to perform. After him a host of thinkers like McDougall and Driesch supported his thesis by their researches, but in 1899 it was, in reality, his pioneering genius that took up the cudgels on behalf of a cause that appeared to all to be of forlorn hope. Mechanism, like the proverbial jinn, set free unwittingly from its hide-out by the untutored hands of scientists, and bent upon destroying his rescuers, was once more brought under control and put back to its real place by Bergson.

Though pre-eminently a philosopher, he left the beaten track so far followed by the members of his profession and chalked out for himself a totally new way of dealing with the problems of his time. He presented his point

of view not only on the basis of mere abstract, logical reasoning and *a priori* truths, but marshalled verifiable and scientific facts in support of his theory. His brilliant style, his lucid exposition, his beautiful similes and metaphors, his deep-rooted conviction in the truth of his view-point, all contributed towards convincing the hard-boiled people of his age that though total fruth may not be on his side, eved then he was not far from truth.

When William James, the celebrated American thinker, read his *Creative Evolution*, he wrote, "It seems to me that nothing is important in comparison with divine apparition . . . a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy." He concluded by adding, "There is so much that is absolutely new, that it will take a long time for your contemporaries to assimilate it . . . "[1] And there is no doubt that Bergson said much that was unpalatable to the people of his age, people who under the influence of rich harvests from scientific materialism and machine age, had developed a distaste for the finer things of the Spirit. To an age steeped in the thought of the present and forgetful of the past, he gave a message of the future ; to the people who had been forced to abandon faith in free will and immortality, he held out a bright hope of a new and exuberant life not only in this world but in in the world hereafter. Men of science had woven round themselves a halo of false sanc-

1. *Letters of William James* (1920 , pp. 290-91.

tity and the general people, struck by the enormous material benefits that followed their résearches, were fain to tear it to pieces, though their hearts yearned for something else. Bergson boldly stepped forward and pulled down with ease what appeared to be impregnable. He had the honour to break the idol and now it lies trampled under the feet of all. Even the scientists themselves now disown it. And all this came about at the hands of—should it not be appropriate to call him—a mystic seer.

Iqbal had to face an equally formidable situation. The Muslims of this sub-continent were living only in their past. They had nothing to go by in the present and lacked any clear vision of the future. On a mere past, however glorious, nothing tangible and permanent could be built. Intellectually inferior, morally bankrupt, materially powerless, psychologically frustrated, they were being crushed between the demands of the present and the need of the future. They had lost faith in the revitalizing power of their religion and were thus being driven to different blind alleys which brought no relief. Their self-confidence was lost and with it everything else seemed to disappear. The mystic path which once claimed to be the sure antidote, was proving of no avail, for it had lost touch with the brute facts of reality. Life—this day-to-day life—seemed all too important and engaging to be brushed aside by the meaningless and insignificant spell devices of the mystics. Mere intellectual pursuits had also not proved to be

the promised sesame. The door still remained banged against their faces. At such a time Iqbal put before them way out of this predicament. He not only understood the real problem but also gave them the key with which the doors of our future destiny could be easily opened. To him it was not the problem of East *vs.* West but of East-cum-West. Belonging to the East, he could not set his foot against the best traditions of this land of the Sun. Nor could he accept what the West claimed to offer without qualifications. Both had to offer something valuable but there was much in both which needed purging. Iqbal tried to appropriate what was best in the two. From the West he learned what he claimed was really the legacy of Muslim thought, *viz.*, the scientific attitude and love of the concrete. But he could not accept the anti-religious and anti-moral implications of this culture. The moral and religious fervour of the East was contaminated by too much indulgence in the other worldly prejudices and so needed to be broadbased on the concrete facts of reality.

In this respect Iqbal owed much to Bergson. Except Nietzsche, no other contemporary Western philosopher had looked upon the problems of life, culture and science as deeply as Bergson. When Iqbal went to Europe in the early twentieth century, Nietzsche and Bergson were the two leading thinkers that occupied the whole stage. Of the two, Nietzsche was more negative and destructive while Bergson was more positive

and constructive. Bergson's emphasis on the deeper levels of consciousness, or, in other words, on the spiritual inwardness of human life, and the part which intuition plays in bringing into play this dynamic experience, fascinated Iqbal. It was in reality an echo of the East in the very heart of the almost paganised West and Iqbal captured andenlarged this impulse. The theory of evolution once hoped in the West to be tne last nail in the colffin of religion, was expounded by Bergson—on the basis of hard facts—in a way which tended to dissipate this false hope. Not only his way of dealing with these problems but also the conclusions at which he arrived were in most cases allied to Rumi's thought and it was perhaps this fact which brought Iqbal nearer both to Rumi and Bergson. All the three viewed Reality as dynamic and creative with this difference that to Iqbal and Rumi, this Reality is spiritual while Bergson, handicapped by the tradition of the West, fought shy of such a bold step. Iqbal's viwe of time is mainly derived from Bergson while on the question of freedom of will all the three stand on the same ground. The constrast of reason and intuition had been an old problem among Muslim thinkers and Rumi's point of view is, perhaps much more impressive though less philosophical. But both Bergson and Rumi, in their zeal for intuition, tend to look down upon thought and intellect while to Iqbal the Ultimate Reality is an organic Unity in which both thought and intuition have an equally important place. There may be

difference, rather antagonism, between the two at the lower level but both become one at a higher plan. True love and true reason become identical. Rumi and Iqbal part company with Bergson when the latter calls the Reality, the *elan originel*, to be moving towards no goal. A goalless movement, a progression that has no objective, no far-off end towards which it is constantly moving, would be no movement in the real sense, but the cyclic motion of the Greeks which would not only make time unreal but reduce Reality to be mechanical, non-creative and governed by blind necessity. This, in short, amounts to reversal of the whole of Bergson's position and therefore Iqbal improves upon it and advocates that the process of evolution is tending towards a particular goal, *viz.*, the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become befitting parents of the Perfect Man.[1]

II

When Bergson started thinking about the problems of philosophy, the mechanistic physics was wedded to materialism and biology as expounded by Darwin and his followers was treading the same path. The concepts of life and mind had lost all significance which was once attached to them and along with it, all moral

---

1 Introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi* (English translation), Lahore, 1950, p. xix.

and aesthetic values, faith and religion were in danger of being thrown overboard. The situation at that time can be clearly grasped from the following words of Prof. Tyndal who, at a meeting of the British Association in 1874 (during Bergson's early teens), declared that science would soon be able to explain all tha happened and did happen in terms of the "ultimately purely natural and inevitable march of evolution from the atoms of the primeval nebula to the proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science."[1] In fact, Bergson began his philosophical career with Spencer as his model. His early efforts were directed towards achieving the results envisaged by Prof. Tyndal. He dreamed of extending the application of mechanistic explanation to the entire universe. Having a sound training in science and mathematics, he was confident of reaching some fruitful conclusion. But very soon he found himself against a blank wall. The evidence of facts seemed to him to be too overwhelming to fit in within this preconceived framework and his scientific training, therefore, compelled him to abandon the hypothesis. He began the study of Spencer's *First Principles* once again with the intention of discovering where the difect lay. When he came to the idea of time it at once struck him that here lay the main stumbling block. He realized that

1. Joad, *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 46.

evolution of Spencerian concept was no evolntion at all and the idea of time presented by the mechanistic philosophy was not real time but distorted and materialized by contact, as it were, with space. It became the starting point of Bergson's new research. He spent full seven years in retirement thinking over this problem. It was in reality a problem of far-reaching importance which affected the life of all men beneath the sun. If man is nothing but a conglomeration of atoms and molecules with no supra-sensual aspiration and only obeying the inexorable laws of causation then there is no sense in striving for higher ends and purposes. If man's sense of inner freedom is only an illusion and his multifarious activities are nothing other than the movement of a stone thrown haphazardly by a naughty boy as Spinoza viewed man to be, then why all this fuss about values, and faith, goodness and beauty, etc. And seven years of Bergson's intensive contemplation over this problem proved indeed very fruitful. Prophet-like he emcrged out of his retirement and began to preach a new gospel of life to a despairing humanity. To the people of his age who were being nourished on pure materialism, Bergson's message was the first glimmer of a new dawn. In 1889 his first book *Time and Free Will* was published and since its appearance, materialism and its concomitant belief in the mechanistic interpretation of the whole universe, have been gradually losing

ground until today both have been discarded even in circles where they were once most ardently defended. He stood for the primacy of life and freedom of will and thus had the honour of bringing to the notice of the scientists of his age, especially the psychologists, that life and mind are vitally different from inert matter and therefore need a different method of ap-roach and treatment.

The conception of time commonly accepted by this type of philosophy was defined by Newton. "Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in itself, and from its nature, flows equally, without relation to anything external. The flow of absolute time cannot change . . . Duration remains the same whether motions are swift or slow or none at all." It is conceived as infinite, homogeneous, of one dimension, continuous and irreversible. Bergson lays particular stress upon its homogeneity and its continuity. It is an empty, qualityless or indifferent homogeneous medium in which points are dis-inguished as 'now' and 'not-now,' as successive, or as first, second, third, etc. This homo geneons medium is distingnished from space, another qnalityless, infinite and infinitely divisible medium, homogeneous in all its parts, in which points are distinguished as 'here' and 'not-here,' as simultaneous, or as co-existing in one moment of time. Bergson contends that this conception of time is not pure but adulterated with space. But if mechanism is

not a true interpretation of the problems of life and does not give a true conception of time which is, according to Bergson, the very life it-self, then where are we to seek its true nature? The answer is: in consiouscness, in the very heart of life itself. To reach the true nature of reality, we must study not the crust but the core. We must instal overselves at the very heart of life-movement.

A study of our consciousness, however, reveals that self has two different aspects, social and fundamental. The self with which psychology deals is the social self which is viewed in spatial terms. We say that states succeed one another and can be quantitatively measured and determined. The time of the social self is the time of which we predicate long and short and can be conceived as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one another like so many stages in a journey. But when we look into deeper self, we find that the boundaries of 'states' gradually melt away, the multiplicity of definitely outlined feelings, volitions, images become less definite, less a multiplicity. The unity of the fundamental self is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as unity in which every experience permeates the whole. This organization of the facts of consciousness is the work of time, it is time itself.

Corresponding to these two selves, there are the two methods of approach. Our social self,

that part of our life where we are most concerned with material world around us, is amenable to mechanistic and analytic treatment. But our fundamental self, which is the core of our life, resists this interpretation. It is truly free and cannot be grasped in deterministic terms. Thus Bergson was led to the important distinction of intellect and intuition. The problem was the legacy of Kantian philosophy. Kant, in the examination of the limits of pure reason, reached a conclusion that was, in effect, a denial of the possibility of knowing the Reality. Bergson accepted this challenge and by his subtle logic tried to prove that Reality was accessible to men but not through reason. He agreed with Kant that reason by its nature of logical analysis cannot grasp what is beyond logic. But then he took the bold step and asserted that intuition is the key which cannot only reveal the hidden door of Reality but also open it. We only need look within and come face to face with what Kant called the thing-in-itself. With the help of this new method, *viz.*, intuition, Bergson proved that Reality is pure time, duration, free and creative.

In order to prove his point of view, Bergson took up the hypothesis of evolution as presented by different biologists. In the classical interpretation, evolution was conceived as a mechanical process wherein fitness of the organism for the environment is the criterion of survival. According to Darwin, evolution proceeds through chance variations in which the

individual organism has no part to play. Those variations which are most suited to the environment tend to survive and to reproduce themselves. The whole process is a result of mere accident. Whether these variations are gradual or sudden, in either case the role of life in the whole affair is mere passive and negative. It does not contribute anything. According to Lamarck and his followers, the adaptation to environment determines the pace of evolution. When environment changes due to climate or other factors, it produces a corresponding effect on the organisms. Those who are successful in adapting themselves to the changes survive while others are eliminated. But while differing in other respects, both these explanations agree in looking upon the whole process of evolution as proceeding on mechanical lines. Bergson brought forth a wealth of facts based on the study of insect, animal and vegetable life pursued for 11 years to show that both these classical theories fail to prove how evolution proceeds. Leaving aside general considerations, Bergson presents a concrete example. "Here is the eye of a vertebrate and beside it that of a mollusc such as the common Pecten. The same essential parts, composed of analogous elements, exist in both. The eye of a Pecten exhibits a retina, a cornea, a lens, with cellular construction like ours . . . Whatever opinion one may hold as to the origin of molluscs, it will be agreed that they and verteb-

rates had been separated from their common trunk long before the appearance of an eye as complex as that of Pecten. How, then, is the analogy of structure to be explained ?"[1] Bergson explains that both the theories fail to explain this wonderful phenomenon of the existence of eye in two divergent lines of evolution and he asserts that this fact in itself is a sufficient refutation of mechanism. "Pure mechanism," he says, "would be refutable . . . if it could be proved that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution." [2]

Besides these particular instances, Bergson put forward another important point which, as he claims, destroys the whole basis of classical theories of evolution. If survival of the fittest or adaptation to environment had been the only criterion, evolution should have ceased long ago. There are many lower organisms perfectly adapted to the environment. So he is driven to the conclusion that there is an impulse within the process itself which moves it along the path. He says, "A very inferior organism is as well-adapted as ours to the conditions of existence, judged by its success in maintaining life ; why then, does life, which has succeeded in adapting itself, go on complicating itself and complicating itself more and more dangerously ? Why did not life stop wherever it was possible ?

1. *Creative Evolution*, p. 56.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Why has it gone on? Why, indeed, unless it be that there is an impluse, driving it to take ever greater and greater risks towards its goal of an ever higher and higher efficiency?" Thus, in opposition to the usually accepted interpretation, Bergson asserts that there is a vital urge behind this process of evolution. So far the thinkers had been concerned only with the outer crust of change in the body of the living organism. But Bergson penetrates to the core of the evolutionary process and discovers a life impulse, *elan vital*, which determines the tortuous course of evolution. To explain variations by reference to chance is meaningless, for there is some unsuspected teleological significance behind these mutations. There are "risks" which life takes towards the goal which it has set itself to achieve.

But is there any goal to this process of evolution? Denying mechanism, one could expect that Bergson would accept teleological explanation. But he rejects both. "The essence of mechanical explanation is to consider the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and to submit that *all is given.* On this hypothesis past, present and future would be visible at a glance for a superhuman intelligence capable of making the calculation."[1] If so, then change, growth, evolution and creation would be utterly foreign to the universe.

---

1. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 39,40.

Creative activity and spontaneity would become impossible. But what about teleology? To Bergson the explanation of human activity with reference to motives or ends is equally defective. It is as inapplicable to the creative activity of men as mechanism. There is a form of teleology in which beings and things realize a cut-and-dried programme which is actualised in the course of time. Here again, then, all is given, present, past and future and all so-called activity is simply the realization of a predetermined plan. Teleology thus understood, Bergson holds, is merely mechanism in the reverse order. Evolution means growth and growth implies untold possibilities that cannot be foreseen. Life is history and history never repeats itself. Life consists in creative evolution, that is, a succession of absolutely heterogenous, quite disparate, qualitative changes.

If there were any plan in the working of evolution, Bergson argues, there would have been complete harmony in nature. We find, instead, lack of harmony, disorder and disorganization. Harmony was at the start of life, being the result of the same impulsive urge but as evolution advances conflicts and divergencies appear. In looking backwards, the direction of life can be traced and it will appear as if it were attaining an end. There is a unity of impulsion and not of aspiration. In order to save the novelty and unforeseeability of new events, Bergson had to abandon the teleological view. Like the mechanist, the advocate of teleology

seeks in the past rather than in the future the reason for the harmony. But to Bergson this vital impulse, instead of producing only identity, repetition and death, as the mechanist conceives it, is a creative impulsion, continually welling forth in new and unforeseeable events. If mechanism had its way, all evolulion would be the result of a series of accidents which add up together to produce the existing form. But in the Bergsonian conception, though the end is not predetermined, it has nevertheless been obtained by a process which in some way resembles a voluntary act of will. This original and vital impulse operates in a way that its activities cannot be predicated. The universe grows at every moment and the gates of future are always open. Life produces novelties, makes fresh creations, advances on unchartered seas, devising charts for itself as it sails away. It is just because the vital impulse is active and creative that the future of living beings can never be predicted. If history is a record of such creative, vital and unforeseeable acts, then every event of the past and the present is unique in itself and cannot be repeated in exactly the same shape. No past can be repeated in its original form, for life must move ever along new, fresh and original paths.

This creative impulse which is of the character of 'pure will' or 'consciousness' does not, however, proceed without interruption. At one point its continuous flow is interrupted and, like the recoil of a spring, turns back upon it-

self. This inverse movement is matter. Reality is, no doubt, ceaseless change and flow but matter is a flow in a direction opposite to that of the vital surge itself. Bergson expresses the relation of matter to reality in defferent meta-iphors. Life impulse is a rocket whose extinguished remains fall to the ground as matter. It is a fountain which is playing in ever-increasing abundance. Jet of the fountain is vital activity while the drops which fall back are the creative movement dissipated and are matter. Matter is, then, 'a flux rather than a thing,' but its flow is in the direction opposite to that of the spirit. The flux of spirit is creative evolution ; the movement of matter is towards stability, towards a present which is unceasingly renewed. Bergson seems to arrive at these two opposing tendencies in the universe on the analogy of the movement in our consciousness. Natural direction of mind involves interpretation of parts, continuous creation, free activity but as soon as this movement is interrupted, the opposite movement towards extension, repetition and necessity begins. So the experience of an individual seems to be projected into the comic organism and thus Bergson explains the presence of matter.

The problem of the appearance of matter in Bergson is allied to Fichte's similar problem of the emergence of the non-ego and both, in reality, failed to explain it satisfactorily. Fichte started with the pure Ego which, according to him, holds the key to the universe. In self-

consciousness he discovered the clue to all reality. I am, I exist, only as I act. But then out of this ego as active subject appears a non-ego as object which limits the activity of the subject. Why should there be a non-ego at all? Fichte's position is that the answer to this question lies in the very nature of the ego itself as infinite activity or impulse. Activity of the subject demands, in order to release itself, an object which it must overcome and so it creates out of itself a limiting reality. To Bergson, the Reality is also a creative movement and impulse, a pure will. But experience points to the limitation of this will. According to Bergson, it is due to the inversion of the free activity of the *elan vital*. But the question is: Why should the free activity ever become inverted? Why should there be any interruption in the free flow? Bergson fails to give any definite answer and his metaphorical language in itself is a fact positive that it is a problem which cannot be stated is cold logic. It is nothing more than an interesting and ingeneous cosmic speculalion.

Whether Bergson has been able to solve this problem or not, the more important point for the moral outlook is the opposition between these two forces. The universe is an intermingling of the two directions; the direction of the life force and a force retarding it. Life started as total and undiminishing activity but at a certain stage it meets the resistance of matter, a force moving in the opposite direction. From this meeting of the two opposed movements, this

universe of ours originated. The world of pure tension becomes extension, freedom is changed into activity. Perfect life would be incessant change and creation but matter leads to periodicity. Without matter there would be no struggle. Effort can only be provoked when resistances are met with and when there are obstacles to be overcome. And so it is owing to matter that the force of life is tested and intensified. Meeting with resistance of matter, the *elan vital* at once devises means to overcome it. Instinct and the organic tools with which it works in insects and animals, intelligence and the presence of sense-organs, are all diverse means employed by this impulse to attain its object.

The *elan vital* is an activity but whether it is conscious or unconscious is not definitely explained by Bergson. In its continuous march forward, this activity is met by an activity of opposite nature. The result is a kind of compromise as in the case of plants or the *elan* of life (which is the same thing as will or freedom) may gradually overcome the activity which is matter. An organism is formed thereby, a *modus vevendi* between the two activities. Two paths are open to it to continue its conquest over matter. It may do so immediately, by creating an organized instrument with which to work , or it may do so mediately, in an organism which, although it is not endowed with the natural instinct, will itself manufacture it by fashioning inorganic matter to its needs. The line of development which ends in insects

represents the first alternative while the other line which, starting with the vertebrates, ends in man represents the second. In the former, instinct is the means while in the second case, intelligence is the required tool. These two, instinctive activity and intelligence, represent two divergent solutions of the problem which presented itself to the original *elan* in its action upon matter. The problem was to "create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of liberty ; to construct a machine which would triumph over the mechanical, and to make use of the determination of nature in order to break through the meshes of the net which it had spread."[1] Thus if life force assumes the form of intelligence in man and thus for a while suffers diminution, it is all but necessary for achieving the ultimate purpose. Intelligence becomes allied with matter so much so that materiality and intellectuality become identical terms in Bergson. The force which threads its way through matter has chosen to adopt the form of matter, to insinuate itself into matter, in order that it might ultimately conquer that which it has, so to speak, ingratiated itself. Intellect is simply a stage of the life force in the progress of free activity. Matter does not determine the form of intelligence as Spencer tried to advocate, neither does intelligence impose its form upon matter as Kant held, nor have matter and intelligence been regulated upon one another

1. *Creative Evolution*, p. 278.

by some pre-established harmony, as Liebniz contended, but matter and intelligence have been progressively adapted to each other, and ended in a common form. The force, as if voluntarily, purposefully and cunningly adopted the form of matter. This temporary degradation becomes essential so that the spirit can discover and overcome the order in matter and this is possible only, as if, by stooping to conquer.[1]

According to Bergson, these two modes of the *elan*, instinct and intelligence, do not appear in one line of evolution. He combats most strongly the view commonly held by biologists of modern times as well as Arisotle. He says, "The cardinal error which, from Arisotle onward, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational three successive degrees of development of one and the same tendency whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew."[2] Bergson argues that instinct and intelligence have appeared in their developed forms on two divergent lines of evolution and each represents an attempted solution of one and the same problem, the conquest of mind over matter. Originally they formed part of the creative impulse immanent in life. They are thus complementary, yet opposed faculties.

---

1. J. M'Kellar Stewart, *A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*, p. 121.
2. *Creative Evolution*, p. 135.

Intelligence is concerned with the form of matter; instinct with the activity of life. Although man, as endowed with intelligence, is inclined towards mechanism and materialism, yet the basic force in life in him compels him to look deeper within himself. It is impossible for him not to rise to the higher point of view. He is not pure intelligence: he is not "in entire forgetfulness" of the source whence he, as an intelligent being, sprang. "There pulses in him, though feebly enough at times, the will which created him and which surges through innumerable worlds. Let him resist the distractions of matter which has hypnotised his spirit; let him get back into this will, listen to it, feel it—the antinomies will disappear, and he will feel himself living the life of the world-will, for he has placed himself at the heart of world-progress, the cosmic life, the universal will. We are, all of us, as human, artisans by nature, but we are also, as superhuman, artists, to a greater or less extent. Fugitive instincts, fleeting direct visions of reality in its inwardness, appear through the turmoil and the din of the artisan work in which contact with matter has involved spirit—let us develop these, and our vision of life becomes clear and full."[1]

The principle of life in its march towards creative activity meets resistance of matter. From this resistance emerges the whole problem of life and thenceforward this principle works

1. J. McKeller Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

with the set purpose of attaining greater and greater freedom. The presence of matter hinders this progress to a degree but at the same time this resistance proves useful. The goal towards freedom lies only through conquest over matter. In man alone, this impulse has succeeded in gaining this object to a greater extent. Man alone is free and he is free because of the marvellous complexity of his brain structure. Freedom has been achieved through mechanism. In this sense we may say that man is the goal of evolution. It does not imply that any fore-ordained plan was fulfilled in man. The freedom which consciousness had lost by its contact with matter has been most completely regained in man. Man is essentially intelligence : it is necessary that he should be so if he were to gain conquest over matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be one in which intelligence was supported by intuition, in which these two forces find full development. According to Bergson, the philosopher will be the nearest approach to the perfect man. He conquers matter not by ignoring it but by patiently de-ciphering its meaning. But then it must surpass it. Intelligence is a means and not end. When it has fulfilled its purpose, it must be thrown aside. We must then turn our face towards the light eternal through intuition. It is then and then alone that we can experience in ourselves the very source of life. It is only then that we can appreciate the real significance of true crea-

tive freedom and participate in the cosmic life of humanity. Then "we no longer feel ourselves isolated in humanity ; humanity no longer seems to us isolated in nature which it dominates. As the smallest grain of dust is interconnected with our entire solar system, carried with it in this undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself so all organized beings, from the first beginnings of life to the time in which we live, and in all places as in all times, do but render visible to the eye a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and, in itself, indivisible. All living beings hold together, and all yield to the same formidable impetus. The animal finds its point of support in the plant, man bestrides animality, and humanity in its entirety, in space and in time, is one immense army which gallops on every side of us, before and behind us, in a sweeping charge capable of overcoming all resistance and of clearing many obstacles, perhaps, even death itself."[1]

III

In the Quran we come across some very instructive verses which throw light on the nature of Reality.

"It is of Him that the night returneth on the day, and that the day returneth on the night" (39 : 7).

---

1. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 285-86.

"And of Him is the change of the night and of the day." (23 : 82)

"Verily in the creation of the heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding." (3 : 188)

"He (*i.e.*, God) adds to His creation what He wills." (35 : 1)

All these and several other verses emphasise that it is the duty of Muslims to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them as if they were blind and deaf. This description of the universe as dynamic in origin, as finite but capable of increase, was totally against the whole tenor of Greek philosophy which influenced early Muslim speculation. For Plato, *e.g.*, the Ultimate Reality, the World of Ideas was static, immutable, lying above and beyond the world of change and becoming. Change and movement meant for him unreality. But then the question was how this change and movement which characterise this so-called unreal world came about. Plato was unable to give any satisfactory answer and it was to remove this defect in Plato's theory, *viz.*, the absence of dynamism, that Aristotle postulated God as a principle of movement, as the Prime Mover of the Universe. But the nature of Reality conceived by Aristotle was equally inadequate to explain what he wanted to explain. God, according to him is, no doubt, the prime Mover but His activity is nothing short of inactivity.

Aristotle himself calls it "an activity of immobility." He is Himself unmoved. Removed from this world of pain and suffering, change and becoming, sunshines and storms, and having no sort of interest in the welfare of His creatures, Aristotle's God is no God but a mere mechanical principle that does nothing and therefore is nothing. In reality the view of Reality as envisaged by the Greeks was totally static, quite at variance with what the Quran describes it. The conception of life as a creative, continuous and dynamic process was totally foreign to Greek temperament. Even if some thinkers, like Heraclitus, regarded movement and change as real, it was not creative and dynamic change but circular which had no beginning and no end. Everything in the world was recurrent, eternally rotating and governed by a cyclic motion. According to Islam—and, as a matter of fact, all Semitic religions before it, Christianity and Judaism,—the world is conceived as a historical fulfilment. This dynamic conception of life introduced by Islam was the consequence of certain basic ideas which had no place in Greek thought. The first is the idea of freedom to choose between good and evil which each individual man possesses and on account of which he is morally responsible for what he does. A world in which there is no evil, no freedom of choice, would be a world without beginning, mere fulfilment, the perfect Kingdom of God, a complete and perfect cosmos, an

idea contrary to the spirit of the Quran. In such a world the conception of life as a continuous, creative and dynamic process could not arise. The Greeks had no real knowledge of freedom. Submission to fate was the most prevalent idea in the whole Hellenistic speculation. To them form was always more important than content. The second basic idea is the doctrine of goal of life. It is absolutely essential for the elaboration of the idea of life as a significant progression or movement, that we must have a definite doctrine of the goal of life, its issue and fulfilment. Without an elaborate eschatology it would be impossible to conceive life process as dynamic. An evolutionary process that neither leads towards a determinate end nor has any such end in view, tends to be governed by cyclic motion. The Greek thought had been dominated by the idea of frequency and recurrence of events while the Quran taught that events were immediate, non-recurrent and unique and this fact more than anything else introduced dynamism in its conception of life and Reality.

It was to emphasise this dynamic and creative aspect of Reality that the Quran refers time and again to the ever-changing and continuously growing aspect of the universe, the idea which Iqbal has so beautifully expressed in the following verse :—

یه کائنات ابھی ناتمام ھے شاید
که آرھی ھے دمادم صدائے کن فیکون

This universe is perhaps incomplete,
For every moment there is a cry of "Be, and it becomes."

He finds support for this thesis from Einstein's theory of Relativity. He says, "Einstein is quite right in saying that the universe is finite but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (*shan* in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless, because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Quran was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought."[1] He expressed the same idea in the following verses :—

کران او درون است و برون نیست
درونش پست بالا کم فزون نیست

درونش خالی از بالا و زیر است
ولے بیرون او وسعت پذیر است[2]

Its limit is internal and not external ;
There are no distinctions of low and high,
More or less in its internal aspect.
Its internal aspect is devoid of high and low,
But its external aspect is liable to extension.

Following Bergson, Iqbal starts upon the

---

1. Iqbal, *Self in the Light of Relativity* [An article]. See the writer's book, *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. 398.
2. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 216.

quest of determining the true nature of Reality in the light of our conscious experience, which is the most privileged case of existence, where as Iqbal asserts, we are in direct contact with Reality.[1] If we go deeper into our self we shall find ourselves face to face with the Real in its full glory.

بیا بر خویش پیچیدن بیاموز
بناخن سینه کاویدن بیاموز
اگر خواهی خدا را فاش بینی
خودی را فاش تر دیدن بیاموز

Come and learn to look within your self,
Learn to dig into your heart with the nail of your finger.
If you wish to see the Real directly and immediately,
Learn to look to the unfolding of your self in the deeper recesses of your heart.

اسرار ازل جوئی ، بر خود نظرے کن
یکتائی و بسیاری ، پنہانی و پیدائی

If you are desirous of knowing the secret of Reality,
Well, look within,
And your experience (of deeper levels of consciousness) will reveal :
You are one and many, apparent and hidden (as much as the Real which you are seeking).

Bergson writes, "I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations,

1. Bergson's *Creative Evolution* opens as follows: "The existence of which we are most certain is incontestably our own, for we perceive ourselves interually, deeply."

feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing."[1] Iqbal agrees with the conclusion drawn from this analysis of inner life that there is nothing static and immobile in it. All is constant mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no stoppage, no halt, no resting place :

فریب نظر ہے سکون و ثبات
تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرۂ کائنات
ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شان وجود
سمجھتا ہے تو راز ہے زندگی
فقط ذوق پرواز ہے زندگی
دمادم رواں ہے یم زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی

Rest and immobility are mere illusions.
Every particle of the universe pulsates with life.
The caravan of Life never stops ;
At every stage it manifests itself in a new form.
You think that Life is a mystery. (No, it is not).
It is nothing but duration, a continuous flow.
This flow of Life is continuously marching on, growing and developing.
Everything in the universe manifests the durational aspect of the Life-Principle.

It is this continuous, ever-changing, developing aspect of life which Bergson calls Duration.

But, are rest and immobility, in reality,

1. *Creative Evolution*, p. 1.

illusions? To the common man it would be absolutely preposterous to deny the facts which his eyes report and his reason corroborates. Nor do Iqbal and Bergson belie the evidence of facts and reason. It is not the question of validity or otherwise of what we perceive of the outer world by our senses. To them it is the question of the *way* or the *method* by which we look at the universe. The method that we shall adopt in our enquiry is determined in the last resort by the object we have in view. If we wish to deal with our material environment, then the view of the universe, accepted by common-sense, as consisting of static and immobile things, is practically true and useful. But if we are in search of the Ultimate Reality, then this way of looking at the universe surely leads us nowhere. It lands us in the intricate maze of antinomies out of which it becomes impossible to extricate ourselves. Corresponding to these two distinct aims, there are thus two ways of looking at the universe around us. In the first way, we see objects in juxtaposition to other objects. They are repeated and tend to distinct multiplicity and spatiality. Then there is re-collection of past events that helps us to interpret these objects. Looking back on them, we imagine them as distinct from one another, arranged somehow in the order of their occurrence. As we watch ourselves, these seem distinct states, and the more we analyse, the more defined do they become. They seem, too, to repeat former states. But if we go a little

deeper, we see a tendency towards reciprocal interpenetration. Our living and acting self is no longer divided into distinct states. They fuse and interpenetrate till there is simply a continuity, indivisible perpetual becoming. In this ceaseless change, no one moment is the same as any other moment ; there is complete qualitative heterogeneity and incommensurability between past and present. No sensation, no feeling can repeat itself. The present is for ever unforeseeable and new, though organized with the past and so animated by a common life that the whole self may express itself in one state. This indivisible continuity of change is what characterises true life. It is experienced and lived time, the unfolding of our conscious life. There is no absolute distinction in it of past, present and future. It is only our engagements in the external world that keep back from us this process of eternal becoming. The necessities of our daily life weave a sort of mask over this fundamental reality and instead of continuous change and becoming, we find distinct and static objects, time divided into past, present and future and events happening as if in a line of succession. This conception of time is false, spatialised and is at the basis of all our difficulties that remain unresolved in the field of metaphysics. Zeno's proof in favour of unreality of change and movement was based on this wrong notion of time. What was an indivisible act of change, when divided into component parts, becomes a series of motionless acts and

thus we are led to a conclusion that is absolutely paradoxical. What, in reality, Zeno was able to prove was not the unreality of change and motion but the inadequacy of this spatialised time to grasp the true nature of change. This conception of time is the result of our practical necessity. Superficially we perceive what is useful for our daily needs. Man is in perpetual struggle with his environment; he must act on the things around him if he would preserve himself. And this is why it is so important for him to perceive things in the form most conducive to his being able to make use of them. In reality everywhere there is change but we localise it on the surface of things, for this is the view of things that is useful to us. But if we wish to get at what is most fundamental, we must eliminate these practical habits of perception. We must take off the spectacles through which we are enabled to act on the things around us and try to look at these things in a disinterested fashion. It is only by the help of intuition or what Iqbal calls love; that we are able to penetrate behind this mask.

فروغ دانش ما از قیاس است
قیاس ما ز تقدیر حواس است
چو حس دیگر شد ، این عالم دگر شد
سکون و سیر و کیف و کم دگر شد[1]

The development of our intellect is through reasoning;
Our reasoning depends upon the nature of senses.

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 236.

When there is a change in the "senses" (*i.e.*, when we leave aside reason and employ intuition), the nature of the universe correspondingly undergoes change ;
Rest and motion, quantity and quality change.

But, how can we transform the "senses" as desired by Iqbal ? What is the nature of the method which can help us in grasping the secret of the self ? He says :

چه پرسی از طریق جستجویش ؟
فرو آ در مقام هائے و هویش
شب و روزے که داری بر ابد زن
فغان صبحگاهے بر خرد زن

خرد را از حواس آید متاعے
فغان از عشق می گیرد شعاعے
خرد جزو را، فعان کل را بگیرد
خرد میرد، فغان هرگز نمیرد

خرد بهر ابد ظرفے ندارد
نفس چون سوزن ساعت شمارد
تراشد روز ها، شب ها، سحر ها
نگیرد شعله و چیند شرر ها[1]

You want to know how you can experience the Real within you. Come down to the stage of lamentation (intuition).
Change your days and nights for eternity.
Change from intellect to the morning lamentation.
Intellect fattens on sense-perception,
Lamentation gets light from love.
Intellect grasps the part, lamentation the whole,
Intellect dies but lamentation is immortal.
Intellect has no categories to comprehend eternity,
It counts moments as the hand of the watch,

---

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 229.

It contrives days and nights and mornings ;
It cannot catch (comprehend) the flame therefore it takes only sparks.

When one follows this method and tries to capture the One by journeying within oneself, what is the result ? Iqbal describes it in the following verses :—

سفر در خویش ؟ زادن بے آب و مام
ثریا را گرفتن از لب بام
ابد بردن به یک دم اضطرابے
تماشا بے شعاع آفتابے
ستردن نقش هر امید و بیمے
زدن چاکے به دریا چون کلیمے
شکستن این طلسم بحر و بر را
ز انگشتے شگافیدن قمر را
چنان باز آمدن از لا مکانش
درون سینه او ، در کف جهانش[1]

To travel into self ? It is to be born without father and mother.
To catch Pleides from the edge of the roof ;
To hold eternity with a single stroke of anguish ;
To see without the rays of the sun ;
To obliterate every sign of hope and fear,
To cleave the river into two like Moses ;
To break this spell of sea and land,
To split the moon with a finger,
So to return from this experience of the Invisible world,
That it is within the heart, and the world in his grasp.

This intuitional way of looking at the

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid,* p. 225.

Reality in contradistinction from the intellectual can be easily illustrated by certain very instructive examples. In the process of perceiving red it has been calculated that the frequency of waves reaching our eyes is four hundred billion per second. If it were possible for us to count these waves at the rate of 2,000 a second which is supposed to be the limit at which they could become perceptible, it would take 6,300 years to complete the enumeration of the waves which occur in one second. Thus we grasp or hold together in one single mental act of vision that which is practically incalculable.[1] The Quran, in describing the act of creation, refers to two different things.

" (He) in six days created the Heavens and the earth, and what is between them, then mounted His throne ; the God of mercy." (25 : 60)

" All things We have created with a fixed destiny : Our command was but one, swift as the twinkling of an eye." (54 : 60)

Commenting on these two apparently different statements, Iqbal says, "If we look at the movement embodied in creation from the outside, that is to say, if we apprehend it intellectually, it is a process lasting through thousands of years ; for one Divine day, in the terminology of the Quran . . . is equal to 1,000 years. From another point of view, the process of crea-

---

1. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 229. See Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 49.

tion, lasting through thousands of years, is a single indivisible act, swift as the twinkling of an eye."[1]

ضمیر زندگانی جاودانی است
بچشم ظاهرش بینی ، زمانی است

The impulse of life is eternal,
But if you look at it from the outside, *i.e.*, from the intellectual point of view, then it is bound by time.

The intellectual aspect of life is not useless and insignificant. In its evolution, life encounters the resistance of matter and in order to continue its original movement, life adopts the form of matter. Thus, the conquest of matter and material forces becomes essential in the interest of the emancipation of life from its fetters. The world of Nature for Iqbal, as for Fichte, is the training ground for man as a moral being. This universe, which grows out of the richness of the self, is not alien to it but a task which exists only for moral purposes—in order that individuals can find opportunity to perform their duties. In the absence of obstacles to be overcome, nothing can be accomplished by man. I know and exist as a moral object, and the world exists for me only as the field of my moral activity :

خویشتن را چون خودی بیدار کرد
آشکارا عالم پندار کرد
در جهان تخم خصومت کاشت است
خویشتن را غیر خود پنداشت است

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 48.

سازد از خود پیکر اغیار را
تا فزاید لذت پیکار را
بهر یک گل خون صد گلشن کند
از پے یک نغمه صد شیون کند
عذر این اسراف و این سنگین دلی
خلق و تکمیل جمال معنوی

When the Self awoke to consciousness,
It revealed the universe of Thought.
By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world :
It imagines itself to be other than itself.
It makes from itself the forms of others
In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.
For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred rose-gardens
And makes a hundred lamentations in quest of a single melody.
The excuse for this wastefulness and cruelty
Is the shaping and perfecting of spiritual beauty.[1]

But due to the influence of neo-Platonic philosophy, the true significance of this aspect of self's development was completely ignored with the result that a life of total passivity with regard to nature became a common feature of Islamic Mysticism. One of the main purposes of the Quran in referring repeatedly to the observable aspect of Reality is to awaken in man the true conception of his relation to the universe. According to Christianity, the spiritual life of man can be developed only through the revelation of a new world within one's self. In other words, Christianity tried to build the

1. *The Secrets of the Self* (1950), pp. 9-10.

spiritual life of man only on the durational aspect and completely ignored the intellectual aspect. Islamic mysticism followed in the footsteps of Christianity in denouncing this world of matter as evil and urging upon the Muslims to confine all their activities to the inner world of heart. Islam, however, while accepting the truth advocated by Christianity, goes forward and asserts that this new world revealed from within is nothing foreign to the world of matter. "The Ultimate Reality, according to the Quran," says Iqbal, "is spiritual and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular . . . All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit."[1]

As expressed in the Quran in reference to the point raised by the angels, God establishes the superiority of Adam over them through man's capacity for naming things. It means that man is endowed with framing concepts of things. To form a concept is to 'grasp' them in the literal sense of the term 'grasp.' With this weapon of the ideational capacity of mind, of the ability to form images and ideas, and to weave the latter into trains of thought, in short, intellectual power, man approaches the observable aspect of Reality. The greater his capacity the greater is his control and dominancc of the environment. It is intellect that not only affects direct contact with Reality but also achieves this

---

1. *Lectures,* p. 155.

contact on an ever-widening scale that has, in principle, no limit. The result is science in all its glory, science, the expression of man's constant effort to know and master.

ما سوا از بہر تسخیر است و بس
سینۂ او عرضۂ تر است و بس
از کن حق ما سوا شد آشکار
تا شود پیکان تو سندان گداز
خیز و واکن دیدۂ مخمور را
دوں مخواں ایں عالم مجبور را
غایتش توسیع ذات مسلم است
امتحان ممکنات مسلم است
جستجو را محکم از تدبیر کن
انفس و آفاق را تسخیر کن
علم اسما اعتبار آدم است
حکمت اشیاء حصار آدم است[1]

The non-ego is meant only to be conquered,
Its heart is only to be the target of our arrows.
From Creator's 'Be', the non-ego came into being,
So that your arrow may learn to pierce iron.
Rise and open your intoxicated eyes,
Don't call this determined world as base.
Its object is the expansion of the personality of a Muslim,
To put his potentialities to test.
Strengthen your search by yon devices,
Control the worlds of universe and self.
Man gets honour by this conceptual knowledge,
This wisdom is the source of his strength.

One of the ways by which life seeks to overcome the hindrances in its way is the invention of

---

1. *Remuz-i-bekhudi.*

instruments out of itself. Schopenhauer, as we have seen, holds that the body is the will made visible or objectified. The several organs of the body correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself. Teeth. throat, and bowels are objectified hunger ; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire. The tiger's teeth and claws manifest his will to live by predation. Iqbal says, "Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstruction in its march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals, and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion it has invented or developed out of itself certain instincts, *e.g.*, senses, intellect, etc., which help it to assimilate obstructions."[1]

چیست اصل دیدهٔ بیدار ما ؟
بست صورت لذت دیدار ما
کبک پا از شوخیٔ رفتار یافت
بلبل از سعیٔ نوا منقار یافت
بینی و دست و دماغ و چشم و گوش
فکر و تخییل و شعور و یاد و هوش
زندگی مرکب چو در جنگاه بافت
بهر حفظ خویش این آلات ساخت

What is the source of our wakeful eye ?
Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape.
The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing
Nose. hand, brain, eye and ear,

1. Introduction to *Asrar-i Khudi*, [English]; p. xiv.

Thought, imagination, feeling, memory, and understanding—
All these are weapons devised by Life for self-preservation,
In its ceaseless struggle.

But this intellectual way of making the world our own—in understanding the world as a rigid system of cause and effect—though essential and indispensable, is not final. It must be surpassed. We must outgrow its utility. The other way of approaching the universe is what Iqbal calls vital. The causal chain wherein we try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its own purposes. The ego is called upon to live in a complex environment, and it cannot maintain its life in it without reducing it to a system which would give it some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of things around it. The view of its environment as a system of cause and effect is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, though not the final expression of the nature of Reality.

ابد را عقل ما ناسازگار ست
" یکے " از گیر و دار او هزار ست

" یکے " را آں چناں صد پاره دیدیم
عدد بہر شمارش آفریدیم

چوں لنگ است او سکون را دوست دارد
نه بیند مغز و دل بر پوست دارد

حقیقت را چو ما صد پاره کردیم
تمیز ثابت و سیاره کردیم

Infinity is not amenable to our intellect,
' One ' in its hand becomes a thousand.

We introduced division into the 'one' so much
That we created numerals to count them.
As it is lame, it likes rest (immobility) ;
It does not see the kernal, therefore looks towards the shell.

As we divided Reality into several spheres,
We made a distinction of change and rest.

As a consequence, it becomes impossible for reason to recapture the original unity and movement. Opposed to it is the vital way of looking at the universe. It is the absolute acceptance of the inevitable necessity of life regarded as a whole which in evolving its inner richness creates serial time. The vital way of appropriating the universe is what the Quran describes as *iman* (ایمان). Only men of exceptional brilliance and vitality are capable of such power in its full glory. Hallaj's 'I am the Creative Truth, and Ali's 'I am the living Quran' are the expressions of this deep-rooted conviction. All creative activity and moral idealism have their origin in it. No reform, no constructive revolution in politics, religion or art, no cultural advance, no scientific discovery and invention has been possible without it. In the following verses of *Javid Nama*, Iqbal has brought out the difference between these two modes of approach which he calls as, *aql* and '*ishd*, reason and intuition :—

عقل هم خود را بدین عالم زند
تا طلسم آب و گل را بشکند
می شود هر سنگ راه او را ادیب
می شود برق و سحاب او را خطیب

چشمش از ذوق نگه بیگانه نیست
لیکن او را جرأت رندانه نیست
پس ز ترس راه چون کورے رود
نرم نرمک صورت مورے رود
کارش از تدریج می یابد نظام
من نه دانم کے شود کارش تمام
می نداند عشق سال و ماه را
دیر و زود و نزد و دور راه را
عقل در کوهے شگافے می کند
یا بگرد او طوافے می کند
کوه پیش عشق چون کاهے بود
دل سریع السیر چون ماهے بود

Intellect also casts itself on this universe,
To break the spell of water and clay,
Every stone in its path teaches it a lesson,
Lightning and clouds become revealers of secrets.
Its eye is not foreign to the art of seeing,
But it lacks the enterprising spirit of an adventurer.
Therefore through the fear of the path, it moves like a blind person,
Moves slowly like a snail,
It works by stages.
I can't say how it can finish its work.
Love does not care for months and years,
Late and early, near and far of the path.
Intellect dynamites its way through a mountain,
Or circles round it.
Before Love, a mountain is a straw,
'Heart' floats easily like a fish.

Hence in order to enjoy fuller and richer life by which alone the ago is able to achieve true freedom and immortalitv, we must outgrow the intellectual outlook and go down into the

deeper levels of consciousness. Intellect must be replaced by love. This transition must be made in the interest of the self :

حکیماں مردہ را صورت نگاراند
ید موسیٰ ، دم عیسیٰ ندارند
زمانے با ارسطو آشنا باش
دمے با ساز بیکن ہم نوا باش
و لیکن از مقام شاں گزر کن
مشو گم اندریں منزل ، سفر کن
به آں عقلے که داند بیش و کم را
شناسد اندرون کان و یم را
جہاں چند و چوں زیر نگیں کن
بگردوں ماہ و پرویں را کمیں کن
و لیکن حکمت دیگر بیاموز
رہاں خود را ازیں مکر شب و روز[1]

The scientists tend to adorn a dead body,
They do not possess the Hand of Moses and Breath of Jesus.
For a while familiarise yourself with Aristotle,
For another while sit in the company of Bacon.
But you must pass beyond their attitude,
Don't get lost in this stage ; journey on.
With the aid of that intellect that knows more or less,
Probe the depths of mines and oceans ;
Master the world of how and why,
Catch the moon and Pleides from the sky.
But then learn wisdom of another sort,
Free yourself from the snares of night and day.

This "wisdom of another sort," as Iqbal puts it here, is the vital way of assimilating the

---

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 218.

universe by inserting oneself in the inner centre of experience :

بخود رس از سر هنگامه بر خیز
تو خود را در ضمیر خود فر و ریز

> Leave aside all this hustle and bustle and look within.
> Drop yourself into the inner depth of yourself.

And when we dip into the stream of consciousness, we discover the continuous flow of life in its exuberance which is pure time, duration, life in its original purity. In it there is no distinction of past, present and future. It is an organic whole in which past operates along with the present and the future as an open possibility is also there. Like life or consciousness, real time is an existence in which all reality is the actually present, moving, changing now. It is when we grasp the true nature of our experience of time and distinguish it from its spatial representation that the real nature of free will appears. It is spatial time which makes us think of ourselves as made up of ourselves as made up of elements that can be measured and counted like material and static objects of science, and of our actions as the play of these elements. "If time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of Reality is original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable . . . To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be

absolutely free and original in creaton. In fact, all creative activity is free activity"[1]

اے اسیر دوش و فردا ! در نگر
در دل خود عالم دیگر نگر
در گل خود تخم ظلمت کاشتی
وقت را مثل خطے پنداشتی
باز با پیمانۂ لیل و نہار
فکر تو پیمود طول روزگار
وقت را مثل مکاں گستردۂ
امتیاز دوش و فردا کردۂ
اے چو بو رم کردہ از بستان خویش
ساختی از دست خود زندان خویش

Look, O thou enthralled by Yesterday and Tomorrow,
Behold another world in thine own heart !
Thou hast sown the seed of darkness in thy clay,
Thou hast imagined Time as a line ;
Thy thought measures length of Time
With the measure of night and day.
Thou hast extended Time, like Space,
And distinguished Yesterday from Tomorrow.
Thou hast fled, like a scent, from thine own garden ;
Thou hast made thy prison with thine own hand.[2]

In the following verses Iqbal further elaborates this idea of free creativity of the ego by drawing a distinction between a slave and a free man :—

عبد گردد یاوہ در لیل و نہار
در دل حر یاوہ گردد روزگار

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 50.
2. *Asrar-i-Khudi* (English Translation), pp. 80—2.

عبد را تحصیل حاصل فطرت است
واردات جان او بے ندرت است
دمبدم نو آفرینی کار حر
نغمه پیہم تازه ریزد تار حر
عبد را ایام زنجیر است و بس
پر لب او حرف تقدیر است و بس
همت حر با قضا گردد مشیر
حادثات از دست او صورت پذیر
رفته و آئنده در موجود او
دهر ها آسوده اندر زود او

A slave is one who, engrossed in the activities necessitated by his being born in the material environment, lacks the necessary lnitative to pass beyond his intellect to love. He is slave to his body, to mechanical habits, to matter, to nature, to necessity. He becomes naught within the limits of day and night while for a free man, who, in a single jump, has crossed into the frontiers of love, days and nights themselves become naught. A slave deals in imitations and second-hand material and his life-experience lacks originality. A free man is constantly engaged in creating and singing new sings at every moment of his life. For aslave, time becomes his fetters and he sings of *taqdir*, the inevitable fate which awaits him. A free man, on the other hand, is a co-worker with fate and new events take shape at his hands. His present carries past and future in its sweep and his moments are expressive of ages.[1]

---

1. *Cf.* the following verses of Iqbal :

خرد دیکھے اگر دل کی نگاہ سے
جہاں روشن ہے نور لا الہ سے
فقط اک گردش شام و سحر ہے
اگر دیکھیں فروغ مہر و ماہ سے

If we wish to prove this creative freedom enjoyed by the free man by any act of logical argument, we shall be facing an impossibility. As soon as an attempt is made to define a free act, it becomes solidified in concepts and words and then the deterministic position becomes inevitable. In a world conceived in conceptual, *i.e.*, intellectual way, there can be no room for freedom. We are left with nothing but to deny it as the determinist rightly asserts, or to relegate it, as Kant did, to the timeless domain of things-in-themselves, a domain inaccessible to consciousness. Free-will, this power of free creative action, is not the so-called liberty of choice which the indeterminists have asserted and the determinists have equally vehemently denied. Free-will is the very nature of our lives as individual wholes, the expression of the individuality of life, The free act is a veritable unity, lived and perceived from within, and never repeated. Our inner life is not mathematics, at the mercy of the inevitability of the mechanical law, but history which proceeds dynamically and creatively without repetitions; we do not live in space but in the world of soul.

خرد دیکھے اگر دل کی نگاہ سے
جہاں روشن ہے نور لا الہ سے
فقط اک گردش شام و سحر ہے
اگر دیکھیں فروغ مہر و ماہ سے

زندگانی را سر تکرار نیست
فطرت او خو گر تکرار نیست
زندگانی نیست تکرار نفس
اصل او از حی و قیوم است و بس

Life does not countenance recurrence ;
Its nature is unfamiliar with repetition.
Life is not a continuity of homogeneous breaths ;
Its origin is the ever-living and ever-creating God.

Assuredly, free act, in this sense, is very rare and for this reason we are most often not free. A truly free life is made up of actions, largely automatic, habits and conventions forming a crust around our free expression. It is only at moments of crises or when we are touched with deep emotion that we seem to burst through this crust. We live for the external world rather than for ourselves ; we spcak rather than think ; we are acted upon rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration. Free act is the result of our being mind or spirit and all automatic habitual actions are the result of our being body. If we had been all mind or spirit, all our actions woul, no doubt, have been free ; all past would have been ever present with us. But we are bodies as well ond so need to live in the present. According to Iqbal, our body is not a receptacle of our soul or mind as is commonly understood. It is the instrument which our mind has made in order to act. By our bodies we are attached to this life of action and by our mind or spirit we tend towards detachment and thus Iqbal is able to suggest a new solution of the problem of relation of body and mind which has been taxing the minds of thinkers, since Descartes bifurcated the original

unity of life. The mind, or *nofs*, he says, is the pure act; the body is only the act become visible. He quotes with approval the following famous verse of Rumi:

بادہ از ما مست شد ' نے ما ازو
قالب از ما هست شد ' نے ما ازو

It is *not* we that get intoxicated through wine; it is rather the wine which gets intoxicated through us.
It is *not* we that live through body; it is the body that receives life through us.

In *Gulshen-Raz-i-Jadid*, he explains this relation in the following versus:—

تن و جاں را دوتا گفتن کلام است
تن و جاں را دوتا دیدن حرام است

بجاں پوشیدہ رمز کائنات است
بدن حالے ز احوال حیات است

عروس معنی از صورت حنا بست
نمود خویش را پیرایہ ها بست

حقیقت روئے خود را پردہ باف است
کہ او را لذتے در انکشاف است[1]

To talk of body and soul as two separate entities is wrong:
It is totally sinful to do so.
The whole secret of the universe lies in the soul;
Body is one of its modes of expression.
The bride of Reality adorned itself by the *hina* of form;
It assumed different shapes for its manifestation.
Reality weaves a veil to cover its face,
For it finds delight in discovery.

This body is thus a mere veil which must be

1. Pp. 216-7.

removed by our efforts and then we can see the epiphany of Reality in its full splendour. But even then the need for body remains. It is a mode of Reality and, as such, necessary. As long as we are to live in the present environment, we need action and here body performs its fuction as an instrument of mind of action. Therefore both attachment and detachment are essential. As Bergson has said, "Attachment and detachment, these are the two polest between which morality oscillates . . . If we are no attached to life, our effort will be lacking in itself. If we do not detach ourselves in some small degree . . . our efforts will be lacking in aim and direction." Thus we are constantly moving from the plane of detachment to the plane of attachment, from the sphere of the dream to the sphere of action. A truly fruitful life consists in a balanced movement which crosses from one plane to other and never consents to be confined to either. He who is content with the sphere of action alone as for example, the businessman of today, sets machines at work, acts machanically himself, lives in matter and ends by acquiring the stiffness and materiality of that which he handles. He reduces himself to an automation. The other person who would be content to dream his life away a being cut off from action, would be all spirit, but his life would be equally barren, for he lives in a world of illusion which has no connection with the world of action in which he was born and in which he is required

to live. The limitation imposed by body on mind tends to mak men mechanical and therefore it is necessary that man should, at regular intervals, look within his inner self so that by coming into direct contact with the springs of the over-changing creative life-force, he may regain his original freedom. Man, being a part and parcel of life, is essentially free and creative but by the necessity of this invironment in which he has been placed, he often falls a prey to automatism and therefore it is essential that he must regain his true spiritual self and thus retain his freedom and creativity. The method by which this power of freedom can be regained is according to Islam prayer. In prayer, the deeper self of man, what Iqbal calls the appreciative self in contradistinction from the efficient self of our daily life, come into direct contact with Reality and by this the individual regains his nitiative and freedom. "Prayer as a means of spiritual illumination." says Iqbal, "is a normal vital act by which the little island of our personality suddenly discovers its situation in a large whole of life."[1]

So long as we retain this body of ours, intellectual approach is not only necessary but intevitable. And it is for this reason that Iqbal strongly protested against what he calls false anti-intellectualism advocated by the mystics. It is not reason that is defective but the way it is used that leads to disaster. Reason and

1. *Lectures* p. 90.

intuition must combine to give a true picture of Reality. It is only when intellectual approach gradually develops and merges into the vital that one can hope to realise the true idea of manhood. It is for this reason that, according to Iqbal, McTaggart, for example, is a greater philosopher than either Bergson or Plotinus. Both the latter thinkers started with intuition and afterwards tried to rationalise their vision, while McTaggart started with reason and ended with intuitive insight that brought to him deep conviction in the truth of what he knew. A thinker who begins and ends with intellectual persuits contributes very little to the cultural heritage of humanity. Mere intellectual approach may produce an acute thinker who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. It is rather the vital mode of approach which succeeds in creating true human beings who not only react to external stimuli but mould the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes. It is only in this way that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. This vital way of dealing with the universe is strengthened by the prayer. It brings us back from the plane of attachment to the plane of detachment, from habit to creation. "Indeed," says Iqbal, "Islam recognises a very important fact of human psychology, *i. e.*, the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power

to act freely, as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer which according to the Quran restores 'self possession' to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanising effect of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom."[1] It is thus only through love and intuition, that is, through reconstruction of the finite ego by bringing it into direct contact with an eternal life-process, that man can hope to gain liberation from the mechanistic influence of daily routine. It is this stage which Iqbal calls thc period of discovery in the life man, when religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of law, but by discovering the ultimate source of law within the depths of his own consciousness.[2]

In *Javid Nama*, Iqbal describes the process of assimilating the universe as a sort of 'second birth' which has a dual aspect, apparent and hidden, corresponding to the intellectual and vital modes of approach. One is nourished by intellect and reason, while the other is developed through intuition and love. Reason grapples with this universe of water and clay,

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 109.
2. *Lectures*, p. 181.

and with each obstacle in its way, marches forward to its goal. It has a knack of understanding and grasping the Real but it is not as bold and sweeping as tove. Due to its slow-footedness, its process is trying and the end always seems far off. But with love, it becomes easy. With the help of reason, we can hope to attain only what he calls *sifat*, attributes, the observable aspect of the Real, while with the help of love, we can enjoy the *dhat*, the Real Person, the Ultimate Ego. He alone is the true man who can enjoy the epiphany of the Ego, Such a man alone is truly free and creative. Iqbal sums up the whole problem of free-will and creativity in the following verses :

اے کہ گوئی محمل جان است تن
سر جاں را در نگر ، برتن متن
محملے نے ، حالے از احوال اوست
محملش خواندن فریب گفتگو است
چیست جاں ؟ جذب و سرور و سوز و درد
ذوق تسخیر سپہر گرد گرد
چیست تن ؟ با رنگ و بو خو کردن است
با مقام چار سو خو کردن است
از شعور است ایں کہ گوئی نزد و دور
چیست معراج ؟ انقلاب اندر شعور
انقلاب اندر شعور از جذب و شوق
وار هاند جذب و شوق از تحت و فوق
ایں بدن با جان ما انباز نیست
مشت خاکے مانع پرواز نیست

You say that body is a receptacle of soul. Don't be

foolish and try to realise the true significancc of soul.

Our body is not a receptacle, but a mode of expression of the soul.

To call it a receptacle is wrong.

What is soul or mind ? It is emotion, ecstasy, burning and pangs ;

It is desire to control the revolving sky.

What is body ? It is meant to adapt itself to the world of smell and colour,

To familiarise with four dimensional space.

This distinctions of 'near' and 'far' are due to intellect.

What is ascension ? Revolution in the way of thinking.

This revolution is the result of love.

Love removes the distinction of 'up' and 'down.'

Thus Iqbal agrees with Bergson in looking upon Reality as a free creative impluse of the nature of volition. In his early writings, we often come across verses where Iqbal seems to be voicing this view of Bergson without any qualifications. To the latter, the *elan vital* is the sole reality. It serves no purpose ; it evolves with no goal before it.

زندگی رهروان در تگ و تاز است و بس

قافلهٔ موج را جاده و منزل کجا است ؟

Life is constantly on the move, struggling and marching on its way. And that is all.

Can you imagine any destination or goal for the caravan of waves of the ocean ?

But soon Iqbal realised that this form of goalless and aimless evolution is meaningless.

It would be identical with Schopenhauer's blind incessant Will that leads us nowhere. If *elan vital* is blind, unconscious and moving towards no goal, then Schopenhauer was correct in concluding that we should run away from this Reality which not only produces evil and suffering but is itself evil. It was the credit of Nietzsche that he adopted the doctrine of the primacy of Will from Schopenhauer, but saved himself from his pessimism by assigning a particular aim to the working of this Will. The objectifications of this Will are not for the fun of malice and vengeance but for good. The destination of evolution is, according to Nietzsche, towards the creation of the Superman. Here lqbal parts company with Bergson, He learned much from him but, as Nietzsche turned in honour from his erstwhile guide, so Iqbal turned his back upon Bergson. With the tradition of purely teleological evolutionary theory as evolved by Muslim thinkers before him, Iqbal could not adopt an aimless and blind impulse, however vital and creative it may be, as the Reality. The Quran is clear in this respect. "We have not created the Heavens and the earth and whatever is between in sport. We have not created them but for a *serious end.*" (44 : 38).

The point of departure of Bergson, as we have seen, was a revolt against mechanisation of life. He could not view life as something given and settled, with no scope for free-will,

spontaneity and creation. He was right so far. An intuitive insight in our conscious experience surely confirms that the actions of living organism, from lower to higher. are motivated by some sort of inner impulse which manifests itself in ever new, unpredictable patterns of behaviour. But his revolt against mechanism went to the other extreme and his analysis of conscious experience on which he bases his whole theory remained defective. In order to save the spontaneity and creativity of Reality, he not only rejected mechanism but also discarded its teleological characteristic. If there is no purpose, no direction in which the evolutionary process is seeking expression, religion loses all and ethics a large part of its meaning. Therefore it was impossible for Iqbal to ignore the teleological aspect. The mistake of Bergson arose out of his defective analysis of conscious experience. "He (*i.e.*, Bergson) regards," says Iqbal, "conscious experiences as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has a forward aspect also. Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. Even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate interests and purpose." Further elaborating this point, he continues. "Thus ends and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or subconscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of our conscious

experience. And the notion of purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the future. The past, no doubt, abides and opreates in the present ; but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes colour not only our present states of consciousness but also reveal their future direction. In fact, they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be. To be determined by an end is to be determined by what ought to be."[1]

Thus the presence of purpose means that our acts are being determined by ideals. Without ideals, it is not possible to bring about unity in the behaviour of individuals. A multiplicity of diverse actions does not make a man but only when they are strung together on the unity of purpose that these actions become significant and important. Without the existence of a purpose, individual cannot be fully creative and free. All creative actvity can be understood only in relation to a fixed ideal.

زندگی را بقا از مدعا است
کاروانش را درا از مدعا است
زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است
آرزو صید مقاصد را کمند
دفتر افعال را شیرازه بند

Life is preserved by purpose ;

1. *Lectures*, pp. 52-3.

Because of the goal its caravan-bell tinkles.
Life is latent in seeking and striving,
Its reality is hidden in desire.
Desire is a noose for hunting ideals,
A binder of the books of deeds.[1]

Not only is the whole evolutionary process an unfolding of a purpose but even at the different stages of this process, we can perceive its operation. According to Iqbal, social organization, customs, laws, all science and art, all cultural achievements, are the result of this purpose.

What is the essence of the mind that strives after new discoveries and scales the heavens ?
Knowest thou what works this miracle ?
'Tis desire that enriches Life—
What are social organization, customs and laws ?
What is the secret of the novelties of science ?
A desire which realised itself by its own strength
And burst forth from the heart and took shape.[2]

But Bergson was partly justified in rejecting teleological causation. Aristotle who was a teleologist viewed the universe as a process of development from potentiality to actuality. This process of eternal becoming aims at realising the Form which is represented as the final cause. Every process has for Aristotle a last stage in which the Form which was once latent in the developing organism becomes fully realised. The end which each thing is striving to

---

1. *Asrar-i-Khudi* (Eng), p. 13.
2. Ibid, p. 14.

bring into being, towards which it is evolving, pre-exists the movement. In Aristotle's system this end or goal is God, the unmoved Mover, Who is Himself outside the universe, in whose evolution. He is not at all interested and in the creation of which He had no hand. He is neither moral nor personal. This teleological causation which is working from without and which makes the whole process of evolutionary development as already given before-hand deserved to be discarded and Bergson was therefore right in rejecting it in *toto*. If teleology means working out of a plan in view of a predetermined end, it takes away all creativity and spontaneity of life. If all is given somewhere in eternity, then what is the significance of all this great panaroma of human history, man's achievements in the diverse fields of culure ? No doubt, this form of teleology is nothing less than mechanism in another and subtler form.

But there is another sense of teleology which avoids these defects. There is no distant goal which we are striving for. At every stage of our life, we are working, developing and shaping our behaviour in the light of new aspirations. There is a sort of hormic drive in us which does not let us rest at any moment. We wish to achieve an object, we struggle hard and attain it. But then our restless spirit is not allowed to rot. We are, as if, pushed forward and backward form within ourselves. "To live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them." The Kantian

categorical imperative had its basis on the assumption of 'I can,' and it is this 'I can' this experience of inner freedom and realisation of an internal hormic push, which moves us every moment to *be* something. This continuous activity of man to be something attains its end by forming ideals and purposes, realising them and then again guided by other and higher ideals and thus life moves on. The evolutionary process, in the same sense, is not moving towards a fixed destination. "To endow the world process with purpose in this sense," says Iqbal, "is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends are terminations of a career ; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated. A time-process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing---an actualisation of open possibilities. It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past. To my mind nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a pre-conceived plan."[1]

This kind of teleological causation can be understood in reference to the creative activity of a poet or an artist. Take, for instance, the common example of a college student who is engaged in preparing an essay on a subject

1. *Lectures*, p. 55.

which requires reading, reflection and originality. He may start with a tentative plane in his mind but as he begins to write, thoughts develop and he finds that he cannot stick to his original plan. He maks and modifies his scheme as he goes along. His essay may turn out to be a brilliant piece of work. But before he started, with all the schemes and plans, he could not predict just what he was going to write. This sort of inner purpose has been called immanent teleology. Here future pre-exists but only as an open possibility and not as a fixed order of event with definites and contours.

Iqbal is thus led to view Reality as a pure duration in which life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. It is of the naturc of vital impulse which is constantly changing, developing and creating. But he goes a step further and call this Reality a Self—an all-embracing, concrete self which is the ultimate sonrce of all individual life and thought. It is not blind and aimless but a rationally directed Will, whose creative activity has no limit and who appears in a fresh glory eveey moment. Iqbal calls this Reality an Ego because. He responds to our invocations. We are awarc of our minds birectly and immediately but our consciousnes of other minds is only inferential. We talk and gesticulate in order to express our thoughts. When we see other people talking and gesticulating we infer that they also posses minds. On the basis of

this simple fact Iqbal argues that the Ultimate Reality must be an Ego because our calls are responded and our invocations are answered. The Quran says of Him, "And your Lord saith, call Me and I respond to your call." (40 : 62) To call the Ultimate Reality an Ego does not mean that we are fashioning God after the image of man. Intuition, says Iqbal, reveals Life as a centralising ego. "It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not formless fluid, but an organising principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalises the dispersing disposition of the living organism for a constructive purpose."[1]

This Reality, the rationally directed, spiritual, creative Ego, is not only transcendent but also immanent. He is in close personal touch with the universe and man and yet is far above them. He is not the purely transcendent God of Aristole who lies totally outside the whole evolutionary process of life uninterested and unperturbed by its ebbs and flows. The Quran, on the other hand; describes Him as nearer to man than his neckvein though this nearness is not spatial. He loves those who love Him and answers the call of those who invoke Him. "Say : Allah is one. Allah is He on whom all depend ; He begets not nor is He begotton. And none is like unto Him." These verses beautifully sum up both transcendence and immanence. They emphasise

---

1. *Lectures*, pp. 60-1.

the most intimate relation of God to this universe ; it is on Him that everything depends. In spite of the fact that everything lives through Him nothing is like Him and He transcends everything. He is immanent because He is in everything and specially in the soul of man ; it was His own Spirit which He breathed into man. He works with and seeks the co-operation of human beings in the creation and development of this universe which does not exist in relation to Him as something 'other.' What we call Nature or not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God, an expression of His continuous creative activity.

کہن دیرے کہ بینی مشت خاک است ؟
دمے از سرگزشت ذات پاک است[1]

Do you think that this old universe before you is a handful of dust ?
It is one of the phases of the creative activity of the Lord.

In short, the nature of Reality, as viewed by Iqbal, can best be described in the words of the Quran, "He is the First and Last, the Apparent and Hidden." The whole evolutionary process started from this Unitary principle which split itself into multiplicity and it will reach the same goal whence it started. "And verily towards thy Lord is the limit." (53 : 14)

It was in this truly dynamic and teleological sense that first Ibn-i-Maskwaih and then Rumi interpreted the evolutionary development of life

---

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 217.

on this earth. Ibn-i-Maskwaih (d. 431) holds, in the light of the Quranic teachings, that all things proceeded from God and to Him will they return. The detail of boilogical evolution that he describes is, in reality, meant to illustrate how the Many is gradually and imperceptibly proceeding towards the goal, regaining and enriching those characteristics the loss of which became the starting point of the whole evolutionary process. It is the presence of what he calls the Spirit that determines the position of a being in the scale of evolution. This element, according to Ibn-i-Maskwaih, is present in the whole chain of beings starting from inert matter to the highest manifestation of it in the prophet or the Perfect Man, with this difference that it is potential in the early stages but gradually as we rise higher it goes on becoming increasingly actual till in the Perfect Man it is fully actualised. The process of descent or diversity started when the principle of Life this Spirit, assumed the form of corporeality. But the urge to express itself led the Spirit to assume different forms, each higher than the first. Each higher form is better able to give expression to the yearning of the immanent life-principle, till passing from matter, plant and animal life, we reach man and then the prophet. There is rising note of self-consciousness appearing at each stage. In the mineral, Spirit is, as if, asleep while in the Perfect Man, it attains complete freedom and self-consciousness so much so that the limits of

space and time and corporeality cease to act as fetters for him. It is in him that the whole process of evolution reaches its goal.

Rumi (d. 672) further developed this idea of Ibn-i-Maskwaih. The inner drive of the principle of life not only assumes gradually higher forms but also invents certain instruments for its expression suitable to its different stages and needs. In this respect his conception is amazingly reminiscent of Bergson's point of view. The environment in which we are placed requires certain forms of action and so the spirit has adopted the form of body to enable it to express itself in a better way. Life of the spirit is totally of the past and future while life of the body is totally of the present. We live, but not exclusively, in the past and future, by means of the mind which is both memory and freedom. We also live in the present by means of the body which inserts and actualises the immediate past in the imminent future. This relation of body and spirit Bergson expresses by the metaphor of a coat and a nail. "Coat is solidary with the nail on which it hangs ; it falls if the nail is removed ; it sways if the nail is loose and shaky ; it is torn or pierced if the nail is too pointed." Thus, he holds that the spirit is solidary with body as its instrument and not its cause. Without the boby, the mind cannot work and act though it can exist without it. Body is one of the various instruments which spirit in its march towards fuller manifestation adopts. It is the internal impluse, the purpose

to live a higher life, in order to participate in the splendour of the spirit Divine, that creates everything and is leading to higher and still higher manifestations.

ز انکه بے حاجت خداوند عزیز
مے نه بخشد هیچ کس را هیچ چیز
پس کمند هستها حاجت بود
قدر حاجت مرد را آلت بود
پس چو حاجت شد کمند هستها
قدر حاجت مے رسد از حق عطا

If there is no desire on the part of anybody, he gets nothing. It is this hormic drive which brings into being different things. It is purpose which gives to man his organs. As existence and being are dependent on desire, that is, the hormic conative impulse, so man's position in this world depends on the intensity of this desire. It is this purpose that moves the whole evolutionary process. from matter to plants, animals and man.

> First man appeared in the class of inorgonic things,
> Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
> And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal state.
> He had no remembrance of his state as a plant—
> Again the great Creator, as you know,
> Drew man not of the animal into the human state.
> Thus man passed from one order of naıure to anoter,
> Till he become wise and knowing and strong as he is now.

This whole process of evolution proceeds by what Rumi calls the assimilation of the lower by the higher. It is definitely not the result of

mere chance variations. The internal necessity pushes lower organism to the higher forms and in this process life presents a constant struggle of existence. "When you consider, this world is all at strife, mote with mote,—one more is flying to the left and another to the right in search. One mote flies up and another down ; in their inclination (movement) behold actual strife. War of nature, war of action, war of speech, there is a terrible conflict amongst the parts."[1] In this constant struggle and strife consists the development of different beings. Matter is assimilated by plants, plant is assimilated by animals and animal is assimilated by men and thus the process of evolution goes on. The driving force behind this process is what Rumi and Iqbal both call Love. This process started when the One manifested itself in Many and the return of the Many to One is the Love for the Beloved. It is this love that forces matter up to the stage of plants, and the plant to the higher plane of animality and then to manhood. "Beneath this visible evolution of forms," says Iqbal, "is the force of love which actualises all strivings, movement and progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non-existence and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force of love, various forms

———

1. *Mathnavi* VI, lines 36—38, 46-7.

and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty."[1]

دور گردونها ز موج عشق دان
چون نبودے عشق بفسردے جهان
کے جمادی محو گشتے در نبات
کے فدائے روح گشتے نامیات

The revolutions of the sky are due to love.
Had there been no Love, this universe would have been frozen to death.
How could inorganic matter be assimilated and changed into plants ?
How could vegetation assume self-consciousness ?[2]

Iqbal has very beautifully expressed this idea in several places in his poems. In the following verses, he says that matter, plants animals, all are driven by this inner necessity of their being. The various hues and smells of plants, and flowers, the constant slruggle on the part of man, the revolutions of sky and stars and earth the movement of the fish in the water, of animals in the air and of insects on the earth, are all so many ways of the expression of this love.

به برگ لاله رنگ آمیزیٔ عشق
بجان ما بلا انگیزیٔ عشق
اگر این خاکدان را وا شگافی
درونش بنگری خون ریزیٔ عشق

It is love that imparts colour to the tulip.
It is love that agitates our souls.
If you open up the heart of this earth,

1. *Metaphysics of Persia*, pp. 39—41.
2. *Mathnavi*, V, lines 38, 54—5.

You will see it the blood-stains of love.

Not only this much. All this hustle and bustle of life, this struggle against unfavourable circumstances, this constant endeavour to attain higher goals, is all the result of love.

تہی از ہائے و ہو میخانہ بودے
گل ما از شرر بیگانہ بودے
نبودے عشق و ایں ہنگامۂ عشق
اگر دل چوں خرد فرزانہ بودے

The tavern would be without commotion,
Our clay would be without spark,
If there had been no love and its commotion.
If the 'heart' had been as wise as intellect.

This love, as Iqbal himself explains, means the desire to assimilate and to absorb. Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals, and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion, it has invented or developed out of itself certain instruments which help it to assimilate obstructions. The greatest obstacle in the way of life is the world of Nature with its categories of space, time and causation. It is in reality the way our intellect interprets it. The world of nature, according of Iqbal, is not a static fact situated in an a-dynamic void but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous flow which our thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time. It is the expression of the creative act of God and it is only our intellectual mode of

apprehending the life of God that we cut this continuous work of creation into the moulds of space and time. But if we leave aside this intellectual way and rise to the vital way of assimilating the universe, all these limitations of space and time come to an end. Thus it becomes possible for man. through love, to attain Perfect Manhood.

عشق سلطان است و برهان مبین
هر دو عالم عشق را زیر نگین
لا زمان و دوش فردائے ازو
لا مکان و زیر و بالائے ازو

Love is a power and a divine light,
Both the worlds are under its rule.
It is beyond time, and 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow' are through it,
It is beyond space, and 'down' and 'above' are through it.

The intellectual approach leads us only to see the Attributes (*sifat*) of Ultimate Ego, *riz*., the observable aspect of Reality ; while the approach of love brings us face to face with the Ego Himself (*dhat*), This vital act deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts. but something to be made and remade by continuous actions. It is this vital act born of love that is supremely creative of new values and standards and changes the life of individuals and communities.

It is the Perfect Man who, according to Iqbal, is the goal cf evolution. This perfect

man is not only the man of love but also of reason. In his person reason and love commingle to form a unique personality. It is through this combination of intellect and intuition in him that he is able to give to the world both peace and stability, material progress and spiritual illumination. Through him our reason will be able to achieve greatest possible mastery over the forces of nature so much so that the elements would reveal their innermost secrets for the material benefit of mankind. But his wider and comprehensive nature will, at the same time, save humanity from the destructive consequences of rational approach. He will unveil the secret of the hidden springs of self and thus bring about a perfect harmony between the contradictory demands of our nature. Without love, intellect is destructive, so well illustrated in the life of present-day soulless activities of the modern man ; without intellect, love remanis unproductive and ruitless, as is clearly proved by the history of mysticism. True life consists in a combination of the two and the Perfect Man is the true embodiment of this.

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کار عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس
عشق چون با زیرکی همبر شود
نقشبند عالم دیگر شود

Intellect becomes God-concious through love,
Love becomes fruitful only through reason.
When both love and reason combine,
A new world comes into being.

In Iqbal's words, "Vision (*i.e.*, love) without power (attained throngh intellect) does bring moral elevation, but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity."[1] It is this idea which he exrpesses in the following beautiful verss :

دلبری بے قاہری جادو گری است
دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است

It is this unique combination of the two that characterises the Prefect Man. "He is the completest ego the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body ; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end."[2]

طمع فطرت عمر ها در خوں تپد
تا دو بیت ذات او موزوں شود
مشت خاک ما سر گردوں رسید
زیں غبار آں شاهسوار آید بدید
از وجود تو سر افرازیم ما
پس به سوز ایں جہاں سوزیم ما
نوع انساں مزرع و تو حاصلی
کاروان زندگی را منزلی

Natue travails in blood for generations
To compose the harmony of his personality.

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 92.
2. Introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, (Eng), pp. xviii-xix.

Our handful of earth has reached the zenith,
For that champion will come forth from this dust.
It is to thee that we owe our dignity
And silently undergo the pains of life.
Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest,
Thou art the goal of Life's caravan.[1]

In spite of the apostolic work that Bergson did in rehabilitating the position of love in the affairs of mankind, he could not yet visualise the spiritual hights to which his doctrine could lead. He could not break through the shell of Western secularism completely and enjoy the sight of the goal of the whole evolutionary process.

نہ دیا نشان منزل مجھے اے حکیم تو نے
مجھے کیا گلہ ہو تجھ سے تو نہ راہ نشین نہ راہی

O philosopher ! You failed to give any inkling of the goal ;
Why complain against you ? You have not tread the path.

But in Nietzsche we find a spirit of a different calibre. Imbued with the love of philosophy as he was, he yet rose to the heights of great spiritual excellence. He was not a thinker but a prophet with a mission ; not a philosopher but a ture mystic experimenting with spiritual experiences; not an upholder of speculative doctrines but a seer of great visions. In him we meet not only a scathing criticism of the maladies of his contemporary world but also glimpses of the goal towards which man

1. Ibid p. 48.

must traverse on the path of evolvution. In a way he supplements the Bergsonian doctrine of love and intuition with his doctrine of the Superman as the ideal type of a free creative genius id whom love, intellect and deed have all coalesced—a type of man envisaged in Bergson's philosophy but not made explieit, In the next chapter we shall see how Nietzsche viewed this ideal type of manhood and in what respect Iqbal agrees with and differs from him.

# IQBAL AND NIETZSCHE

## I

Nietzsche (1844—1900) was born when Europe was experiencing the height of economic prosperity and political ascendancy. Asia and Africa were being colonised and exploited and huge wealth was pouring in to enrich the people of Europe. The Industrial Revolution which was transforming the old patterns of social, moral and political life, brought about very acute problems in its wake. Adaptation to the abruptly changing environment is a difficult task and it is no wonder that the majority of the people at that time felt dissatisfied and frustrated. Towns and villages changed overnight and population drifted from one place to another. It is said that Paris, for instance, witnessed more changes in the first decade of the nineteenth century than it had in the three preceding centuries. This abnormal rate of change brought in its train certain grave problems of adjustment. Nietzsche's books refer time and again to this lack of equilibrium and balance in the life of the people and it was perhaps this factor more than anything else that made Nietzsche what he is today, a critic, a destroyer of old values, a visionary of the future, a prophet despite his atheism. He viewed the problems

of his day not as an academic philosopher like Kant or Hegel, *e.g.*, would see. The problem of the validity of *a priori* synthetic judgment did not so much distrub him as the moral problem of the categorical imperative. He was not interested in the cold logical process of dialectic which reached the Absolute through the successive stages of development ; to him the development of an individual human being amid an ever-changing environment was much more absorbing. So if we study Nietzsche's books with a view to find some coherent system of philosophy after the pattern of two of his countrymen, we are sure to be disappointed. He was not a philosopher in the technical sense. His true place is among the great seers of the world. He did not start with set premises to arrive at certain conclusions ; he was like Buddha, aware of certain unhingements in the life of his contemporaries and he set out to find adequate ways and means to restore the much-needed equilibrium and balance in their life. He had passed the stage of metaphysics and entered the sphere of deeper psychology where one wants to experience within one's self the ultimate reality. In the words of Iqbal, "it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories."[1] Cold grey eyes may give us intellectually higher systems of thought but fail to produce that

---

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 184.

warmth of conviction in the hearts of people that succeeds in creating new scales of values and higher cultures. It is this sacred task which Nietzsche undertook to perform and there is no exaggeration in saying that he poured out his life-blood in whatever he wrote. He was the bad conscience of his time as he himself puts it, and in spite of most untoward circumstances, without friends and sympathisers, without normal health, without any recognition from the people around him, he fought alone a gruesome battle for the betterment of the future race of men on this earth. Nietzsche was a strange phenomenon in modern Europe and he himself seems to realize it—a mystic seer in the 19th century sounded something of an anachronism. And there is no doubt that he did receive some vision. In *Ecce Home*, he describes the nature of his mystic experience and expresses his amazement if anyone in the 19th century could claim to be possessed in such a rapturous fashion or understand what inspiration really means. In this respect he feels himself akin to the prophets of thousands of years before. Though a confirmed atheist, he asserts that in such a state of ecstasy, one "feels that one is the mere incarnation, mouthpiece or medium of an Almighty Power."[1]

Nietzsche was totally disgusted with his time. He could not find consolation in anything or any person. Being a child of his

---

1. *Ecce Home*, p. 102.

age, he experienced in himself all the bad things which he detested and yet the mystic vision of a glorious future age which grew from within the depth of his heart, moved him to deliver his message. His language was often provocative as if he wished to cry and shriek into the ears of the men who were unwilling to listen to him, who were unaware of the malady they were suffering from and therefore did not feel that they needed a doctor—a surgeon who knew how to apply the knife of his thought "vivisectionally to the very *virtues of the time*."[1] In this job he was all alone and he felt this loneliness sometimes very acutely. He expressed his desire for disciples or for a guide who may thus relieve the burden of his soul and the intensity of his spiritual conflcits. "I confront alone an immense problem : it is as if I am lost in a forest, a primeval one. I need disciples : I need a *master*." Again he exclaimed. "Why do I not find among the living men who see higher than I do and have to look down on me? Is it only that I have made a poor search? And I have so great a longing for such."[2] In reality he had searched much, but he could not find anyone in whom he might confide, from whom he could get guidance or whom he could guide. For him the 19th century was a barren age in all respects. When we look around we find that in the field of speculative thought,

———

1. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 212.
2. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 195.

Schelling and Hegel had made their mark; Darwin's doctrines were conquering the world; the Prussian army had established Germany's political supremacy on the continent; science and technology were making most spectacular advances; everybody was optimistic. And yet Nietzsche called the age nihilistic and attacked it most severely. All the material prosperity of the time was looked upon by him in the same light as the Prophets of Israel, for instance, brought indictment against the then highest cultural achievements of 'Ad and Thamud and the reason for the indictment was almost similar. Nietzsche's contemporaries believed and claimed to follow Christianity and yet Neitzsche proclaimed that God had died and it were the people who had themselves killed Him. He felt the agony, the suffering and the misery of a goalless world so intensely at a time when others were yet blind to its tremendous consequences that he was able to experience in advance, as it were, the fate of a coming generation.

The statement of Nietzche about the death of God implies that once He was alive and now people have killed Him. It is a statement of historical eultural fact. It is an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civilization. "God is dead" signifies that something on which men have lived for centuries has vanished, thereby ringing the knell of civilization. Thus the death of God incidentally brings into the forefront Nietzsche's whole problem, *viz.*, to lead mankind though this crisis, to rebuild on a new

basis what has been lost by the creation of a yet higher form of existence. When Christian God and morality are washed away the problem for Nietzsche becomes very acute and he devotes his whole, long, miserable and lonely life to tell the people a way out of this predicament. He fully realised that belief in God and divine teleology diminishes the value and significance of man but he was also aware that belief in the non-existence of God would equally threaten human life with nihilism from which he wanted to save the man of the future. In the same parable where he relates the story of the death of God through the mouth of a man, he says, "Must not we ourselves become gods to seem worthy of it ? Never before was so great a deed performed—and all those born after us will, by that very fact, belong to a higher form of history than any that has hitherto existed."[1] As an escape from Nihilism which resulted from the practical denial of belief in God, he placed before his contemporaries the ideal of the Superman who will be as a god for the common man, their source of inspiration, their law-giver, their ruler, their guide, in short, the embodiment of all those qualities which once people claimed to be possessed by God.

Feeling dissatisfied with Christianity, he did not find anything in the secular philosophies of the day either—in democracy, liberalism, humanitarianism, socialism, etc., etc. He called them sarcastically as "modern ideas" and hence false.

1. *Joyful Wisdom*. Aph. 125.

They repeated, in the eyes of Nietzsche, the old worn out ideals in a new garb. The mere alleviation of misery, the mere quantitative spread of happiness over the greatest number of people were too negative satisfy him. Such philosophies were but temporary veils over an ultimate conviction of the worthlessness of existence. It was, in reality, his dissatisfaction with any of these so-called remedies that led him to Schopenhaeur. He was thoroughly convinced that the facile optimism of these shallow philosophies was at bottom meaningless and those who, like Schopenhauer. emphasised the dark side of human and cosmic life, were far more sincere and courageous. All around him he saw signs of decay and corruption ; business and politics dominated everything and true culture throttled. This critique of his time naturally set the whole problem for him ; how to discover what was fundamentally wrong with the age, to explain how the things came to go wrong and finally to set them right and to let man feel once again the spiritual dignity and honour that he has lost amidst his material prosperity. "*The most general characteristic of the modern age :* man has lost *dignity* incredibly in own eyes. Long as centre and tragic hero of existence in general ; then at last struggling to prove himself related to the decisive and intrinsically valuable side of existence . . . he has been *animal*, animal without metaphor, abatement and reservation, he who in his previous faith was almost god

('child of God' 'God-man') ... Since Copernicus man seems to have got upon an inclined plane—he is now rolling faster away from the centre—whither? into nothingness? into the *overwhelming* feeling of his nothingness"?[1]

It was this realization that the modern age has animalised man, deprived him of his higher spiritual dignity that drove Nietzsche on a dangerous voyage of discovery to unknown shores where at last man could regain his true moral stature. Granted that old ideals have lost their charm, can there be no new ones to replace them? The value that we used to ascribe to this world has proved to be mere sham—does it thereby become valueless? If the old meaning is false, cannot there be new and deeper meaning in it? Perhaps what is wrong is not *thc* world but only the modern world, nothing wrong with nature but with us. And there is no doubt that Neitzsche's diagnosis was almost correct. What had gone wrong with the Western culture from the Islamic point of view was placed before Europe by him in a clear light. It was perhaps for this reason—his clairvoyance—that Iqbal called him a *majdhub* and a Hallaj.

باز ایں حلاج بے دار و رسن
نوعا دیگر گفته آں حرف کہن
حرف او بے باک و افکارش عظیم
غربیاں از تیغ گفتارش دو نیم

1. *Will to Power*, as quoted in Morgan, *What Nietzsche Means*, p. 53.

هم نشیں بر جذبهٔ او بے نبرد
بندهٔ مجذوب را مجنوں شمرد

جاوید نامه ۱۷۷

Once again this Hallaj without being crucified
Gave expression to the old message in a new way.
His ideas are bold and great.
The West is torn asunder by the sword of his oratory.
His contemporaries could not appreciate the significance of his experience.
He was a *majdhub* but was regarded as mad.

A *majdhub* is one who without any endeavour on his part receives illumination in his heart and as a consequence sees his path of duty mapped out as if before him.[1] This vision gives him a warmth of conviction which enables him to traverse his path without fear or favour of the crowd, without wavering or doubt. But the mental background of Nietzsche was totally unsuited to this task. Partly due to his study of Greek society and partly due to his study of contemporary European life, he was led astray in the interpretation of his vision. A great mystic saint like Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (India) was needed to guide him in his mission. He alone, Iqbal thinks, would have supplied him the necessary background to interpret his experience correctly and then apply it most appropriately.

ورنه او از خاکیاں بیزار بود
مثل موسیٰ طالب دیدار بود

---

1. See Shaikh Shuarwardy, *Awariful Ma'arif*, Part I.

کاش بودے در زمان احمدے
تا رسیدے بر سرور سرمدے

جاوید نامہ ۱۲۸

He was dissatisfied with the earthly man ;
Like Moses he desired to see the Vision.
Had he been in the days of Ahmad (Shaikh of Sirhind),
He would have achieved the Beatific Vision.

It is a great irony of fate that this great genius could not succeed due to the unfavourable circumstances in which he was born. Iqbal often calls him a modern prophet. His message was as opposed to the spirit of his age as the message of Hallaj was to the orthodox theologians of the day and yet there was much truth in both. One was taken to the gallows and the other was accused of madness. It cannot be denied that Nietzsche's role in modern life was truly apostolic. He re-echoed to a great extent the message of Islam in the almost paganised atmosphere of materialistic Europe, I think that a study of Nietzsche's books would help every Muslim to understand where to attack and where to build and in this respect I have no doubt that it was Nietzsche who shook Iqbal from his complacency and awoke him to a consciousness of his new mission of reconstructing Islamic society in the new industrial era of the 20th century.

II

It is related that very early in his life Nietzsche came upon Schopenhauer's *The World*

*as Will and Idea* in a second-hand book-shop. He took it home and read it from cover to cover. He was spell-bound. In it he found reflected as if in a mirror the whole problem of contemporary civilization ih its darkest aspect. He was impressed by the sincerity and honesty of the author.

Schopenhauer's main contribution to philosophy is the doctrine of the primacy of Will. Following Kant, he divided the world into the phenomenal and the noumenal, the empirical and the real, but while Kant did not discuss the nature and content of the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer described it as Will, a blind incessant impulse which objectifies itself in life and consciousness. This conception of the incurable blindness of the Will provides the metaphysical justification for pessimism. Human life becomes totally purposeless. It has no more goal to achieve than the waves of the sea. "It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

There are two ways of escape from this world of gloom : the aesthetic and the moral. In the perception of beauty it is possible that a man may be able to control the demon of all-devouring Will. When we view a thing from the aesthetic point of view, we rise to a higher level of disinterestedness and are capable of overcoming the finite Will. Music, above all other forms of art, helps man in releasing him from the bondage of time, space and causality and thus save him from the tyranny of the Will.

The other way of escape is through moral action. In sympathy, according to Schopenhauer, a man is able to combine in his personality egoism and altruism and thus in moral action an individual is able to free himself from the chains of Will and attain peace and rest. But then Schopenhauer adds that these moments of relief and peace are only temporary. The vision of beauty and the nobility of goodness last for a brief span of time and then it is all over with man. He once again falls into the mire of ever-striving, goalless and purposeless Will. There can be no permanent salvation except to deny life in all its forms.

Nietzsche's infatuation for Schopenhauer was, however, only temporary. Temperamentally an activist, he could not accept his conclusion. To him not negation but affirmation of life was the ideal. He accepted from Schopenhauer the doctrine of the primacy of Will but to him this Will was not blind. The cosmic life may have no divine purpose but it is not goalless. He characterised his age nihilistic mainly because, according to him, the people were leading a life without any ultimate ideal, and without such an ideal human existence loses all its spiritual significance.

It was in search of this significance that he turned his attention to pre-Socratic age of the Greeks. There he found exemplified two different attitudes towards life, Apollonian and Dionysian. The former attitude expresses itself in a world of beautiful forms such as sculpture,

painting or poetry, etc. and thus tries to escape from the crude world. In this aesthetic enjoyment man is able to experience these objects above the vicissitudes of time and space. The Dionysian attitude is exemplified in the abandonment that one feels while enjoying musical revelries. The spectator feels himself one with Nature and loses the sense of his individuality and separateness. It was the combination of these two tendencies that produced the tragic drama. The spectators were lifted above the storm and stress of daily life and thus they could endure the darkest spectacle of misery in life with calm equanimity. They fully realized that the world had no moral justification, and evil in it far exceeded the good that was apparent to the eyes and yet the role of the tragic hero brought home to the spectators that in spite of all this evil and ugliness, life is worth living not only in its simplicity but in all its fullness and exuberance. From the Greeks he learnt that life is justifiable only as an aesthetic phenomenon.

But this marvellous culture which produced such a galaxy of great geniuses was brought to an abrupt end by the teachings of Socrates and then Plato. "The apparition of Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a symptom of decadence ; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount."[1] They represent reason and dialectic as opposed to instinct and intuition ;

---

1. *Will to Power*, i, aph 427.

mob rule to aristocracy ; morality and truth to life, virtue and knowledge to true Dionysian love for fuller and ampler existence. They taught the doctrine of the Beyond, the denial of the senses, the absolute standards of right and wrong ; in short, they turned their back on the world and prepared the way for Christianity, the greatest mortal enemy of yessaying to life on this earth. Thus along with the advocacy of the Dionysian ideal, he opposed the Socratic ideal of man—theoretic, critical, optimistic, non-mystic. His cry of Dionysus versus the Crucified represents the same conflict, here Christianity takes the place of Socrates. Viewing his contemporary culture in the light of Greek history, he looked upon himself in the role of a tragic hero with all the tradition of early Greek thinkers fighting against a Socratic civilization that has lost touch with this earth and this life, in which only the mediocre find opportunity of exercising control, which thwarts and hinders the growth of men of genius who alone are able to lead and guide mankind.

To fight this rising tide of decadence, Nietzsche advocated a new culture based on a totally new ideology. He did not press for more knowledge, more science, more technology, more political adventures. He rather wanted a new orientation of the mental background of the people. He wished to help in establishing this culture free of all traditional moral or Christian background. The paramount ideal round which he wanted the people to rally,

was life, abundant and stormy. Not morality, not religion, not science—but life was to be our guide. We should judge everything, every activity, every pursuit, in the light of this ideal. "What are our values and tables of moral goods themselves worth? *What comes of their rule?* For whom? In what respect?—Answer: for life."[1] Loyalty to life—remaining true to the earth—is the essential basis of his demand for revaluation of values. But there are different grades of life and Nietzsche realises that life of a cultured superman for instance, is something different from the life a decadent and thus he is led to the doctrine of gradation. What he desires is not mere life as it is but abundance, thriving growth, enhancement, intensification, heightening of life. This gradation appears in his contrast between healthy and decadent life. What distinguishes healthly from decadent and what is the specific nature of the life Nietzsche proposes to enhance? His answer is: will to power. He takes the fulfilment of the basic urge of all life for his criterion of value.

"I have the good fortune, after whole thousands of years of straying and confusion, to have rediscovered the way that leads to a yes and a no.

"I teach no to all that weakens—that exhausts.

"I teach yes to all that strenghtens, that stores up power, that justifies the feeling of

1. *Will to Power*, as quoted in Morgan, *op. cit*, p. 115.

power."[1]

He is totally opposed to Darwin and Spencer who emphasised too much passive adaptation to the environment. Life often takes initiative and modifies the environment to suit its ends. Mere adaptation is a sign of decadence. Healthy individuals with abundence of will to power would even resist the environoment to the very limit of sacrificing their life. That hierarchy of values therefore which tends to develop in man the highest will to power in this sense is worthy to be cultivated and adopted. By will to power Nietzsche does not mean mere physical and brute strength. It includes control of nature, intellectual and moral strength. A man of strong impulses who has succeeded in controlling them will be, according to Nietzsche, the man possessed of will to power. Mere political ascendancy, or possession of wealth, or physical prowess do not constitute power for him. True will to power expresses itself in self-over-coming.[2]

In *Zarathushtra* while discussing moral relativism, he asserts that though every country and people have their own valuation of good and bad, yet there is something that is found in all these different tables of values and that is: self-overcoming. "A table of virtues hangs over every people. See, it is the table of its

---

1. *Will to Power*, as quoted in Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

2. Prof. M. M. Sharif, *Nietzsche's Ethical Doctrine*, pp. 6-7.

overcoming ; sce, it is the voice of its will to power."[1] But this will to power is not the sole peroragative of a superman. According to Nietzsche, it is present wherever there is life. "Only where there is life, is there also will : not, however, will to life, but—so I teach thee—will to power."[2] It is also present in the herds who wish to dominate the masters. "Wherever I found a living thing, there found I will to Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master."[3] But Nietzsche constantly and fiercely attacks herd morality, herd-valution and herd supremacy. It follows, therefore, that for Nietzsche mere power is not the only value. Those who ought to be the masters, the lords of the earth should possess certain characteristics which will make them true leaders. Not power alone but something else besides is the ideal. Will to power in the sense of self overcoming is present in all; what Nietzsche desires is self-overcoming of a particular type which he glorifles in the Superman.

Every moral system, whether of Kant's Categorical Imperative type or of Utilitarianism, implies some sort of control of passions and instincts of man. This self-control distinguishes a moral act from a non-moral behaviour. The difference in moral codes arises

---

1. *Zarathushtra*, p. 66.
2. Ibid., p. 136.
3. Ibid., p. 136.

not merely in their aims and sanctions but also in the manner of self-overcoming of human impulses. In this respect Nietzsche's position is very much akin to Islamic code of ethics which recognises the intrinsic value of human instincts and appetites. He insists that all good drives can be developed from bad ones. "Those of his (man's) abilities which are awesome and considered inhuman are perhaps the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can grow."[1] This process of self-overcoming is called by Nietzsche sublimation—a term which become popular by Freudian use but which was, as a matter of fact, used in this particular sense first by Nietzsche. He believed that sexual impulse for example, could be channeled into a creative spiritual activity, instead of being fulfilled directly. Similarly, the barbarian's desire to torture his foe can be sublimated into the desire to defeat one's rival, say in the Olympic contests. Christianity, on the other hand, looked upon the side of flesh as something contemptible and worthy of suppression. Commenting on the dictum (Mark 9.43 ff) that if a part of your body "offend thee", you should "cut it off", Nietzsche says, "In the case of sexual irritability, unfortunately it does not follow that a member is missing but the character of man is *emasculated.* And the same goes for the moralists' maxim which demands not the control but the extirpation of the

1. Kauffmann, *Nietzsche*, p. 188.

passions"[1] In *The Twilight of Idols* he says that for the Greeks "the *sexual* symbol was the venerable symbol *par excellence*", and that "only Christianty . . . has made something unclean out of sexuality : it throws filth upon the origion, upon the presumption of our life."[2] It was in this connection that Nietzsche often spoke in favourable terms about Caesar Borgia and the blonde beast. What he finds praiseworthy in them is not the ruthlessness or brutality but their impulsiveness. He wanted to emphasise in contrast to Christian conception of "only the emasculated man is the good man", the conception of a full-blooded impulsive man. It is a picture of contrasts. To him a man of strong impulses is far better than a man of no impulses. "The force and power of the senses—that is most essential in a successful and complete man : the splendid animal must be given first—else what does all 'humanization' matter ?"[3] A true culture which Nietzsche envisages for the future needs men who are able to control and sublimate their impulses and not men who have, following the Christian moral code, rendered themselves unfit for the job of recreating a new life. The blonde beast and Caesar Borgia are for him only ideograms of unsublimated animal passions. If sublimated, they have a greater chance of becoming the

1. *Will to Power*, 383.
2. *Twilight of the Idols*, x, 4.
3. Morgan, *op. cit.* p. 130.

fittest forerunners of the man of the future. The definition of culture given by Nietzsche as the organization of the chaos, or as a harmony of living, thinking, feeling and willing must be understood as the sublimation of the impulses which gives style and form to our way of living and thinking.

The second manifestation of the basic force of Will to Power is what Nietzsche calls Geist, spirit or reason. Along with passion and instinct, intellect is an instrument or tool in the hand of Will to Power. Impulses need sublimation but rationality is *sui generis*. If a man follows sublimated passions, he is a slave to his instincts ; but rationality helps him in gaining mastery over himself. It is the highest manifestation of the will to power, in that through its help man can realize his objective more fully. Reason is something good not because it is a faculty which forms universal concepts and draws inferences, but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony—and thus to give man power : power over himself and nature.

Nietzsche's polemic against morality is based on his conviction that there can be no absolute standards of good and bad, right and wrong. "Many lands saw Zarathushtra and many peoples : thus he discovered the good and bad of many peoples . . . Much that passed for good with one people was regarded with

scorn and contempt by another : thus I found it. Much found I here called bad, which was there decked with purple honours..."[1] Only that is good which leads to enhancement of will to power and because in different times and climes, it is possible to achieve this result with the help of different moral devices. Nietzsche did not see any point in prescribing a universal code of ethics. Kant's Categorical Imperative—a duty for all without distinction—is to Nietzsche a sign of decadence.[2] His prescription would, on the other hand, be of the nature of hypothetical imperative that does not involve any absolute obligations. And Nietzsche seems to be justified in this attitude of moral relativism.[3] Refusing to seek guidance from any revelational basis—which, as I hope to discuss later on, is the only stable basis—, he could not reasonably accept any current moral code or universalise the morality of his society which he looked upon as decadent and therefore totally unfit for the 'breeding' of perfect men. The one common denominator that he discover-

———

1. *Zarathushtra*, p. 65.

2. Nietzsche uses a very strong language against Kant in this respect. "Nothing is more profoundly, more thoroughly pernicious, than every impersonal feeling of duty, than every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction. Fancy no one's having thought Kant's categorical Imperative dangerous to life ! — The instinct of the theologian alone took it under its wing" *Antichrist*, pp. 136-7.

3. See Prof. M. M. Sharif, *op. cit.* 3-4.

ed in the morality of every people was self-overcoming and that he recommended to the Superman, provided Christian point of view was totally excluded.

Nietzsche distinguishes two kinds of morality—that of the masters and that of the slaves. The aristocrats of the old—the promulgator of master-morality—were strong, noble, full of vitality, brave and adventurous and naturally these qualities were looked upon as good. Nietzsche points out that among the Greeks, whom he considered to be excellent embodiments of master-morality, the antithesis was not between good and evil but between noble and ignoble and thus their equation of moral value stood as good=aristocratic=beautiful=happy=loved by gods.

This aristocrat was in himself good and noble and therefore all his actions were derivatively called good and noble. Not actions but men were the first objects of moral approval or disapproval ; the worth of actions was secondary, depending upon the kind of man they typified. The master-morality is active and positive. It calls those traits good which make a man respected, even feared—power, pride, frankness, the ability to be a good friend and a noble enemy. Whatever is contrary to these qualities is called bad and worthless—fear, flattery, baseness, humility and lying. In the slave morality, evil is a primary concept while good is only derivative. What the noble aristocrat possesses is called bad. A good man,

in this morality, is the safe man : he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid.[1]

But the slaves, who were originally under the dominance of the noble aristocrat, thought of overpowering them and from this event dates what Nietzsche calls the slave rebellion in morals. It was started, according to Nietzsche, by the Jews and was inherited and passed on to our modern age by the Christian priest. The table of original values was overturned. In order to achieve this most unworthy object, the Christian priest, so Nietzsche alleges, introduced certain absolutely false conceptions. Soul, free-will, original sin, guilt, etc., were invented to cover up his evil programme. To Nietzsche there is no soul separate and independent of the body. In opposition to Christian pseudo-spirituality, he emphasised the role of body, although his true position was that man's spiritual life cannot be understood apart from his body as his physical life cut off from his spiritual life becomes distorted. He was in favour of neither free-will nor determinism. To him the motives of actions were not conscious and therefore there was no question of invoking free-will in determining the moral valuations of an act. The theory of original sin Nietzsche derived from the ancient conception of the debt which people thought they owed to God. Since this debt was too great ever to be paid, man

1. *Beyond Good and Evil,* aph. 260.

stood in the same relation to God as an insolvent debtor to his creditor, leaving himself open to the most terrible of punishments. Man tried to put the respsonsibility of this debt on his first ancestor who incurred the divine malediction. Thus was invented, holds Nietzsche, the theory of original sin. Man accused nature without himself and instincts within himself, and looked upon them as the source of evil. The debt was too great to be paid by man and so God Himself become man to redeem mankind.[1] In contrast to it, Nietzsche holds that man by nature is innocent and this sense of innocence shall be one of the main characteristics of the new era foretold by Nietzsche when Christianity has been defeated and obliterated. "Christianity should have set up the innocence of man as an article of faith—men would have become gods . . . "[2]

According to Nietzsche the nihilistic character of Christianity was due to St. Paul against whom he uses very strong language. Paul realised, he says, that he was by nature unfit to follow the Jewish Law and seeing the ambition of his life being realised in the person of Jesus after his death, he embraced Christianity and distorted it and thus became the apostle of the annihilation of the Law.[3]

---

1. See H. Lichentberger, *Gospel of Superman*, pp. 125-6.
2. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
3. *Dawn of Day*, aph. 68.

It was he who, according to Nietzsche, introduced the doctrine of salvation through faith only (as opposed to action and practice), who paved the way for the full growth of priesthood and church,[1] and emphasised the role of life after death at expense of this. Nietzsche agrees that the kingdome of God is in the heart of man—but when this kingdom is sought only in the life after death, as Christianity taught of Jesus seems to Nietzsche to be betrayed and thus he fights against the very conception of life after death. His aim was not to cast any doubt on this aspect of human life. His only concern was to analyse the moral attitude that this belief engenders. First, this conception has historically furnished the basis for the depreciation of this life. Expecting perfetion in the other world people have often been led to put up with imperfection in this world. Secondly, the depreciation of this world could be curried to the extent of a complete disvaluation of anything a man might do in this life. This doctrine of tow worlds became almost a symbol of a double standard of condut. There is a Christian world where one will be perfect and in which one must have faith, and there is a pagan world which one perceives all round oneself. Jesus' "Give unto Cæsar's what is Cæsar's" appeared to Nietzsche as the expression of sublime indifference which is felt by those absorbed in the task of self-perfection. Religious and secular standards

1. *Will to Power*, i, aph. 168.

were separate and it never pricked the conscience of a Christian to bring harmony in this chaos. Nietzsche therfore totally rejected this bifuraction of human life into sacred and secular spheres as against the interest of a harmonious development of individuals and society.

Another very grave charge brought by Nietzsche against Christianity was that the type of man developed by it is the ideal of the slave, the lowly, the degenerate, and it was against this ideal that Nietzsche emplyed the full force of his strong and virulent language. He is ready to leave aside what he call "Christian fable, Christian cobwed-spinning in ideas and principles and Christian theology" but he cannot countenance the type of manhood that it wanted to creat. "What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking thier spirit, at exploiting thier moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards. against themselves—until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation. . ."[1] In *Autichrist*, he sums up his charge-sheet: "Christianity is the revolt of all things that crawl on the bellies against everything that is lofty: the gospel of the "lowly" lowers."[2]

---

1. *Will to Power*, i, aph. 252
2. p. 187.

In contrast to his condemnation of Christianity, Nietzsche praises Islamic ideal of manhood and its culture. In *Antichrist*, recounting the misdeeds of Christianity as the destroyer of rich ancient cultural heritage, Nietzsche adds. "If Islam despises Chritianity, it is justified a thousand times over ; for Islam persupposes men."[1] He goes on to say that the same spirit of revenge, hatred and resentment which led Christian fathers of old to trample underfoot the Greek and Roman cultural achievements, led them to attack the Moorish culture of Spain. "The Crusaders waged war upon something before which it would have been more seemly for them to grovel in the dust—a culture beside which even our Nineteenth Century would seem very poor and very 'senile'." He adds : "Christianity destroyed the harvest we might have reaped from the culture of antiquity, later it also destroyed our harvest of the culture of Islam. The wonderful Moorish world of Spanish culture, which in its essence is more closely related to *us*, and which appeals more to our sense and taste than Rome and Greece, was *trampled to death* . . . why?—because it owed its origin to noble, to manly instincts, because it said yea to life, even that life so full of the rare and refined luxuries of the Moors. . ."[2]

It is the victory of the slave morality in the form of Christianity—the capital crime against

---

1. p. 226.
2. *Antichrist*, p. 226.

life as he calls it—that has brought the whole Europe to the brink of annihilation. If it is to be saved from the danger of complete collapse, we should go beyond the sphere of good and evil, that is, leave behind the traditional morality of the slaves and adopt the new moral code of the so-called "new barbarians". Nietzsche hailed the ruin of Christian morality as 'that great spectacle in a hundred acts which is reserved for the next two centuries in Europe, the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles.'[1] Then the new barbrians will no doubt be able to appear. They will not be barbarians, only Nietzsche wanted to give a picture of contrasts. The Superman of the future will be the new barbraian whome he describes

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| the new *barbarians* | the cynics, the attempters, the conquerers | a combination of spiritual superiority with well-being and excess of strength.[2] |

Thusthe Superman of Nietzsche is not a new species that will appear after the disappearance of man, as men evolved out of the ape as alleged by Darwin. The Superman is only the present human being who has perfected his nature, overcome his animality and organised his appetities and impulses. Explaining this point, he writes, "Not what shall succeed humanity in the sequence of beins is the problem I pose

———

1. *Geneology of Morals,* iii. 27.
2. *Will to Power,* 899.

herewith . . ." A little further on he makes his sense more clear. " . . .There is a perpetual success of single cases, in the most different places on the earth and from the most diverse cultures, where a *higher type* does indeed represent itself : something which in its relation to the totality of mankind is a kind of *Ubermensch.* Such lucky accidents of great success wer always possible . . ."[1] In a passage in *Ecce Home* he explictly distinguishes his Superman from Darwinism and from Carlyle's hero-worship.[2] We have seen that Superman is not a distinct species but the state of perfect humanity. Darwin asserted that man is animal, being derived from animal ancestors and thus he set in motion a tendency in modern times that man *should* then live like animals, give full vent to his animal passions etc. Nietzsche's doctrine of Superman was in reality a revolt against this animalising of man ; he stressed that though man was an animal yet he has the potentiality to rise higer and develop his spirituality to hitheto unknown heights."In man"he says, "there is both creator and creature."[3] And Nietzsche's Superman is the ideal whereby one can develop the creator in onself. It is also distinguished from Carlyle's hero-worship, Accorping to Carlyle, great men have only instrumental value. Such men made history possible and without them there

1. *Antichrist*, pp. 3, 4.
2. p. 57.
3. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 225.

would be only anarchy. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, *Ubermesch* is a value in himself ;he embodies the state of being which all of us yearn. Nietzsche appreciates Napoleon not because revolutionary anarchy came to an end at his hand . revolution is viewed as the instrument which made Napoleon possible. He says, "The revolution mad possible Napoleon, that is its justification. For a similar prize we should have to desire the anarchical crash of our entire civilization."[1]

Nietzsche regarded Napoleon as coming near his ideal of a Superman. It was not for his military success that he liked him but as an example of a great man who in spite of his weaknesses (and who can claim to be totally without defects ?) rose for above the petty nationalities and the modern nation-states, and was working for realising the dream of a United Europe and thus paving the way for the rise of a new European culture. He represented in his person the ideal of a Good European. Caesar was another example. He is the embodiment of the passionate man who controls his passion—ideal of self-integration, self-creation and self-mastry. He says, "The highest type of free human beings one would have to seek where the highest resistance is overcome continually—beautiful type : Julius Caesar . . ."[2] In order to remove the misunderstanding that the super-

---

1. *Will to Power*, 877.
2. *Twilight of Idols,* ix. 38.

man is identical with brute force—though, incidentally, he does not necessarily exclude it—Nietzsche adds that the true ideal would be "the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul"[1] This ideal of Ubermensch, according to Nietzsche, can alone remedy the catastrophic termination of modern decadent Europe.

In *Zarathustra*, while discussing the characteristics of the Superman, Nietzsche deliberately uses provocative language. Opposed to the Christian emphasis on the traits of benevolence, pity and asceticism in the character of a good man, the Superman possesses, what Nietzsche calls, three "evil" things : *voluptuousness, passion for power* and *selfishness.* "These three things have hitherto been best cursed and have been in worst and falsest repute—these three things will I weigh humanly well." Voluptuousness he regards as a bridge between present and future : to the despisers of the body—such as Christian ascetics—it is a sting and stake ; while to free hearts, it is a thing innocent and free, the garden happiness of the earth, all the future's thanks overflow to the present Passion for power—which is a usual phenomenon of life but which only a superman knows how to exercise most beneficially—drives the lofty from self-sufficient solitude to exercise power over lower humanity. Selfishness, the wholesome, healthy selfishness. that springs from the powerful soul who possesses a handsome, triumphing, refreshing body.

1. *Will to Power*, 983.

The day when 'selfishness' was regarded as evil are gone. In future, selfishness will be regarded as the highest virtue.[1] But this selfishness which Nietzsche so much praises is not the mean selfishness which the old moralists have condemned and which Nietzsche himself calls as the 'selfishness of the sick' and which he regards as the charactreristic of a degenerate.[2] His ideal of selfishness can best be illustrated in pregnancy: self-nature for the sake of something growing within, which we hope will be greater than we are.[3] Zarathustra's conception of virtue is "that *your* self be in the action, as the mother is in the child"[4] Nietzsche's critique of altruism in favour of egoism is thus in reality not advocacy of mean and sickly selfishness but an advocacy of *self*-perfection, *self*-overcoming, *self*-realization.

The second characteristic of the Superman is that he is enemy of pity and is the embodiment of suffering and hardness. Nietzsche's polemic against pity is well known. Nietzsche claims that almost all famous philosophers like Plato, Spinoza and Kant depreciated pity.[5] Pity, he thinks, is bad both for those who feel it and for those who are being pitied. It is bad for the pitied because it does not help them towards happiness and perfection. We do not pity those

---

1. *Zarathustra*, III, pp. 229—33.
2. Ibid, pp. 86-7.
3. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
4. *Zarathustra*, II, p. 112.
5. See Preface to *A Geneology of Morals*, 5.

whom we admire. It involves the implicit belief that suffering is somthing bad and must be removed at all cost. His attack against Christianity for its advocacy of pity and compassion, therefore, arose out of his belief that a "reign of comfortableness" is unfit for enjoyment of full life. Suffering is according to Nietzsche, the indispensable element in the development of man and without it none can hope to attain perfection. The preachers of pity look only to the 'creature' side of man; they show no respect to man's spiritual side, the 'creator' in him—they do not realise that self-perfection needs not pity but hardness and suffering. To pity others or to be pitied by others when one is undergoing suffering and tribulations, therefore, means for Nietzsche to defeat the wholesome effect of suffering. It is the denial of life itself. "Pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the energy of the feeling of life : its action is depressing. A man loses power when he pities."[1]

Addressing the advocates of pleasure ideal he says, "You wish if possible . . . to *abolish suffering* ; and we ?—It quite seems that *we* had rather have it greater and worse than it ever was ! . . . The discipline of suffering, of *great* suffering—know you not that only *this* discipline has produced all enhancements of man hitherto? . . ."[2] Nietzsche's sanction of cruelty is to be understood in the same context. A true creator

1. *Antichrist*, p. 131.
2. *Morgan, op.cit.*, p. 179.

must be cruel to himself in the sense that he must bear untold hardships and undergo tough discipline to achieve his ideal of self-overcoming. "Almost everything that we call 'higher culture' rests on the spiritualization of, and giving depth to, cruelty."[1]

III

Five years after the death of Nietzsche Iqbal went to Europe and found that his philosophy had taken the whole continent by storm. Iqbal studied his works and was at once attracted by his prophetic handling of the problems to which he had given not a little attention before going to Europe for higher studies. Nietzsche had predicted the fall of Western culture and suggested ways and means not to avert it—for he believed that decadence must work itself out—but to reconstruct a healthier culture on its ashes. Iqbal was born in a country that was politically under alien control and was suffering from intellectual stagnation and moral weakness. He belonged to a community that was once the harbinger of a healthy culture but had lost the qualities necessary for the moral leadership of the world. Before going to Europe, Iqbal had pondered over these problems. He was deeply struck by the horrible spectacle that the Muslims of this subcontinent presesnted before 1905. In a very early poem انسان اور بزم قدرت (Man and Nature), after describing the beauty of the land of his birth, he exclaims :

---

1. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 229.

جل گیا پھر مری تقدیر کا اختر کیوں کر
میں بھی آباد ہوں اک نور کی بستی میں مگر
نور سے دور ہوں ظلمت میں گرفتار ہوں میں
کیوں سیہ روز ، سیہ بخت ، سیہ کار ہوں میں ؟
(بانگ درا صفحہ ۴۵ - ۴۶)

I also live in this country of light ;
Why then was the star of my luck in gloom ?
I am away from light and surrounded by darkness ;
Why am I unlucky ?

This was the expression of a heart that wanted not only to know the reason of decadence of Muslims but also to search for the ways and means to rescue them from the abyss of dishonour. At the end of the poem, he says :

تو اگر اپنی حقیقت سے خبردار رہے
نہ سیہ روز رہے پھر نہ سیاہ کار رہے

If you are aware of your true nature,
You would no longer be unlucky.

It was a foretaste of what Iqbal developed ten year later into his famous doctrine of *Khudi.*

When Iqbal went to Europe, England was at the height of material prosperity. Her empire extended to the seven seas, her industrial growth had no rival and her land was the centre of world finance. This spectacle of supreme might and power was visible to everyone who had eyes to see. Just a decade earlier Sayyid Ahmad Khan had returned from his visit to England totally overawed. He preached total assimilation of Western culture. Perhaps he could not discern the underlying volcano that was slowly and imperceptibly gathering its evil strength.

Several of Iqbal's contemporaries[1] were equally blind to this aspect. They were overwhelmed by the superficial glamour of Europe's material prosperity. But Iqbal's reaction was quite different. He might have gone there to learn something but in the end he had to unlearn much. It was his study of Nietzsche, no doubt,—the modern prophet as he calls him—that opened his eyes. He realised that the ascendancy of Western culture was only temporary : for it was harbouring within its bosom its own mortal enemy.

دیار مغرب کے رهنے والو ! خدا کی بستی دکاں نہیں هے
کھرا جسے تم سمجھ رهے هو وہ اب زر کم عیار هوگا
تمہاری تہذیب اپنے خنجر سے آپ هی خود کشی کرے گی
جو شاخ نازک پہ آشیانہ بنے گا ، نا پائیدار هوگا
(بانگ درا صفحہ ۱۵۰)

> O people of the West, the world of God is not a commercial shop,
> What is true in your eyes will prove false.
> Your cultural will kill itself by its own malady ;
> For a nest built on a delicate bough is unsteady.

And so he had to turn elsewhere for the remedy which he was all the time looking for the uplift of his people. There is much in Nietzsche's writings, in his polemic against Christianity and in his characterisation of the Superman, which to Iqbal was quite well-known. It was all the echoes of Islamic teachings. All this roused Iqbal to the realisation that perhaps the remedy he was in search of was not to be

1. Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Husain* (A political biography), p 39.

found anywhere else but in Islam. As the days passed, this conviction grew stronger and stronger. In the poems written during his stay in Europe, this idea gradually emerged. In the same poem where he criticises modern culture, we find him saying :

نکل کے صحرا سے جس نے روما کی سلطنت کو آلٹ دیا تھا
سنا ہے قدسیوں سے میں نے وہ شیر پھر ہوشیار ہوگا

> The one who came out of the desert of Arabia and overturned the Roman Empire—
> I have heard from the angels that this lion will come to his own again.

It was a complete transformation. Under the inspiration of Nietzsche, he was led to a reorientation of his thoughts and there and then the vision of his new mission in life came to him. In a poem عبدالقادر کے نام (To Abdul Qadir), he summarises his new ideal :

آٹھ کہ ظلمت ہوئی پیدا آفق خاور پر
بزم میں شعلہ نوائی سے اجالا کر دیں
اس چمن کو سبق آئین نمو کا دے کر
قطرۂ شبنم بے مایہ کو دریا کر دیں
رخت جاں بت کدۂ چیں سے آٹھا لیں اپنا
سب کو محو رخ سعدی و سلیمیٰ کر دیں
بادہ دیرینہ ہو اور گرم ہو ایسا کہ گداز
جگر شیشہ و پیمانہ و مینا کر دیں

(بانگ درا صفحہ ۱۴۰)

> Rise, for there is darkness on the horizon of the East,
> Let us illumine it by our fiery speech.
> By giving to it the lesson of the principle of progressive evolution,
> Transform the worthless drop of dew into a river.
> Let us shift our camp from the Temple of China,

And make all enamoured of the face of Slaima and Sa'di[1]

Let the wine be of old and so hot.
That it may melt the heart of the glass.

According to Nietzsche as we have seen, it was the Christian doctrine of dualism between body and mind which, in its turn, introduced the pernicious distinctions of secular and religious aspects in the life of individuals, that was responsible for decadence in modern life. This criticism of Nietzsche was fully endorsed by Iqbal as it was exactly the criticism which the Quran urged against the Christian hermits. Unfortunately, Christianity, due to the interpretation given to it by St. Paul, could not develop into a full-fledged code of life ; it remained an order of monks having nothing to do with the affairs of the world. It had no policy of its own which might guide the Christians in the affairs of the state. Thus when Roman emperors embraced Christianity for politial creasons, they soon realised that it could not fulfil their purpose of evolving a common ideology among their subjects. A purely monastic and other-wordly outlook cannot help in the affairs of this world. The result was that Emperor Julian was forced to return to the old gods of Rome for providing an emotional basis for the unification of his subjects.[2] This initial weakness of Christianity

---

1. I.e. turn to Arabia for inspiration.
2. Iqbal *Lectures*, p. 146.

had a far-reaching effects on the cultural development of the races accepting this religions. Both Iqbal and Nietzsche agree that kingdom of God is revealed in the hearts of men.[1] But when this kingdom is sought exclusively in other life, then surely it would amount to the betrayal of the higher spiritual demands of human nature. It is true that man can gain spiritual illumination from within the depths of his heart ; but—and this was the important contribution made by Islam—this world revealed to man within his soul is not something foreign to the world of matter. The spiritual life of man can by developed not by renouncing the world of body and matter but by a proper adjustment of man's relation to these material forces in the light of inner illumination. So long as spiritual excellence is divorced from this life, it tends to become antisocial and thus stultifies the healthy growth of individuals in a society. Islam, therefore, tried to bridge the gap between the mathematical without and the biological within and thus enabled every individual to attain his spiritual development within the framework of this material universe.[2] There is no bifurcation of body and mind in Islam. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the external world ; it is mind

---

1. Kaufmann, *op cit.*, p. 140, p. 303 and *Lectures*, p. 9.
2. *Lectures*, pp. 9-10.

or soul when you look at it as acting.[1]

Similarly there is no scope for the distinction of religious and secular activities in Islam. All the multifarious activities of man are brought under a general moral law. It restores unity and harmony in the life of man. The most serious problem of modern life, the disparity between power and wisdom, can be resolved only if the much-sought for unity is given back to the individual. This unity was possible in primitive life but the progress of modern civilization has brought about a complex differentiation of functions. Movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity no doubt helped in promoting human welfare, in putting in the hands of man immense power. But alongside this advance, he lost the necessary equilibrium and harmony. That can be supplied only by the ideal advocated by Islam. It does not accept the division of life into private and social. There is nothing secular or profane : everything is sacred. It is in the last resort the attitude which a man adopts towards life that determines the value of an act. If in all our activities we keep before our mind the ultimate law, then all we do in this world is sacred and spiritual ; but if we adopt a point of view of indifference towards the infinite complexity of life, then of course our life on this earth becomes profane and mischievous.

During the Middle Ages, the church-organisation to a very great extent supplied the neces-

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 154.

sary unity in the political and economic life of Europe. In spite of short-comings in the original set-up of Christianity, the social life everywhere was organized by the church. It supplied both political unity to the people of Europe as well as harmony to the life of the individual who could apply a single moral law to all the different activities of his life. It gave security to all. But the revolution of Luther by dissolving this church-organisation removed this element of security. To the leaders of Reformation moral and religious values resided within the inner life of the individual. The social structure, all political and economic institutions, ceased to have any particular connection with ethical and religious ideal. They were to be determined henceforth only by temporal or secular considerations. Morality, it was held, has its seat in one's conscience and faith while our relation to the state and concern in economic activities are matters of natural necessity and self-interest which have no relation whatsoever with the inwardness of morality and religion. Thus religion began to be looked upon as a private affair of the individual having nothing to do with this so-called profane world. This secular or non-religious outlook of Europe which is a legacy of Luther's revolt, is one of the reasons why Iqbal looks upon the Western culture as bound to decay, as it has borne much bitter fruit.

یورپ از شمشیر خود بسمل افتاد
زیر گردون رسم لا دینی نهاد

گرگے اندر پوستین برۂ
هر زمان اندر کمین برۂ
مشکلات حضرت انسان از وست
آدمیت را غم پنہاں از وست
در نگاهش آدمی آب و گل است
کاروان زندگی بے منزل است

(پس چه باید کرد صفحه ۲۵)

Europe has fallen a prey to her own sword,
Has set up in the world the principal of secularism.
A wolf in the guise of a lamb.
Always lying in ambush for it.
Through her, mankind is in travail,
And suffering from a hidden malady.
For her man is no more than a handful of clay,
And the caravan of life is without any goal.

In Michævelli we see the full blossoming of this secular tendency leading to most inhuman extremes. He advocated a complete break with the moral principles in determining political activities. Iqbal has therefore called him a 'messenger of Satan.'

باطل از تعلیم او بالیده است
حیله اندوزی فنے گر دیده است
شب بچشم اهل عالم چیده است
مصلحت تزویر را نامیده است

(رموز)

Falsehood has flourished by his teaching,
Deception has grown into an art.
He has laid out darkness before the eyes of the world,
Deceit has been called diplomacy.

The result was that the state, commerce and industry totally broke away from all moral considerations and everything—deceit, falsehood,

expropriation—came to be justified in the interest of political and material gain. Addressing the Prince, Michævelli said. "You have to understand that a prince . . . cannot observe all the things for which men are esteemed ; being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity and religion." A man may be faithful, truthful, honest in his private life but in his political and economic activities he must cease to be human and become a beast. The political activity of the modern man is exploitation of weaker people, his economic activity tends to deprive the poor man of his bread and his scientific pursuit is heading all mankind to destruction. And the reason, according to Iqbal, is that the modern man has adopted a false perspective of life. Divorced from the spiritual springs of his heart, he has degraded himself to the lowest of the low. Starting with metaphysical dualism of body and mind—which Iqbal thinks Christianity inherited from Manichænism—we were led to the division of life into religious and secular and then ultimate victory of secular over the religious and thus the resultant frustration is evident in the life of each and every individual.

بدن را تا فرنگ از جاں جدا دید
نگاهش ملک و دیں را هم دو تا دید
کلیسا سبحۂ پطرس شمارد
کہ او با حاکمی کارے ندارد
به کار حاکمی مکر و فنے بیں
تن بے جاں و جان بے تنے بیں
(گلشن راز جدید صفحه ۲۱۷)

Since the West viewed body and soul as separate,
It also bifurcated State and Religion.
The Churchman only tells beads,
For he had no work of the State to perform.
See deceit and artifice in statecraft :
It is a body without soul, or a soul without body.

"In Islam," on the other hand, "the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains." There is no scope in it for the dualism of body and mind and hence no division of life into different watertight departments. In the following verses Iqbal refers to the philosophical problem of relation between mind and body and clearly states that its solution is quite apparent.

عقل مدت سے ہے اس پیچاک میں الجھی ہوئی
روح کس جوہر سے ہے خاک تیرہ کس جوہر سے ہے
ارتباط حرف و معنی ! اختلاط جان و تن
جس طرح اخگر قبا پوش اپنی خاکستر سے ہے
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۵۲)

Since long Intellect has been bewildering
What is the nature of matter and what of soul ?
Relation of body and mind is akin to the relation of words and meaning,
As a burning cinder is covered with the cover of its ashes.

And perhaps it was due to the absence of this wrong distinction between these twin aspects of the same reality that human life was considered by Islam to be an indissoluble unity. Matter was as important for the development of the individual as spirit and nothing should be neglected. For the purpose of this harmonious

growth, Islam emphasised the control of matter and pointed the way to do it with a view to enable the individual to discover a basis for a realistic regulation of life. It is by this mastery of the world of matter that a man can hope to realise his true self. The intellectual discipline needed for the observation and control of environment proves useful in preparing him to see the Real behind the appearances. In *Ramuz-i-Bekhudi*, Iqbal refers to the Importance of control of matter in the development of the individual :

خیز و وا کن دیدۂ مخمور را
دوں مخواں ایں عالم مجبور را
غایتش توسیع ذات مسلم است
امتحان ممکنات مسلم است
نائب حق در جہاں آدم شود
بر عناصر حکم او محکم شود

Rise and open your intoxicated eyes,
Don't call this mundance world base.
Its object is the expansion of the personality of a Muslim,
To put to test his potentialities.
Adam becomes vicegerent of God on this earth,
His mastery over the forces of nature becomes established.

But this intellectual pursuit, Iqbal remineds, must be carried on not in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life but fully guided by it. It was the lack of this attachment that the empirical attitude of the West could not produce the desired result. Being divorced from the ethical ideal, it has led mankind to the

brink of destruction. So in spite of emphasising the importance of scientific attitude, Iqbal was obliged to criticise the atheistic spirit and exclusively this-wordly outlook of Western scientists which was the direct consequence of secularistic philosophy.

علم اشیاء خاک ما را کیمیا است
آہ ! در افرنگ تاثیرش جدا ست
آہ از افرنگ و از آئین او
آہ از اندیشۂ لا دین او
اے کہ جاں را باز می دانی ز تن
سحر این تہذیب لا دینی شکن[1]

---

1. In *Javid Nama*, Iqbal gives a picture of a new dynamic culture. One important basis of it is what he calls 'Knowledge is a great good.'

گفت حکمت را خدا خیر کثیر
ہر کجا این خیر را بینی بگیر

God characterised *hikmat* (wisdom) as abundant good.
Get wherever you find this good.

But he adds that this search for knowledge must be in tune with the Infinite, must be related to the spiritual basis of human life.

علم را بے سوز دل خوانی شر است
نور او تاریکئی بحر و بر است
دل اگر بندد بہ حق ، پیغمبری است
ور ز حق بیگانہ گردد کافری است

If you get knowledge without the burning of the heart
Its light becomes a source of darkness all around.
If the heart has connection with God, it becomes prophetic.
If not, it is infidelity and *kufr*.

Knowledge of things' is useful for us,
But alas ! in the West, its effect is different.
Beware of the West and her laws,
And of her conception of secularisation.
O you who look upon body and sout as separate,
Break the spell of this secular culture.

Another very bitter fruit of secularism was the growth of the ideals of nationalism and racialism. When Luther's revolt broke up the church-organisation and thus removed the one unifying force in the life of Europe, naturally there occurred a sort of emotional vacum in the life of the common man. The church was a symbol of unity as well as loyalty for millions of people. It afforded an ideological content to their daily life. How to fill this gap thus created ? Instead of this universal loyalty, narrower loyalties of country and race were created. Such false and limited emotional attachments did fill up the gap and more than made up the loss suffered by the disintegration of the unity of the church. Within a short span of time there appeared on the map of Europe big and small nationalities, conscious of their glorious traditions and ambitious of future political and military expansion. What was quite an innocent beginning soon assumed the shape of a hideous monster whom few were willing to own. The doctrines of Original Sin and Redemption deprived man of his inherent dignity, exclusively other-worldly outlook made his life on this earch of little significance, the ideal of state as divorced from higher values

reduced him into a means of exploitation, so these new loyalties of country and race robbed him of all human and spiritual meaning.

آن چناں قطع اخوت کردہ اند
بر وطن تعمیر ملت کردہ اند
تا وطن را شمع محفل ساختند
نوع انسان را قبائل ساختند
این شجر جنت ز عالم بردہ است
تلخئی پیکار بار آوردہ است
آدمی اندر جہاں افسانہ شد
آدمی از آدمی بیگانہ شد
(پس چہ باید کرد صفحہ ٥٦)

The West has so much destroyed the idea of human brotherhood,
That her people have built their loyalty round "nationalism."
Since country has become the ideal,
Mankind has been divided into tribes.
This tree has ruined the paradise of the earth
And its fruit is bitter strife.
Man became a myth in the world,
Man was cut off from man.

Nietzsche had correctly judged the situation. He was as strongly against nationalism or racialism as he was against Christianity. The culture to him was not a function of race or country or of anything merely physical: it involved the whole man, both body and soul. In this as in most other respects he was only re-echoing the lofty ideals of Islam which had built a new community not on the basis of blood or country or race but on purely humanistic grounds. Nietzsche denounced

nationalism and race hatred as a "scabies of the heart and a blood poisoning."[1] He strongly advocated intermarriages among different nations and races of Europe and expressed his desire for a mixed race of Good Europeans. He praised Napoleon for his .efforts to unify Europe. But, as he himself says in *Ecce Home*, he was born much before his time. It needed the holocausts of the two great wears to make the modern man realize the dangerous implications of national and racial outlooks. But how could Europe be united as Nietzsche desired ? It was not possible to return to the pre-Reformation unity provided by the Church. In spite of his intensely human outlook, Nietzsche could not conceive of any positive emotional basis for this unity. His view of a United Europe was as much negative and defensive as the idea of modern European Defence Community (E.D.C). Nietzsche is fully conscious that "the time for small politics is gone," that "the next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earth—the *coercion* to great politics." He hoped that the vast wars to come will bring to an end nationalism and the "comedy" of the existence of many states ; he envisaged "such an increase of the menace of Russia" that Europe will be forced, in self-defence, to become "One *Europe*."[2] No doubt, his prophetic utterances seem now to us to be

---

1. Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 253, 259, 266.
2. *Joyful Wisdom, 362 ; Beyond Good and Evil, 208.*

too true but the basis of unification suggested by Nietzsche proves also too hollow to one who is witnessing the tragedy of modern times. It is true that the might of USSR is compelling not only the peoples of Europe but also of the whole world to form a united front against atheistic socialism, yet this must be admitted that Communism can be met successfully only with the help of some positive ideology. Neither Nietzshe on account of his atheism, nor modern Europe on account of its secular traditions and national sovereignties can be hoped to furnish any firm basis for the unification of humanity. No solid foundation for peace and security can be laid in the world upon mere hate, suspicion and resentment which, as Nietzsche truly analysed, impoverish the spiritual energies of man.

This ideological basis which the modern world is seeking so earnestly to save itself from destruction, was provided by Islam by its doctrine of Tauhid—the belief in the unity of God.[1] From the unity of the Creator, Islam derived the unity of mankind and thus established a code

---

1. Nietzsche's atheistic outlook unfortunately prevented him from envisaging any such positive ideal for the unification of mankind :

حریف نکتۂ توحید ہو سکا نہ حکیم
نگاہ چاہئے اسرار لاالہ کے لیے
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۸۳)

The thinker could not comprehend the significance of *tauhid*.
Insight is needed to understand its meaning.

of universal ethics. The Quran says that God created all mankind from a single individual (39 : 6), thus refuting all differences of race, blood or country. It describes God as the Sustainer of the East as well as the West (73 : 9) thus demolishing the hateful supremacy of the Whites over others. Man wherever he may be belongs to the one human race and so Islam did not recognize any worth in any of these physical criteria. Racialism and nationalism as political concepts, *i.e.*, as principles of human solidarity, were totally rejected by Islam. It recognizes only the principles of human dignity and brotherhood as worthy of consideration. As Iqbal has put it, "Islam does not aim at the moral transformation of the individual alone; it also aims at the gradual but fundamental revolution in the social life of mankind, which should altogether change its national and racial view-points and create in its place a purely human consciousness. The history of religions conclusively shows that in ancient times religion was national as in the case of Egyptians, Greeks and Iranians. Later on, it became racial as that of the Jews. Christianity taught that religion is an individual and private affair. Religion having become synony mous with private beliefs, Europe began to think that the State alone was responsible for the social life of man. It was Islam and Islam alone which, for the first time, gave the message to mankind that religion was neither national and racial, nor individual and private, but purely human and that its purpose was to unite and

organize mankind despite all its natural distinctions."[1] It will be only when we rise higher than the distinctions of race, nationality, colour and language to the nobler conception of human brotherhood and unity that we can hope to attain true peace and security. And in the future culture of Iqbal's pattern this ideal is placed at the top.

برتر از گردون مقام آدم است
اصل تہذیب احترام آدم است
(جاوید نامہ صفحہ ۷۵)

The position of Man is higher than that of the sky.
The essence of culture is respect for man.

In order to achieve this wider affiliation and broader unity, Islam took the first practical step towards the realization of a final combination of humanity by calling upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical code to come forward and combine. "O people of the Book! come, let us join together on the word (unity of God) that is comman to us all."[2]

Nietzsche once or twice mentions in his works the possibility of a European League of Nations which may neutralize the nihilistic effect of national rivalries. But he missed to see that it would be nothing more than a corporate body of the accursed *nations* which he wanted to exterminate. If Nietzsshe had lived to see how the League of Nations came to birth and how it met its death at the hands of its promoters, he

1. *Speeches and Writings of Iqbal*, p. 226.
2. *Speeches and Writings of Iqbal*. p. 32.

would have very strongly protested. No unity or league based merely on the basis of race or country can hope to purify culture of its, decadence. Only that culture can hope to survive and provide congenial atmosphere for the growth of true human beings that is based on the preservation and promotion of human worth and dignity.

اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھی ہوئی عام
پوشیدہ نگاھوں سے رھی وحدت آدم
تفریق ملل حکمت افرنگ کا مقصود
اسلام کا مقصود فقط ملت آدم
مکے نے دیا خاک جنیوا کو یہ پیغام
جمعیت اقوام کہ جمعیت آدم ؟
(ضرب کلیم ۵۴-۵۵)

In our age there have been many meetings of the nations,
But the unity of man remained hidden from the eyes.
The aim of Western diplomacy is to divide nations,
The aim of Islam is only the establishment of unity of mankind.
Macca gave this message to Geneva,
Association of nations or association of Man ?

True peace and security of the world depends solely on this factor. Man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind. No system of unification, based on race or blood or country, can usher in an era of peace. Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man which is above race, colour or language and which is the natural corollary of belief in one God. It alone can create the

conception of unity of human life and produce in the minds of the people a broad human outlook.

This is one of the reasons why Iqbal denounced Western democracy. A form of government which was started to safeguard the rights of the common man against the encroachments from the moneyed class of kings, came to trample under feet the same rights ; where the will of the people is claimed to be soverrign, man is not honoured as man, his privileges are often snatched away from him and he is no better off than under a government where he has no voice in determining the policy of the state.

می کند بند غلاماں سخت تر
حریت می خواند او را بے بصر
(پس چه باید کرد ۳۶)

It strengthens the chains of the slaves,
But the fools call it freedom.

Democratic government claiming to represent the common people soon started on a career of imperialist expansion and the so-called backward regions of the world began to receive the "blessings" of this "new light." These noble exploits of democracy are described by Iqbal in almost all books and he looks upon it as another, albeit disguised, form of Imperialism. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he says :

فرنگ آئین جمهوری نهاد است
رسن از گردن دیوے کشاد است
ز باغش کشت ویرانے نکوتر
ز شهر او بیابانے نکوتر

خرد جز کافری کافر گری نیست
فن افرنگ جز مردم دری نیست
گروہے را گروہے در کمین است
خدایش یار اگر کارش چنیں است
(گلشن راز جدید ۲۳۳)

The West has set up the rule of democracy,
It has untied the rope from the neck of a fiend.
A desolate field is better than its garden,
A desert is better than its city.
Intellect is nothing but fostering of unbelief,
The art of the West is nothing but man-killing.
A group lies in ambush against another group,
Such a state of affairs is sure to lead to disaster.

In *Javid Nama*,he concludes his polemic against democracy thus :

اے به تقلیدش اسیر ، آزاد شو
دامن قرآں بگیر ، آزاد شو

O you who are imprisoned in its snares, free yourself,
Hold the skirt of the Quran and be fully free.

In other words, the bitter fruit of democracy in the West, according to Iqbal, is due to the same atheistic outlook which we had been discussing before. Democracy in Islam means that the Government must have the full support of the people and there must be every scope provided for peaceful change in the Government in accordance with the wishes of the people. Democracy in Islam does not mean sovereignty of the people in the sense that men are completely free in doing what they wish. It was this freedom of action which led Western democracies to develop into imperialistic autocracies.

Certain fundamental moral principles must be accepted as final in determining national and international relations. Man is not the sovereign ; sovereignty lies only with God. Man is His vicegerent and in this lies his true honour and dignity. If he is made to assume the wrong role of sovereign as democracy in the West has done, we are sure to meet the same disastrous consequences.

Nietzsche also denounced democracy but for different reasons. According to him, the ideal should be the breeding of unique individuals who count much more than thousands of the mediocres. As democracy hinders the growth of such fine specimen of humanity, Nietzsche favoured the formation of some sort of aristocracy. In the following verse Iqbal echoes this view of Nietzsche :

گریز از طرز جمہوری غلام پختہ کارے شو
کہ از مغز دو صد خر فکر انسانے نمی آید

Run away from the way of democracy, be an experienced slave,
For out of the heads of two hundred asses, man's ideas cannot arise.

But Iqbal's main attack against democracy did not imply any Nietzschean belief in the inherent weakness of the common man for whom he uses most vulgar words contemptuously. Iqbal could not forego the basic Islamic creed that every individual without any distinction whatsoever has the potentiality to become a perfect man. In his article on "Muslim Democracy", he poses the question, "Is the plebeian so absolute-

ly hopeless ?" in the light of Nietzsche's criticism of the common man. Iqbal's answer is in the negative. He adds, "The Democracy of Islam . . . is a *spiritual* principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power.[1]" Thus what is needed is the application of spiritual principles to the life of individuals and societies. In the presence of this principle, democracy and socialism all tend to the welfare of man ; in its absence they become tools of tyranny and injustice as we witness today. Only that form of emotional system of unification is beneficial which derives its root from the spiritual basis of human life.

Communism also claims to give an ideological basis for the unification of mankind. Nietzsche opposed the movement on account of what he calls its decadent morality. He holds that like Christianity it is based on the psychology of resentment and hatred. In the case of the ascetic morality this hatred is directed towards one's self while in case of socialism (or communism) it is directed towards others. Socialists make society to blame for the misery of the unfortunate and try to make life bearable for

---

1. *Secrets of the Self,* Introduction, p. xxx, foot-note. Italics mine.

them by taking revenge upon the fortunate.[1] Nietzsche could not countenance a movement that struck at the very root of his aristocratic ethics of supermen. Iqbal, however, saw in this movement an element of truth. He was struck by the immense vitality shown by it in repudiating the false ideals of race and nationalism and founding a state on purely ideological grounds, for the care bestowed on raising the level of the poor and less fortunate individuals. He was more impressed by the negative side of their crusade and hoped that soon they would be able to lay the foundation of a new culture on the ashes of a society "motivated by an inhuman competition which has lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflicts of religious and political values."[2] In *Javid Nama* (1932) addressing the Russians, he says :

کہنہ شد افرنگ را آئین و دیں
سوئے آن دیر کہن دیگر مبیں
کردہ ای کار خداوندان تمام
بگذر از لا جانب الا خرام

(صفحہ ۸۸)

The law and religion of the West have become obsolete,
Don't look towards this old mansion.
You have done away with old idols,
Pass from 'nay' to 'yea'.

But he was conscious of the fact that the ideological basis supplied by Communism was

---

1. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
2. *Lectures*, p. 189.

not conducive to peace and harmony. It was not based on the conception of human brotherhood and equality but on the brotherhood of workers as against the capitalists, on the equality of stomachs and not on the equality of human dignity, or the equality of participation in the common spiritual heritage. Unfortunately it is based on the same secular outlook of tife that gives priority to economic and material needs. To socialists, dignity belongs not to man as such but to the exploited man only. They excluded their programme of justice, fairplay and equality from a particular class of mankind and thus narrowed their ideal of unification. Communism in practice has unfortunately served the same dehumanising tendency as imperialism and capitalism had done. Like nationalism it draws upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment and not of love, trust and tolerance.

هر دو را جاں نا صبور و نا شکیب
هر دو یزداں نا شناس آدم فریب
زندگی ایں را خروج آں را خراج
درمیان ایں دو سنگ آدم ز جاج
ایں به علم و دین و فن آرد شکست
آن برد جاں را ز تن ناں را ز دست
غرق دیدم هر دو را در آب و گل
هر دو را تن روشن و تاریک دل

(جاوید نامه صفحه ۷۰)

The life of both is without patience,
Both are atheistic and man-deceiving.
For one life is attack on others, for other it is political exploitation,

Between them man is ground to pieces.
One brings its enemies to the ground by art and skill,
The other removes life out of body, and bread out of hands.
Both are in mersed in the sphere of water and clay,
Each has its body shining and heart gloomy.

Another cause of decadence in Islamic society, according to Ipbal, is the prevalence of what Nietzsche calls the slave-morality. Europe, by adopting secularism, succeeded in shaking off this monstor but in the East it had still a very strong hold on the minds of the people, sanctified by its connection with several eminent mystics. As soon as this realisation came, Iqbal plunged himself headlong into the crusade against this life-denying moral code. His *Asrar-i-Khudi* was the first shell that he threw among the people who were enamoured of it. As soon as it saw the light of the day, a violent storm of opposition, abuse and slander arose and in this controversy some of the well-known mystics of the day took a keen part. In a series of brilliant articles, Iqbal defended his position and in the end successfully convinced the intelligentsia that not only should the mystic way be totally discarded if the Muslim were to be regenerated but he also tried to establish that the political and moral decline of the Muslims was mostly due to its ramifications in the different ranks of the society.

This other-worldly mysticism (رھبانیت) takes its rise from a totally wrong belief that this world is a sort of prison-house of pain and

misery and human instincts and passions are the unworthy chains which are meant to keep man's pure soul tied to this earthly abode. Salvation, according to it, lies only in flight from this world into wilderness, in suppressing all desires, will and passion. For this purpose mortification of the body is adopted so as to enable the soul to soar into higher regions of bliss. The anti-social philosophy of life gives birth to an allied system of morals which is totally negative. A great emphasis is laid on resignation, submissiveness and mortification of the body. A sufi must patiently bear all the tribulations of this life ; he should be morose and never give way to smiling or any show of merriment. Body being evil, he should not look to bodily cleanliness or health. It is related in Attar's *Tadhkira* that a mystic refused to bathe or change his dirty clothes. When people used force, they were surprised to find bugs of very huge size in hundreds. There was a regular school of thought mystics who advocated the ideal of blame (ملامت) in order to attain the attitude of indifference towards the opinions of the common people. In spite of Holy Prophet's injunction of marriage was ridiculed. Hujwari, for instance, definitely says that Sufism is based on celibacy.[1] The author of *Awarif al-Ma'arif*, a renowned mystic, brings forth a wealth of facts and anecedotes to prove the marriage, though enjoined by the Holi Prophet, would destory the whole struc-

———

1. *Kashf al- Mahjub* (Eng.), p. 365.

ture of mysticism and divert the sufi from his self-imposed task of renunciations.[1] Proverty is claimed to be superior to wealth and, in the discipline of the sufi, courting of poverty is an indispensable rule. In order to strengthen the attitude of passive resignation and submissiveness, begging was introduced as a regular avocation of the sufis.[2]

In the Quran and traditions we meet strong denunciation of this ascetic, slave morality which directs the attention of the people away from the earth to the world beyond. In Islam both the worlds are equally real aud so it demands adjustment to both. The moral code of Islam, therefore, keeps in view this necessity of engendering in the individual the proper attitude towards both the worlds. Christianity, as we saw, erred in this respect and therefore Nietzsche was quite justified in opposing it. It was this realisation on the part of Nietzsche which Iqbal appreciated much, as it was in heeping with the spirit of Islam. In the following verses of *Piyam-i-Mashriq*, Iqbal evpresses his appreciation of Nietzsche's moral stand-point both in regard to his criticism of Christianity and in regard to his positive ideal.

نیشتر اندر دل مغرب فشرد
دستش از خون چلیپا احمر است
آں که بر طرح حرم بتخانه ساخت
قلب او مومن دماغش کافر است

---

1. Chapter 21.
2. *Kashf al-Mahjub*, pp. 316-7; *Awarif al-Ma'arif*, Chaps. 19, 20.

خویش را در نار آن نمرود سوخت
زاں که بستان خلیل از آذر است

He thrust a dagger into the breast of the West,
His hand is tainted with the blood of the Cross.
As he built a temple on the basis of of a mosque,
His heart is a believer, though intellectually he is an atheist.
He burnt himself in the fire of this Nimrod,
Out of Adhar came the garden of Khalil (Abraham)[1].

In the footnote he adds that intellectually he was an unbeliever (کافر) because he did not believe in the existence of God, though in the formulation of his ethical code he came very near to the Islamic ideal. The Quran, referring to the otherworldly code of the Christians, asserts (57 : 27) that God did not ordain any code of renunciation (رهبانیت) for the followers of Christ ; it was they themselves who in order to win God's favour, adopted this way of life. But as it was unnatural, most of them could not do justice to this mode of life.

Iqbal, in several of his books, has therefore stigmatised this mystic code as inconsistent with the spirit of Islam. The conception of *faqr*, that forms and integral part of Iqbal's perfect man, is to be strictly distinguished from begging of slave morality : for *faqr* in our mystic literature had acquired a totally un-Islamic and

1. Reference is to the incident in the life of Abraham when King Nimrod ordered him to be put in fire. It is related that fire did not burn him but changed into a cool garden. Adhar, the father of Abraham, was an idolator.

negative significance, while *faqr* which Iqbal extols is something positive, and therefore in order to mark it off from the former calls it Islamic faqr.[1]

کچھ اور چیز ہے شاید تری مسلمانی
تری نگاہ میں ہے ایک فقر و رہبانی
سکول پرستئ راہب سے فقر ہے بیزار
فقیر کا ہے سفینہ ہمیشہ طوفانی
(ضرب کلیم ۴۷)

Your conception of Islam is perhaps something different,
For to you *faqr* and renunciation seem identical.
*Faqr* is dissatisfied with the quietism of a recluse,
The boat of a *faqir* is always tossing on the stormy waves.

In *Bal-i-Jabril*, he asks Rumi :

کاروبار خسروی یا راہبی ؟
کیا ہے آخر غایت دین نبی ؟

What is the goal of the religion of Islam—
Statecraft or renunciation ?

and receives the reply :

مصلحت در دین ما جنگ و شکوہ
مصلحت در دین عیسیٰ غار و کوہ

The true path in our religion is holy fight,
The true path for Christianity is flight to caves and mountains.

---

1. The following verse from *Zarb-i-kalim*

ہمت ہو اگر تو ڈھونڈ وہ فقر
جس فقر کی اصل ہے حجازی
(صفحہ ۸۸)

If you are daring, search that *faqr*.
Which has its root in Hijaz.

In *Javid Nama*, he further explains his position :

جنگ شاهان جهان غارت گری است
جنگ مومن سنت پیغمبری است
جنگ مومن چیست ؟ هجرت سوئے دوست
ترک عالم ، اختیار کوئے دوست
آنکہ حرف شوق با اقوام گفت
جنگ را رهبانئی اسلام گفت

The war of the kings of the world is destruction ;
The war of a Muslim is the Sunna of the Prophet.
What is the war of a Muslim ? It is flight towards the Beloved,
Leaving the world for the abode of the Beloved.
He who addressed to the world the new message of peace,
Called 'war' the renunciation of a Muslim.

Basing his position on the prophetic traditions, he asserts that Jihad is a better substitute in Islam for what the Christian hermits wanted to achieve through the code of renunciation. What is Jihad ? This word has been invested with some very unpleasant associations due to misunderstanding or wilful misrepresentation. Especially in India after the country came under the political control of the British, this problem raised much useless theological controversy. In order to appreciate the true significance of Jihad in Islamic moral code, we should first try to understand what Islam as an ideology stands for. It is not religion in the sense of being a collection of a few dogmas and a particular mode of worship and ritual. It is rather a code of life which involves the fundamental assumption that God is not only

the Creator but also the sole lawgiver. True sovereignty rests not in kings, in dictators, in people but with God and no man, not even a prophet, has any inherent right to rule over people like himself, to command or to prohibit. The doctrine of Tauhid was a call for social revolution for the sake of the common man against exploitation by politicians, priests and capitalists. It was not a metaphysical proposition demanding nothing beyond a verbal acceptance or rejection ; it was a call for revaluation and re-interpretation of life's ultimate good and a new approach towards it. The second point was the inherent value and dignity of the individual. The Quranic legend of the angels bowing before Adam symbolises this inalienable right of each and every individual to live a life of peace, freedom and security on this earth. Those who tend to disturb this peace and harmony—and the Quran declares that all societies that do not accept the Sovereignty of the Lord as true are *ipso facto* helping in creating chaos, disorder and mischief—must be opposed and fought by all possible means. It is the duty of every man to rise against injustice in every form and this sacred duty in Islam is called Jihad. Prayers, fasting and zakat are a sort of discipline which Islam prescribes for preparing the individual for this peaceful crusade.

This clearly brings out the difference between the two codes of morals. The ideal type of manhood in slave morality is a recluse who, over-

whelmed by chaos and disorder all around him, runs away shirking his responsibility. He is a disgrace to human dignity. Instead of heroically fighting against injustice and exploitation, he flies away from the world of matter, of evil and pain, to the selfish security of his seclusion. He has neither the strength nor determination to change the wrong pattern of society of his day. He mortifies his body for the sake of his soul as he sacrifices this world for the sake of the next. Islam, being a code of behaviour in this life, could not be oblivious of the need of establishing a true pattern of society and therefore the right type of manhood envisaged by it was a *mujahid* who strives hard by all means at his disposal to bring about a better social order so that man may be able to live a life of peace and security according to the law of God. Such a man is both submissive and bold ; submissive before his Creator and bold and daring before his enemies ; he is innocent, lowly and cheerful when engaged in his creative activities but he is ferocious and recklessly hazardous when dealing with the enemies of society.

He despises his body, wealth, his wife, his children, even his life when there is the question of creating new values and when he is engaged in the attempt to preserve them but this attitude does not imply that like the recluse he hates these things absolutely. Like the recluse he regards his passions and appetites as evil, but unlike the hermit he does not wish to castrate

himself. He sublimates his impulses for nobler purposes. Like a recluse he has an eye on the hereafter, but unlike the mystic he looks upon this world as a preparatory ground for the next. His aim is not confined to this world of space and time as Nietzsche would have us do ; his zeal for the betterment of life in this world is motivated by his conviction that there is a life after death where he will be called to account before God how he acquitted himself in the world. In the following verses Iqbal contrasts the two moralities :

فقر کافر خلوت و دشت و در است
فقر مومن لرزۂ بحر و بر است
زندگی آں را سکون غار و کوہ
زندگی ایں را ز مرگ با شکوہ
آں خدا را جستن از ترک بدن
ایں خودی را برفسان حق زدن
آں خودی را کشتن و او سوختن
ایں خودی را چوں چراغ افروختن
فقر چوں عریاں شود زیر سپہر
از نہیب او بلرزد ماہ و مہر
فقر عریاں گرمیٔ بدر و حنین
فقر عریاں بانگ تکبیر حسین
فقر را تا ذوق عریانی نماند
آں جلال اندر مسلمانی نماند

(پس چہ باید کرد صفحہ ۲۶ - ۲۷)

*Faqr* of an unbeliever is privacy in mountains,
*Faqr* of a Muslim is to produce commotion in land and sea.

Life for one is quietitude in caves and mountains,
Life for the other is honourable death,

One seeks God by mortification of flesh,
For the other it consists in sharpening his ego on the whetstone of God.
One kills the ego and burns it out,
The other illumines the ego like a lamp.
When *faqr* becomes 'naked' under the sun,
Sun and moon tremble at its sight.
The 'naked' *faqr* is at the back of wars of Badr and Hunain,
It is this *faqr* which is manifest in the cry of Husain.
Since *faqr* lost its nakedness.
All majesty departed from Muslims.

All this desire for 'nakedness', for self-assertion, vanished when slave-morality came to replace the master morality of a *mujahid.* A very instructive illustration of this transformation can be appreciated from the following anecdote related in *Awarif al-Ma'arif*, a very standard work on Sufism by Shaikh Shahabu'd-Din Suhrawardi, a prominent founder of a Sufi fraternity. This anecdote amply bears out the contention of Iqbal that the decline of Muslim society was the result of the acceptance of monastic life in place of Jihad, of slave-morality instead of true Muslim ethical code. A *mujahid* brother once wrote from a battlefield to his brother, a sufi of a monastery, persuading him to join the jihad against the attacking infidels. The sufi brother wrote back that he was compelled to stay within the monastery, for the door was closed on him. He received the following reply, "If everybody followed in your footsteps, then surely Muslims would have

been brought to naught politically and socially and the infidels would have subdued Islam. Hence it is impossible to defend Islam without jihad." The sufi brother replied, "If all people were to adopt my path and utter the name of Allah sitting in their monasteries, they would have conquered Constantinpole." (Chap. 13). Not to speak of conquering Constantinople, these people of monasteries helped in destroying the remnants of vitality left in the people and made them ripe for defeat before the onslaughts of the invaders.

کر سکتی ہے بے معرکہ جینے کی تلافی
اے پیر حرم تیری مناجات سحر کیا ؟
ممکن نہیں تخلیق خودی خانقہوں سے
اس شعلۂ نم خوردہ سے ٹوٹے گا شرر کیا ؟
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۱۷۷)

Is it possible to maintain life without striving ?
O sufi, can your cloistered prayers achieve anything?
The creativity of the ego is not possible in the monasteries,
Can its damp light produce any spark ?

Following Nietzsche, Iqbal illustrates this metamorphoses of morals by the parable of sheep and lions. All of a sudden there came into the preserve of sheep—a haven of peace—some ferocious lions who soon began to prey on the fat sheep. Confronted with this dangerous situation, the sheep thought a way out—to transform the lions into sheep. An old sheep, on the basis of his spiritual experience and with the sanction of prophetic revelation, came forward to convince the lions of the truth of his

mission, which Iqbal sums up as follows : "Whoso is violent and strong is miserable. Life's solidarity depends on self-denial. Paradise is for the weak alone. Strength is but a means to perdition. It is wicked to seek greatness and glory, penury is sweeter than princedom. Slay thy self and thou wilt have honour. Life is rendered unstable by violence, oppression, revenge and exercise of power. Close your eyes, close your ears, close your lips, that your thoughts may reach the lofty sky. This world is naught, fool, do not torment yourself for a phantom."[1] The lions, after a period of ceaseless struggle and conquest were passing through a moment of relaxation and exhaustion. They found in this code an irresistible charm of peace and they succumbed to the viles of their enemies. The result was that "by degrees courage ebbed from their breasts, that frenzy of uttermost exertion remained not, that craving after action dwelt in their hearts no more. They lost the power of ruling and the resolution to be independent ; they lost reputation, prestige and fortune ; their souls died and their bodies became tombs."[2]

زور تن کاهید و خوف جاں فزود
خوف جاں سرمایۂ همت ربود
صد مرض پیدا شد از بے همتی
کوته دستی ، بے دلی ، دوں فطرتی

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 29—31. *Cf. Zarathustra*, Part I, Discourses ii, iv, vi, ix, etc.

2. *Lectures*, p. 31.

شیر بیدار از فسون میش خفت
انحطاط خویش را تهذیب گفت

Bodily strength diminished, while spiritual fear increased :
Spiritual fear robbed them of courage.
Lack of courage produced a hundred diseases—
Poverty, pusillanimity, low-mindedness.
The wakeful tiger was lulled to slumber by the sheep's charm :
He called his decline culture.[1]

If you substitute the moral principles enunciated by the mystics for those of the sheep and the Muslim lions, you can understand the whole history of Muslims as viewed by Iqbal, its rise and fall and the main cause of its decline.

It was in this context that Iqbal chose Plato as the originator of slave-morality.

راهب اول فلاطون حکیم
از گروه گوسفندان قدیم

Plato, the prime ascetic and sage,
Was one of that ancient flock of sheep.

It was through his teaching that mystic thought and the anti-social movement of flight from the world got currency in the world. When pious Muslims of the eariy period became dissatisfied with the way things were developing under the Umayyad rule, they saw no way out except to renounce the world. But this temporary tendency soon developed into a permanent feature when Greek thought—mainly neo-Platonic—became popular and then the example of Christian hermits in monasteries of Iran and Iraq further helped in

1. *Lectures*, p. 31.

strengthening this movement of renunciation. Iqbal, in criticising Plato, wanted to warn the Muslims that any regeneration of Muslim society in the future must be fully conscious of the dangers implied in any revival of this un-Islamic neo-Platonic mysticism. "The thought of Plato regarded loss as profit and his philosophy declared that being is not-being. He disbelieved in the material universe and became the creator of invisible ideas. He soared with his intellect to the highest heaven and called the world of phenomena a myth. It was his work to dissolve the structure of Life and cut the bough of Life's fair tree asunder."[1]

قومہا از سکر او مسموم گشت
خفت و از ذوق عمل محروم گشت

The peoples were poisoned by his intoxication :
They slumbered and took no delight in deeds.

But, unfortunately, the whole Persian and Urdu literature reflected this tendency from top to bottom and it was in reality through this medium that the morality of the slaves permeated the virile Muslim society. Iqbal therefore pleaded very strongly that our literature and art should free themselves totally from this pernicious influence :

ہے شعر عجم گرچہ طربناک و دلاویز
اس شعر سے ہوتی نہیں شمشیر خودی تیز
(ضرب کلیم ۱۲۷)

The poetry of Persia is no doubt enchanting and joyful,
It does not, however, sharpen the sword of the ego.

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 33-4.

He took Hafiz as a typical Persian poet who, in his poetry, propagated the ideals of slave morality. A man should be content with his lot, he should be patient and lowly, for even if he gives himself over to grief and complaints at his hard lot, what can he do ? Can he tear the skies ? Can he change the course of the world ? Can he alter his fate ? All this is impossible and therefore passive resignation and total self-denial is the only course left for him. Take to wine and forget the ills of the world, for it is all evil and pain around and it is not for you to bring about any change for the better. It was slave morality *par excellence* sung in a most melodious tone. Iqbal could not countenance its propagation any longer. The evil consequences had become too damaging and therefore he decided to attack it. His criticism evoked great protests from those who held Hafiz and other mystics of the same type in great esteem. The intensity of storm thus raised showed that Iqbal was right in the diagnosis of the disease. People were still spell-bound by this type of moral code and it was his duty to bring home to the people the sting of poison hidden in this type of literature.

وائے قومے کز اجل گیرد برات
شاعرش وا بوسد از ذوق حیات
خوش نماید زشت را آئینہ اش
در جگر صد نشتر از نوشینہ اش

Woe to a people that resigns itself to death,
And whose poet turns away from the joy of living !

His mirror shows beauty as ugliness,
His honey leaves a hundred stings in the heart.[1]

Hafiz was only a specimen of such apostles of slave morality. As a matter of fact, the voluminous *divans* of almost all Persian and Urdu poets could be easily cited in support of Iqbal's thesis. They were all alike tending towards decadence. The poison and opium filtered into the hearts of the people through the sweet wings of melody had made them into slaves ; fondness for life, for action, for noble endeavour had all vanished, and in their place resignation, sickness, death came to be valued—it was through this transformation that the Muslims became "a disgrace to Islam throughout the world." The standard of conduct was totally changed and a horrible metamorphosis in values took place : what was once blameful became praiseworthy by the magic of poetry and what was once looked upon as loss came to be regarded as again. And Iqbal emphatically declares that when the literature of any nation comes to express the valuations of the slave, that nation cannot hope to survive for long and there is no doubt that in the case of Muslims this did come to pass. So he set out to bring about a healthy revolution in Islamic literature, to free it from the slave-valuations under the influence of mystics. He appealed to the poets and writers of the future to look to Arabic literature for inspiration.

---

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 37.

فکر صالح در ادب می بایدت
رجعتے سوئے عرب می بایدت
از چمن زار عجم گل چیدۀ
نو بہار ہند و ایران دیدۀ
اندکے از گرمئی صحرا بخور
بادۀ دیرینه از خرما بخور

It behoves thee to have healthy literature,
(Therefore) it behoves thee to go back to Arabia ;
Thou hast gathered roses from the garden of Persia
And seen the springtide of India and Iran :
Now taste a little of the heat of the desert,
Drink the old wine of the date ! [1]

In *Ramuz-i-Bekhudi*, he quotes a saying of a mystic saint in his support and gives reason for it.

با مریدے گفت اے جان پدر
از خیالات عجم باید حذر
زانکه فکرش گرچه از گردوں گذشت
از حد دین نبی بیروں گذشت
قلب را زیں حرف حق گرداں قوی
با عرب در ساز تا مسلم شوی

He told one of his disciples, "O my son,
Beware of the thoughts of Persia.
Though the flight of her ideas was beyond the skies,
It transgressed the limit set by the Law of Islam.
Strengthen your breast by my advice :
Revert to the ways of the Arabs that you may become true Muslim."

In the following beautiful verses, Iqbal has contrasted the two codes of morals, that of the mystics and that of the Muslims, of the slaves

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 39-40.

and lords and the resultant types of men produced by them :

آں نہال سر بلند و استوار
سیرت صحرائی اشتر سوار
پائے تا در وادیٔ بطحا گرفت
تربیت از حدت صحرا گرفت
آں چناں کاهید از باد عجم
همچو نے گردید از باد عجم
آں که کشتے شیر را چوں گوسفند
گشت از پامال مورے درد مند
آں که از تکبیر او سنگ آب گشت
از صفیر بلبلے بیتاب گشت
آں که عزمش کوه را کاهے شمرد
با توکل دست و پائے خود سپرد
آں که ضربش گردن اعدا شکست
قلب خویش از ضربهائے سینه خست
آں که گامش نقش صد هنگامه بست
پائے اندر گوشهٔ عزلت شکست
آں که فرمانش جهاں را ناگزیر
بر درش اسکندر و دارا فقیر
کوشش او با قناعت ساز کرد
تا بد کشکول گدائی ناز کرد

That lofty and strong plant, *viz.*, the Muslim, like
the camel-rider of the Sahara ;
He grew up amid the valley of Batha
And was hardened in the heat of the Desert ;
That plant withered so much under the influence of
wind from Iran,
That it became weak and sickly like a bamboo ;
He who would kill a lion as if it were a mere sheep,
Came to feel stings of sympathy at the trampling of
a tiny insect ;

He whose *takbir* used to melt even stone-hearted persons,
Began to feel uneasy at the song of a nightingale ;
He before whose will even mountains became straw,
Handed himself over to passive resignation ;
He whose strokes would break the enemy's neck,
Made his heart weary by the beating of his breast ;
He whose steps created several new worlds,
Adopted a hermit's life ;
He whose orders were irrevocable
And at whose door kings like Alexander and Darius were only beggars—
His endeavours and active life were given up for the sake of contentment
So much so that he came to feel proud of his Bowl of Beggars.

Iqbal follows Nietzsche in the psychological analysis of the weak and the slave. Their main stock-in-trade are meanness, pity, *ressentiment*, contentment, gentleness, humility, helplessness, self-indulgence. And in order to counteract the poisonous effect of these tactics of the weak, Iqbal, following Nietzsche, advocates the panacea of power, more and full power. He thinks that the psychological make-up of strong and noble people is the love of strength of body and its manifestation in all aspects of their activities.

زندگانی قوت پیداستے
اصل او از ذوق استیلاستے

Life is power made manifest,
And its origin is to attain power and dominate.[1]

He goes so far with Nietzsche as to say that power is synonymous with truth and determines the standard of values. He who is strong and

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 53.

powerful is on the right side and he who is weak is destined to be reckoned false.

زندگی کشت است و حاصل قوت است
شرح رمز حق و باطل قوت است
مدعی سرمایه دار از قوت است
دعویٰ او بے نیاز از حجت است
باطل از قوت پذیرد شان حق
خویش را حق داند از بطلان حق
از کن او زهر کوثر می شود
خیر را گوید شرے، شر می شود

Life is the seed, and power the crop ;
Power explains the mystery of truth and falsehood.
A claimant, if he be possessed of power,
Needs no argument for his claim.
Falsehood derives the authority of truth from power,
And it falsifies truth and yet it is considered truth.
Its word transforms poison into nectar ;
It says to Good, 'You are bad,' and good becomes evil thereby.[1]

---

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 54-5. In another place Iqbal says :

خوب زشت است اگر پنجۀ گیرات شکست
زشت خوب است اگر تاب و توان تو فزود

Good is evil if your power thereby decreases.
Evil is good, if it increases your power.

In a story related about an Arabic poet Ma'arri in *Bal-i-Jibril*, he draws the same moral, viz. power determines the value of a thing :

تقدیر کے قاضی کا یہ فتویٰ ہے ازل سے
ہے جرم ضعیفی کی سزا مرگ مفاجات

It has been the judgment of Destiny since eternity :
The penalty of weakness is death.

Explaining the significance of the title of 'Ali—Abu Turab, *i.e.*, father of earth,—Iqbal says that to reduce oneself to dust, to be lowly and submissive as the earth, which was a popular ideal in the slave morality of the mystics, is tantamount to the total extinction of man. In contrast to it, 'Ali was called Bu Turab, that is, the conqueror of the earth.

خاک گشتن مذهب پروانگی است
خاک را آب شو که این مردانگی است

(اسرار صفحه ۸۰)

To become earth is the creed of a moth ;
Be a conqueror of earth ; that alone is worthy of a man.[1]

He who controls his body, becomes thereby hard and strong. By his love of action and struggle, he is able to create a new world for himself. He does not complain of the intransigence of the universe, for he has power enough to mould the environment according to his wishes and needs.

آزماید صاحب قلب سلیم
زور خود را از مهمات عظیم

ممکنات قوت مردان کار
گردد از مشکل پسندی آشکار

He that has a sound heart
Will prove his strength by great enterprises.
The potentialities of men of action
Are displayed in willing acceptance of what is difficult.[2]

---

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 52,
۲. *Lectures*, P. 53.

This theme is further illustrated by the story of a man who, overawed by the stratagem of his enemies sought advice from a saint. Through the mouth of the saint, Iqbal declares that what one will ultimately become depends upon what one thinks oneself to be. "If you regard yourself a piece of glass, you thereby become liable to be broken into pieces. If you look upon yourself weak and feeble, your strength evaporates and you become prey to the strong. Your body may be composed of clay and water but your real self is an enduring reality all full of fire and ambition and in the realization of this self, in the process of maturing and integrating this personality, untoward circumstances, rebellious enemies, unfavourable and uncongenial environments—all play their part and help you in your higher aspirations."[1]

In order to emphasise the morality of the masters which contains the precept of becoming hard, Iqbal relates first the story of a bird faint with thirst and secondly, the dialogue between coal and diamond. A thirsty bird taking a piece of shining diamond to be a drop of water pecked at it but was repulsed by its hardness. Then it chanced to see a drop of dew and drank it up.

---

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 55-6. Cf. the following passage of Nietzsche : "Ye shall be those whose eyes ever seek for an enemy—for *your* enemy—ye shall only have enemies to be hated, but not enemies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your enemies ; then the successes of your enemies are also your successes." *Zarathustra*, I, x, pp. 52-3.

In the end he asks the following question to emphasise the difference between the two roles :

اے که می خواهی ز دشمن جاں بری
از تو پرسم قطرهٔ یا گوهری ؟

O thou that would like to deliver thy sout from
enemies,
I ask thee – "Art thou a drop of water or a gem ?"[1]

And your answer shall decide what role you are going to adopt. If you are a drop of water—*i.e.* If you follow the slave-valuations—you will soon be made to lose your identity ; but if you become as strong and hard as a piece of stone, then all the stratagems of your enemy will come to naught.

The second story is a dialogue between a piece of charcoal and a diamond. By nature of their constitution, as composed of carbon, both are alike but by the nature of development they are poles apart and the result is that the former is consigned to fire to be burnt to ashes while the other is sought after and adorns the crowns of kings and swords of the warriors. In the words of the Diamond, it is hardness and daring strife with environment that made it radiant and it is the softness and immaturity of the coal that made it mean and debased.

فارغ از خوف و غم و وسواس باش
پخته مثل سنگ شو الماس باش
می شود از وے دو عالم مستنیر
هر که باشد سخت کوش و سخت گیر
در صلابت آبروئے زندگی است
ناتوانی ، ناکسی ناپختگی است

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 60.

Be void of fear, grief and anxiety ;
Be hard as a stone, be a diamond !
Whosoever strives hard and grips tight,
The two worlds are illumined by him.
In solidity consists the glory of life ;
Weakness is worthlessness and immaturity.[1]

So far Iqbal agrees with Nietzsche in the psychological analysis that will to power is at the root of everything that man does—which is the manifestation of the will not merely to preserve and maintain life but to enjoy life in its fulness and exuberance. The highest specimen of this type of life, according to Iqbal, is the ego which can be attanied only if the individual can be made to exercise his will to power in its intense form. This exercise of the will to power keeps the ego in a state of perpetual tension and helps it to attain perfection. The slave morality, life of other-worldliness and renunciation which both Iqbal and Nietzsche forcefully repudiate, tend to destroy this state of tension and thus loosen the bonds of the ego and dig its grave. The ideal of master-morality, on the other hand, helps the ego in attaining the ideal of perfection by exercising its inherent will to power. The man overawed by his enemies (in the stories related above) was advised that the presence of enemies signified that his ego must be

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 63. This story is taken from Nietzsche. Cf. *Zarathustra*, III, lvi, pp. 261-2. In another place Iqbal said, "Mussolini's maxim was : He who has steel has bread. I venture to modify it a bit and say : He who is steel has everything." *Speeches* etc., p. 55.

kept in a constant state of tension without which it would not be possible to attain perfection. The hardened piece of diamond was able to achieve a higher state of egohood than was possible for a dew-drop or a piece of charcoal.

اے که می خواهی ز دشمن جان بری
از تو پرسم قطرهٔ یا گوهری ؟
قطره سخت اندام و گوهر خو نبود
ریزهٔ الماس بود و او نبود
غافل از حفظ خودی یکدم مشو
ریزهٔ الماس شو ، شبنم مشو

O thou that wouldst deliver thy soul from enemies,
I ask thee—"Art thou a drop of water or a gem ?"
The drop was not hard in body and gem-like ;
The diamond had a being, the drop had none.
Never for an instant neglect preservation of Ego :
Be a diamond, not a dew-drop !

Thus, according to Iqbal, it is not merely the preservation of life as biologists like Darwin and Spencer hold, or the will to power as Nietzsche would say, but the Ego that should be the criterion of value. Our social institutions, our moral eodes, our educational system, our political organizations, our industry and agriculture must be built and developed so as to strengthen the ego in the individuals. He who is able to achieve this egohood is the true perfect man, the al-Mahdi.

هوئی جس کی خودی پهلے نمودار
وهی مهدی ، وهی آخر زمانی

He whose ego matured first
Is the real *mahdi* (guide), the harbinger of a new epoch.

And such a person alone is the creator and judge of values.

خودی کو جس نے فلک سے بلند تر دیکھا
وهی هے مملکت صبح و شام سے آگاہ
وهی نگاہ کے ناخوب و خوب سے محرم
وهی هے دل کے حلال و حرام سے آگاہ
(ضرب کلیم صحفه ٦٨)

He who looked upon the ego as higher than the skies,
Is alone aware of the kingdom of the world ;
His eye alone can determine the table of values,
His heart alone can decide what is lawful and what is unlawful.

In a poem "Objective" (مقصود) in *Zarb-i-Kalim*, Iqbal presents his point of view inc ontrast to Plato and Spinoza, the two great Western thinkers who are deeply related to the mystic thought. Plato, as we have seen, was the originator of slave morality while Spinoza was a great pantheist and his contemporaries were pleased to call him a "God-intoxicated man."

According to Plato the ideal is :

نگاہ موت پہ رکھتا هے مرد دانشمند
حیات هے شب تاریک میں شرر کی نمود

A wise man looks at death ;
Life is like a spark in the darkness of night.

According to Spinoza, the ideal is :

نظر حیات پہ رکھتا هے مرد دانشمند
حیات کیا هے؟ حضور و سرور و نور و وجود

A wise man looks at life.
What is life ? It is presence, ecstasy, light and being.

But according to Iqbal, the ideal should be :

حیات و موت نہیں التفات کے لائق
فقط خودی هے خودی کی نگاہ کا تصور

Life and death are not worth our attention ;
Ego alone is the object of the ego.

How can man come by this self-realization? This ideal was equally advocated by the mystics of the old. It was a famous maxim of theirs ; he who knows himself knows God. But this knowing of the self, according to them, meant its death and extinction. There is another maxim of theirs which clearly explains it : die before your (natural) death. Iqbal therefore could not accept this interpretation of the realization of Ego. There was the modern interpretation of it given by Darwin and his followers. He had declared that there was no cardinal difference between man and animals. Man to start with can have no supra-animalic characteristics. Accumulation of riches—the ideal of the present decadent culture—honours and even scholarship cannot make any difference. None of these characteristics can raise us above animals with whom we share even intelligence. Mere difference of degree does not give us any significance beyond animals. But the deadliest aspect of Darwinism was that not only is man an animal but also that man *should* be animal. The highest state of manhood should be the perfection of his animality, the ideal state of Rousseau's Return to Nature. 19th century industrial era hailed this modern interpretation of self-realization as the charter of freedom. There was no need of any restraint from the side of religion, morality, reason ; and man, thus shorn of all restraints, became proud to be called a mere animal.

Henceforth his ideal in life became pleasure, the more sensual the better. It was this deadly gospel of Darwin and Rousseau that provoked Iqbal to serious thinking. His interpretation of self-realization was not to pattern individual and social life after the advice of the mystics of the old or according to the suggestions of the modern wise men. His purpose was, in the words of Nietzsche, to transfigure and develop human nature along certain lines, to bring harmony in the choas of impulses. Like Nietzsche he wanted to transform the Darwinian ,ape-man nto a god-man. He had full faith, born of his conviction in God's benevolence, that though animalic, yet deep in man there lies the possibility of a great future. Both Christianity and Islam proclaimed this message of hope. It was this potential dignity of man—to become "god-man"—that is described in the Quran as Vicegerency. "Indeed we made vicegerent on earth." (2 : 30) "We created you and gave you a (human) form and then ordered the angels to prostrate before Adam." (7 : 11) "Indeed we gave honour and dignity to man" (17 : 69).

But this dignity does not belong to man by nature ; it needs to be realized and developed . "Surely We created man of the best stature ; and then We reduced him to the lowest of the low, except those who believe and do good deeds" (95:4—6). Given a proper education every man is capable of uttaining this position of honour and thus give significance to his life. Rationally considered, this world may be the worst possible,

the quantity of pain and evil may far outweigh the quantity of happiness and joy and hope and yet man can justify his existence on this earth. Nietzsche tried to find where this justification may lie. He was sure that it was not morally justified. Good is not always rewarded and evil is not always punished as it should be. In his early works, he came to the conclusion that only as an aesthetic phenomenon could the world be justified. But this was only an academic answer. In the end he came to believe that the man who transforms his original brute nature, who sublimates his dassions, who perfects himself by self-realization, achieves that happiness towards which all men grope, and feels a supreme joy which obviates any concern with the justification of the world : "he affirms it forwards, backward and in all eternity." His joy is the joy of a powerful man and he redeems himself, gives meaning to his life and justifies the world by achieving perfection.[1]

How can a man achieve perfection ? How can man redeem himself as well as humanity out of the present choas ? How can man cross the cleft from the animals to true humanity—or, in the ill-chosen but famous word of Nietzsche, become a Superman ?

Iqbal suggests three stages in the development of the ego following the tripartite division of Nietzsche. The first stage in the latter is represented by the camel, the load-bearing animal. He seeks to take as much burden on himself as

1. *Ecce Home*, p. 54.

possible and thus is pleased to show his strength ; he undergoes all kinds of sufferings in order to gain something. He patiently endures the worst trials and voluntarily submits himself to the strictest discipline so as to be able to accumulate a heavy load of experience. His attitude is that of submission and reverence. He accepts the law and traditional morality without any qualms of conscience. The second stage of soul's development is represented by the lion. Here he seeks freedom—freedom from bondage to law, freedom from tradition, freedom from belief. He is now relieved of the burden. His position is that of a great nay-saying spirit whose doubts and suspicions have now led him to refuse to accept the lordship of the dragon of Law. Instead of accepting blindly the demands of "Thou shalt", he is ready to assert "I will". The dragon has the values of a thousand years glittering on its scales and he hurls the absoluteness of moral standards in the face of the lion : "All values have already been created and all created values do I represent." But the lion is in no mood to accept this challenge. He has left that stage behind. He is now free—totally free. But yet the lion is not able to hurl anything positive in answer to the challenge of the dragon. He represents the middle stage of "nay", he is now on the road from "no" to "yes", or from لا to الا, though there is needed another and last metamorphosis to achieve that goal. This last stage, of complete "yea" saying is represented by the symbol of a

child, who is creative out of his pure and joyous innocence. He has the healthy and strong will to say yes to life and to create incessantly.[1]

In Iqbal the first stage in the development of the ego is obedience and like Nietzsche, he compares man at this stage to a camel whose main characteristic is not only that he bears burdens and obeys but does all these without uttering any complaint and as a part of his duty.

But what is this burden which man should bear patiently ? To Nietzsche it is the traditional code of morality, what he calls mythical religion which is discarded at the next stage. To Iqbal, this burden is the Law of Islam which cannot be thrown away at any stage, though at a later stage it ceases to be a "burden" at all. Unless a man learns to obey the law, his energies cannot be harnessed to better and wider interests. He must unflinchingly obey what has been commanded by God in the general interest of mankind. Out of this obedience grows freedom and constructive activity.

در اطاعت کوش اے غفلت شعار
می شود از جبر پیدا اختیار
هر که تسخیر مه و پروین کند
خویش را زندانئی آئیں کند

Endeavour to obey, O heedless one !
Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.
Whoso would master the sun and stars,
Let him make himself a prisoner of Law.

Nietzsche fully realized the value of dis-

1. *Zarathustra*, p. 27.

cipline for the development of the individual ; only he did not favour any externally imposed law. As we have seen, he repvdiated Rousseau for the simple reason that the state of nature was to him wild, arbitrary , disorderly while he wanted the individual to transform this brute nature by a rigorous discipline. "It is only the weak who have no power over themselves and who hate being bounded by style." The powerful man is a creative man and so he cannot follow the previously established laws. A genuinely creative act contains its own norms and every creation is a creation of new norms. But that does not mean the abrogation of all laws. Without following some universal code of morats, it is not possible to establish social harmony in human relations. The experience of mankind spread over centuries has proved beyond doubt that while in the sphere of mere physical sciences man has been able to evolve principles of universal import, in the domain of moral action he has been usually led astray and hence the dangerous crisis of the present culture, the insuperable gap between power and wisdom.

اپنی حکمت کے خم و پیچ میں الجھا ایسا
آج تک فیصلۂ نفع و ضرر کر نہ سکا

جس نے سورج کی شعاعوں کو گرفتار کیا
زندگی کی شب تاریک سحر کر نہ سکا

(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ٦٧)

He got entangled so much in the hair-splitting of his intellect,

That he could not determine the standard of good and evil.
He who entrapped the rays of the sun,
Could not illumine the night of his life.

Nietzsche, on account of his atheistic outlook, was not able to give spiritual basis to his discipline and therefore his ideal of self-perfection would not be able to impart that unity and harmony to the life of the individual which he so much desired. Iqbal removes this lacuna and gives due place to the obedience of Islamic Law in the development of the individual. A moral system based on naturalistic basis cannot ensure any unanimity in the determination of the ultimate good to be pursued or of the criterion of right and wrong conduct, therefore Iqbal felt the necessity of some code of life based on some fixed basis and that was supplied to him by the Quran. Discussing this problem, he says that this law, though having a revelational basis, has a unique relation with every individual heart. God being the source of our spiritual life, the law amounts in the last resort to be the manifestation of the ideal aspect of man.[1]

آدمی اندر جہان خیر و شر
کم شناسد نفع خود را از شرر
کس نداند زشت و خوب کار چیست ؟
جادۂ ہموار و نا ہموار چیست ؟
شرع بر خیزد ز اعماق حیات
روشن از نورش ظلام کائنات
(جاوید نامہ صفحہ ۳۸-۳۹)

1. *Lectures*, p. 147.

In this world of mixed good and evil,
Man is hardly able to know gain from loss.
Nobody knows what is good and what is bad,
Or what is right conduct or wrong.
*Shari'a* takes its birth from the very bosom of Life,
It illumines the darkness of the universe.[1]

As Iqbal bases his moral system on belief in Tauhid, naturally the attitude which an individual should adopt, according to him, is to do what is liked by God and to avoid what is disliked by Him ; or, in other words, to do what is progressive, what is helpful in the growth and enhancement of life, and to avoid what hinders the development of the individual. In other words, the *summum bonum* for Iqbal is the Will of God as manifested in the Quran and communicated to us by our Holy Prophet.

مصطفی داد از رضائے او خبر
نیست در احکام دیں چیزے دگر

The Holy Prophet informed us about the Will of God,
There is nothing else in the laws of *Shair'a*.

In the second stage of self-control, the camel in man dies a natural death. So long as there is a conflict between the inner and outer aspects of man, between the flesh and the soul, man feels the burden of law oppressive and it often happens that the outer man—the flesh—controls the inner. As Iqbal has put it, love and fear predominate. He is afflicted by fears

1. See also *Javid Nama*, p. 78.

of diverse kinds, fears of this world and of hereafter, of death, of all the pains of earth and heaven. Love of riches and power, love of country, of self and kindred and wife[1] all waylay him in moments of ease and exhaustion. He feels that these impulses of his are evil and ugly but they raise their head again and again. Man is thus divided against himself. There are two selves, as it were, one rational and the other irrational. The one tries to give form to the other : man tries to remake himself and to organize the chaos of his passions. And yet often his impulses are recalcitrant and therefore man suffers. The remedy for all these afflictions, according to Iqbal, is boldly to negate them. The discipline of self-control helps man in saying "nay" to everything that hinders self-development. In order to give style to his character, he must, as it were, burn a No into his soul and look upon the recalcitrant impulsas evil.

هر که در اقلیم لا آباد شد
فارغ از بند زن و اولاد شد

Whoso dwells in the world of Negation
Is free from the bonds of wife and child.[2]

This nay-saying is a necessary stage towards perfection.[3] The first part of Islamic *Kalima* brings home the necessity of denying whatever

1. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 44.
2. *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 44.
3. Cf. the following verse :

در جهان آغاز کار از حرف لاست
این نخستین منزل مرد خداست

is false. All halos of sanctity must be removed from all false gods—from the sun, moon and stars and nature must be divested of all animistic beliefs. The Quran declares that these things were created for the service of man and not he for them. It was out of this negation, the bold assertion of لا, that Muslims were able to demolish all the false loyalties from the hearts of the people and build a culture that was founded only on the conception of human brotherhood and equality. It was through this assertion of لا that they were able to trample under their feet the mighty empires of those days and out of their ashes brought forth a republic of God-fearing geniuses who were able to influence the course of history for centuries. When this sword of لا was raised, the material universe came to acquire a new significance. It was not the duty of a Muslim to bow his head before it but to control and master it. And it was out of this attempt at mastery of the human environment that the Arabs were able to lay the foundation of modern science and industry. It was all the fruit of nay-saying, of denying everything false, of boldly declaring "there are no gods ! "

با تو می گویم ز ایام عرب
تا بدانی پخته و خام عرب
ریز ریز از ضرب او لات و منات
در جهات آزاد از بند جهات
هر قبائے کهنه چاک از دست او
قیصر و کسریٰ هلاک از دست او

گاه دشت از برق و بارانش بدرد
گاه بحر از زور طوفانش بدرد
عالمے در آتش او مثل خس
ایں همه هنگامهٔ لا بود و بس
(پس چه باید کرد صفحه ۲۰-۲۱)

I relate to you the history of the Arabs,
So that you may sift the truth from falsehood.
All false idols were broken by their one stroke,
Man became free of all limitations.
Every old loyalty was torn to shreds,
Caesars and Khusroes were dethroned.
At one time they traversed the sandy deserts,
At others they sailed over tumultuous seas.
A world was on fire as if it were a straw ;
It was all the manifestation of the force of "nay".

Similarly in the modern period, Iqbal refers to Communist Russia as a society that is exclusively based on the doctrine of nay-saying and as such it has been able to demolish most of the false gods from their thrones and is trying to build a culture on a new foundation.

روس را قلب و جگر گردیده خوں
از ضمیرش حرف لا آمد بروں
آں نظام کهنه را برهم زد است
تیز نیشے بر رگ عالم زد است
(پس چه باید کرد صفحه ۲۱)

Heart of Russia bled at this sight,
The cry of "no" rose from its bosom.
It has destroyed the old order,
Applied to the body of the world the knife of a surgeon.

Iqbal would go further. He would like to demolish not only the false idols of race, colour

and nationalism, capitalism, communism and imperialism but also the root cause of every other false god, *viz.*, belief in secularism and materialistic interpretation of life.

صنم کدہ ہے جہاں اور مرد حق ہے خلیل
یہ نکتہ وہ ہے جو پوشیدہ لا الہ میں ہے

This world is an idol-temple and the true man is like Abraham ;
This is the point implicit in "there is no god but "God."

But, according to Iqbal, this nay-saying is only a stage in the life of individuals and societies. At this stage man may destroy all false gods false loyalties, false traditions and clear the way for healthy constuctive work but unless this "nay" is conjoined with some "aye" there can be no hope of a sound and permanent culture. Mere denial is not productive of any creative work and so life demands affirmation of some concrete ideology. It needs both no and yes, denial of everything that is false and affirmation of that which is true. Where "no" is separated from "yes" we get a false perspective of life and the result is a culture that nurtures in itself the seeds of its destruction. Negation to be effective takes rise only in the light of the affirmation. A man negates what is not conducive to the realization of his ideal. Iqbal epitomises this important point by referring to the Islamic doctrine of Tauhid which negates and affirms in the same breath. It negates what is incompatible with the principle of affirmation.

Iqbal's criticism of modern culture rests on the point that it has accomplished the negative without at the same time affirming the ideal Reality.

لبا لب شیشۂ تہذیب حاضر ہے مئے لا سے
مگر ساقی ہے ھاتھوں میں نہیں پیمانۂ الا
(بال جبریل صفحہ ۳۹)

The cup of the modern culture is full to brim with "nay",
But the cup-bearer has no cup of "aye",

And he boldly declares that this culture based only on" no" is bound to go down as others before it have gone.

نہاد زندگی میں ابتدا لا انتہا الا
پیام موت ہے جب لا ھؤا الا سے بیگانہ
وہ ملت روح جسکی لا سے آگے بڑھ نہیں سکتی
یقیں جانو ھؤا لب ریز اس ملت کا پیمانہ

In life, we begin with "no" and end with "yes",
When "no" is divorced from "yes" it becomes destructive.
A nation whose spirit does not advance from "no" to "yes",
Be sure, that nation is on the brink of death.

It is here that Nietzsche's main contribution lies. He tried hard to save himself from many false gods which his contemporaries were ardently worshipping. He rose far above what he contemptuously called "mendacious race-swindle"; he derided patriotism and nationalism as sickness and unreason; he laughed at Luther who inadvertently helped in establishing the reign of secularism which, in its turn, enabled man to kill God Himself. He alone among

his contemporaries was bold and far-sighted enough to discern the dangerous implications of Darwinian "truth". He fearlessly said "no" to Socrates, Plato, Wagner, Schopenhaur, Christ, Kant, Hegel, in short the whole Western tradition of philosophy in order to realize his cherished ideal of the Perfect Man. But, unfortunately, this ideal of his remained more of a negation than an affirmation. He could not truly comprehend and represent the ideal of his vision. He failed to make the requisite "leap" which Kierkegaard, for instance, after him took—transition from reason to faith, لا to الا. Speaking about him, Iqbal says :

زندگی شرح اشارات خودی است
لا و الا از مقامات خودی است
او به لا در ماند و تا الا نرفت
از مقام عبده ، بیگانه رفت
(جاوید نامه صفحه ۲۲۱-۸)

Life is the explication of the mysteries of the ego,
"No" and "yes" are the different stages of the ego.
He remained confined to "no" and did not pass to "yes",
He remained ignorant of the rank of "His servant."

What is الا, the principle of affirmation? It is the recognition of the fact that the ultimate basis of life and universe is spiritual and there is nothing which can be called pure materiality. Matter, as Iqbal puts it, is only spirit in space-time context and therefore it is wrong to draw any line of demarcation between the two. The spiritual can be realized only

through its manifestation in the material. Mysticism tries to seek the Real by neglecting its expression in the material and therefore spurns the opportunity of remoulding the human environment for the better. The modern scientist studies the world of matter without any reference to its spiritual basis and the result is, as Nietzsche foretold, that a time will come when "brotherhoods with the aim of robbery and exploitation of non-brothers ...will appear on the arena of the future."[1] In order to avoid this fatal mistake made both by mysticism and materialism, both لا and الا should be asserted simultaneously. Unless both negation and affirmation are combined, there can be no hope of a stable culture that will usher in the era of peace and freedom. In the following verses Iqbal has given a graphic picture of how this universe and man are related to God, the ultimate spiritual basis of both :

آدمی شمشیر و حق شمشیر زن
عالم این شمشیر را سنگ فسن
مشرق حق را دید و عالم را ندید
مغرب در عالم خزید و ز حق رمید

(جاوید نامه صفحه ۳۵)

Man is a sword and God is the striker of this sword,
World is the whetstone for this sword.
The East saw God but did not see the world,
The West busied itself with the world and forgot God.

1. *Thoughts Out of Season*, II, 9.

If this basis is corrected and life is viewed in its true perspective, the scientific observer of nature becomes a truly religious man. It has been very beautifully put by Prof. C. A. Coulson of Oxford in his address to British Association (September 1954). He said, addressing the scientists, "If you see Reality as most closely bound up with people, then science becomes one of the languages in which God is described and the scientists are among the people of His heralds."[1]

This transformation of negative into affirmative attitude, or the supplementing of negative with affirmative can be achieved, according to Iqbal, only through Islam. There is no doubt that Christianity taught that the ultimate basis of life is spiritual but it sought it only in the heart of man. It could not go beyond it. For it the world of matter was alien and not prone to spiritual interpretation and handling. It was Islam alone which taught that the kingdom of God can be had not only in the heart but also in this world of matter and it is this affirmation of spirit in matter that is most needed today. As Iqbal has put it, "Humanity needs three things today—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis."[2] No doubt, Nietzsche

---

1. Daily *Dawn*, Sept. 7, p. 3. Cf. Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. 90-1.
2. *Lectures*, p. 179.

realized the wrong step Christianity took in confining this Kingdom of God to the individual's heart yet he could not go beyond his materialistic background and comprehend that only by affirming the spiritual basis of life can man realize the highest ideal of perfection.

To cultivate the spirit of no and yea saying, Iqbal prescribes for the individual the five-fold discipline of Islam without which, he claims, it is not possible for any one to attain the proper type of self-control. Prayer and fasting help a man in controlling his instinctive appetites, in sublimating his primary inclinations, steeling his heart against lust ; motives of love and fear give place to resignation to God's will. Charity gives a sense of kinship with poorer members of humanity and develops a sense of real values by divesting our minds of excessive importance that modern acquisitive culture has assigned to the hoarding of wealth. Pilgrimage broadens the sympathies of the individual beyond the limits of race, geography, colour and language and lays the foundation of a universal human outlook. It is only thus that man can give significance to his life and cross the abyss from animality to perfect manhood, the last stage in the development of the Ego.

Unlike Nietzsche's Superman, Iqbal's Perfect Man does not live beyond the sphere of good and evil. No doubt Nietzsche's polemic against morality was justified because he could not accept the moral values advocated by

Christianity. But the moral code of Islam is thoroughly natural and does not suffer from any extremism ; it is particularly free from all the criticism which Nietzsche levelled against Christianity. It provides full scope for developing those very characteristics in the individual which Nietzsche would like his Superman to possess in abundance. Therefore the Perfect Man of Iqbal would follow the law of God as revealed in the Quran and expounded by the holy Prophet. But his knowledge of law is not derivative ; it is almost direct and revelational. He follows the law as if it has grown out of the depth of his richer personality.

پس طریقت چیست اے والا صفات
شرع را دیدن به اعماق حیات
فاش می خواهی اگر اسرار دیں
جز به اعماق ضمیر خود مبیں
بنده تا حق را نه بیند آشکار
بر نمی آید ز جبر و اختیار

(پس چه باید کرد صفحه ۴۰)

O man of dignity, what is *tariqat* ?
To look at *Shari'at* from the depth of life.
If you wish to know the secrets of religion openly,
Do but look within the depth of your heart.
Unless man sees God clearly,
He cannot be rid of determinism and indeterminism.

The last line clearly brings out the character of the Perfect Man. Religious law becomes a matter of personal experience. It ceases to be a mere dogma or ritual but a matter of personal assimilation of life and power. He has left

behind him the stages of blind faith and rational justification. He has gone beyond the superficialities and is in direct contact with the spiritual source of life itself. He does not need any reasoned arguments to prove or realize that this world has full justification ; his creative actiorty is the very proof of it. He jumps, as if, beyond the restraints of determinism and indeterminism and acquires a really free personality—free not in the sense of discarding the fetters of law but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness.

ترے ضمیر پہ جب تک نہ ہو نزول کتاب
گرہ کشا ہے نہ رازی نہ صاحب کشاف
(بال جبریل صفحہ ۱۱۲)

So long as the Book is not revealed on your heart,
Neither Razi nor Kashshaf can solve the mysteries.[1]

It was this fact which a sufi expressed in the following words: "No understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the prophet." And it is the chief characteristic of the Perfect Man that by following the strict moral discipline of Islam, he succeeds in freeing his true self from the innervating influence of day-to-day life. He rises higher than the mere intellectual point of view and reaches out to

1. Razi, the famous commentator of the Quran. Kashshaf, the famous commentary of Zamakhshari, the Mu'tazilite.

what Iqbal calls, after Spengler, the vital way of dealing with the universe. After contact with the Most Real, he is able to insert himself in the current of the world and changes it for the better. After an inner biological transformation, his self bursts forth in world-making or world-shaking acts. It is only in this sense that Iqbal calls the perfect man the creator of new values and the destroyer of the old.

خیمه چوں در وسعت عالم زند
این بساط کهنه را برهم زند
فطرتش معمور و می خواهد نمود
عالمے دیگر بیارد در وجود
زندگی بخشد ز اعجاز عمل
می کند تجدید انداز عمل
زندگی را می کند تفسیر نو
می دهد این خواب را تعمیر نو

(اسرار صفحه ۴۲-۵)

When he pitches his tent in the wide world,
He rolls up this ancient carpet.
His genius abounds with life and desires to manifest itself:
He will bring another world into existence.
He bestows life by his miraculous action,
He renovates old ways of life.
He gives a new explanation of Life,
A new interpretation of this dream.

Iqbal explains the direct contact which the perfect man attains with the Real by a reference to the experience of our holy prophet during Ascension. It is related in the Quran that when he was in the presence of God, "his eyes turned not aside nor did they wander." (53 : 17).

Commenting on this verse, Iqbal remarks: "This is the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam." And then quotes this verse.

موسیٰ ز هوش رفت به یک جلوهٔ صفات
تو عین ذات می نگری و در تبسمی

Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality,
You see the very substance of Reality with a smile.

In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he poses the question:

کرا گویم که او مرد تمام است؟

Of whom I shall say that he is the Perfect Man?

His answer is:

کمال زندگی دیدار ذات است
طریقش رستن از بند جهات است
چنان با ذات حق خلوت گزینی
ترا او بیند و او را تو بینی
کسے کو "دید" عالم را امام است
من و تو نا تمامیم او تمام است

(صفحه ۲۳۲)

The perfection of life consists in seeing the Essence,
The way of achieving it is to free ourselves from the limits of time and space.
You should enjoy privacy with the Divine Person in such a way,
That he sees you and you see Him.
He who "saw" is the leader of the world,
We and you are imperfect, he alone is perfect.

What is this دید, vision? It is the experience within the soul of the individual, of a vision of his intimate and direct contact with Reality. In mystic literature this experience has been very common and yet Iqbal would hesitate very much to include most of these mystics in this

category. It is only when this vision results in some creative act that its recipient can properly be called perfect. Iqbal has quoted a saying of a sufi saint, "Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest heaven and returned. I swear by God that if I had reached that point, I should never have returned." The mystic attains the vision but is lost in it while the perfect. Man returns "to insert into the sweep of time with a view to control the forces of history snd thereby to create the fresh world of ideals."

چناں باز آمدن از لا مکانش
درون سینه او ، در کف جهانش
(گلشن راز جدید صفحه ۲۲۵)

So to return from this experience of the Invisible world,
That it is within the heart, and the world in his hand.

In *Javid nama*, he explains this point more fully. The question is : What is meant by دید or vision?

چیست دیدار خدائے نہ سپہر
آں که بے حکمش نگردد ماه و مهر؟

What is the meaning of "seeing" the Lord— —
Without whose order sun and moon do not move ?

The answer is:

نقش حق اول بجاں انداختن
باز او را در جهاں انداختن
نقش جاں تا در جهاں گردد تمام
می شود دیدار حق دیدار عام

To cast the print of God first in one's soul,
Then in the world.
when this print of God spreads everywhere,
God's vision becomes the property of all.

In other words, when the whole social order is re-organized and established on a sound basis, the goal of the perfect man is achieved. Then he distinguishes him from a mystic :

وائے درویشے که هوئے آفرید
باز لب بر بست و دم در خود کشید
حکم حق را در جہان جاری نکرد
نانے از جو خورد و کراری نه کرد
خانقاهے جست و از خیبر رمید
راهبی ورزید و سلطانی ندید
(جاوید نامه صفحه ۱۵۲)

Sorry for that dervish who raised a cry,
Then closed his mouth and withdrew his breath.
He did not extend the "order of God" to the world,
Ate barley but did not attain impetuosity.
Sought a monastery and forsook Khaibar,
Adopted the life of a hermit and did not reach kingship.

The Perfect Man of Iqbal's conception is thus a *mujahid* and not a sufi ; he is as much concerued with the problems of life, culture, society as with the problems of after-life, spiritual welfare and death. Unlike a sufi, he will be actively intolerant towards all wrong-doing, mischief and chaos around him. He will try to mould everything according to his ideal. Like Nietzsche's Superman, the greatest mark of the Perfect Man will be non-conformity to the existing order which, however, does not spring out of resentment or hatred. His strength of character and indifference to the material welfare and his unshakable belief in

the righteousness of his cause all support him in his crusade against all kinds of evil. He will be the embodiment of power and ruthless in the use of it to exterminate all those who stand in the way of righteousness, but, unlike Nietzsche's Superman, he will be at the same time sympathetic, kind and beneficent to those who deserve it. Power without the complementary quality of compassion will be pure evil and Satan personifies it. Iqbal found a great charm in powerful personalities and therefore we find in his works commendatory appreciation not only of Satan but also of some of his representatives like Mussolini, Alexander and Chengiz. This reminds us of Nietzsche's admiration for blonde beast or Caesar Borgia not because he upheld them as specimens of highest humanity but because, to him, a man of strong passion and fiery temper was far better than a castrated man, a recluse, a sufi, who had mortified his soul along with his flesh and thus rendered himself unfit for the arduous task of free creative activity. A man of passion and power is decidedly better as he has the chance of sublimating it and using it in better causes. Speaking of power, therefore, Iqbal says :

لا دیں ہو تو ہے زہر ہلاہل سے بھی بڑھ کر
ہو دیں کی حفاظت میں تو ہر زہر کا تریاک

(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۲۳)

If it is not subject to religion, it is more dangerous than poison,
If it is subject to religious ideology, it becomes panacea for all ills.

The Perfect Man, therefore, will have power as well as compassion, use force as well as persuasion to achieve his holy mission in life. To emphasize power without compassion would be to transform Adam into Satan and so Iqbal made the Perfect Man the embodiment of contradictory attributes. He is as strong and powerful as Satan, as compassionate and kind as angels, as fiery and passionate as Iblis but submissive and lowly as Adam.

قہاری و غفاری و قدوسی و جبروت
یہ چار عناصر ہوں تو بنتا ہے مسلماں

(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۵۷)

Vengeance and forgiveness, piety and power—
These are four things which make up a Muslim.

Such a person alone can establish peace, brotherhood and concord. He is a happy combination of a sufi and a king, a dervish and a ruler, Bayazid (a sufi saint) and Salahuddin Ayyubi (the hero of the Crusades), fused in one.

تیغ ایوبی نگاہ با یزید
گنجہائے ہر دو عالم را کلید

Sword of Ayyub and the insight of Bayazid—
This is the key to open the treasures of the two worlds.

Thus in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he explains this combination as follows :

دریں دیر کہن آزاد باشی
بتاں را بر مراد خود تراشی
بہ کف بردن جہان چار سو را
مقام نور و صوت و رنگ و بو را

فزونش کم ، کم او بیش کردن
دگرگون بر مراد خویش کردن
به رنج و راحت او دل نه بستن
طلسم نه سپهر او شکستن
شکوه خسروی این ست این ست
همین ملک است کو توام به دین است

(صفحه ۲۱۰)

To hold in the grasp of your hand all the world
Of light and sound, of colour and smell ;
To change its quantitative aspect,
To mould it according to your heart's purpose ;
Not to be captivated by its sorrows and delights,
To break the spell of its nine skies ;
This is indeed the true kingly glory,
This is the State that is linked to Religion.

In the Perfect Man we see a ruler who will embody also the fundamental spiritual principles of life. In spite of all power, he will not act irresponsibly like Nietzsche's Superman but will hold himself responsible before God for all he does. He will not be an autocrat but subject to the will of his Creator. He will be the true Vicegerent of God on this earth. His kingdom will be a true spiritual democracy in which every individual will enjoy real freedom born of his obligation to his Creator and his fellow-human beings. Through him power and wisdom, material well-being and spiritual excellence will be realized. In the words of the Prophetic tradition, his appearance on this earth will be acclaimed by the inhabitants of the earth as well as heaven ; and the earth shall

yield all its treasures at his command and the sky shall rain all its blessings on the earth.

Is there any hope of such a man appearing now or in future ? Nietzsche thinks that highest specimen of humanity had been in existence in the past. He often mentions Julius Cesaar, Napoleon, Plato and Goethe among this list but he holds that they appeared only by accident and yet on his principle there is nothing which may hinder the appearance of such men in future. According to Iqbal the highest type of perfection was embodied in the person of our holy Prophet.[1] After him, he looks upon 'Umar and 'Ali as personifications of this ideal. But following the famous mystic writers like Hallaj and Ibn-i-'Arabi, Iqbal looks upon Muhammad not only as a perfect *man* but also as a cosmic principle which operates in the universe and which manifests itself in different periods of history to guide the destinies of nations. In *Javid Nama* he asks the poet Ghalib to explain his famous verse which implied the repeated manifestation of this principle at different times.

هر کجا هنگامۂ عالم بود
رحمتہ للعالمینے هم بود

Wherever there is the world,
There shall be the "Mercy of the Worlds."

Referring to the Quranic verse : "We (God) created him (Man), then apportioned him his destiny and then guided him" which describes

1. *Lectures,* p. 118.

the initial stages of the creation of man on this earth, Ghalib asserts that relative to this beginning of the career of man, the Perfect Man is to be reckoned as its (logical) end.

خلق و تقدیر و ہدایت ابتدا ست
رحمتہ للعالمینی انتہا ست

Creation, fashioning and guidance is the beginning,
"Mercy of the Worlds" is the (logical) end.

Muhammad is here viewed as a sort of logical principle which directs the course of evolution towards a fixed end. Like a seed it was there in its potential form in the creation of Adam but in the course of time it became actual and assumed different forms. To clarify it Iqbal introduces Hallaj who was the first Muslim mystic to expound this doctrine of Logos and gave it an Islamic terminology.[1] Hallaj asserts :

---

1. "God looked into Eternity," says Hallaj, "prior to everything, contemplated the essence of His splendour, and then desired to project outside Himself His supreme Joy and Love with the object of speaking to them. He also created an image of Himself with all His Attributes and Names. This image was Adam the *Huwa Huwa*, whom God glorified and exalted. Glory to God who manifests His *Nasut* wherein lay the brilliant light of His *Lahut* : then appeared to His creatures in the form of him that eats and drinks." *Tawasin*, p. 130 as quoted in 'Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi*, p. 70. Affifi adds "Hallaj's *Huwa Huwa* is the prototypal idea of Ibn "Arabi's *al Insanul Kamil* . . ." Iqbal's exposition of this doctrine is influenced by both and thus Hallaj's *Huwa Huwa* reappears in '*abduhu* of Iqbal in *Javid Nama*.

هر کجا بینی جهان رنگ و بو
آنکه از خاکش بروید آرزو
یا ز نور مصطفیٰ او را بہا ست
یا هنوز اندر تلاش مصطفیٰ ست

Wherever you see the world of colour and smell,
Where there is the expression of a desire;
Either it has value through the light of Muhammad,
Or is in search of it.

This universe of ours gains significance only through the manifestation of Muhammad (understood as a cosmic principle) or is in search of it. This answer naturally raises the question whether this recurrent phenomenon of life is in the form of a person or principle:

آدمے یا جوهرے اندر وجود
آنکه آید گاهے گاہے در وجود ؟

Is it a man or a principle in being
That comes into existence now and then ?

Hallaj replies that it is both; it is this which moves the spheres of the heaven,[1] is identical with Time itself; though created in time yet will be eternal; it holds within itself the whole secret of the universe; in short, it is identical with God Himself, *Huwa'l Ḥq, Hau 'Abdahu.*

عبده، صورت گر تقدیر ها
اندرو ویرانه ها تعمیر ها
عبده، با ابتدا بے انتها ست
عبده، را صبح و شام ما کجا ست
عبده، چند و چگون کائنات
عبده، راز درون کائنات

1. Cf. the function assigned to *al-Muta'* by Ghazali in *Mishkat-al-Anwar.*

جوهر او نے عرب نے اعجم است
آدم ست و هم ز آدم اقدم است

لا اله تیغ و دم او عبده،
فاش تر خواهی، بگو هو عبده،

(جاوید نامه صفحه ۱۴۶—۱۵۰)

'Abdahu is the fashioner of destiny,
Who constructs buildings out of ruins ;
'Abdahu has beginning, but no end,
His morning and evening are not like ours.
He is why and wherefore of the universe,
He is its inner mystery.
He belongs neither to Arabia nor to Persia,
He is Adam, and is also prior to Adam.
*La ilah* is a sword and 'Abdahu is its edge,
If you wish to know it plainly, Hu 'Abdahu, 'Abdahu
is Divine.

This principle will operate in the future as it operated in the past and manifested itself in the form of perfect men in different periods of history. Whenever there are conditions of confusion and disorder, whenever there is supremacy of *Jahliyyat* over Islam, the universe will by a natural necessity give birth to men of unbroken desires and will, who combine superior minds with exuberant vitality. Such enigmatic men, sovereign individuals, of a yet unknown power and breadth of soul, will lead humanity once again to the true path of peace and concord. And there is nothing unnatural or abnormal about it. Thus in *Asrar-i-Khudî*, he hails the advent of such individuals.

اے سوار اشهب دوران بیا
اے فروغ دیدۂ امکان بیا

Appear, O rider of Destiny !
Appear, O light of the dark realm of change !

He will be able to illumine the scene of existence, bring to end the suidical wars of nations, and establish the rule of brotherhood of man, in short, the rule of Islam in place of *Jahliyyat*, ignorance.

Some critics have accused Iqbal of inconsistency in this respect. Here he hails the apperance of the perfect man as an event of great significance and prays for his early arrival. But in *Lectures*, while criticising Spengler's view of Islamic culture, he asserted that the attitude of constant expectation of some future reformer was against the spirit of Islam and a remnant of magian culture. He even argued in another place that the traditions which predict the appearance of a Mahdi or Mujaddid in the beginning of each century, were all false. He quoted the excellent work done by Ibn-i-Khaldun in critically examining all these traditions and rejecting them all.[1] The points that Iqbal accepts in this criticism as valid are these two. First, there cannot be any rigidity in the calculations in the appearance of such men. To say that such men must appear at such a time or after a fixed lapse of time is to falsify the whole creative role of the historical process. It is utterly absurd to say that the appearance of some events or individuals can be predicted to the very, if not moment or day or month, at least, year.

1. Iqbal, *Speeches* and *Statements*, pp. 102-3.

Secondly, most of these traditions predict along with the appearance of a Mahdi certain fixed and unchangeable bodily or mental signs by which he could be recognized. Iqbal, following Ibn-i- Khaldun, rejects it as well. This criti cism of Iqbal does not at all imply any denial of the appearance of individuals at different periods of history in the past or in futurer. Nature intuitively finds its own needs and the direction of its expression and so wherever there is any vacuum, individuals after the pattern of perfect men shall appear to guide mankind. Iqbal praises Nietzsche for once again reviving the idea of the appearance of such enigmatic men (Mahdi) in the modern world and criticises those who fight shy of it.

مجذوب فرنگی نے بہ انداز فرنگی
مہدی کے تخیل سے کیا زندہ وطن کو
اے وہ کہ تو مہدی کے تخیل سے ہے بیزار
نومید نہ کر آھوئے مشکیں کو ختن سے
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ٥٦)

The Western mystic in Western style
Revived his country by the conception of a Mahdi.
O you who hate this conception,
Don't make the deer despair of its Tartarish home.

This Mahdi will be a man among men, not a mulla or a sufi ;[1] only he will be the

---

1. Iqbal describes his *Mahdi* as follows :

صوفی کی طریقت میں فقط مستئی احوال
ملا کی شریعت میں فقط مستئی گفتار
وہ مرد مجاھد نظر آتا نہیں مجھ کو
ھو جس کے رگ و پے میں فقط مستئی کردار

highest specimen of humanity, representing the consummation of both head and heart, a true *mujahid* whose sole life mission would be to combat the forces of Darkness and help in establishing the kingdom of God on earth. He will create new values and give new interpretations ; he will bring about a radical change in the attitude and outlook of the people, prepare them for a new social revolution, and impart to each and every one the fire and passion of his personality. The present world undoubtedly needs such a peaceful revolutionary.

دنیا کو ہے اس مہدئی برحق کی ضرورت
ہو جس کی نگہ زلزلہ عالم افکار

(ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۴۰)

The world needs today that true Mahdi
Who produces a commotion in the world of thought.

What is the relation of this Perfect Man with the rest of mankind and how is he related to God, the Supreme Ego ? Unfortunately Nietzsche was an atheist and could not visualise this relation in a true perspective. To him the Superman was the lord and the rest were merely his slaves who must do his bidding without asking the reason for it. His aristocratic bent of mind could not countenance the democratic view of a progressive society of individuals on a basis of equality and common brotherhood and in which each person pursues his own ends for the commonwealth. James Ward, an English thinker of great eminence, viewed this universe as a great commonwealth of Many in which everybody including God co-operates

in the common task of evolving into a unique Realm of Ends, in which each and every member out of his free choice contributes whatever he can. We shall see in the next chapter how Ward views this problem of the mutual relation of God and the Man and how far Iqbal agrees with him in this respect.

## IQBAL AND JAMES WARD

### THEISTIC PLURALISM

James Ward was a scientist and philosophy was his later choice. Thus he brought to philosophy not only a scientific outlook but also rich experience of scientific research. This background of Ward suggested to him the new problems which he was called upon to defend in his philosophy.

On the basis of experience, Ward's standard of truth, he was led to a sort of philosophy which was first spiritualistic, which, as he defines himself, holds that only conscious, *i.e.*, thinking, feeling and willing beings, are real, or to be more precise, matter (or more generally, nature) is to be regarded as dependent on, or as the manifestation of, Spirit. Secondly, it was voluntaristic. Psychologically, he held that the sole function of perception and intellection is to guide action and to subserve volition. Thirdly, he emphasized pluralism in opposition to the monistic trend of British thought as represent by Neo-Hegelians. It was Ward's pluralism as well as theism, spiritualsm as well as voluntarism that appealed to Iqbal most. It was a system of thought which was in keeping with the spirit of the Quran and the best tradition of Muslim speculation.

The first representative of this system in the

West was Leibniz (1646—1716), a true prototype of a thinker in whom we find the new outlook of science which was making great strides after a long period of neglect in the Middle Ages. The researches of Galileo (1564—1641), Copernicus (1473—1543) and Kepler (1571—1630) in the field of natural science had revealed a new world before the eye of man. Along with this, the new horizon brought with it new problems for philosophy. In the Middle Ages, the problem had been mainly to reconcile religion and philosophy, faith and reason. It was commonly held that truth is one and indivisible. What was revealed by God was accepted to be beyond doubt. But then, unfortunately, the bulk of the dogmatic creed of Christianity seemed to be incompatible with reason. Though no part of revelation, the Church insisted on accepting this as such and thus the acute problem of reconciliation arose. It was amidst this unhealthy controversy that a group of daring thinkers advocated the dangerous doctrine of two truths—independent and exclusive which, by some mischance, came to be attributed to the illustrious name of Ibn-i-Rushd and in the history of medieval scholastic thought came to be styled as Latin Averroism. It was in reality a way of escape. When the dogmatic tenets of Christianity fail to comply with the basic demands of human reason and the Church insisted upon its total acceptance in spite of that, one of the logical alternatives is to accept that truths of revelation stand apart by them-

selves without being compatible with the truths of reason. But it was, in reality, to accept that the so-called truths of faith are not truths of reason and so St. Thomas of Acquinas (1226—76) fought this tendency and succeeded by the help of Arabian philosophers,[1] with whom he was thoroughly familiar, in founding a system of thought which tried to reconcile the two, faith and reason.

But with the birth of Renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian era, men began to look around. They found themselves in a totally new universe. The researches of the men of science changed their outlook and, of necessity, the problem of thought shifted its ground, There was no question of reconciling faith and reason but the greater and deeper problem of incorporating the new conception of nature in the old accepted view of the universe and man. So far, man and the earth where he lived his life were the centres of the universe. But first Copernicus and then Kepler proved by experiments that this was not so ; man no longer seemed to be the epitome of creation and the earth was no longer the idol to which the whole universe paid its homage. It was a common belief that life of man and the rest of the universe served a higher end which God in His inscrutable will has set before them all. All things were

1. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western* (Ist. ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 153—7.

doing a duty which was set for them by the Almighty. But Galileo had dangerously proved that the universe moved according to certain laws in which there was no manifestation of will or choice or chance. It obeyed these laws in a most efficient way. Thus the modern period of new science shook the very foundations of man's belief in God, in freedom of will, in the rationality of faith.

It was with this background that Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz started their speculations. Fortunately, Descartes and Leibniz were themselves pioneers in the field of scientific research and occupied no mean position in this respect. As such they were fully qualified to deal with the new problem. If the man of science was on the right path—*i.e.*, if the physical world followed the law of mechanical causation and every event from the revolution of the planets to the circulation of blood in veins, can be quantitatively measured and predicted, how was it to be reconciled with the "world of grace," *viz.*, the qualitative world where God reigns supreme, where moral values and belief in personal immortality are held sacred and inviolable ?

Descartes' attempt could not achieve the desired result. In his system, the two worlds remain apart. The world of extension obeys the law of mechanism pure and simple while the world of thought enjoys freedom and at no point is there any scope for interaction. It is the will of God which manages to keep the

worlds in constant harmony. In the hands of Spinoza, the world of nature, man and God all are brought under the law of strict determinism and no scope is left for the exercise of free-will anywhere, neither in man nor in God. Some of his critics have rightly emphasised the materialistic trend of his pantheistic love for the Supreme Being whom Spinoza had no right to call God. In the hands of Leibniz, however, we find a sincere attempt to reconcile the two apparently opposed tendencies of thought. In his works, we find, for the first time, the concept of new science interpreted in a philosophical way. In Spinoza we meet with universals and particulars, substances and forms, the relics of the Middle Ages while in Leibniz we come across with force, energy, dynamism and individualism.

To Leibniz, Descartes' separation of things into two heterogenous substances only connected by the omnipotence of God, and the absorption of both by Spinoza into one divine substance, was the result of an erroneous conception of substance. The Cartesian characterisation of substance as extension was unacceptable, for it could not explain motion. Leibniz finds the principle of explanation in force. It is not motion that is constant as Descartes held but force. It is super-spatial and immaterial and therefore the basis of the new physics ought to be dynamic metaphysical substance. He called it monad to distinguish it from the atom of the physicists. Thus Leibniz

was able to bridge the gulf between extended matter and thought. The monad is, so to say, a soul-atom, alive, resistant and reproductive. If there were only one substance as Spinoza held, then nature would be passive and non-resistant. Leibniz, therefore, advocated that there are innumerable monads which constitute the universe. Each is unique in itself, self-determining and the centre of activity.

As centres of force, monads are simple, without parts, without extension, form or divisibility. It is the aggregation or arrangement of the monads that gives the appearance of space. There is no possibility of their extinction or dissolution by natural means. As such they would be distinguished from atoms of Democritus and the physicists because the latter possess magnitude and form which have position. Their inherent power of action marks them off from everything material. As the bent bow springs back of itself, so the monads naturally pass into action.

Nor do the monads act upon one another. Their activity is rather self-centred. Action of the one excludes that of every other. Activity of each is the result of internal development. All its attributes are contained within itself and it is, therefore, by nature, sufficient unto itself. The activity of each is the result of its own past state, the determinator of its own future. In Leibniz's phrase monads are windowless. Whatever may happen to any individual thing or substance, whatever course its inner life may

take is a necessary outcome of its original nature, which merely manifests itself through lapse of time. Therefore a monad possesses spontaneity and is capable of evolving its nature and experience from within itself. It is not inert and passive but reflects the whole universe as if in a mirror. It is a microcosm—"the universe in little"—each reflecting the universe from a particular point of view. Though physically separated psychologically and ideally they are united. But this aspect of monads—their inherent power of mirroring the universe—is also the principle of distinction among them. There is no difference of kind among them. Qualitatively all are alike ; it is the degree of their "mirroring" which distinguishes one from the other. There is a continual chain of monads starting with the lowest to the highest : the lowest, *i.e.*, matter, are characterised by the undeveloped or confused perception. Minds are superior to other monads due to distinctness with which they mirror the universe and are endowed with self-consciousness. And in this continuous chain, no one monad is like the other. In the overall harmony of the universe, no monad loses its unity and individuality. All co-operate in the interest of higher purposes, from the lowest to the highest, and God, the Highest Monad, has in His infinite wisdom, established this harmony from the very beginning,

By endowing monads with spirituality, Leibniz tried to do away with the Cartesian

dualism of mind and body. To him all is mind. But still he could not clearly visualise how different monads act and react towards one another. To explain it he had to bring in the doctrine of pre-established harmony, a doctrine which was introduced merely to prove the utility and work of God in a universe which was otherwise a collection of unrelated monads. In contrast to Spinoza, he succeeded in emphasizing the reality and uniqueness of the individual which was swallowed up in the all-important substance of the former. Both conceive natural phenomena to be under the law of mechanical causation but in the hands of Leibniz this law assumes richer and deeper significance. In Spinoza's hands this causal relation relegates the individual to the position of unreality, a mere illusion, while in the hands of Leibniz the law of causation becomes a law of harmony, a teleological principle in which each individual monad has a unique being—described in a misleading phrase as "windowless"—and a unique function—"mirroring" of the universe from its own individual point of view. It was this emphasis on individuality by Leibniz that led him to view the universe as teleological rather than mechanical.

The individualism of Leibniz has its parallel in the system of St. Thomas (1226—74) in the Middle Ages who had to fight against the pantheistic tendencies of his time. The latter went back to Aristotle for inspiration in opposition to the neo-Platonic mysticism made

popular by Augustine. In this effort he drew upon the huge philosophical literature of the Muslim thinkers which was available then in translation. He was familiar with the philosophies of Ibn-i-Sina and Ghazali. The works of these authors were "in the possession of the Latins in the twelfth century".[1] In respect of atomic theory, Leibniz seems to be indebted to Kalamistic theory of atomism. The atoms, according to Kalamist thinkers, were qualitatively alike. According to Leibniz difference is due to the degree of distinctness with which each mirrors the universe, while, according to the Ash' arites, difference arises due to what they call *hayyaz*, a term which seems to have been wrongly translated as space or position; it must be taken in the sense of natural aptitude. Just as a geometrical figure like cone, cylinder or sphere, possesses an individuality of its own by occupying a distinct position in space—an example on which Leibniz based his argument—so every atom, though qualitatively alike to all others, possesses its unique individuality by having certain characteristics which it derives from its very nature. McDonald holds that "the monads (of Kalamist thought) differ from those of Latin in having no nature in themselves, no possibility of development along certain lines."[2] But he is definitely wrong in

1. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, vol. 2, p. 156.

2. *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, article 'Allah'.

this interpretation. As we have seen, the Muslim thinkers use the word *hayyaz* not in the sense of space (for which they use the word *makan*) but to express the potency of occupying a special position among the totality of monads constituting the universe. Besides, they use the word *Jiha*, which denotes a particular direction of the self-development of the atom. Thus it is clear that the monads as conceived by the Ash'arites and Leibniz are similar. They are mere points having neither magnitude nor extension and are not divisible. The words used in Arabic جزو لا يتجزى refer to its indivisibility. It is only by aggregation that these infinitesimal substances become spatially extended bodies occupying the tri-dimensional *makan*. These monads are not created by God ; He simply brings them into existence. Similarly there is no possibility of their annihilation. Even the word "monad" used by Leibniz came to him from various lines of Renaissance tradition[1] which points out that it must have its origin from a Latin word mistranslating some Arabic philosophical term then current.

As regards the natural action and reaction among the monads, the position of Leibniz is at par with the Kalamist view. Both bring in God to explain the continued existence of the world of nature. Both used the theory of monads to prove the absolute power and infinite wisdom of the Infinite. God's existence is one

---

1. Windleband, *History of Philosophy* (1950), p. 423,

with His essence and He exists without absolute necessity while the existence of finite things is contingent. The world and all that belong to it has only conditional or hypothetical necessity. This contingency of the world, Leibniz, following Kalamist thinkers and Dun Scotus, traces back to the will of God. The world might have been otherwise but He created this world out of many possible ones because it wasthe best.

Leibniz, thus, following Kalamist tradition,[1] ushered in the tendencies of vitalism and voluntarism that made themselves manifest in modern thought in the philosophy of Nietzsche and Bergson. And if Iqbal felt himself attracted towards the voluntaristic and spiritualistic thought of these thinkers, it seems thus quite natural, because it was in the true spirit of Mulim thought that first found expression in Kalamist atomistic pluralism.

II

The modern exponent of spiritual pluralism in the West is James Ward (1843—1925) who developed the theory of monadology of Leibniz. In certain respects it is an improvement upon Leibniz's attempt, particularly where he discards the theory of pre-established harmony and that of windowlessness of the monads. Like Leibniz, Ward was a scientist and was therefore thoroughly aware of the particular trend of

---

1. M. M. Sharif, *Muslim Thought, its Origin and Achievements*, (Lahore, 1950), p. 76.

modern scientific speculation. It is a strange coincidence that the problem of reconciliation of religion, science and philosophy in three different epochs of human thought, in the eleventh, in the seventeenth and in the twentieth century, by Muslim thinkers, Leibniz and Ward, respectively, developed into a sort of theistic pluralism. Perhaps their familiarity with the working of the world of nature stood in the way of accepting any sort of Monism which by its logical implications, excludes the reality of individual units not only occupying this vast universe but actualy contributing to its gradual expansion both in its extension and intension. It was difficult, in short, for them to ignore the significant presence of beings who by their constant efforts had made the world so different, so beautiful, so charming from what it originally was. It was equally difficult for them to conceive this whole of manifold parts without the creative efforts of the one whom, as the Quran puts it, sleep never overtakes and who is always active in relation to this universe. It was the combination of both these interests—in the world of nature and in the world of spirit—that led them to formulate a philosophical theory which had the set purpose to find a place—and an honourable place at that—for both individuals and God.

In the age when Ward began to speculate, the popularity of natural sciences had eclipsed every other sphere of human activity. It had repercussions everywhere. It was thought that the

category of mechanism and mathematical exactness which was employed by Physics with a great success, should be applied to other branches of learning. Spinoza had already tried this method and produced a system of thought in which mechanism reigned from bottom to top. Man was a machine who was born with a set pattern of behaviour to which he gave expression amid an environment which was but the unwinding of a pre-ordained clock on a big magnitude. His God was a passive spectator of a drama which was being enacted before His eyes and which He had no power or iniatative or will to stop ; willy-nilly it must go on, good, bad or indifferent as it is. Such a conception of the universe and God could import no warmth, no heat, no ambition to the heart of man ; it repelled him by its icy chillness. Amidst a surrounding that is more often hostile and against which he is required to combat, and in which attempt he is liable to fail or succeed in proportion to the kind of efforts he puts in, man needs a God from whom he can hope to get a warm response and a helping hand. A philosophy and a faith which accepts mechanism as the basic creed, cannot fulfil this eternal craving of man. All logic aside, man feels within himself that he is not a mere mode, a mere bubble, a non-entity. He has relization of his worth and value in spite of all that logicians may say. Bradley's logic compelled him to assert that self is a bundle of contradictions and therefore unreal and yet even he

could not help admitting that it does possess reality of a sort. Does not this admission prove that facts are not always amenable to logic ? It was to counteract this tendency towards belittling the role of individuals that Ward set out to attack both naturalism and absolutism. Strangely enough, both science and philosophy had combined to dethrone man from his high pedestal to which he had been raised by religion.

Before proceeding with his positive work, Ward, therefore, had to deal both with Naturalism and Absolutism and point out where these theories erred. His first objection against mechanism was that it started with the notion of inert mass and totally ignored activity. It was in line with Leibniz's rejection of Descartes' characterisation of material extension as mere inertia. Just as Leibniz tried to emphasise the element of force, so Ward asserted, in opposition to mechanism, that activity is what is prior and basic. And this activity, according to him, was not merely mechanical action and reaction as Bain had done, but as the expansion of the inner spontaneity of a spiritual subject. Even eminent men of science, who have tried to think of Reality on the basis of the assumption with which science starts, have been led to idealistic or what Ward prefers to call spiritualistic[1] outlook. He cites the name of Huxley and

1. Ward, *Essays in Philosophy* (1927), pp. 166-7.

quotes him as saying, " I take the conception of necessity to have a logical, not a physical foundation . . . for I am utterly incapable of conceiving the existence of matter if there is no mind in which to picture that existence."[1] We might add the name of Eddington to this list. Thus he concludes that only "conscious, *i.e.*, thinking, feeling and willing beings are real . . . and matter, or—more generally—nature, is to be regarded as dependent on or as the manifestation of, spirit."[2] He thus lays emphasis not only on the priority of mind, but also on its volitional or practical side. He regards the emphasis on Will by Schopenhauer a reaction against Hegelian apotheosis of Ideal[3] and yet he agrees with him in emphasizing the role of will in human life. This led Lotze to base his metaphysics on ethics : all that *is* must have its ground on what *ought to be*. It was his emphasis on the volitional or practical side of human consciousness that led many to include Ward among the Pragmatists.[4]

But his greatest attack against mechanism rose out of what he calls historical view of life. The attempt of Spinoza to consider haman action and desires in exactly the same manner as though he were concerned

---

1. *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (1899),vol. 11. p. 213 ff.
2. Ward, *Essays*, p. 167.
3. Ward, *Esssays,* p. 168·
4. A. H. Murray, *The philosophy of J. Ward,* (cambridge, 1937), p.63.

with lines, planes and solids, was the attempt to apply mathematical catagories to problems of life and it utterly failed. We cannot dismiss as mere epiphenomena facts, individuals, purposes and meaning, progress or decline. Nature presents to us not merely static continuity or mechanical repetition, but also "novelties" and it is the historical point of view which brings out this creative aspect of life—what he calls epigenesis or creative synthesis. When we look at nature from this angle, *i. e.,* from the historical point of view, we see the operation of final causes, purposes and ends which, in its turn, implies the notion of good or worth. There is a distinct difference between what is and what ought to be—a distinction which is totally meaningless for science. But as soon as we enter the sphere of life, we feel that we cannot do without either final causes, or good and worth. The moral or social order that we see all around us even in its simplest or crudest form pre-supposes a community of free persons, severally distinct and peculiar, but all co-operating for a supreme end. So Ward concludes that it is this teleological point of view alone which can explain life and hence the world of nature, as the manifestation or expression of activity of conscious beings, can be interpreted only if we adopt this historical point of view. Plato maintained that 'universals' were *entia* prior to and independent of *fientia*, the particulars perceived by sense. But Ward maintains that the *entia* are not Platonic ideas but living agents,

and the *fientia* are not primarily phenomena, but the actual deeds of such agents. He sums up his view against mechanism as follows, "Form the teleological stand-point . . . natural objects can only be completely understood if we regard them as ultimately either subordinate individuals with some initiative—at least the striving or conatus towards self-preservation and well-being—or as merely the acts and utterances of these agents : in a word, in this historical world we can recognise only individual agents and their manifestations. Things which do not act, we should say, are themselves but the products of beings that do. There may be no such inactive things at all, and this was Leibniz's view; but if there are such they are the manifestations of mind, as Berkeley held." [1] In this respect Ward decided to follow Leibniz in holiding that this univers of ours is a world of monads, compossible conative agents, who are not windowless but are linked together in the closest fashionby inter-communication and interdependence.

Ward's first objection against Absolutism of all sorts is that it likes to start with the One from the above and relegates the many to be dealt with as the exigencies of logic, then, demand. When we try to explain the nature of our daily experience in all its multiplicity in the light of an assumed unity or Absolute about the existence and the nature of which we have no definite knowledge, it is merely pursuing a

1. Ward, *Essays*, pp. 233-4.

will-o'- the wisp ; it is to explain the known by the unknown, a most unscietific way of dealing with problems. Ward, therefore, mentions with approval the attempt of Leibniz in refusing to start with substantiality or with Reality. For him the fundamental starting point was activity of finite centres of experience. It was, perhaps, in this sense that Goethe made Faust translate the biblical words : In the beinning was 'Logos'. Faust translated 'Logos' first as 'word', then as 'thought' and finally accepted 'act' as the most appropriate. In the same spirit, Ward asks : Has pure thought ever formulated any coherent system which was not refuted later on? Pure thought which is out of touch with our daily experience and the plurality of the data which goes to make up that experience, is helpless and barren. He could not reconcile himself with an Absolute which was viewed as perfectly static, above and exclusive of plurality, impersonal, etc. To him the Many with all their diversity, incompleteness and activity seemed to be too real to be ignored. His scientific training and the need of times both compelled him to leave aside the unproductive path of pure abstract thought and its main ideal of the Absolute which devours all plurality. Instead, he tried hard to start with what common experience presents us, *viz.*, concrete particulars, individual agents *enrap-port* together, as he calls it. These finite centres of experience cannot be called mere appearances, nor fragments, for that would be to contradict experience which is the bedrock of both science and

philosophy.

Ward's psychological studies helped him towards strengthening the anti-intellectual current of the time. Relying on the historical method[5] he argues that activity comes first and thought makes its appearance later on. Sense-knowledge precedes thought-knowledge. The former arose from the relation between external movement and sensations and in its turn it gives rise to experience. It is only after the system of monads which forms the self has had much experience of action and movement that sense-knowledge can give rise to thought-knowledge. Thus, discussing the latest trend of philosophical speculation, Ward quotes from his article in Encyclopaedia Brittanica, "Looking broadly at the progress of life, as it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards the history of man, it seems safe to say that knowledge is always a means to ends, is never an end in itself . . . psychologically, then, the function of perception and intellection is to guide action and to subserve volition—more generally, to promote self-conservation and betterment,"And in two different essays, the first and the last, Ward asserts that faith alone, perhaps, may be able to usher in a high level of life and insight surpassing the scientific investigation. He seems to be one with Bergson in holding that instinctive aspect of human life is much nearer to the source of life—the *elan vital*—than mere intellect. It is only when we have taken a bold step in a certain direction meant

to conserve and better life that reason comes forward to strengthen it.[1]

After a detailed study and criticism of Naturalism Ward comes to the conclusion that it is only mind or Spirit that can help us to explain this universe of diverse relations and objects. He has proved that starting with matter or mechanism as the only reality, it is not possible to explain the presence of purpose or end in the sphere of life, and hence he asserts that we should reverse the process and start the other way round. We must give a spiritual interpretation of the universe, for it alone can explain all the facts that need to be accounted for. After the manner of Bergson, Ward analyses the account of development of life in the sphere of biology as presented by Darwin. He admits that, no doubt, certain aspects of this development can be explained by non-teleological mode of approach as, *e.g.*, the leopard's skin, the tiger's spots and the tawny mane of the lion.[2] But then, on the basis of

---

1. Ward, *Eassays*, pp. 110, 168, 349.

2. Even here certain thinkers like Schopenhauer would not agree with the mechanistic explanation. For them the presence of Will can unmistakably be discerned even here. For them function precedes and detemines structure. Cf. Iqbal's following verses from *Asrar-i-Khudi* :

What is the source of our wakeful eye ?
Our delight in seeing hath taken wisible shape.
The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing.
(Lines 289—292).

Darwin's analysis itself, he points out that most of the processes of adaptation on the part of living beings, both lower and higher in the scale of life, can only be explained if we adopt the teleological mode of approach.

Ward, thus, comes to the conclusion that matter and nature are both amenable to the category of teleology, Even knowledge, he argues, after the manner of pragmatists, is through and through a means towards an end. "Knowledge . . . may even be regarded as the joint product of natural selection and subjective selection : it emerges tainted with—as some may think—but at all events, permeated by, a teleological colouring."[1] Purpose and intelligence permeate nature from bottom to top and so qualitatively nature is one. This aspect of his thought is called spiritual Monism.

But then he does not wish to follow the Monists of different types, especially the Absolutists, in reducing this multiplicity of the real 'things' all around us to a single all-embracing and all-absorbing One, however it may be conceived. He is so much convinced of the reality of the Many that he cannot think of any Unity that may overwhelm and destroy the plurality of the existents and thus he follows the lead of Leibniz in declaring that the universe consists of a plurality of things and gives them the name of monads which possess life and mind, however rudimentary and simple it may

---

1. *Eassays*, p. 168.

be. As these monads develop, their consciousness or sentiency becomes clearer and they are able to reflect their surroundings each from a different angle. So far Ward agrees with Leibniz. But contrary to the latter's windowless monads, Ward holds that in order to explain higher forms of life, some sort of relation between the monads must be established. Leibniz's monads had no will but agglomerated according to a pre-established plan but according to Ward, these monads are ultimately free and striving mental beings.

How, then, to explain matter and mechanism? This is as difficult a part of Ward's philosophy as it was with Bergson after him, and both agree in their approach. On the analogy of organic life, Ward explains the presence of matter and mechanism as a case of arrested development. As we rise higher in the scale of life, we notice greater clearness in perception and greater complexity in organization of the monads. But when this urge for development somehow stops, we witness petrification and this is matter. Not only some societies but also some forms of biological life like the lamp-shell, have remained unaltered through the centuries. It means cessation in the increase of organization and hence no step forward in the control of environment. As a result, there is the appearance of immobility and uniformity. The same thing, Ward asserts, seems to have been the cause of dead and mechanical matter. His other

argument is derived from statistics.[1] While calculating and arriving at a general result, the statistician ignores the individual. His conclusions apply to general body but never to the individual and so they give the appearance of uniformity or stationariness both in the realm of nature and the realm of higher life.

Thus Ward comes to the conclusion that this world of ours is a collection of conative individuals called monads who are inter-related and inter-act in the interest of their own being as well as of the whole. There is a law of continuity which pervades throughout, linking the lower and higher monads in a series of developing and increasing complexity of organization and perception. But at every stage of life, from the lower to the higher, we often meet certain creative syntheses. Certain monads, so to say, agglomerate and we witness a new type of being before us. Thus life proceeds both by leaps and by gradation, both by the law of continuity and by law of epigenesis or of creative synthesis. The whole process is determined not by any mechanical necessity but purely by a teleological urge.

To keep the freedom of the individual, Ward asserts that there is place for contingency in the universe but this contingency is not absolute. He denies the possibility of pure chance. His position is distinct both from Absolutism and from pragmatism. Against Absolutism, he

---

1. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 65-66.

advocates the presence of contingencv and against Pragmatism, he admits a sort of self-determinency. He distinguishes between contingency of chance and contingency of freedom. "If the future of the world is partly determined by the conduct of free agents there will continually be new beginnings that were not foreseen ; and new possibilities will become imminent, that no knowledge of the past can surely forecast." He looks upon the individuals as conative and creative agents and advocates a highly suggestive idea that God, being a Creator, has empowered individuals with free creative powers. He has created not dummies or playthings which move about the stage of life by the pull of an invisible chain but true creators who by their will can bring about new change in themselves and in their relation to other individuals and environment.[1] He admits, however, that the actions of individuals are not the result of accident or pure chance ; they ore fully determined not by any outside agency but by their internal motivation which is the expression of their character. Being essentially creative, their behaviour often seems to others as a consequence of pure arbitrary will. "Though contingent for others, a man's acts are not contingent for him : if they were, we should have to admit absolute contingency or chance."[2] He quotes the saying of Kant that 'life means the capacity to act or change according to an

---

1. *Realm of Ends*, pp. 75—8, 454-5.
2. *Realm of Ends*, p 455.

internal principle.'[1] What pluralism of Ward demands is that the real beings must have spontaneity and initiative. It is due to this that we do and can leave our mark on our environment. Every individual is a creator of a new series with the result that if nature is, in one respect, *natura naturata*, in other respect, in regard to its relation to creative individuals, it is *natura naturans* ; that is, nature in the process of making itself, developing at each stage and continually liable to increase.

While it is possible to formulate an Almanack predicting the appearance of lunar and solar eclipses, it is not possible to produce an equally infallible almanack about the behaviour of individuals and societies. There are, no doubt, certain laws which have been formulated, expressing probabilities about the rise and fall of nations but more often there have been epigenetic changes in the life of societies. A strange behaviour of a single individual has often led to the rise of a certain people to the highest pitch of creative activity which could not have been possible other wise. Appearance of Muslim Community in the seventh century of the Christian era in Arabia was one such unforeseen event ihat changed the shape of the things of the whole world of that time. It clearly proves the contention of Ward that in the world of conative individual nature is more of a *naturans* than *naturata* implying spontaneity and growth fresh experiences and inspirations, new

1. *Realm of Ends*, p, 75.

epochs and unforeseen leaps.[1]

How is this creative freedom of individuals compatible with God's omniscience and creative powers? In view of this most difficult aspect of the problem, as old as philosophy and theology, some modern thinkers have tried to formulate a view of teleology without God. Hoernle gives us an account of Professor Henderson's point of view in this respect.[2] He holds that because we usually view natural phenomena statistically and not in their natural context as a part of a larger whole, we miss the element of 'pattern' in them. How can we conceive the 'activities', of, say, hydrogen and oxygen and carbon which 'prepare' themselves for ever-new synthesis? It is due to this that life is possible on this earth.[3] But if we analyse the implications of the word 'prepare', we shall see that it leads to the presence of some mind in nature; only that the author has not seen it fit to go so far. As a matter of fact, if we accept teleology in nature, we cannot do without mind or minds and thus the old theological problem crops up. Ward seems to be baffled by the logical contradictions involved in

---

1. *Realm of Ends*, pp. 72, 298.

2. *Matter, Life, Mind and God*, p. 124, as quoted in Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-7.

3. In criticising Ward, Radhakrishnan remarks, "When water is produced from a combination of certain properties of oxygen and hydrogen, we have synthesis which is creative."

*Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 101-2.

it. But starting from the Many and their freedom of action he is bound to view the problem in a new light. He definitely rejects the theory of predestination: for, as he says, 'this theory has always led to a sort of atheism and moral laxity'[1] The attempt of some to draw a logical distinction between what. He decrees and what He merely permits, is quite meaningless in view of their advocacy of complete fore-knowledge of God.[2] So Ward is led to advocate freedom for the individual, though not to the fullest extent. "All is not decreed: the world is not created like a symphony. Again, all possibilities are not left open: the Many have not severally unlimited freedom, the 'freedom of indifference' which is undistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creators, pluralism maintains: their 'nature' is partly His doing, partly their own; He assigns the talents, they use or misuse them . . . The total possibilities, then however far back we go, are fixed; but within these contingencies, however forward we go, are open."[3] He does not see any way out of the problem except by putting certain limitations on the activity of God. If God has full pre-science of everything that each individual intends to do, then, no doubt, God is all-powerful but individuals lose

1. *Realm of Ends*, p. 310.

2. This distinction between *amr* (degree) and *mashi'at* (wish) was first drawn by Hallaj and later on elaborated Ibn-i-Arabi.

3. *Realm of Ends*, p. 315.

all freedom and initiative and are thus reduced to the status of mere machines. He therefore agrees with the view of Martineau that "foreknowledge of the contingent is not a perfection," because a world of free agents is better than a 'block universe.' He even goes so far to say that " . . . *if* creation necessarily involves absolute pre-science then I can see no alternative but to deny creation. . . ; for there is no denying freedom. Substitule providence for prescience continuous control for etrnal chance, and the whole difficulty vanishes and nothing of value is lost."

With this, pluralism of culminates Ward in theism and he sees in it the fulfilment of his principel of continuity. The universe of conative individuals is a commonwealth of intelligences arranged in a hierarchy of lower and higher grades. The highest intelligence is God. And then he is led to give in his system a due place to the act of faith besides the act of experience as understood by natural science and the act of reason as understood by philosophers. He defines faith as "that personal trust and confidence in the Unseen Being to which the religions in all ages have attributed their power to overcome the world."[2] In another place, he argues, "A powerful practical argument in favour of religious faith might be worked out on the following lines : first we might point

---

1. *Realm of Ends,* p. 492. Italice mine.

.2*Essays,* p. 101.

to its universality . . . Next we might point to its survival . . . Lastly we might point to the advance of religion that has usually accompanied the increase of morality and intelligence."[1] He emphasised the act of religious experiencc and its content quite unequivocally. He says that at first it is "merely a vague sense of 'something beyond', and a feeling of helpless dependence—and this much is God among men everywhere—at length religion culminates in the Christian's faith in anunderlying presence as the source of new life—an experience without any sense of vagueness or isolation."[2] He clearly identifies this trustfulness of faith with love. "Faith and love go together, and no one can trust God without loving Him, or love Him and not trust Him." It is here that Ward's position departs more clearly from Absolutism. "The latter emphasises thought and intellect to an extreme degree while for Ward the ideal operates not in man's thought but in his actions and in his life ; it is not revealed by the self-examination of thought of itself, but as an intuition dimly realized as yet—it is in action that it is fully realized. Thus, for him, in the final religious experience the world view obtained would be a 'world intuition' of such a nature that thought would lose its discursive relational nature in the act of intuition."[3]

———

1. *Realm of Ends*, pp. 450.
2. *Essays*, P. 355.
3. Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 171, 174.

Ward admits that God created the universe but he does not conceive of it as creation *ex nihilo* nor as unfolding of some pre-arranged plan. The idea of deism and pantheism are both repudiated, nor does he subscribe to the occasionalistic relation between God and the universe. Deism makes God totally transcendent and almost unrelated to the universe, while pantheism goes to the other extreme of identifying the two : the reality of the One means so much that there is no reality left for the Many at all. To Ward this relation can be both transcendent and immanent. Creation does not "assume merely that one transcendent Being exists above and beyond the whole series of Many . . . ; but it assumes further that this one Being is related to them in a way in which none of them is related to the rest : they do not simply co-exist along with It, they exist somehow in it and through it."[1] In calling God the creator, it

---

1. *Realm of Ends*, p. 231. Dr. Ishrat Hasan Anwar, in his articles on Iqbal and Ward (*M'arif*, vol. 69) has attributed to Ward a position in this context which he does not hold. According to Dr. Ishrat, Ward's God was mainly transcendent, while, as a matter of fact, as has been shown here by quotations from his *Realm of Ends*, Ward's conception of God is as much transcendent as immanent and in this respect Iqbal totally agrees with him, as this was the true conception of God as presented in the Quran and Muslim theists like Ibn-i-Maskwaih, Ghazali and Rumi.

is simply the world's dependence on Him that is expressed. He tries to save himself from falling into theological controversies. He brushes aside the theory that God willed to create a world and then He selected the best of all possible worlds. The creative act is at once 'pure activity' and 'original insight', idea and deed, life and light. God is transcendent in relation to this creative activity, for it is not God but His manifestation. Yet, because He ever sustains it, He is immanent in it, it is His continuous creation.[1]

But if God is the creator of all, and yet the Many that He has created are free and creative themselves, it follows that God in the very process of creating has imposed certain limitations upon Himself. A God whose creatures had no independence would not himself be really a God. Theism of Ward, therefore, claims to give "a living God with a living world, not a potter God with a world of illusory clay, not an inconceivable abstraction that is only infinite and absolute, because it is beyond everything and means nothing."[2] There is a purpose in the universe but that purpose is being generally realized and in this realization all are co-operating to form a commonwealth of Many and thus consti-

---

1. *Realm of Ends*, p. 240. See also p. 447 where he says, "God is the ground of the world always as an active, living, interested spirit and not as a merely everlasting, changeless and indifferent centre, round which it simply whirls."

2. *Realm of Ends*, p. 444.

tuting one realm of ends. "The world's future history, the course by which the purpose is to be attained, depends not on him (*i.e.*, God, alone but also on the free agents, whom he sustains but never constrains . . . If that purpose is verily to allow his creatures some initiative, to associate them as co-workers with himself, it surely must need imply some self-limitation and some contingency."[1]

Ward conceives God as a person among persons but whereas in regard to us, the world exists as another, independent to us, with regard to Him, it does not so exist. No doubt he is confronted by the world and is active in it, yet it is not "merely objective (known through sense or intellection) or merely ejective (known through instinct or interpretation."[2] For God the world is represented in its unity and entirety. "His is not a perspective view such as 'standpoint' implies nor is it a discursive view, such as our limited attention entails God is ubiquitous and omnicontinuitive . . . Finally, self-consciousness and reason in God are not as with us incomplete and intermittent. There are no 'broken lights' in him : he alone can say *I am that I am*."[3] He therefore agrees with Lotze in saying that "perfect personality is in God only : to all finite minds only a pale copy of it is allotted."[4]

---

1. *Realm of Ends,* pp. 478-9.
2. Ibid., p. 477.
3. Ibid., pp. 477-8.
4. Ibid., p. 478.

His discussion of the problem of evil, the problem that is the crux of every theistic system of thought, is moderate and cautious. Starting with two important facts, *viz.*, (1) the possession of freedom to choose and to act and therefore to be liable to go astray ; and (2) the limitation that God has imposed upon Himself in order to help in the moral development of individuals, the problem assumes a different form for Ward. Schopenhauer, defending his pessimism, claimed that in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost as synonymous expressions. Ward admits this but he very acutely remarks that this does not imply that the world is absolutely evil but that when the ideal of man is divorced from the spiritual background of his life, when the material and the ideal aspects of our life are rent asunder, then this world of ours becomes virtually evil. He admits that there is evil in the world, both moral and physical, but it does not imply thereby that the world itself is evil. When the Many have some initiative, contingency and conflict, fallibility and temptation seem inevitable. We can conceive the possibility of a universe where there is no evil, but then it would also imply the absence of free choice to an individual. Huxley, commenting on the prevalence of evil and wrong-doing in the world said, "If some great Power would agree to make me think always what is true and do what is right on condition of being turned into a sort of clock . . . I should instantly close with the bargain." This pious hope, no doubt,

expresses very acutely the inner yearnings of a truly moral man who is always pained to see himself sometimes being carried away by the temptations around him, but in the fervour of his passion for right-doing, he forgets that freedom to do right without freedom to do wrong cannot exist. Freedom and clock-work, freedom and yet no choice—is a contradiction in terms. "Fugitive and cloistered virtue" proves but feeble and ineffective compared with the virtue that "sallies forth and sees her adversary." Hegel rightly said that Paradise without the so-called Fall was a park for beasts. A world entirely in leading strings may realize an ideal, but that would be no moral ideal, for no ideal can be truly moral unless it is self-determined. "Nothing takes place morally except what takes place *through one's own self-determination* : that it is that converts it from a mere taking place into an action."[1]

And yet this evil is only negative, *i.e.*, there is no principle of evil co-eternal and co-existent with the principle of good. There may be evil and yet it is true that none follows it because it is evil. Milton's Devil may say : "Evil, be thou my good" but no man intentionally and purposely follows evil as evil ; evil can only flourish disguised *sub-specie bonie*' The struggle with evil is not a struggle for supremacy like the battle of the gods and the Titans ; it is an advance against hindrance, which exists only as

1. *Realm of Ends*, p. 374

hindrance, not as beings having ends of their own as Manichaenism supposed.[1]

If this universe of ours is truly a moral order in which the activities of individuals ultimately lead to the realization of the good, how, then, to account for death ? In the case of the animals, it can be said that after the main purpose of their presence—*i.e.*, procreation, perpetuation of the species—is attained, death becomes a biological necessity. But in the case of man, this attitude cannot be adopted, for it militates against the ultimate worth of an individual : it will make him only a means and not an end. A system of thought that starts with Many cannot relegate the individual to any lower position of a tool, a mere puppet in the hands of the forces of nature. Nor can we accept the contention of some that the life of man is limited to the present period of his existence on this earth : for it definitely violates the universal belief in a future life and the hope of realization of all men's moral and religious ideals. Belief in immortality is the natural outcome of the realization which comes to every man of thought and action but there is a disparity between man's possibilities and aspirations on the one hand and the narrow scope afforded him in the brief span of the present life on the other. Thus the moral ideal leads to the belief that the Spirit would have other

---

1. *Realm of Ends*, p. 376.

dimensions than those of the time and space that encompass the world of phenomena. Thus death is viewed not as a termination of the career of the individual. If evil is to be overcome and the ideal of spiritual society is to be realized, then there must be a life after death.[1]

But the *sine qua non* of this future life must be the retention of consciousness of the present life. We do not aspire for a future life in a ; vacuum life in a different context, totally cut off from our presentl ife, affords no charm for man. What each one of us desires is a future life which is a continuation of our life on this earth, to which memory is indispensable : what we need is not mere continuity but a personal continuity. As to how the disembodied soul manages to clothe itself. Ward thinks that the analogy of the growth of embryo in the womb is the best. "May we not then suppose that if the germinal soul can accomplish so much, the separated spirit can accomplish more."[2] As to what kind of organism the soul shall adopt, we are, Ward thinks, not sure. The present mode of embodiment is not the only possibility ; what is essential is its rapport with the world.

After death, the spirit enters a final and irrevocable state of existence in the unseen and eternal world and between the two lives

1. *Realm of Ends*, pp. 386, 429.

2. Ibid., p. 398.

there comes a period, an intermediate state of mental rumination and reflection. "It is not a domain of deeds and works, for the external conditions for them are wanting . . . it is the domain of inwardness, of silent consideration and pondering. a domain of recollection in the full sense of the word."[1]

What is the end of this world of ours which Ward often calls the realm of ends ? This term clearly shows that, to him, the end does not lie outside it. To say that the world is the glory of God seems to him to deny the worth of the individual human beings. So he claims that it is Love for which and to which everyone is moving. God Himself is Love and so is the world. "In such a realm of ends we trust God is love indeed, and love creation's final law."[2]

This brief discussion of the main position and implications of theistic pluralism as developed by James Ward bring out many points of similarity between him and Iqbal. Professor Sharif has summed up these points in the following words :

"Both of them, after the manner of Kant, reject the three notorious arguments of the existence of God, discard Platonism, Pantheism and Absolutism and object to regarding omniscience as fore-knowledge of a pre-ordained reality and applying serial time to God and the finite self—and all this for exactly the

---

2. *Realm of Ends*, p. 406.

3, Ibid., p. 453.

same reasons. Both are Pluralist Theists and Spiritual Monists. Both hold Panpsychism against Berkley's occasionalism and windowed monadism against Leibniz's windowless monadism. Both believe in the creative freedom and immortality of the individual. For both the sensuous world is due to interaction between egos, the body is created by the mind to serve its own purpose and serial time is only an act of the mind. Both hold on exactly the same grounds and in exactly the same sense that God is an infinite, conscious, omnipotent and omniscient spirit which is immanent in the finite egos and yet transcends them in the same way as every organism is immanent in its parts and yet transcends these parts.

"For both He is a perfectly free creative spirit that limits its own freedom by creating free finite egos, and for both, this internal limitation is not inconsistent with His own perfect freedom. According to both, God is perfect throughout His creative progress, for this progress is progress in perfection, not towards perfection. Both hold that God's will functions through the will of the finite egos. Both believe with Wundt that reason can prove the necessity of faith, but it cannot turn faith into knowledge. Both agree that belief in God is ultimately a matter of faith, though of a rational faith, that conviction or complete certitude about Him comes not from reason but from living, that direct communion with Him is gained only through rapport or love

and that it is only through love for Him that Immortality is achieved by the finite self."[1]

III

There had been a twofold tradition of philosophical thinking in the Islamic world since the Muslims started their speculation under the influence of Greek thought. The first was the tradition of pure rationalism represented by Mu'tazilites, Farabi, Ibn-i-Sina and Ibn-i-Rushd But the tendency inherent in purely rational approach towards scepticism and adverse criticism of the religious attitude, tended to alienate the sympathies of the public and so very soon this tradition of pure thought was brought to an abrupt end. Ghazali's criticism of Muslim thinkers like Farabi and Ibn-i-Sina[2] further helped in this process. He stated his position unequivocally that human intellect cannot comprehend everything and there was much that was beyond its range. The second was the tradition of anti-rationalism represented by mystic thought. Though primarily based on the 'perception of the heart' *i.e.*, intuition, mysticism developed a metaphysical theory of its own on purely rational grounds known as the theory of Unity of Being or pantheism. With the efforts of Ibn-i-Arabi and some of his renowned disciples like Sadr-ud-Din of Qonia, 'Iraqi and

1. Prof. M. M. Sharif, article "Iqbal's Conception of God" in *Iqbal as a Thinker* (Lahore, 1948), pp. 124-5.

2. Ghazali, *Munqidh* (Lahore, 1311 A.H. Urdu, translation), pp. 25-26, 35.

'Attar, it became the most popular philosophical tradition among the Muslims. Almost all the Persian poets, whether mystic by conviction or not, made it their primary theme in their songs and so the basic ideas of this school of thought became the property of each and every cultured Muslim. Thus when Iqbal started his poetic career, we see in *Bang-i-Dara* several verses which clearly reveal this point of view.

حسن ازل کی پیدا ہر چیز میں جھلک ہے
انسان میں وہ سخن ہے غنچہ میں وہ چٹک ہے
انداز گفتگو نے دھوکے دئے ہیں ورنہ
نغمہ ہے بوئے بلبل ، تو پھول کی چہک ہے
کثرت میں ہوگیا ہے وحدت کا راز مخفی
جگنو میں جو چمک ہے ، وہ پھول میں مہک ہے

The reflection of Eternal Beauty is apparent in everything.
It is poetry in man and blooming in a bud.
It is only the result of wrong mode of talking, otherwise
Song is the smell of nightingale smell is the song of a flower.
The mystery of the One has been hidden in the Many,
The light of the glow-worm is really the smell of the flower.

He seems to have accepted pantheism as the only philosophical tradition worthy of notice. In the introduction to his first work, *Development of Metaphysics in Persia,* he speaks of Ibn-i-Arabi in a way which brings out his unbounded admiration for the Shaikh. He seems to speak as a Brahmin to whom the rigid

monotheism of Islam appeared to be "dry-as-dust" as compared with the profound and enchanting system of pantheism.[1] McTaggart after reading *Asrar-i-Khudi* testified in one of his letters that Iqbal had been a staunch pantheistic mystic while in Europe. But deeper study of mystic literature soon convinced him that pantheistic sufism was a totally wrong philosophy. In one of his letters to Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, while commenting on the Introduction of *Tadhkira* of Abu-al-Kalam Azad, he points out that this change in his outlook dated from 1909 while he was still in Europe. In 1915 was published *Asrar-i-Khudi.* In the Urdu Introduction he attacked Ibn-i-Arabi and pantheism, which raised a storm of protest in Muslim circles of those days. He had therefore to write a series of articles in his defence.

He tried to distinguish the purely religious point of view from the metaphysical, in order to clarify his position *vis-a-vis* pantheism. Mystics have usually styled themselves pure monotheists by advocating not Unity of God but Unity of Being. 'Many,' Iqbal asserts, is not opposed to the theistic Oneness of God. Belief in the Unity of God is opposed to what is technically called *shirk*, ascribing divine attributes to others than God, to the existence of other gods besides Allah and not to belief in the existence of beings other than God ; while belief in the theory

1. Second edition (Bazm-i-Iqbal, Lahore), p. x. See also Foreword by Prof. M. M. Sharif.

of Unity of Being involves denial of the existence of Many.[1] It was this denial of the Many which is involved in pantheism that led Iqbal to oppose this theory. He was forced to admit that the theories of emanation and the Unity of Being were not supported by our religious literature especially the Quran ; and Ibn-i-Arabi and his followers were totally on a wrong track when they claimed to derive it from that source. In reality, it was only a matter of grafting Neo-platonic thought on purely Islamic theism. Some mystics hold that Unity of Being is a real fact while others say that it is a mere state of the heart. Ibn-i-Arabi holds both these positions. But if it is a mere mystic state—and to Ibn-i-Arabi it is the highest station that a mystic can reach in his self-development—does it correspond to any objective fact ? Iqbal thinks that no mystic thinker ever took the trouble of raising this important question. If the existence of Many is a reality, then this experience of identity with the Divine is a mere delusion and has value neither for philosophy nor for religion. If the state of Unity is a mere station—albeit the highest, as claimed by Ibn-i-Arabi—and does not reveal any objective reality or fact, then it is meaningless to prove its existence rationally. Moreover, it does not help at all in the spiritual

---

1. "It was an illegitimate step for the Muslim pantheists to pass from the proposition that 'there exists but one God' to the entirely different proposition that 'there is nothing *in existence* except God.' " Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy of Ibn-i-Arabi*, pp. 55-6.

development of an individual because, according to the Quran, the relation of the objective world to the Real is that of the creature to the Creator and not that of identity. Again, "it is fallacious to say that from the fact that under certain mystical experiences I feel one with an unknown power I choose to call God, I am entitled to assert the ontological proposition that I am one with God and from this to make the much wider generalisation that everything that is, or will be, is one with God, and that God is all that exists. A mystic has every right to his experience as an experience, but he is not justified in putting an interpretation on it which amounts to a *metaphysical theory of the whole* of Reality."[1] Following Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, Iqbal holds that servitude (*abdiyyat*) is the highest stage a man can attain in relation to God.

The practical consequences of pantheism were equally injurious. Iqbal holds that the first effect of accepting this doctrine was to develop in the individual the state of intoxication (*sukr*) which renders him unfit for the struggles of daily life and often leads to renunciation of the world. The second is transformation of moral values of Islam. Pantheistic mystics use religious terminology but, as a matter of fact, those terms are given quite a different significance. The whole Persian poetry is permeated with this moral anarchy and played a very important and ignoble part in unnerving

1. Affifi, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

the vitality of the Muslims.[1] Thus Iqbal rejected pantheism on three grounds. First, it denied the reality of the Many; secondly, it conceived God as purely immanent, as permeating the whole universe; and thirdly, on ethical grounds which follow from the first two considerations.

Recently Mir Vali-ud Din[2] has tried to construct a metaphysics of pantheism claiming to remedy these defects. He holds that the Quran teaches the doctrine of Pluralism, and posits the 'otherness' of *khalq*, their discreteness and plurality; God is transcendent in the sense of being a necessary being, self-begotten, self-caused, self-existent, independent and absolute in contradistinction to the contingent, created and determined beings in the phenomenal world. He accepts the doctrine of pluralism that the essence of God is different from the essence of the created beings and the relation of 'otherness' exists between the two. But, then, how are the two related? To explain this relation he introduces the conception of *ayan-i-thabita* which Ibn-i-Arabi employed to prove the identity of the Many with the One. These *ayan* are the 'ideas' in the mind of God who knew them from eternity. As 'ideas' they were non-existent but when they were clothed with existence—the term which Ibn-i-Arabi uses—they became the many. In the words of Mir Vali-ud Din,

1. Lost Links in the Life of Iqbal, an article by Mr. Abdullah Quraishi in *Iqbal*, Vol. II, Nos. 2, 4.

2. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Vol. 2, pp. 173—7.

"the essences of things are in themselves non-existent, that is to say, they subsist only in the knowledge of God as 'Ideas.' They derive what existence they possess from God who is the real substance of all that exists. There is nothing in existence except God." Elucidating his point further, he holds that just as true existence belongs only to God so also activity belongs to Him alone. God alone is the doer, the agent. We must negate action from the essences of things as we negate existence and attributes from them.

He claims that Iqbal seems to accept the theory of *ayan-i-thabita* in explaining different aspects of his philosophy.[1] But it appears that he is stretching the point too far. Process of creation, according to this theory, is the manifestations of God to Himself in His own Ideas while to Iqbal this process is more allied to the manifestation of God's will than that of his intellect which the theory of *ayan-i-thabita* involves. Moreover, the theory of pluralism based on *ayan* leaves no room for evolution or progress or continuous creation. Mir Vali-ud-Din argues that the many as 'ideas' of God were in the mind of God before He created them. "God being a knower *from eternity* knows His own thought—these being the object of his knowledge."[2] It is clear that

---

1. *Ramuz-i- Iqbal,* (Hyderabad Deccan, 1944, Urdu), p.26 ff.

2. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western,* p. 173. Italics mine.

this universe was present in its entire range and complexity in the mind of the Creator before He gave it existence. Nothing new happens, no creative activity is possible either from the side of God or from the side of indivinuals. Thus we shall have to revert to the block universe of Aristotle which was perfect and had no room in it for addition ; it is eternal passivity and the role of God is reduced to mere continual contemplation of His ideas. *Ayan* of pantheism are 'ideas', static, eternal and complete, while "egos" of Iqbal, though capable of perfection, are incomplete, developing centres of will, action and creation. To identify the two is definitely illogical and wrong. The *ayan* are by definition abstract universals while Iqbal's finite as well as infinite ego is concrete and individual ; *ayan* are ideas while egos are will-centres.

Again, the role of many in this new interpretation of pluralism is only apparent. As a matter of fact, there is no plurality at all, neither as regards their existence nor as regards their activity. Their existence is derived and they are not agents of their actions : existence and doing belong exclusively to God. What is khudi, according to Iqbal ? Its essential characteristic is the possession of independent existence and capacity to act freely and creatively. In *Javid Nama* he asks Rumi what 'existence' (وجود) signifies. Rumi explains :

گفت موجود آنکه می خواهد نمود
آشکارائی تقاضائے وجود

زندگی خود را به خویش آراستن
بر وجود خود شهادت خواستن

He said : existent is one that desires expression,
(For) expression is the very demand of existence.
Life is to adorn yourself with egohood,
To invoke witnesses for your existence.

What is existence ? It is the expression of personal individuality and uniqueness :

وجود کیا ہے ؟ جوہر خودی کی نمود

What is existence ? It is the manifestation of the essence of egohood.

and in this expression it is not dependent upon anything else nor does it wish to lose its uniqueness even a little.

اگر یک زره کم گردد ز انگیز وجود من
باین قیمت نمی ارزم حیات جاودانی را

If even a jot is lessened from the tension of my existence,
I will not buy eternal life at this cost.

Thus it is clear that Iqbal cannot accept the pantheistic interpretation either of Ibn-i-Arabi or of Mir Vali-ud-Din, for in both cases the basic reality of experience, the existence of many, is totally obliterated.

In the history of Muslim thought, there have been several half-hearted attempts to construct a system of thought on the reality of self and pluralism. The first attempt was visible in Ibn-i-Sina though the general trend of his thought seems to be a repetition of the same Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. In one of his works on Love, he seems to have conceived life as progressing in an evolutionary scale on the basis

of individuality, which is determined in its turn by the presence of the force of love, a cosmic principle of universal application. "Things are so constituted that they hate non-existence and love the joy of individuality in various forms." The principle of love forces, as it were, matter to assume different forms and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. This force has a tendency to centralise itself and in the vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness and so is the case with beings higher than man. In short, "all things are moving towards the first Beloved—the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its n.arness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle."[1]

The other attempt towards pluralism was visible in the atomism of Kalam which we have discussed above. But, unfortunately, due to extraneous considerations, the independent existence of the many was sacrified by these thinkers for the sake of preserving the arbitrary will of God and the result of their speculation, in the last resort, served to reinforce the negative conclusion of pantheism. The third attempt was that of Wahid Mahmud, who was born in 600 A.H. in a village in Gilan. According to *Dabistan*, he was a great scholar of eminence and established a distinct school of thought. He wrote many books but unfortunately none of them are extent at

---

1. *Metaphysics in Persia* (Bazm-i-Iqbal), pp. 33, 34.

present. From the account of his thought, as explained in *Dabistan*, we learn that he taught that the primary constituents of the universe are innumberable units endowed with life. Unlike the Kalamists who used the words *jauhar* (atom) he calls them *afraid* a term which like the Leibnizian monads underlines the vitalistic characteristics of the units. These monads evolve according to a certain principle from organic to animal life and lastly to human level. Every later stage is more perfect than the former.[1]

But unfortunately these pluralistic tendencies in Muslim thought remained submerged and never had a chance to come to prominence. The monistic tendency of pantheism was strong enough to destroy all these half-hearted attempts. The Quran, however, gives due emphasls to the unique existence and worth of the individual and proclaims that he is destined to live for ever and become a permanent element in the constitution of being. "Thinketh man that he shall be left as a thing of no use?" (75 : 36) It clearly emphasises the innate importance of the individual. The pluralist point of view is emphasised in the following

1. *Dabistan* (Persian, Bombay), pp. 243—7 Iqbal's *Metaphysics,* pp. 93-4. Ibn-i-Maskawaih, whom Iqbal calls one of the most eminent thinkers of Persia, viewed the human self as possessing independent existence (See) *Metaphysics* pp. 24—29) and looked upon life as an evolutionary movement which developed down from matter to man and then emerges in the form of of Perfect Man.

verses where the Quran views the final destiny of man not as a class but individually and separately. "Verily there is none in the Heaven and in the Earth but shall approach the God of Mercy as a servant. He hath taken not of them and *remembered them with exact numbering*: and each of them shall come to Him on the day of Resurrection as *a single individual*." (19 : 95-96)[1] But this plurality and multiplicity is not incompatible with the unity of the Creator. The Quran, in two different places, refers to this oneness. "He it is who created you (*i e.*, the multiplicity) out of one *nafs*" (5 : 99), and "We did not create and bring you forth except like one *nafs*." (5 :28)Thus Rumi, discussing this problem, emphaises the unitary aspect of life. To him plurality and multiplicity is phenomenal while in essence there is only One.

ده چراغ از حاضر آری در مکان
هر یکے باشد بـــه صورت غیرآں
فرق نتواں کرد نـور هـر یکے
چوں بنورش روئے آری بے شکے
درمـــعـــانی قسمت و اعـــداد نیست
درمـــعـــانی تجزیـــه و افـــراد نیست
منبسط بودیم و یک گوهر همه
بے سر و پـــا بدیم آں سر همه
یک گہر بودیم همچو آفـتـــاب
بے گره بودیم و صافی هم چو آب
چوں بصورت آمد آں نور سره
شد عدد چوں سایۀ هائے کنگره

If you have in the house ten lamps, though every-

1. Iqbal, *Lectures*, pp. 11, 117.

one be different in form from the othere, you cannot distinguish the light of the one from the other. In the meanings there is neither division nor number nor individuals. In the Realm of Spirit we all are one extended substance without beginning and end: One substance like the Sun, clear and without knots like water.[1]

In another place, referring to those people who have realised their ultimate unity, he says:

چون ازیشان مجتمع بینی دو یار
هم یکے باشند و هم سی صد هزار
مفترق شد آفتاب جانها
در درون روزن ابدانها
تفرقه در روح حیوانی بود
نفس واحد روح انسانی بود

When from among them you see two friends, they are one and three hundred thousand at the same time. The sun of the souls has been split up in the windows of the bodies. Differences are found only in the animal soul; the human soul is only one.[2]

And it was this unity of spirit that is the ground and essence not only of human beings but also of all objective reality, including inorganic and organic. It is true that relation of man to this Primal Unity is on a different footing from the relation of other levels of beings to their Creator, and Rumi like all other Muslim mystics and philosophers makes pointed reference to the world Creation and the world of Command, عالم خالق و عالم امر, referred to in the Quran with reference to the nature of the soul.

---

1. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, *Metaphysics of Rumi* 1933, p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 15.

پس لـه‌الخلق ولـه‌الامرش بـدان
خلق صورت امر جان را کب بدان

To Him belong Creation and Command. Creation is form while Command is the tider.

Yet it was this basic unity—the aspect of spiritual monism in Rumi—which he discerned everywhere in the universe. His celebrated exposition of the doctrine of evolution rests on this conception. All is permeated by a sort of life which has its ultimate source in the One spirit.

بـاد و خاک و آب و آتش بنده اند
بـا تو مرده، بـا خق زنـده انـد

Air, earth, water and fire—are all dead for you but alive with God.

From matter to organic life, from organic to animal life and then to man—everything is, in reality, the manifestation of the One reality. And yet this emphasis on the unitary aspect of existence does not lead Rumi to the denial of the reality of individuality. In essence, the light of ten lamps may be the same, yet each lamp as repository of light possesses uniqueness which nobody can deny. Even in the highest stage of *fana* the individual does not lose it seperate existence. He views it only as transformation.

هستی ات در هست آن هستی نواز
همچو مس در کیمیا انـدر گداز

Your existence in the life of the Origin of Life is like a base metal transformed in alchemy.

Thus Rumi by a strange mixture of logic and poetic paradoxes, succeeded in refuting

the pantheistic merging of the individual souls in the Absolute and thereby ably served the cause of moral values, dynamism of life and theistic interpretation of the universe. It was, perhaps, under the inspiration of Rumi that Iqbal was able to shake off his former attachment to pantheism. In the prologue (تمہید) to *Asrar-i-Khudi* he gives explicit expression to this indebtedness.

پیر رومی خاک را اکسیر کرد
از غبارم جلوه ها تعمیر کرد

موجم و در بحر او منزل کنم
تا در تابندهٔ حاصل کنم

The master of Rum transmuted my earth to gold,
And set my ashes aflame.
I am a wave aad I will come to rest in his sea,
That I may make the glistening pearl my own.

The same Rumi appears to the poet in a dream and advises him :

آتش استی بزم عالم بر فروز
دیگران را هم ز سوز خود بسوز

خیز و جان نو بده هر زنده را
از قم خود زنده تر کن زنده را

Thou art fire : fill the world with they glow !
Make others burn with they burning.
UP, and reinspire every living soul !
Say 'Arise' and by that word quicken the living !

And the reuslt was :

بر گرفتم پرده از راز خودی
وا نمودم سر عجاز خودی

I unveiled the mystery of the Self,
And disclosed wondrous secret.

It appears that it was as a result of inspiration

that Iqbal recevied from the study of Rumi's *Mathnavi* that he began to view pantheism with disfavour. As he himself relates in the articles he wrote in his defence after the publication of *Asrar-i-Khudi* and in his letters to Khawaja Hasan Nizami, the general trend of philosophy in the West was towards pantheism of one form or other. The mystic thought as well as the poetic tradition among Muslims of this sub-continent was another important factor which helped in the alignment. Bur on his return from Europe in 1908. the thought of political and economic decline of Muslims of the world must have focussed his attention on its causes. In this atempt Kumi's *mathnavi* played a very important role. It convinced him that pantheism as a system of thought may be right or wrong on logical grounds but on purely moral and religious grounds it must be not only rejected but replaced by a theistic creed which is in complete accord with the true religious idealism. Thus in the Urdu introduction to the first edition of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, discussing the different implications of the theories about self, he wrote, "In Hindu thought we find a strange mixture of theory and practice. Some of their great thinkers have deeply thought over the nature of human capacity for action. They arrived at the conclusion that the continuity in the life of self. which is at the root of all pain and suffering, is achieved through activity and . . . therefore if one wishes to be free from the cycle of self's

existence one should abhor activity. This conclusion was apparently harmful for the individual as well as for society . . . Sri Krishna, however, criticised the philosophical traditions of his people. He pointed out that to abhor activity does not mean complete inactivity, as action of one sort or other is in the very nature of the self. To abhor activity means to be indifferent to the deed and its consequences. Ramanuj followed the same line of thought, but the Logical hair-splitting of Sankara once again darkened the outlook.

"In Western Asia, Islam gave the world a message of activity . . . Yet there appeared a strange similarity in Hindu and some of the Muslim thinkers. The point of view adopted by Sankara in the interpretation of *Gita* was the same that was followed by Ibn-i-Arabi in the interpretation of the Quran. The deep erudition and charming personality of the Shaikh-i-Akbar made the doctrine of pantheism an indispensable element of Muslim thought-structure. Kirmani and Iraqi were most influenced by it and gradually all the Persian poets of the 14th century of C.E. accepted it.

"But while in India, Pantheism was a philosophical doctrine with only its appeal to reason, in Iran it went beyond its limits and in the hands of poets it began to appeal to the heart instead of the head, with the result that it reached every nook and corner of the Islamic world and became the main cause of social and political decay of the Muslim society. The first among

the Ulama to protest against this universal tendency was perhaps Ibn-i-Taimyya and among thinkers Wahid Mahmud. Unfortunately his books are not extant today but Mulla Mohsin Fani Kashmiri has noticed this thinker in his work *Dabistan al-Madhahib* from which we can realise the significance of his thought. The logic of Ibn-i-Taimiyya no doubt did much but logical arguments cannot be effective against the charms of poetry.

"Although Western philosophy started with pantheism of the Jewish thinker of Holland, *viz.*, Spinoza, yet the practical nature of the West reasserted itself. This magic spell of pantheism which was supported by the deductive type of mathematical reasoning could not maintain itself long. The first reaction against it appeared in Germany (in the person of Leibniz) and gradually Western philosophy especially of England freed itself from its phantom arms. Just as there are particular sense-organs for perception of smell and colour so there is another sense in man which many be called "sense of events" (حس واقعات), *i.e.*, sense-experience. Our life depends on the observation and understanding of external events and then acting accordingly. Out of the womb of nature events had been and will go on happening. But nobody realised before Bacon that these objective events and experiences which the *a priori* thinkers, confined to their ultra-rational theories, looked down upon, had a valuable treasure of hidden facts and realities."

Thus repudiating pantheism, Iqbal made his start from experience, a totally modern approach to the problems of philosophy. In the history of philosophy, there have been two different methods of approach to the problem of truth, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* (or empirical), the deductive and the inductive. The great systems of thought known to the world generally follow the deductive line while the development of physical science rests on the use of the inductive method. But since the time of Kant, the empirical method has been used in the sphere of philosophy as well. Ward, for instance, as we have seen, laid great emphasis on this method in his attempt to solve the philosophical problems. But according to Iqbal, this method was characteristic of Islam and it was empirical long before modern science learnt to do so.[1] The Quran emphasised the importance of sense-perception in grappling with the observable aspect of Reality. It "sees signs of the Ultimate Reality in the 'Sun', the 'moon', the 'lengthening out of shadow', 'the alteration of day and night', 'variety of human colour and tongue', 'the alteration of the days of success and reverse among peoples'—in fact in the whole of nature as revealed to sense-perception of man. And the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them 'as if he is deaf and blind" for he 'who does not see these signs in this life will remain blind to the realities of life

1. *Lectures*, p. 182.

to come.' "[1] And so Iqbal interpreting the Quranic text "name of things" (علم الاسما), infers that the nature of human knowledge is conceptual with which he approaches the observable aspect of Reality.[2] This was one of the reasons why he rejected the mystic approach to the problems of life—an approach that tends to neglect the shifting actualities of life. "The mystic forgets that reality lies in its own appearance and the surest way to reach the core of it lies through its appearance."[3] Addressing the sufi, he says :—

تری نگاہ میں ہے معجزات کی دنیا
مری نگاہ میں ہے حادثات کی دنیا
عجب نہیں کہ بدل دے اسے نگاہ تری
بلا رہی ہے تجھے ممکنات کی دنیا

You are looking up to the world of miracles.
While I have an eye on (daily) events.
There is nothing strange if your eye may change it,
This world of possibilities is inviting you.

Iqbal, therefore, true to the spirit of the Quran

1. Ibid., pp. 127-8.

2. Rumi, however, interpreted this primordial knowledge as intuitional in character rather than as conceptual.

چشم آدم کو به نور پاک دید
جان و سر نا مہاگشتش پدید

The eye of Adam which saw through pure light, understood the real secret of the "names".

But the text of the Quran clearly refers to 'things'—external and objective—and not to experiences and thus Iqbal seems to be nearer the sense of the Quran.

3. Iqbal's article, Self in the Light of Relativity. See writer's *A study in Iqbal's Philosophy*, p. 400.

and Muslim culture, lays proper emphasis on the empirical nature of our knowledge and in this respect he sees no harm in learning from the West. According to him, the Western scientific attitude is a legacy of the Muslim thinkers and therefore we must grasp it as our own heritage. In *Bal-i-Jibril* Iqbal has given a beautiful expression to this empirical side of man's activities. All this vast expanse of the universe, the perpetual flux of things around us, are a challenge to our intellectual power and are waiting to come under our control. As soon as Adam enters the stage of self-consciousness, he is amazed to see all around himself Nature in its grandeur and feels himself tiny and powerless in proportion. But the Spirit of the Earth hails him with open arms and lays open before him the hidden potentialities with which he is endowed.

هیں تیرے تصرف میں یہ بادل یہ گھٹائیں
یہ گنبد افلاک ، یہ خاموش فضائیں
یہ کوہ یہ صحرا یہ سمندر یہ ہوائیں
تھیں پیش نظر کل تو فرشتوں کی ادائیں
آئینۂ ایام میں آج اپنی ادا دیکھ
سمجھے گا زمانہ تری آنکھوں کے اشارے
دیکھیں گے تجھے دور سے گردوں کے ستارے
ناپید ترے بحر تخیل کے کنارے
پہنچیں گے فلک تک تری آھوں کے شرارے
تعمیر خودی کر اثر آہ رسا دیکھ

These clouds and vapours of the sky
Are all uuder your control ;
This vaulted sky and this silent atmosphere,

> These mountains, deserts, oceans and winds.
> Yesterday you were enjoying the company of the angels,
> But today look to your own self in the mirror of the passing days.
> The Time will understand (and obey) the signs of your eyes,
> And the stars of the sky shall see you (wondrously) from afar ;
> The ocean of your thought shall be without shores,
> And the flames of your cries shall reach the sky ;
> Build your ego and see the effects thereof.

But this study of experience which, according to Iqbal, had a potentiality of opening up a rich field of research, unfortunately in the West took a line of action which led to very grave consequences. Due to several social factors that were peculiar to the West, this study of empirical science, from the very beginning, took first a negative and later a positively hostile attitude towards moral and spiritual values with the result that in the 19th century not only religion and morals but even human mind was totally excluded from the sphere of scientific investigations. It came to be believed that the difference between mechanical, living and conscious entities was no more than a degree of complication and everything could be explained in physico-chemical catogories. In the sphere of physics, the role of mechanism was held supreme and it went so far as to predict that the whole universe, including, of course, the behaviour of man, could be adequetely explained provided there was an infinitely industrious

mathematician who knew the exact position and velocity of every particle in the universe at its creation.[1] Iqbal's criticism of modern science was due to this particular form of its development.

حکیماں مردہ را صورت نگا راند
ید موسیٰ دم عیسیٰ ندارند
دریں حکمت دلم چیزے ندید است
برائے حکمت دیگر تپید است

The scientists embellish the outer form of the dead body,
They prossess not the Hand of Moses nor the Breath of Jesus.
My heart sees nothing (of value) in this knowledge,
And it yearns for wisdom of another sort.

And fortunately this attitude soon proved fruitless. In the sphere of biology and physics, reactions began to appear and very soon the whole edifice of materialistic physics tumbled down. "What we have hitherto thought of as matter (alien to mind) is essentially an activity of something beyond the reach of physics, and activity which manifests itself as physical phenomena and which some philosophically inclined physcists suggest may be of the same kind as the activity of thought . . . The classical mechanism has disappeared and the case of the old philosphical materialism has dissolved away. . . . Ultimately for the physicist matter is resolved into energy and energy into some substrate activity which

1. E. E. Harris, *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*, (London 1954), p. 376.

. . . 'throws up bubbles' that we can perceive."[1] Thus the mind of man ceased to be regarded as some sort of attenuated image or shade inhabiting his body, or as a kind of ideal *camera obscura* in his head through which passes the 'magic shadow-show' of ax external world ; it assumed its real position as a stage in the process of evolution and perhaps, the highest stage so for reached implied in and presupposing all the lower phases ; it is the fruitition of their development. The lower phases cannot be argued away in Berkeleyian fashion nor can they be denied existence in their own right.[2] The emergence of mind at a later stage in the process is evidence that mind must be in some manner present from the first. It must be immanent, or implicit in that from which it emerges. There can, therefore, be nothing in nature which is wholly deviod of mind. Nature is not merely 'saturated and permeated' by mind ; it is mind in its various forms of selfmanifestation.

Scientists as well as thinkers started with experience but with the former, it was the

---

1. E. E. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 390-1.

2. Some verses in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* (pp. 212-3) in answer to Question 2 seem to show that Iqbal followed Berkeley in denying the existence of the material world but in his Lectures, commenting on Einstein's Relativity, he admits that what is disputed is not the objectivity of Nature but the view of substance as a simple location in space which led to materialism. See *Lectures*, p.38. See the articles articles of Dr. Ishrat in *M'arif*, Vol. 69.

experience of an independent existent matter that was somehow conceived to lie at the bottom of everything real and from this a standard of values was evolved : that alone is real and valuable that is as solid as matter. But this attitude, as we have seen, produced a line a thought that was soon repudiated by the scientists themselves. Therefore it was important for a thinker like Iqbal to consider deeply what experience should mean before any further step was taken. This problem of the starting point is presented in a nutshell by Iqbal in the following verse. Man asks Natures :

عالم آب و خاک و باد ، سر عیاں ہے تو کہ میں ؟
وہ جو نظر سے ہے نہاں اسکا جہاں ہے تو کہ میں ؟

وہ شب درد و سوز و غم کہتے ہیں زندگی جسے
اسکی سحر ہے تو کہ میں ، اس کی اذاں ہے تو کہ میں ؟

کس کی نمود کے لئے شام و سحر ہیں گرم سیر
شانۂ روزگار پر بار گراں ہے تو کہ میں ؟

تو کف خاک و بے بصر ، میں کف خاک و خود نگر
کشت وجود کے لئے آب رواں ہے تو کہ میں ؟

(بال جبریل صفحہ ۴۵)

O world of Nature, is it you who are the visible manifestation (of Reality) or I?
Who is the (real) expression of the Reality that is hidden from the eyes, you or I?
The night of pain, sorrow and misery which is called Life;
Who is the morning of this night, you or I?
For whose sake are the revolutions of days and nights?
Who is a burden on the shoulders of the Time, you or I?

You are a piece of clay and inert ; I am a piece of clay but self-conscious—
Who is the flowing water for the meadow of life, you or I ?

Thus reaching a sort of blind alley in starting from the world of Nature, Iqbal thinks it proper to begin with the inner experience of the individual who though insignificant in itself—a 'piece of clay'—possesses the power of looking within himself, of self-consciousness. But the study of human life from objective point of view, as something other, cannot, according to Iqbal, yield anything fruitful. We must reach the primacy of life through other means at our disposal. It is what the Quran calls *qalb* or heart, *i.e.*, inner perception or intuition. Following Descartes, he asserts that mere doubting or thinking presupposes the existence of the thinking subject. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* he says :

توان گفتن جهان رنگ و بو نیست
زمین و آسمان و کاخ و کو نیست
توان گفتن که خوابے یا فسونے است
حجاب چهرهٔ آں بے چگونے است
توان گفتن همه نیرنگ هوش است
فریب پرده هائے چشم و گوش است

We can say that this world of colour and smell is non-existent,
That earth, sky and houses are nothing ;
We can say that (all these) are dreams or magic spell,
Or are a veil over the face of the Absolute.
We can say that (all these) are deceptions of the senses,
Of our eyes and ears.

But when he comes to "self," he says :

اگر گوئی که 'من' وهم و گمان است
نمودش چوں نمود این و آن است
بگو با من که دارائے گماں کیست
یکے در خود نگر آں بے نشاں کیست
خودی پنہاں ز حجت بے نیاز است
یکے اندیش و دریاب ایں چه راز است

If you say that 'I' is a mere imagination,
And its appearance is as doubtful as that of others ;
Then tell me, who is the doubter ?
Just look within (and ask) what this signless thing is!
Ego is hidden and yet needs no demonstration,
Think and understand what this mystery is.

Negating everything that is claimed to be real, we reach the core of our personality, the ego, the 'I' which we cannot doubt, and which is the only reality with which we are most familiar. From this 'privileged case of existence' we can start and be sure of our findings, Here the objective approach would not do. We must try to catch a glimpse of the reality of the ego in its deepest moments of activity, will and desire. Thus Iqbal, following Bergson, distinguishes two different aspects of the self. One is the static and objective view which reveals self as a substratum in which different forms of experience take place. "The self here lives outside itself as it were and, while retaining its unity as a totality, discloses itself as nothing more than a series of specific and consequently measurable state."[1] Out of the multiform objects presented

---

1 *Lectures*, p. 47.

to our sense-perception by the external nature, this efficient self is one. The nature of the true self, on the other hand, is revealed by a deeper analysis of conscious experience and it is possible only in moments of profound meditation. "In the life-process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole."[1] In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* he says:

خودی از کائنات رنگ و بو نیست
حواس ما و میان ما و او نیست
نگه را در حریمش نیست راهے
کنی خود را تماشا بے نگاهے
حساب روزش از دور فلک نیست
بخود بینی ظن و تخمین و شک نیست

But the ego does not belong to this universe of colour and smell

Our senses do not intervene between us and it.

Eyesight has no access to its sacred precincts.

You can see the 'self' without eyesight.

The calculation of its days is not through the revolutions of the sky.

If you look within, there is no doubt or misgiving about it.

According to Iqbal, this approach to the appreciative aspect of the self is indispensable and it alone will enable the individual to come into contact with the true nature of Reality. Iqbal claims to have an intuitive vision of it and

1. Ibid., p. 48.

he wants others to experience it as well. In the Introduction to *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he says:

نہ پنداری کہ من بے بادہ مستم
مثال شاعران افسانہ بستم
بہ جبریل امین ہم داستانم
رقیب و قاصد و دربان ندارم
مرا ذوق خودی چون انگبین است
چہ گویم واردات من ہمین است
نخستین کیف او را آزمودم
دگر بر خاوران قسمت نمودم

Don't you think that I am inoxicated without wine,
And spin tale like poets.
I am in converse with Gabriel.
And possess no rival, messenger or watchman.
Taste for *khudi* is for me (as sweet) as honey.
What else can I do? My whole stock consists of this experience.
First I tried its offects on myself?
And then I (decided to) share it with all the East.

This self lives in pure time which cannot be measured by the revolutions of the sky and which is not therefore amenable to the categories of thought or intellect. Nor is there any play of mechanical causation. "To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation... Creation is opposed to repetition which is characteristic of mechanical action. That is why it is impossible to explain the creative activity of life in terms of mechanism."[1] On the analogy of this inner experience of the ego, Iqbal con-

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 50.

cludes that the physical world is also non-static and non-mechanical and must be conceived after the pattern of the ego, however low in the scale of life it may be. To view matter and mind as two separate spheres was what Whitehead calls the fallacy of 'bifurcation', a fallacy that perpetuated for long a totally barren attitude towards the universe. In every actual entity, he holds, there is a mental as well as physical 'pole' and consciousness is a high phase of development of the former which occurs under special conditions. According to him, the ultimate basis of all Reality is an activity of creation and he calls it 'creativity' or 'process'. What is not process is nothing and every entity is an 'event' or 'occasion', an atomic element of the fundamental process which constitutes the 'passage of nature.' These occasions or 'actual entitles' have something in common with Alexander's point-instants, for each is a pattern of aspects of all other entities in the universe. But they were not completely devoid of size, like mathematical points ; each endures through a minute portion of time and occupies a volume or quantum of space. Whitehead therefore compares them to cells rather than to point-instants. Nature is a perpetual creative process involving the mutual integration of its elementary parts into single, coherent, organic whole which is immanent in each part and in every phase of the process. Every atomic entity in this process is beminded, and the creative advance is effected by an activity which is

essentially that of mind.[1]

Iqbal believes that the whole universe consists of 'individuals' which are alive and possess a core of personality. In the English Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, he says about life that "it is individual : its highest form, so far, is the ego (khudi) in which the individual becomes a selfcontained exclusive centure."[2] The spark of individuality lies dormant in every atom of matter and when it is endowed with life from within itself, it blossoms out into self-expression of one sort of other,

ہر چیز ہے محو خود نمائی    ہر ذرہ شہید کبریائی
بے ذوق نمود زندگی موت    تعمیر خودی میں ہے خدائی
رائی ضعف خودی سے پربت    پربت ضعف خودی سے رائی

Every particle of matter is busy with self-manifestation,
Every atoms is intoxicated with I-amness.
Life without the desire of self-expression is death,
And in the strengthening of khudi lies supremacy.
Lack of selfhood makes a mountain an atom of dust,
While selfhood makes an atom of dust a mountain.[3]

In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, discussing this point. he says :

خودی تعویذ حفظ کائنات است
نخستیں پر تو ذاتش حیات است
حیات از خواب خوش بیدار گردد
درونش چوں یکے بسیار گردد

---

1 E. E Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 418—21, 436.

2 xiii-xiv.

3. *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 79.

ضمیرش بحر نا پیدا کنارے
دل هر قطره موج بے قرارے
سر و برگ شکیبائی ندارد
بجز افراد پیدائی ندارد
حیات آتش، خودی ها چون شررها
چو انجم ثابت و اندر سفرها

Khudi is the talisman which maintains the universe,
And its first expression is : Life.
Life awakens into consciousness ,
And becomes unity-in-multiplicity.
Its essence is a shoreless sea
And the heart of every drop is a surging, turbulent wave.
It has no inclination to contain itself,
And expresses itself in *afrad*, 'individuals'.
Life is like fire, self-hood is like (its) flames,
And like stars it is stationary as well as moving.

The whole world including matter is the expression of this central fact of egohood. Explaining this point in his *Lectures*, Iqbal says that matter is "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-ordination."[1] It is impossible to conceive, he argues, a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind. If such a level were possible, we would be compelled to posit a transcendent Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental. Therefore, Iqbal con-

1. *Lectures*, p. 106.

cludes, "the world in all its details from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-realization of the 'Great I-am.' Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego . . . Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man."[1] The whole universe is a society of individual egos, some higher and some lower. With the help of this spiritual monism, Iqbal is able to solve the dualism of body and mind. To him body is physical organism which is a colony of sub-egos and therefore there is no logical difficulty in viewing the two as forming one organic system. Ego, as the centre of life, is the primary thing which needs and demands maifestation in this world of space, time and causality, and body is this expression. "The *Nafs* is the pure act ; the body is only the act become visible." Rumi very beautifully expressed this idea :

پیکر از ما هست شد نے ما ازو
بادہ از ما مست شد نے ما ازو

Body came into being due to us, and not otherwise,
Wine became intoxicated though us and not the other way round.

In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* Iqbal says :—

بجاں پوشید رمز کائنات است
بدن حالے ز احوال حیات است

---

1. Ibid., p. 7—12.

نمود خویش را پیرا یه ها بست
عروس معنی از صورت حنا بست

The secret of Life is hidden in *nafs*.
Body is one form of expression of life.
Bride of 'meaning' adorns herself with 'form' ;
She assumes different dresses for her expression.

Hence the mechanistic conception of life which has been devised for explanation of material things cannot be applied to the sphere of the ego. Recent researches in the field of lower insects have established the fact that in the activity of organism there is present the fact of 'insight', which is, in reality, the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial and causal relation of things. As we have noticed in our study of Bergson, Iqbal holds that ego in its real activity is creative and not mechanical and his acts are determined by purposes and ends which it continually places before itself. He insists on the element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity, thus establishing its freedom.

How is this freedom of the ago compatible with the mechanical causality of the physical environment in which the ego lives? This was the main problem for Ward to which he could not give any satifactory answer. Iqbal views this question in a different light. To him the physical universes a construction of the ego itself. The very itxistence of the ego demands that it should reduce a to a system which would give it some kind of issurance as to the behaviour of the things around. "The view of his

(*i.e.* ego's) evironment as a system of cause and effect is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed in interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom."[1] Thus thought or intellect, in a way, leads to mechanisation of life, yet it is indispensable for the growth of the ego, for the realization of its full freedom.[2] Intellectual understanding of nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality and sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it. But the true consciousness of freedom comes to man only when he steals a glance of the appreciative aspect of self in a state of contemplation or prayer. Dealing with Bergson, we discussed in detail the two ways of mastering the world. The one is intellectual and the other, vital. The intellectual way is to understand the world as a rigid system of cause and effect while the vital is, so to say, the divine way of looking at the world and it is really in this latter aspect that man can realize fully his creative freedom. Being body he is a part of the world of mechanism and therefore causally determined, but being primarily 'divine' on account of selfhood, he is free and creative. He explains this point in the following verses, where he is taking of khudi ;

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 108.

2. See for a detailed discussion of this topic, Chapter on Fichte.

چه گویم از چگون و بے چگونش
برون مجبور و مختار اندرونش
چنیں فرمودهٔ سلطان بدر است
که ایماں درمیان جبر و قدر است
تو هر مخلوق را مجبور گوئی
اسیر بند نزد و دور گوئی
ولے جاں از دم جاں آفرین است
بچندیں جلوه ها خلوت نشین است
ز جبر او حدیثے درمیاں نیست
که جاں بے فطرت آزاد جاں نیست
شبیخوں بر جهان کیف و کم زد
ز مجبوری به مختاری قدم زد
چوں از خود گرد مجبوری فشاند
جهاں خویش را چوں ناقه راند
نگردد آسماں بے رخصت او
نه تابد اخترے بے شفقت او

What should I say about its characteristics ?
Its outside is determined while its inside is free.
Thus said the Holy Prophet of Islam :
Faith lies between determinism and indeterminism.
You regard every creature determined.
And limited by 'near' and 'far'.
But soul is from the directive energy of God.
Which in spite of all its diverse manifestations is hidden within ;
Three is no question of its determinism.
For soul qua soul cannot but be free.
It lay in ambush for this world of quantitative measurement,
And in a leap stepped from determinism to freedom.
When it casts aside the dust of determinism,
It drives the world as on a dromedary ;
Not even the skies revolve without its permission,
Nor do the stars shine without irs benevolence.

Basing his theory on the Quran, where *ruh* is described as directive in nature as it proceeds from the directive energy of God, Iqbal views the ego as free and creative. It is essentially 'will' and so it expresses itself in continuous purposeful activity. The nature of the universe is such that it provides full scope to the ego for this sort of vital appropriation. It is not mechanical but teleological. Iqbal could not accept Bergson's denial of teleology. To deny it would be to make the life of the ego without content and significance. To strive and will in a vacuum would be meaningless. Life of the ego is past influencing the present and both helping in the formulation of fresh ends and purposes and it is thus that the ego as a moral unity takes its rise and exerts its influence not only on the environment but also on other egos. The universe, as Iqbal asserts is liable to increase and in this process of development the individual plays its important role. It is not only God but also man who lends his creative hand in shaping and remoulding the physical universe to better ends. "Of all the creatures of God he *(i.e.* man*)* alone is capable of conscionsly participating in the creative life of his Maker. Endowed with a power to imagine a better world, and to mould what is into what *ought to be*, the ego in him aspires, in the interest of an increasingly unique and comprehensive individuality, to exploit all the various environments on which he may be called upon to operate during the course of an edless career."[1]

1. *Lectures*, p. 72.

The problem of reconciliation of man's creative freedom with God's omniscience and omnipotence was as important for Iqbal as for Ward. It was for this reason that a school of Muslim thinkers, in order to save the freedom of man. adopted the strange view that God's knowledge is confined only to universals and that. He is unaware of the particulars, *i.e.*, the particular acts of ihe individuals.[1] Thus they limited God's knowledge to prove man's freedom of choice. To Iqbal this view is wrong, because it takes knowledge when applied to God exactly in the sense in which it is applied to man. To us knowledge means knowing a thing that lies outside us, while to God there exists nothing as 'other'. For Him the act of knowing and the act of creating are identical. Again, to look upon God's knowledge as a single indivisible act of perception by which He becomes immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, robs the universe of its evolutionary character. In view of the nature of the universe as continually changing and developing and its liability to increase, we cannot view God's knowledge as a sort of passive omniscience, as a sort of reflecting mirror. "The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God's creative life, but it pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."[2] Either we must view

1. *Cf.* Ghazali, *Munqidh*, (Urdu translation), p. 36.
2. *Lectures,* p. 79.

human history as an unfolding of an eternally settled and designed plan in which case we shall have no room left for man's play of free, creative activity, which however,is proved by the very words of the Quran, *viz.* 'Blessed, therefore, the God—the most excellent of makers' (23 : 12—14), referring to creators besides God, establishing thereby, achprectd to Iqbal, the fact that man is end owngiowi creative powers akin to God's. In another place (84 : 17—20) the Quran refers to man as an ascending spirit who, in his onward march, rises from one state to another. Therefore Iqbl is led, like Ward, to view God as One Who has imposed limits upon Himself by creating free creators. This limitation is self-imposed and therefore does not militate against His supreme authority. "It (*i.e.* limitation) is born out of His creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power and freedom[1]"

Does this conception of self-limitation by God contradict His omnipotence ? The key to this problem, Iqbal thinks, lies in the view of God as a concrete individual Ego, Who works and allows others to work. All activity, creational or otherwise, is a sort of limitation and therefore it is impossible to regard God as Creator finite individuals and yet to be omnipotent in the absolute sense. What is omnipotence ? Viewed as an abstraction, it

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 80.

is merely a blind. capricious power without limits which, in view of the conception of God and Nature and their relation as viewed by Iqbal, cannot be applicable to Him. He says, "The Quran has a clear and definite conception of Nature as a cosmos of mutually related forces. It, therefore, views Divine omnipotence as intimately related to Divine wisdom, and finds the infinite power of God revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular and the orderly."[1]

This controversy arose out of certain difficulties. If God is all-powerful, can He make a false proposition true or annihilate Himself? It was on the basis of this alleged failure on the part of God that a Stoic thinker boasted that the sage was in one respect more powerful than God because he could put an end to his existence while God cannot.[2] The same misunderstanding arose among early Muslim thinkers who debated whether God, being all-powerful, could tell a lie McTaggart accepted this position as true about God. To him God's infinite power implies the possibility of bringing about anything. however contradictory it may be—of making black white, good evil, the existent non-existent, the infinite finite, 2+2=5 or 100 and so forth. It was, in reality, a false paradox. Omnipotence means power to do

1. *Lectures*, p. 80.

2. See ERE, article Theism, p. 261.

whatever is consistent with God's own perfection. It is no negation of omnipotence that He cannot do what is in itself absurd. We must therefore, interpret infinite power as the posibility of accomplishing whatever is chosen. It would then be limited by the conception that what is chosen is not evil or absurd—*i.e.*, it would be taken in conjunction with the conceptions of infinite goodness and knowledge. It is only in this sense that Iqbal views God as imposing limits upon Himself so that finite egos may be able to exercise freedom and initiative. "Plainly God is limited by His own Being (He cannot deny Himself), by His own purpose, and by His own works. It cannot be otherwise. We should else have a being to whom no predicates could be attached, of whom nothing could be firmly hoped."[1]

Some critics maintain that Iqbal has made God totally immanent in diference to the latest trends in Western conception of life,[2] though, as he alleges, it was against orthodox interpretation of Islam. Before we can appreciate the point in this criticism, we must first clearly define what immanence is. It denotes the presence or indwelling of God in the world. Its opposite is transcendence which denotes God's apartness from or elevation above the world.[3] The Quranic description of God

1. ERE, volume 6, p. 323.

2. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, (London, 1946) p. 105.

3. ERE, volume 7, p. 167.

includes both these aspects. Iqbal was definitely against pantheism which emphasised only the immanent aspect of God. He strongly repudiated the identification of God with such cosmic elements as force, life or will. The description of God as Light in the Quran is interpreted by him, in the light of the recent researches by Einstien, not as a cosmic pervasive force but as individual and concrete. The use of the proper name Allah was meant, he suggests, to lay emphasis on His unique individuality and to counteract the tendency of viewing Him as something insubstantial, intangible and airy. Ultimate Reality is a rationally directed, creative life whom Iqbal interprets as an Ego, an individual. And yet he views Him as immanent, in whom we all have our existence and life. "Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life." In another place he says that "nature must be understood as a living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no final external limits. Its only limit is internal, *i.e.*, the *immanent* self which animates and sustains the whole."[1]

But to ascribe individuality or personality to God implies a sort of limitation and it was mainly due to this that many thinkers hesitated to call God a person. Personality implies the distinction of self and not-self while, according to Iqbal, there is nothing which may be called 'not-self' or 'other' in relation to God. The

1. *Lectures*, p. 56.

conception of the universe confronting God as His 'other' was only the human way of looking upon the activity of God. From the divine point of view, there is no creaton in the sense of a specific event taking place at a particular moment. The universe cannot be looked upon as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him. "To the Absolute Self the universe is not a reality confronting Him as His 'other', it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the universe is finite but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (*shan* in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless because the creative power God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the universe is liable to increase."[1] Thus when we say that the Ultimate Ego is an individual and a personality, we do not thereby put limitations on His infinity at all ; the infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative and volitional activity, of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression.[2]

Again, he holds that the Quran also affirms the personality of God. Commenting on the nature of mystic experience, he says that res-

1. "Self in the Light of Relativity", an article by Iqbal.

2. *Lectures* pp. 64—66, 77—9. Also see ERE, vol. 7, p. 171.

ponse is the test of the presence of a conscious self. We are not directly aware of other minds and it is only their appropriate response to our physical gestures which convinces us of the presence of mind in others. The Quran says of God, "And your Lord says, call Me and I respond to your call." (40 : 62) Discussing McTaggart's philosophy, Iqbal says, "The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us ? It does . . ." On the basis of this Quranic text and the direct recorded evidence of Muslim mystics throughout the centuries, Iqbal concurs with Ward and Lotze that we must view God as a Person, Without it, we are prone to fall into pantheistic acosmism.

But if the universe is regarded by Iqbal as a passing phase of God's consciousness, what about the human ego ? Is it also a passing phase ? This question is very important, for unless we emphasise the independent reality of the human personality, everything will vanish in the face of God's immanence. Martineau, for instance, believed in the immanence of God but refused to extend it to the human life. "All natural phenomena are due . . . to the immediate activity of God who is their sole cause ; but man is a free spirit, created such by God, and his actions are his own, not God's. He thus in a real sense, though, of course, by divine appointment, transcends God, and constitutes a sphere of independent causality, a centre of free ethical life."[1] Iqbal, similarly, was led

1. ERE, vol. 7, p. 172.

to the limitation of immanence to only a portion of existence, *i.e.*, to the universe, and saved the reality and ethical freedom of the individual human ego by asserting that the relation of God to the ego is on a different footing from His relation to the universe. It was a significant admission that a thorough-going immanence runs counter to the moral values and free activity of man. The nature of self is such that it is self-centred and exclusive. But if not a passing phase of God's consciousness, do the two egos, human and divine, mutually exclude each other? Here Iqbal tries to solve the problem by reference to the two Quranic verses. In one place it is said, "To him belong *khalq* and *amr*," and in the other, "Say the soul is from the *amr* of my Lord." Following the mystic tradition, Iqbal argues that *khalq* (creation) describes the relation of God to the physical universe, while *amr* refers to the relation of God to the human ego. But as to the exact relation of man to God, Iqbal thinks it is not possible to grasp it intellectually. "All that we can say," he asserts, "is that *amr* is not related to God in the same way as the *khalq* is. *The amr is distinct but not isolated from God.*"[1] But he expresses his inability to express this relation in words and quotes Rumi :

اتصال بے تخیل بے قیاس    ہست رب الناس را با جان ناس

A relation above imagination, above analogy,
Exists between the Crearor and men's souls.[2]

---

1. Article of Iqbal above quoted.
2. *Lectures*, p. 118.

Thus Iqbal is led to emphasise transcendence of God in relation to the human self. Without this 'otherness' there would be no objective value in religion and morality, as pantheism, *i.e.*, total immanence, has shown clearly. Human ego is a part and parcel of His being and yet has a distinct individuality of its own. Discussing this question of transcendence and immanence in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he asks the question : if all is in God, what is the position of this man of clay ?

اگر معروف و عارف ذات پاک است
چه سودا در سر این مشت خاک است؟

If knower and known are identical, *i.e.*, God,
What yearning has this handful of dust (man) in his heart ?

He answers :

خودی را زندگی ایجاد غیر است
فراق عارف و معروف خیر است
از و خود را بریدن فطرت ماست
تپیدن ، نارسیدن فطرت ماست
نه او بے ما ، نه ما بے او ! چه حال است
فراق ما فراق اندر وصال است

The life of human self lies in positing something 'other',
The separation of knower and known is a blessing.
It is our nature to separate ourselves from Him,
It is our nature to try and yet not to reach the goal (of union).
Neither He without us nor we without Him ! How strange !
Our separation (from Him) is separation in-union.

And what is the benefit that the human ego

reaps from this ? He says :

جدائی خاک را بخشد نگاھے
دهد سرمایۂ کوھے به کاھے
چه خوش سودا که نالد از فراقش
ولیکن هم ببالد از فراقش
فراق او چنان صاحب نظر کرد
که شام خویش را بر خود سحر کرد

Separation gives insight to the dust (*i.e.* man),
And lends the weight of a mountain to straw.
What a nice yearning that he bewails in separation,
And yet by this separation he grows and develops.
Separation from Him made his sight so penetrating,
That he changed his dark night into dawn.

Thus Iqbal was neither a pantheist nor a deist but, like Ward, a theist to whom God is both transcendent and immanent. In spite of the fact that everything lives through Him nothing is like Him and He transcends everything. He cannot be contained by the universe and cannot be bound by time and space. He is immanent because He is everything and specially in the soul of man, because it is His own spirit which He breathed into man.

This theistic position of Iqbal necessarily brings into forefront the problem of evil.[1] How is evil to be reconciled with the infinite goodness and wisdom of God ? He agrees with Ward and Lotze in holding that there is evil in the world and yet God is good and the presence of evil does not contradict His wisdom. He

1. The detailed discussion of this problem may be seen in Chapters on Schopenhaeuer, Milton and Goethe.

does not subscribe to the optimistic creed to the extent of denying the existence of evil nor does he think that the world is nothing but evil. To him both these positions are wrong. And yet, he asserts, nothing definite can be said in this matter. "We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc, and at the same time sustain and amplify life."[1] If evil and pain are necessary adjuncts of man's freedom of choice, then no doubt, man's creative freedom is a far more valuable thing to be forsaken for mere avoidance of pain. As the Quran puts it, "And for trial will We test you with evil and with good." (21 : 36). Not only evil but good as well is meant to strengthen the ego in its sacred work of achieving the purpose which God has set before us. The complaint that this is not a perfect world is to demand that man shall have no function and no mission in the world at all ; it would make the creation of the world needless and unintelligible. As a matter of fact, the world has not been made but is in the making and man himself is called upon to play his part in the making of it. Hence there seems a sense in the presence of suffering. Which is preferrable, a world in which man has nothing to do in making it a better world, or a world which calls him to be a worker along with God, a co-creater, an architect of this kingdom of free and creative egos ? It is this belief

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 81.

in the progressive development of the universe and the important part played in it by man that can, according both to Iqbal and Ward, refute pessimism and optimism alike. "The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil."[1]

But the real assurance in this final victory lies in the belief in personal immortality. If the career of the human individual is not terminated by death and he is going to enjoy continuity of life then surely this problem of evil assumes a different complexion and it loses most of its sting. But the view of immortality which Iqbal and Ward take is not of a static type ; it is dynamic. The human soul, after death, continues to grow and develop and there shall be no end to it. The so-called reward of man, according to Iqbal, will consists "in his gradual growth in self-possession, in uniqueness and intensity of his activity as an ago."[2] And this development of the ego depends only on action, fruitful and creative activity. The Quran refers to the presence of life and death in order "to test

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 81. J. Ward says that the word 'meliorism' was first adplied to this doctrine by George Eliot. See his *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 181.

2. Ibid., p. 117.

which of you is best in point of deed." (67 : 2). Death will be not a break in this continuity of growth and Paradise is not to be conceived as a holiday resort. "Life is one and continuous. Man marches always onward to receive ever fresh illuminations from an infinite Reality. . . . And the recipient of divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding."[1]

But while to Ward, this chance of personal survival is possible for every one, according to Iqbal this is restricted and conditional. Not every ego shall be able to enjoy immortality as such. In this essay on McTaggart Iqbal gives his reasons. No doubt the human ego is a part of the Absolute Ego, yet it does not follow that in its finitude also the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. This relationship or affinity at the most affords him the chance of winning immortality by his own efforts. Without a right sort of activity, it is not possible for man to belong to the meaning of the universe and become immortal. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* he refers in two different places to this problem. In the first (p. 130) he refers to two kinds of death. One is the death which brings total extinction or dissolution of the ego, while the other death is only a transition from one plane of being to another.

ازاں مرگے که می آید چه پاک است
خودی چون پخته شد از مرگ پاک است

---

1. *Lectures*, p. 123.

ز مرگ دیگرے لرزد دل من
دل من، جان من، آب و گل من
ز کار عشق و مستی بر فتادن
شرار خود به خاشاکے ندادن
ترا این مرگ هر دم در کمین است
بترس از وے که مرگ ما همین است

Why fear that death whieh comes from without ?
For when the 'I' ripens into a self.
It has no danger of dissolution.
There is a more sutble inner death which makes me tremble !
This death is falling down from love's frenzy.
Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps of chaff.
Fear it, for that is really our death,
This death lies in ambush for thee.

In the other place he compares the human ego with the Ultimate Ego and argues that immortality for man is conditioned on the type of life led by him.

خودی چون پخته گردد لازوال است
فراق عاشقان عین وصال است
شرر را تیز بالے می توان داد
تپید لا زوالے می توان داد
دوام حق جزائے کار او نیست
که او را این دوام از جستجو نیست
دوام آن به که جان مستعارے
شود از عشق و مستی پائدارے

When the 'I' ripens, it becomes eternal !
Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved, live in blissful union !
It is possible to give wings to a mere spark,

And to make it flutter for ever and ever!
The eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His actions!
That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wings for herself by love's frenzy.

This doctrine of Conditional Immortality had been held by many prominent thinkers in the past like Spinoza, Fichte, Goethe and Lotze. Spinoza, for instance, held that the ignorant man (for him, as for all pantheists, knowledge is more important than deed) never enjoys true peace of soul and lives ignorant both of God and of thought, and as soon as be ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. While the wise man is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being conscious, by a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul.[1] Thus Spinoza restricts immortality only to the wise. Lotze said, "Every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; everything will pass away which had its authorised place only in a transitory phase of the world's course." He goes on to explain that this principle is equally applicable to man and admits his ignorance as to determine merits "which may give to one existence a claim to eternity."[2] The modern, form of this doctrine is given in Mr. Petavel's

1. *Ethics*, V, Pro. 42. Scholium. See ERE, vol. 3, p. 823,
2. ERE, vol. 7, p. 175.

book, *Problem of Immortality.* (English translation, 1892) which reproduces to some extent the stand taken by Iqbal. The author says, "From this point of view man is a candidate for immortality. Perpetual life becomes the portion of the man who, by faith, unites himself to God."[1]

But there is a fundamental difference between Iqbal and these writers. Iqbal agrees that immortality is not open to all and sundry but only to a few. But the critetion proposed by Iqbal for this candidature is far more important that the one suggested here. It is not mere passive contemplation of the 'face' of the Eternal Beauty in which the mystics so much revel and which is totally unproductive and has no potentiality of effecting any healthy change in individual or society ; nor is it merely due to the working of an arbitrary will of God whose grace may select one and reject the other; nor is it merely 'faith' which may or may not influence the practical life of the individual. For Iqbal the criterion is activity of a fruitful type which alone will enable an individual to attain the blissful promise of immortality. It is here that the basic trend of Iqbal's thought—dynamic spiritualism—makes its appearance. Discussing this problem in a different context, Iqbal asks the question : is it possible for the human ego to attain the divine point of view ? In other words, is it possible for man to be immortal and yet retain his individuality ? If so, how ? The first

1. Ibid., p. 822.

way is of the mystic who tries to achieve this object by escaping from the conditions which material environment and human intellect impose upon us. It is the same view which Spinoza and other thinkers put forward and which Iqbal repudiated strongly. Spiritual vision may have its value but is totally useless for what Iqbal calls 'ego-sustaining' act. What is needed is the activity of a sort that may ward off the dissolution of the ego at the time of death. Nor is he in favonr of mere intellectual pursuits which, as he puts it, do not shape our clay into an ideal human being. "It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the impressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realizés itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation."[1]

The doctrine of Conditional Immortality was in contrast to the universalism of Plato who held that immortality was inherent in the very nature of man and therefore even if man did nothing he would, in the end, attain salvation. It fills man with a fatal sense of security and robs him of a great motive for spiritual effort. Conditionalism fits in well with the highest concéption of God's justice and love and because it represents immortality as a prize to

---

1, Self in the Ligh+ of Relativity" an article by Iqbal,

be won, it stimulates and inspires. In a way, it is the Darwinian theory of survival of the fittest' carried to the plane of spiritualism. Only those survive the shock of death and become immortal who are fittest in the spiritual sense. Discussing the universality of death, Iqbal says :

جہاں یکسر مقام افلین است
دریں غربت سرا عرفاں همیں است
دل ما در تلاش باطلے نیست
نصیب ما غم بے حاصلے نیست
نگہ دارند اینجا آرزو را
سرور و ذوق و شوق جستجو را
خودی را لا زوالے می توان کرد
فراقے را وصالے می توان کرد

This world is a place of passing away :
The highest wisdom is to realize this fact.
Our heart is not after something meaningless,
Nor are we undergoing a fruitless travail.
Here desire is strictly looked after
And also the delight and pleasure in search.
Khudi can be made immortal,
And separation can be changed into union.

But this union after separation for Iqbal does not mean union in the seuse of merging of the finite selves within the bosom of the Absolute. That would be to go against the basic principles of his philosophy. If many is real and possess individuality of its own, it must have an honourable place in the final set-up. So Iqbal strongly advocates that even in the last moment the ego will be able to retain its unique individuality. Referring to the day of

Resurrection, we find the following verse in the Quran : ". . . and each of them shall come to Him on the Day of Resurrection as a *single individual*" (19 : 96). On the basis of this verse Iqbal argues that Islam does not look wlth favour on the total extinction of individuals even on the Day of Reckoning when, according to another version of the Quran (17 : 14), each individual will be presented with a book and will be called upon to "read your book ; there needs none but yourself to make out an account against you this day."

به بحرش گم شدن انجام ما نیست
اگر او را تو در گیری فنا نیست
خودی اندر خودی گنجد محال است
خودی راعین خود بودن کمال است

It is not the end (of our journey) to merge ourselves in His ocean ;
If you grasp Him, you will never meet extinction.
It is impossible that a self may be contained in another self,
The perfection of a self lies in keeping its uniqueness.

And this perfection Iqbal illustrates by the description in the Quran of the Holy Prophet's vision of the Ultimate Ego : "His eye turned not aside, nor did it wander," (53 : 17) and remarks that "the climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embrrcing Ego." And it was for this reason that Iqbal counteracted the Platonic universalism by this theory of Conditional Immortality. Commenting on McTaggart's

point of view which was in the spirit of Plato, he says, "The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again into a perfection transcending time and change must be countracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, an inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact."

اگر مائیم گرداں جام ساقی است
به بزمش گرمئی هنگامه باقی است
مرا دل سوخت بر تنهائی او
کنم سامان بزم آرائی او
مثال دانه می کارم خوری را
برائے او نگه دارام خودی را

The cup of the saki will keep on moving only if we are there,
It is only then that His society will warm up.
My heart burns on the loneliness of God !
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego-Society,
I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood,
And keep a constant vigil over my 'I'.

In the hands of James Ward, this great current of modern thought allied itself with spiritualism and the result was the maturing of theistic pluralism in which God's Will was made compatible with the freedom and creativity of the individual. Henceforth this vitalistic trend spread itself in every sphere. Psychology broke with Associationism and the doctrine of purpose and rorme came to the fore in the person of McDougall. In biology the category of Life was given a unique and independent place and evolution by natural selection gave place to

emergent evolution in the hands of Lloyd Morgan. In William James we witness the development of functional psychology as well as theistic pluralism allied with empiricism. In the domain of literature, Carlyle, Browning and Shaw discussed the problem of life of the individuals and societies in the same perspective. In the next chapter we shall deal with the views of these thinkers *vis-a-vis* Iqbal.

## IQBAL AND SOME OTHER WESTERN VITALISTS

W. McDougall (1871-1938) started as a student of biology and medicine and was for long an active anthropological field worker before settling down in 1900 to the work of a psychologist. His main contribution lies in his revolt against intellectualism and mechanism. Not willing to confine psychology to consciousness, he advocated the study of human conduct or behaviour as equally necessary. In *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908) he says, "Psychologists must cease to be content with the sterile and narrow conception of their science as the science of consciousness, and must holdly assert its claim to be the positive science of . . . conduct or behaviour . . ." But his interpretation of behaviour was totally different from that of the Behaviourists. As we look around in the world we find some things that are inert and mechanical, moved by external forces, and other things that *behave*, that "seem to have intrinsic power of self-determinism, and to pursue actively . . . their own ends and purposes . . . The striving to achieve an end is, then, the mark of behaviour ; and behaviour is the characteristic of livings."[1] Thus McDougall emphasised the

---

1. R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, (London, 1949), P. 217.

role of purpose in human behaviour which implies the presence of striving any goal-seeking and therefore he emphasised teleological in opposition to mechanical causation. But this teleology for McDougall is not the 'mechanical' teleology which Bergson criticised and which Iqbal also rejected. To him the future does not influence the present behaviour of man. It is not the future goal-reaching but the present goal-seeking that influences the present course of events. Or, as Iqbal puts it, "Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands."[1]

The next important problem for McDougall was to discover what goals are sought or what the motives human conduct are. He could not reconcile himself to the intellectulistic outlook of the older psychologists according to whom all human conduct was rational and dependent on foresight of consequences. According to him, there are certain basic motives which are natural and hereditary—which he called by the name of instincts. He pleaded strongly that behaviour is not driven by purely rational considerations but by loves and hates, interests, zeals, rivalries, enthusiasms, all of which have an emotional and impulsive character derived

1. *Lectures*, p. 54.

ultimately from the native propensities of mankind.

It is very difficult to agree with the list of instincts enunciated by McDougall but as far as his basic contribution to the science of psychology is concerned, *viz.*, his anti-mechanism and anti-tellectualism or to put it in positive terms, his purposivism and voluntarism—fairly fit in the thought-structure of Iqbal. McDougall's *Social Psychology* was first published in 1908 when Iqbal left England and along with Bergson's *Creative Evolution* (1907) did serve to strengthen his conviction in the futility of applying mechnical categories to the explanation of human life, in viewing the life of the ego as constant striving after the goals and in looking upon love—the noblest type of sentiment according to McDougall—as the basic force in strengthening the bonds of life.

زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است

نقطۂ نورے که نام او خودی است
زیر خاک ما شرار زندگی است

از محبت مے شود پائنده تو
زنده تر سوزنده تر تابنده تر

Life is latent in seeking,
Its origin is hidden in desire,
The luminous point whose name is the Self
Is the life-spark beneath our dust.
By love it is made more lasting,
More living, more burning, more glowing.

Another very important aspect of McDougall's theory—of Sentiments—seems to

have influenced Iqbal in the formulation of his notion of 'self'. According to McDougall, behaviour at the instinctive level is chaotic and disorderly but when these very instincts become organized with reference to particular objects by means of sentiments, a harmony, consistency and order develop in the life of the individual. Of particular importance, according to McDougall, is the 'selfregarding sentiment', a sentiment on which the various instincts and emotions are organised round the idea of self. In a well-integrated personality the sentiments themselves are organised into something like a hierarchy, with the self-regarding sentiment occupying the central position.[1] It is this basic sentiment—*Khudi* in the words of Iqbal—that determines the moral nature of man. And Iqbal adds that this *khudi* not only determines but becomes the very standard of values and thus settles the problem of good and evil. "That which fortifies personality ('self-regarding sentiment') is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the stand-point of personality."[2] In men of strong character, McDougall asserts, self-regarding sentiment is determined by some ideal of conduct set up by "admiring persons who are known in real life, in religious or ethical teaching, in history or

---

1. J. C. Flugel, *A Hundred Years of Psychology*, (London 1951), p. 276.

2, Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, p. xv.

literature."[1] Iqbal, therefore, put before a Muslim the ideal of conduct set by the holy prophet.

عاشقی ؟ محکم شو از تقلید یار    تا کمند تو شود یزداں شکار

If you are a lover, strengthen by following in the footsteps of the beloved,
So that you may be able to hold even God in your lasso.

Another important person who revolted against the mechanistic interpretation of biological phenomena, Lloyd Morgan (1952-1938) who getting his inspiration from Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, postulates the theory of Emergent Evolution. Though he formally repudiated the strictly vitalistic implication of Bergson's view, yet his theory of emergence of novelties in the course of evolutionary process helped in promoting purposivism in biology. His *Emergent Evolution*, as Gifford Lectures delivered in 1922-3, showed that he was not fully satisfied with the account of evolution as presented by Darwin and Spencer and therefore he was led to postulate the principle of emergence according to which something absolutely new is brought into existence at certain critical stages in the advance of nature. The *emergent*, cannot be "pre-determined from the data afforded at the level below that at which in due course it emerges."[2] Thus, accord-

---

1. Flugel. *op. cit.*, p. 276.
2. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, II*, p. 360.

ing to him, life emerges out of matter, and mind out of life. But why does this emergence take place ? Though Morgan was at one time opposed to Bergson's *elan vital* as being unscientific, yet in attempting to answer this important question of philosophy, he was led to almost the same conclusion. He admits "an operative power or activity which is behind all happenings and is the cause and impulse of all things. . . This activity manifests itself in all the manifold phenomenal forms of the course of development The cause of all this is the creative activity of God."[1] Thus he is forced to admit the presence of the active principle in the process of evolution which is more personal and theistic than the impersonal and nebulous *elan vital* of Bergson. Except for this religious terminology of Morgan's account of evolutionary process, there was nothing in it of special importance for Iqbal. Thus, in his *Lectures*, he refers to both these aspects of the theory—the non-mechanical nature of the emergent and the presence of divine activity that is responsible for their emergence. "The emergent, as the advocates of the Emergent Evolution teach us, is an unforeseeable and novel fact on its own plane of being, and cannot be explained mechanically." A little later on, he says, "The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge, is immanent in nature . . . ,"[2]

James (1842-1910) represents a tendency in thought which is in reality an old way of

1. Ibid., p. 361.

2. *Lectures*, pp. 106-7.

thinking under a new name—the sub-title that he gives to his well-known book *Pragmatism.* It was primarily a polemic against Absolutism of the British Begelian school represented by Green, Bradley and Bosanquet and in this respect carried on the work done by James Ward. James' merit in this respect is not the construction of any positive philosophical system so much as his forceful attack against all systems of philosophy that were monistic and nonempirical. True to the spirit of the times, he stood for pluralism and theism, empiricism and religion, life and change, freedom of the individual and his right to shape his future as he thinks fit in co-operation with others,

Philosophy of the Absolute satisfies to a certain extent our religious craving, but it ignores the concrete facts of Reality. It spurns the dust and is reared upon pure logic. "Affirming the Absolute Mind," says James, "to be the rational presupposition of all particulars of fact . . . it remains supremely indifferent to what the particular facts in our world actually are. Like the sick lion in Æsop's fable, all footprints lead into his den but *nulla vestigia retrorsum.* You cannot re-descend into the world of the particulars by the Absolute's aid or deduce any necessary consequences of detail important for your life from your idea of his nature."[1]

Besides, it is pantheistic and rationalistic.

———

1. W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 71.

Both these characteristics contribute, according to James, to the same abstractionism. Pantheism, though superficially allied to religion is in reality a negation of true theistic spirit and too much intellectualism leads to indifference to the concrete problems of life. But empiricism that lays proper stress on concrete facts and does not ignore the life on this earth, has been so far allied to materialism that is equally injurious to our true human existence, James, therefore, like Ward and Iqbal, tries to present a system of thought in which love of the concrete facts, *i.e.*, empirical attitude, is combined with true religious spirit. We need, according to him, "a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type"[1]

James offers pluralism and radical empiricism which seek to give theistic satisfaction to the individual and keeps him in contact with concrete manifold facts of reality. "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin"[2] In this

1. W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 20.

2. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 314.

process he discarded pantheism as well as old theism inherited from Scholastic period.[1] Pantheism brings man and God into most intimate relation and it has satisfied the religious cravings of the most of the mystics, but, at the same time, it has dulled their instinct of activity and social behaviour. By a strange coincidence it has allied itself with rationalism in running away from concrete facts. As James puts it, panthe-istic idealism tends to make us entitively one with God[2] and it is this relation of identity which is held out to be an ideal of highest intimacy. But in the sphere of moral and social life this ideal of identity tends to undermine the activist attitude. There remains no motive for evolution, change, progress, exercise of one's will for betterment. The world to which pantheism or Absolutism introduces us is "simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it. Its architecture is classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical necessities cement its parts . . . . It is a kind of marble temple shining on a hill."[3] On the other hand, the world of concrete reality is "multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed." So the system of thought represented by pantheism or Absolut-ism is no explanation of our universe ; it is only remedy, a way of escape from our hard life.

---

1. *Pragmatism*, p. 17.
2. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 25.
3. *Pragmatism*, pp. 21-22.

The same reason made Iqbal reject pantheistic mysticism which tended to obscure the vision of men from actualities. Like James, he insists on the necessity of association with the visible and the temporal without which it is not possible to develop even spiritual elements in man. Unless one is familiar with the appearances and is able to achieve control over the material environment and mould what *is* into what *ought to be*, he cannot hope to understand Reality.[1] But theism of classical type was equally unacceptable. It views the relation of God and man as external, unilateral and not reciprocal. It does not conceive Him as the heart of our heart and the reason of our reason but a magistrate ; we are expected to obey His commands mechanically. This dualistic theism which was upheld as a reaction against immanent conception of God has lost its appeal to the modern man who cannot view this monarchical theism with equanimity. We must view the place of the divine in the world to be more organic and intimate. Iqbal, like James, rejects the old form of theism that makes the God sit in the Heavens. According to him. comprehends and encompasses the whole universe. Our life is organic to His Being. "Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life."[2]

In emphasising empiricism in opposition to

---

1. Self in the Light of Relativity, an article by Iqbal.
2. *Lectures*, p. 72.

intellectualism, James and Iqbal both criticise the role of Plato who is made responsible for hypostatising concepts into independent and static realities apart from the perpetual flow of events.[1] In *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Iqbal has devoted a full chapter to the criticism of Platonism which he characterises as ' sheep's doctrine '.

> Plato, the prime ascetic and sage,
> Was one one of that ancient flock of sheep.
> He was so fascinated by the invisible
> That he made hand, eye, and ear of no account,[2]

The result of this vicious abstractionism is that during the Middle Ages in Europe as well as in the East all speculative efforts remained confined to barren hair-splitting of dead concepts unrelated to life. Both therefore agree with Bergson in reversing the Platonic way of looking at the problems. "Dive back into the flux itself . . . if you wish to *khow* Reality, that flux which Platonism, in its strange belief that only the immutable is excellent, has always spurned ; turn your face towards sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse."[3] Iqbal, similarly, has tried to prove that emphasis on perceptual aspect of Reality was the main feature of the Quran and it was the influence of Greek thinkers in the very beginning of Muslim thought which hindered the development of true empirical spirit for a

---

1. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 218.
2. *Secrets of the Self*, pp. 32-4.
3. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 252.

long time. He, therefore, along with James and Ward has tried to base his system on empiricism. "As true disciple of Socrates," says Iqbal, "Plato despised sense-perception which, in his view, yielded mere opinion and no real knowledge."[1]

But as Kant has remarked, concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind. So where true philosophy must start with perception and observation, it cannot rest at that. "Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are thus complementary of each other ; each remedies the other's defects."[2]

Like Bergson, James and Iqbal both criticise the ultra-intellectual attitude adopted by Absolutists. Intellectual point of view feels itself at home while dealing with static and immutable concepts but Reality, according to these thinkers, is in constant flux and so the logical categories of intellectualism cannot grasp it. "Power of framing abstract concepts, no doubt, is one of the sublimest of our human prerogatives,"[3] yet if we confine all our speculative efforts within this narrow field, we are sure to miss the true living reality. We must go beyond the sphere of logical categories to comprehend the real pulsating heartbeat of Reality. Intellectualism, true to its nature, translates the flux of eternally moving phase of reality into a conceptual order

1. *Lectures*, p. 4.
2. *Pluralitive Universe*, p. 251.
3. Ibid. 217.

and then this useful device becomes a tyranny and thereby the whole conception of reality itself undergoes a change. From a perpetual flux, Reality, in the hands of conceptual logic of intellectualism, changes into a static world which James calls a 'block universe', incapable of change, growth and evolution. As such, there can be no finality about our knowledge and so, according to James, "knowledge is a concrete, dynamic process, something which is not *given* but *made*."[1] It is characterised by "looking away from first things, principles, 'categories supposed necessities ; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts."[2] Thus by emphasising the prospective aspect of knowledge and experience, James extends the significance of empiricism which is only retrospective. He quotes with approval the view of a Danish writer that we live forward while we understand backward and so to try to understand life by concepts, by logic of intellectualism, "is to arrest its movement, cutting it up into bits as if with scissors."[3] The reliance on this treatment presupposes "life to have already accomplished itself."[4] But it cannot be denied that concepts, static though they may be, have an important place in the development of knowledge. As Iqbal puts it ;

1. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Part II, p. 340.

2. *Pragmatism*, p. 55.

3. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 244.

4. *Pragmatism*, p. 257.

گہے نارش ز برھان و دلیل است
گہے نورش ز جان جبرئیل است
به چشمے خموت خود را به بیند
به چشمے جلوت خود را به بیند
اگر یک چشم بر بندد گناھے است
اگر با ھردو بیند شرط راھے است

At one time, it gets fire from reason,
At another, it recieves light from Gabriel's breath.
With one eye it sees none but itself,
With other eye, it sees itself spread in society.
If one eye is kept shut, it is sinful ;
If it sees with both, it fulfils the condition of the path.[1]

Thus "in the interest of securing a complete vision of Reality, sense-perception must be supplemented by the perception of the 'heart'. The 'heart' is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception."[2] In this respect, Iqbal agrees with Bergson rather than with James and Ward. Both the latter thinkers are no doubt against too much intellectualism but they fail to give due place in their system to the 'perception of the heart', *i.e.* intuition. To remain confined to the level of sense-perception as James seems to advocate, is to reduce philosophy to the inconsistent view of the common man. As Radhakrishnan puts it, Bergion develops on the lines of Plato and Spinoza ; "James looks to Hume and

---

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 208.
2. *Lectures*, p. 15-6.

Mill for inspiration,"[1] and hence he is not able to go beyond mere sense-perception.

Iqbal agrees with James (and, as we have seen, with Ward) that the true picture of reality can be obtained not in monism but in pluralism, not in what James calls 'all-form' but in 'each-form.' If we believe in the existence and reality of the Absolute, it would virtually amount to the denial of the reality of the individual selves. The Absolute mind is claimed to make 'the partial facts by taking them, just as we make objects in a dream by dreaming them. or personages in a story by immagining them."[2] thus reducing the eaches to a dreamy existence that possesses no independent reality. "Pluralism lets things really exist in the each-form or distributively. Monism thinks that the all-form . . . is the only form that is rational."[3] Thus James is led to view the universe not on the analogy of an empire or a kingdom in which the individuals lose their independence but in the form of a federal republic where each unit exists by itself and along with the Centre contribute to the general welfare.[4] Iqbal quotes the Quranic verse (19 : 95-6) in support of the 'each-form' of Pluralism, "*Each of them* shall come to him on the Day of

1. *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.* p. 270.

2. *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 36.

3. Ibid., p. 324.

4. *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 321-2.

Resurrection as *a single individual.*"[1]

The doctrine of free-will in James in determined by the independent position that he assigns to each individual in his pluralistic universe. "Free-will pragmatically means *novelties in the word*, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identicall repeat and imitate the past."[2] He believes that the future has ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb.[3] In spite of the odium usually attached to the acceptance of chance and contingency—"metaphysical pestilence", as if—James boldly asserts that without the presence of chance by which he means 'indeterminate future volitions,' there can be no scope for betterment in the world. From the practical point of view, freedom of will of the individuals assures us that the world is full of promise and that it is going to be better and richer than before.

As regards the alleged incompatibility of human freedom with God's providence, James employs the analogy of a chess player. As an expert player in spite of not being able to determine before hand the exact moves of his rival, can be sure of winning in the end, so God, the Infinite Mind, in the face of finite beings who are endowed with freedom of choice, can manage so to order the working of the universe that it

1. For a fuller discussion of Iqbal's Pluralism see the Chapter on Iqbal and Ward.
2. *Pragmatism*, pp. 118-9.
3. *Will to Believe*, p. 150.

can achieve the desired result. "The creator's plan of the universe would be thus left blank as to many of its actual details . . . The realisation of some of these would be left absolutely to chance . . . So the Creator himself would not need to know *all* the details of activity until they came ; and at at any time his own view of the world would be a view partly of facts and partly of possibilities, exactly as ours is now."[2]

Iqbal tries to solve this contradication between man's freedom and God's omniscience by limiting the sphere of God's power. To him, as to James, "the future certainly pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."[2] The creative power of the individuals who are called upon "to mould what *is* into what *ought to be*" increasingly exploits all the various environments towards this end and in this process God has imposed limitls upon Himself so as to let the creators create. But to Iqbal this self-imposed limitations of God in no wise reduce Him to the status of a 'finite God'. Infinity in the case of God, according to Iqbal, should be viewed intensively and not extensively. "The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression."[3] The limitation is not externally imposed ; it is born out of

---

1. *Will to Believe*, p. 182.
2. *Lectures*, p. 79.
3. Ibid., p. 64.

His own creative freedom whereby. He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power and freedom. He therefore does not agree with James in conceiving God as having "an external environment and consequently finite." For James, the best way to conceive God is to view Him as "not all-embracing" but as "finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once."[1] But to Iqbal this way of looking at God is totally wrong. According to him, "the universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him." It is only "a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life."[2] There is nothing that can exist outside Him, everything is organically related to Him as a part and parcel of His being.

With regard to the place of evil that is intimately related with God's omnipotence, James, Ward and Iqbal are all of the same view. As the world is continually liable to grow and evolve, every individual has his part to play and in this work God as *primus inter pares* co-operates with us in making the world a better place. "In our cognition as well as in our active life we are creative. We *add*, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality."[3] The universe is still in the making and awaits part of its complexion from the future. And so there

---

1. *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 311.
2. *Lectures*, p. 65.
3. *Pragmatism*, pp. 256-7.

is every hope of ultimate salvation. Optimism and pessimism are both wrong ; the truth lies in meliorism', according to which the universe is neither intrinsically good nor evil ; good and evil both characterise it. But as there are ambiguous possibilities in the future, novelties and continuous creation, it is possible for man to play an important part in bringing about his own salvation as well as that of the world. Given a benevolent God, it is possible to conceive that at last "some conditions of the world's salvation are actually extant."[1] But as to the remaining conditions. James suggests the part the creative activity of human individuals plays. He asks ; Does our act then *create* the world's salvation ? and he unhesisitatingly replies in the affirmative. Man plays a part no less important and constructive than God does in achieving salvation and in gaining victory over the forces of evil.

Differing in details here and there, Iqbal and James are agreed in rejecting any worldview which denies reality of change any plurality, human freedom and individuality, evolution and progress. As such their point of view is allied with vitalism in its biocentric attitude ; with voluntarism in its emphasis upon the primacy of activity over pure contemplation and the purposive character of the mental life ; with evolutionism, in its forward-looking attitude and in its conception of a growing and developing universe ; with empiricism in its concern for facts, and fiinally with indeterminism and pluralism

1. *Progmatism*, p. 286.

in its emphasis upon the reality of human freedom, and recognition of individuals as real centres of activity in human life.

Carlyle (1795-1881) was born and brought up in a period which saw great social and political changes in England. In 1820 George Stephenson invented the steam engine which acclerated hundred fold the rate of industrial expansion and brought with it social evils of various kinds. The first step towards the amelioration of the exploited labour could be taken in 1833 when the first Factory Law was passed, prohibiting the employment of children under teens and restricting the hours of work. The antiquated penal code of the country, according to which capital punishment could be awarded for stealing a paltry sum, was gradually amended ; jails were reformed, slavery was abolished (1833) and preliminary steps were taken to enforce primary and free education. The monopoly of the landowning and industrial classes in the governance of the country was gradually broken down by the reforms of the Parliament and the middle classes were able to make their influence felt.

But the position of the peasants was still unenviable. So the Chartist movement (1838) was started in which Carlyle contributed much by publishing a pamphlet 'Chartism' which discussed not only the way how the immediate problems could be solved but also hinted at the general and basic policy which alone could, according to him, solve the ever-recurring social

evils. He demanded just gains, reasonable hours of work, comfortable dwellings, pure water. He denounced not the employment of machines but the mechanisation of the attitude of the people of the age and along with it he denounced democracy which he called 'a self-cancelling business' and which leads infallibly to despotism in the absence of the 'blessed' alternative of Government by Aristocracy, defined as "a corporation of the best and bravest."

Carlyle was not a professional philosopher but a sensitive soul. The social problems of his days led him to meditate on the fundamental problems of thought, on the nature of man and his destiny, and his relation to society and God. He passed through a period of utter scepticism; his study of German thinkers, however, brought him out of this morass of utter disbelief and gave him access to 'a new earth and a new heaven,' This conversion of his is beautifully described in *Sartor Resartus* in a metaphorical encounter with the Devil whom he calls the Everlasting No. "The Devil said, 'Behold thou art fatherless, outcast, and the universe is mine' to which my whole Me now made answer; 'I am not thine, but Free, and for ever hate thee!'" This unique experience of Carlyle, analogous to several similar experiences recorded in the mystic literature of the world, symbolised his conversion from a Godless. mechanistic and utilitarian point of view of his age to a new world where God occupies an

honourable position, man's creative and free activity is fully restored and the interests of society and individuals are given a due place.

At the time Carlyle went to the University (1809) the school of Locke still reigned supreme, in spite of the devastating power of Hume's scepticism. It was this empirical attitude which tended to drive religion away from the thoughts of men. Carlyle himself noted the irony in the fact that it had been "Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man (who) had paved for banishing religion from the world." He characterised this era by saying that 'Not Godhead, but an iron, ignoble circle of Necessity embraces all things.' He ridiculed the mechanistic and associationistic psychology of his days and scorned at Bentham's reduction of all morality to a calculus of motives and sanctions. His early attachment to Calvinism and his deep-seated conviction in the value of religion in human life, convinved him that there was something wrong in all this system of thought. He seemed to stand for the deeply dynamic nature of man, of society and of the world itself. But for a long time he could not find any way out. His reading from Berkeley and other thinkers did not help him much. Study of Gibbon taught him that there was no iota of truth in Christianity- But the study of German thinkers and especially Goethe opened before him a new vision of life; it restored to him faith in the eternal values of religion and in the efficacy of work. He found

that Goethe's hero in *Wilhelm Meister* "had discovered the dynamic and productive value of simple things, of common life, of daily hours and minutes. He had embraced the actual, and had discovered the curative and creative power of action." He admired Goethe's union of the singer and the sage his combination of the real and the ideal, his treatment of the actual as the raw material of the ideal, his conception of renunciation as the preliminary act in true living, his reverence for sorrow, and silence about the Unseen. Kant served for him as an important force for the rehabilitation of the spiritual world and a "deliverance from the fatal incubus of Scotch or French philosophy, with all its mechanisms and atheisms," The relativity of space and time and the function of reason as expounded by Kant were taken by Carlyle as the means for the refutation of materialism and the vindication of the spiritual realities. But the mere negative attitude of Kant with regard to reason, and the mere regulative function of practical reason could not satisfy Carlyle as it did not do for Iqbal and most of the post-Kantian thinkers. They tried to go beyond the mask of the phenomenal to the core of inner Reality and if that was not possible by theoretical reason as Kant understood it, then it must be found in other spheres. For Carlyle this other source was 'Reason' itself, using the term in the un-Kantian sense of what Bergson and Iqbal call intuition, a sort of metaphysical penetration to spiritual truth, which is an

instrument in the hands of the Seer, the Hero, by which he gains direct insight into eternal truth. Following Fichte, he gave 'faith content' to reason and thus widened its scope beyond what Kant intended to convey by it. It combined intellectual intuition, mystical communion and moral revelation and was, in the eye of Carlyle, one of the sources of our knowledge of Reality. But Carlyle's identification of reason with 'faith' and 'devotion' served to make it inaccessible to most of the people, thus reducing it to a sort of faculty that requires special cultivating. This led Carlyle to posit difference between man and man: some elementally incapable of rising to the appreciation of the higher spiritual attitude, This consequence is compatible with Carlyle's doctrine of the Hero but is hardly acceptable to Iqbal, for whom intuitive insight is within the grasp of every individual, however low intellectually he may be. Agreeing with Carlyle in denunciation of democracy to a certain extent, Iqbal cannot go full length with him in depriving the common man of the power of determining the course of his own life as well as the life of society.

Taking a cue from Kant that space and time are relative to human mind, Carlyle developed his view of nature as unreal and imaginary a sort of dream. He was very fond of quoting Shakespeare's famous lines which he came across very early as a boy :

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life,

Is rounded with a sleep.

But then the reading of Goethe saved him from falling into the purely subjective state of a mystic. The visible world is not *merely* a dream; it is also a curtain for the dynamic revelation of Reality (*offenbarung*). The world is unreal and imaginary but being the revelation or expression of the Real that lay behind it, one could very easily arrive at the truth through the visible garment. The universe was, to use an old theological term, 'a mystery', *viz.*, that which is everywhere revealed but is not understood by those who have not right judgment. He based his view of Nature on the famous lines of Goethe's *Faust* where the Earth Spirit sings of all nature as the vesture or garment of God.

'Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I play,
And weave for God the Garment thou seest Him by.

It was this symbolic representation of the function of Nature that Carlyle accepted as true—Nature as the expression of God. If we wish to penetrate into the Infinite, the true way is to turn to the finite everywhere about us. Adapting Goethe's doctrine of *Das Werdende* (eternal growth), Carlyle looked upon Nature as a scene of universal growth and development, eternal revelation of life. The other element in Carlyle's view of nature he derived from Fichte to whom the the world of matter was a shpere which, by its very opposition, served to help in the moral progress of man. Nature is thus both the obstacle to, and the sphere of, activity and in this respect aids in the realisation

of the Divine Idea that is at the back of all.

Both Goethe and Fichte helped Carlyle in one sense or the other to free himself from prevalent materialism. Writing in his Journal (1840) he says, "I think I have got rid of materialism. Matter no longer seems to me so ancient, so unsubduable, so *certain* and palpable as Mind. I am Mind : whether matter or not I know not—and care not. Mighty glimpses into the spiritual universe I have sometimes had ; would they could but stay with me and ripen into a perfect view." Such a perfect view never came to Carlyle. for he took from every thinker what suited him at the moment without any consideration of consistency. Now and then he toyed with pantheism and Fichte's 'Divine Idea' but he stuck to the last to the theistic conception of a personal God and nature as His Veil which partly screens Him from the eye of man and partly reveals His true nature. 'The universe is but one vast Symbol of God," as Carlyle puts it. "We speak of the Volume of Nature, and truly as Volume it is,—whose author is God . . . Dost thus, does man, so much as well know the alphabet thereof? . . . It is a Volume written in celestial hieroglyphs."[1] It is the duty of the Seer to decipher this symbolism of hieroglyphs—the world of nature—in order to know himself and to discover his destiny.

Iqbal cannot subscribe to Carlyle denunciation of matter as unreal and the universe as

---

1. *Sartor Resartus*, p. 234.

mere dream and a shadow. To him both matter and universe are not *batil;* they are real and have objective existence. According to him, it is the basic defect in the mystic approach that it disregards the value of the appearance *vis-a-vis* Reality and Carlyle's approach was allied in this respect to a mystic's. The shifting actualities of Nature, according to Iqbal, unmistakably lead to the knowledge of the Ultimate Ego of which it is a manifestation, a 'sign' as the Quran puts it. But he agrees with Carlyle in viewing Nature as constantly growing and enriching itself and liable to increase. And like carlyle, Iqbal's view of Nature as a counterpart of the Ego—the non-ego—becomes a gospel of constant and creative activity, a view which both Carlyle and Iqbal derived from Fichte and which is beautifully expressed in the very first pages of *Asrar-i-Khudi* :

> Self-affirmation brings Not-self to light.
> By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world :
> Subject, object. means, and causes—
> All these are forms which it assumes for the purpose of action.
> The Self rises, kindles, falls, glows, breathes,
> Burns, shines, walks, and flies.
> The spaciousness of Time is its arena,
> Heaven is a billow of the dust on its road.

But as Iqbal puts it, God is revealed not only in Nature but also in History and it is in the latter manifestation that Carlyle is most interested in his doctrine of Heroes. The view of history as presented by Hume and others,

based as it was on purely mechanistic interpretation of human behaviour, was totally unacceptable to Carlyle and therefore he naturally turned to German writers who looked upon history after the tradition first made popular by Jews, as a revelation of the Divine, thus bringing God down from high above to the sphere of man's daily activity where the historical process develops according to a teleological principle. Following Schiller, Carlyle looked upon History as the higher, *potential* revelation of the Absolute, as Nature is the lower, actual manifestation. The historical process realises the harmony of freedom and necessity, spirit and matter and thus the history of the human race, according to Carlyle, becomes an immense spectacle of mind struggling with matter, of good battling with evil—in accordance with God's eternal laws. His treatment of French Revolution showed that, according to him, it was but a branch of a greater historical, indeed of a, cosmical process, in which moral ideals are seeking realization.

But this view of history, in spite of its appearance of a developing and changing process, is in reality as mechanically determined as *e.g.*, Hume's interpretation of history which Carlyle rejected. As a critic puts it, "fundamentally there is very little development in history for Carlyle; history is less a progressive, organic revelation of God than a symbol of an eternal and perfect Being. The historirn and the hero are to *read* the symbols, and humanity learns

their meaning by *experience*. Though Carlyle occasionally toyed with the idea of evolution in history. and even though the doctrine of *Becoming* meant, at one time, a great deal to him, nevertheless history, as well as Nature, struck him as the *handwriting of God*."[1] Such a view of history, as a mere revelation of a Divine Plan, or as Iqbal would put it, "as a gradually revealed photo of a pre-determined order of events,"[2] leaves no room for originality and creation. The sage—the Hero—is reduced to be a mere sign-reader, a mere interpreter of the trends of the future ; he is no longer a creator who by his efforts shapes the destiny of his contemporaries along fruitful directions. Common man and the Hero along with him become a tool in the hand of Fate—call it by the name of Providence if you like. He has nothing to contribute ; he has only to interpret and decripher.

Moreover, in Carlyle's conception of history there is implicit the very dangerous idea that whatever survives in the historical ordeal is good and therefore some writers were compelled to view Carlyle's handling of history as supporting the doctrine of "might makes right."[3] Without entering into the controversy

1. C. F. Harrold, *Carlyle and German Thought*, p. 293.
2. *Lectures*, p. 79.
3. "Give a thing time ; if it can succeed, it is right thing." *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, p. 165.

"...Mights which do in the long-run, and forever will in this just Universe in the long-run, mean Rights" *Past and Present*, p. 190.

whether Carlyle did subscribe to it or not, it is evident that once we view history as a revelation of God's Will, we are bound to accept every event that happens as the expression of His approval. We can save ourselves from these dangerous implications only if we look upon historical process, as Iqbal does, "as a continuous movement in time," "a genuinely creative movement and not a movement whose path is already *determined*" and in this process man contributes as much as God.[1]

Carlyle viewed history as the biography of outstanding men in different spheres of life—men whom he called Heroes. "The history of what man has accomplished in this world is at bottom the History of Great Men who have worked here,"[2] In Fichte's doctrine of Divine Idea that seeks its manifestation in different ages in different forms, Carlyle found a favourable theory on which he built his own theory of the Hero. "The only positive men," says Fichte, "are those who seek to reveal the Idea : they are the Heroes, the Leaders, the Sages, who bring order out of chaos, establish right and justice, exalt the ideals of religion and morality."[3] His genius is nothing more than the effort of the Idea to assume a definite form ; his work is the most direct manifestation of God in the world. In the words of Carlyle,

1. *Lectures*, p. 141.
2. *Heroes & Hero-Worship*, p. 1.
3. C. F. Harrold, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

"they were the leaders of men . . . the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain . . . . The great man (is a) free force direct out of God's message to us . . . . A messenger he, sent from the Infinite Unknown with tidings to us . . . . (He) penetrates into sacred mystery of the Universe . . . (into) 'the Divine Idea of the World."[1]

Iqbal would agree with much of what Carlyle says about the Hero. He calls the Perfect Man as 'the inner life of the world,' 'a shadow of the Great Name', who works with the full support of the Will of God. His nature is full and seeks manifestation and brings into being a new world out of the ashes of the old ; he is a representative of Divine Will ; he gives life and energy to the average man ; he brings tidings to the human race which is as a corn-field and he is the fruit of the whole toil,[2]

The first characteristic of the Hero, according to Carlyle (as well as Fichte), is integrity. He says, "I should say sincerity, a deep, great, genuine sincerity, is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic."[3] It was on the basis of this that Carlyle chose the holy prophet Muhammad as a type of Hero. Being a Christian and nurtured on innumerable slanderous statements about Islam, it was a really

---

1. C. F. Harrold, pp. 1-2, 15, 49, 52, 91.
2. *Secrets of the Self*, pp. 46-48 (Lahore, 1950).
3. *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, p. 51.

extraordinary step that he took and yet his treatment of the Holy Prophet was mostly free from prejudice, which showed that Carlyle was able to rise above the narrow partisanship. Ever since Carlyle included him in the list of heroes, misunderstandings about Islam and the holy Prophet have gradually been diminishing. The second characteristic is insight, particularly moral insight. Fichte, discussing particularly the Hero as a Ruler, says, "The Ruler . . . looks beyond that which (is) *in the actual world* to that which (is) in the Divine Idea—to that which therefore ought to be."[1] This quality defines the goal of the leader as one towards which man's struggles are directed in a moral and religious, rather than in an exclusively political or economic progress towards a fuller, spiritual life. It was due to these characteristics of sincerity and insight why Karlyle excluded Napoleon from the list of Heroes. But the mere possession of insight is not enough ; it seems to imply that the work of the Hero is only passive—he possesses, as if, superior spiritual eye by which he pierces through the "show of things" into the underlying realm oj spiritual truth. What a truly perfect man needs is not only insight but foresight—the quality which Carlyle totally ignores—a power to look into the future and to recreate the society of times in view of future welfare. Iqbal describes this characteristic :

1. C. F. Harrold, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

زندگی رامی کند تفسیر نو
می دهد ایں خواب را تعبیر نو
زندگی بخشد ز اعجاز عمل
می کند تجدید انداز عمل
جلوه ها خیزد ز نقش پائے او
صد کلیم آوارۂ سینائے او

He gives a new explanation of life,
A new interpretation of this dream.
He bestows life by his miraculous action,
He renovates old ways of life.
Splendid visions rise from the print of his foot,
Many a Moses is entranced by his Sinai.[1]

In *Zarb-i-Kalim*, describing the characteristics of a leader, he refers to his interest in the future rather than in the present.

ہے وهی تیرے زمانے کا امام برحق
جو تجھے حاضر و موجود سے بیزار کرے

He alone is the true Leader of your age,
Who produces in you a dissatisfaction about Now and Present.[2]

The last great characteristic of the Hero is the capacity for activity and along with it his "talent for silence." His genius expresses itself less in words of praise for himself or for his deeds and more in creative work. He is "unself-conscious" and in him intuition and insight are far more operative than reason. Carlyle quotes Schiller in this respect. "Abstracted from the contemplation of himself, his (hero's) eye was turned upon the object of his labour, and

1. *Secrets of the Self*, p. 47-8.
2. *Zarb-i-Kalim*, p. 46.

he pursued them with the eagerness, the entireness, the spontaneous sincerity, of a boy, pursuing sport. Hence this 'child-like simplicity,' the last perfection of his other excellencies . . . He walked the earth in calm power: 'the staff of his spear was like a weaver's beam'; but he wielded it like a wand."[1] According to Fichte, the Divine Idea inevitably issues in a divine deed and as the Hero is the expression of the Divine Idea, his activities automatically assume sacred character. "All his thoughts and impulses will of themselves take the most direct way to this end; whatever he does, prompted by this thought, is good and right, and must assuredly prosper, for it is an immediately *divine* act."[2] And this act, since it is a revelation of the Divine Idea and is fundamentally creative, is an act of order; the hero conceives the whole and seeks ever to realize the steps towards a greater totality. In the words of Carlyle, this means that the great man "is here to make what is disorderly, chaotic into a thing ruled, regular. He is the missionary of order. Is not all work of man in this world a *making of order?*"[3] His work consists not in upholding what is : his efforts are rather directed towards changing into a better pattern, into what *ought to be.*

در عمل پوشیده مضمون حیات
لذت تخلیق قانون حیات

---

1. Carlyle, *Life of Schiller,* p.p. 198-9 as quoted in C.F. Harrold, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

2. C. F. Harrold, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

3. Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero-worship, p.* 233.

با جهان نامساعد ساختن
هست در میدان سپر انداختن
مرد خود ارے که باشد پخته کار
با مزاج او بسازد روزگار

He bestows life by his miraculous action,
He renovates old ways of life.
The pith of life is contained in action,
To delight in creation is the law of Life.
To comply with this world which does not favour thy purposes
Is to flying away thy buckler on the field of battle.
The man of strong character who is master of himself
Will find Fortune complaisant.[1]

Comparing the man of action with the average man, Iqbal says in another place :

کار ما وا بستهٔ تخمین و ظن
او همه کردار و کم گوید سخن

We are immersed in doubts and misgivings,
While he is Action itself and seldom speaks.[2]

There are, however, two points in Carlyle's theory of the hero which are incompatible with Iqbal's fundamental position, First, Carlyle reduces hero to a secondary position, to be a mere interpreter of Divine Idea ; his is an instrumental value and does not posses any independent position in the economy of uature.[3] Secondly, this idolising the Heo implies the comparative infirmity of the common man. To Carlyle, the Many need rulers rather

1. *Secrets of the Self.* pp. 47-8, 52-3.
2. *Pas Che Bayad Kard*, p. 34.
3. See Chapter on Iqbal and Nietzsche, p. 254.

than liberty. As all that mankind is and enjoys has been the work of a few "noble and powerful men," so the great mass of mankind owe but obedience and reverence, definite and rigid subordination, to their superiors. He went so far as to restore "unspoiled, unobliterated . . . the old spiritual (?) bond between master and servant, between the ruler and the ruled."[1] It was the logical consequence of the doctrine of hero-*worship*.

But when Carlyle comes to deal with the problem of ethics, he gives to the common individual his due place of importance. As we have mentioned above, inconsistencies never stood in his ways. Being no professional philosopher, he took from different writers what suited him most at the moment or what the subject matter under discussion required. Dealing with morality, he derived his inspiration not from Fichte —to whom he owed much of his theory of the Hero— but from Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* which brings into relief the importance of activity in the life of the common man as a remedy against pessimism, otherworldliness and materialism. In one of his books Carlyle describes how he came to realise the uniqueness of his 'I-hood' very early in life. "Never shall I forget that inward occurence . . . wherein I witnessed the birth of my Self consciousness . . . . One forenoon, I was standing . . . in the outer door, and looking leftward at the stack of fuel-wood,—wken all at once the internal vision, 'I am a ME' came like

1. I. C. F. Harrold, *op. cit.* p. 193.

a flash from heaven before me, and in gleaming light ever afterwards continued: then had my Me, for the first time, seen itself, and forever."[1] It was this pure awareness of the self which led him directly to the experience of the divine. Like Iqbal, he held that the true way to reach the divine was to look within: you may fall back into pure consciousness of the self—its appreciative level—and thus touch the Ultimate Ego.[2] And this capacity to reach the Divine is no special boon for high and not for the low: the door is open to all. Carlyle, however, as we have seen does not go so far with Iqbal. Under the influence of Fichte he made a distinction between the high and low, the Hero and the Average Man. To Iqbal this was an unwarranted distinction. Every man' being potentially a *khalifa* of God, as the Quran puts it, is capable of rising to this position of experiencing the divine in his ego and thus raising himself to a high position in life. Without admitting this universality we cannot hope to fight materialism and necessitarianism. In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-jadid*, he describes this sense as a divine spark:

چراغے درمیان سینهٔ تست
چه نور است ایں که در آئینهٔ تست
مشو غافل که تو او را امینی
چه نادانی که سوئے خود نه بینی

1. Carlyle, *Richter*, 11, p. 111 as quoted in Harrold, *op., cit.*, pp. 198-99.

2. *Lectures*, pp.76-77.

There is a lamp in your heart ;
What light this is in your mirror !
You are its trustee : do not neglect it.
What a fool not to see your Self! [1]

In another place in the same book he says :

منه پا در بیابان طلب سست
نخستیں گیر آن عالم که در تست
اگر زیری ز خود گیری ز برشو
خدا خواهی ؟ بخود نزدیک تر شو
به تسخیر خود افتادی اگر طاق
ترا آسان شود تسخیر آفاق

Don't traverse this path lazily.
First hold that 'universe' which is within you.
If you are low, become high by holding the Self;
If you wish to get God, be near to your own Self.
If you become master of your Self,
Mastery of the universe will be easy for you.

And Iqbal admits that he reached the Divine point of view by this way. He experienced the richness of the 'universe' of the Ego and through it he reached the Divine point of view which he preaches to his readers :

مرا ذوق خودی چون انگبین است
چه گویم واردات من همین است
نخستیں کیف او را آزمودم
دگر بر خاوران قسمت نمودم

The taste for Ego is like honey to me ;
What else can I say ? This is my experience.
First I tasted it myself,
And then I decided to distribute it to the whole of the East.

---

1. p. 226.

Iqbal derived this idea from Rumi and other mystics and Carlyle got it from German thinkers of Post-kantian period who were allied in many respects with Rumi. On the basis of this similarity, both viewed with favour the old idea of man as a microcosm, revelation of the divine or, what Carlyle sometimes calls, a finite extension of God.[1] Iqbal's perfect Man is a prototype of this Carlylian microcosm. According to both, man is primarily a self and his material body is but the vehicle—always, conditioning and sometimes hindering—by which the spirit achieves its end.[2] In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, Iqbal says :

بجاں پوشیدہ رمز کائنات است
بدن حالے ز احوال حیات است

The real secret of the universe lies in Self.
Body is only one of the states of the Self.

In *Javid Nama* he discusses this problem more explicity.

محملے نے ، حالے ز احوال اوست
محملش خواندن فریب گفتگو است
چیست تن؟ با رنگ و بو خو کردن است
بامقام چار سو خو کردن است
ایں بدن با جان ما انباز نیست
مشت خاکے مانع پرواز نیست

Not receptacle, but one of the states of the Self :
It is wrong to call body a receptacle.

———

1. *Secrets of the Self,* pp. xviii-xix, 45-9 and C. F. Harrold, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.
2. Ibid., p.200.

What is body ? It is to familiarise the self with directions.

This body of ours is not a companion of our self,
Nor does it stand in the way of its flight.

Thus, according to Iqbal, the presence of our body may serve as a hindrance to a little extent in the flights of the self but it cannot keep it under its check at all times. With Carlyle, he cannot accept the mechanistic doctrine that the instrument—body—wholly determines the self; it would be to deny that inwards certainty which bursts on one in the first discovery of one's identity, or which arises from the consciousness of moral freedom.[1] The greatest moment of certainty arises in the moment of action, or, as Iqbal puts it, "action is the highest form of contemplation, when man comes face to face with the Ultimate Ego. The ideal end would be when vision and action co-mingle—a combination of supreme spiritual vision and the most realistic grapplings with the concrete opportunities of life.

وہ علم کم بصری جس میں ہمکنار نہیں
تجلیات کلیم و مشاہدات کلیم

That knowledge is blindness in which is not combined
The visions of a prophet and the observations of a thinker.

Browning (1812-1889), though romantic in temper, did not follow the Romantic tradition in the English Literature, Wordsworth, Shelley and keats, by their idolizing Nature, had in fact decried some large portion of reality. In the enjoyment

———

1. For the discussion of the problem of self and body, see Chapter on Iqbal and Bergson.

of their experience of revelation in Nature they did not or rather would not turn to the baser problems of life : they were out of sympathy with civilization. The private emotional life of the individual alone mattered for them ; his reactions and experiences, his impressions and responses were minutely analysed and evaluated but the greater and more important questions that ari out of his contact with his fellow human beings in society did not interest them at all. "Keats declaimed at cold philosophy which undid the rainbow's spells; Shelley repelled the claim of mere understanding to settle the merits of poetry ; Wordsworth . . . denounced the 'meddling intellect' which murders to dissect." Browning with his feet firm on the ground, could not fly in such a rarefied atmosphere. He called it 'fairy poetry' which, as he said to his wife, was "impossible in the days of steam." He had his love for the beautiful in nature but the problems of the human individual situated in different relations to his environment, were to him much more important and engrossing. One of his friends once asked him, "Do you care for nature much ?" He replied, "Yes, a great deal, but for human beings a great deal more." A critic has very aptly compared him with Hebrew prophets who, "while they breathed the exalted atmosphere of noble ideals," nevertheless "touched in most real earnest the sluggish mass of life around them stirring up slumbering consciousness, disillusioning the self-satisfied,

awakening dead souls to newness of life, and substituting for the heavy weight of a soul-destroying materialism, a living faith in God and humanity, and establishing on a firmer and more rational basis . . . the unbounded potentialties of human nature."[1]

Iqbal no less than Browning deserves to be designated as a prophet of new message to the new age. Rightly has a Persian poet described him as :

در دیدهٔ معنئی نگهان حضرت اقبال
پغمبری کرد و پیغمبر نتوان گفت

In the real sense of the words, Iqbal lived and acted as a prophet,
Though we may not call him a 'prophet' in the technical sense.

Like Browning. Iqbal did away with the vicious emotionalism of Urdu and persian poetry. He made it a medium to express the acute problems of his day and the way how to solve them. He used the terminology and technique hallowed by the ceturies of usage but he gave a totally new content to it. He refused to be called a poet in the old sense—one who merely tells a tale; but he was willing to be a poet in the new—sense—the sense in whieh poet is another name for a prophet.

نه پنداری که من بے باده مستم
مثال شاعران افسانه بستم
نه بینی خیر ازان مرد فرو دست
که برمن تهمت شعر و سخن بست

1. A. A. Foster, *The Message of Robert Browning* (London, 1912), pp. 3-4.

Don't you think that I am intoxicated without wine,
And told a story like poets of yore ?
You will not experience any good from a person
Who regards me "poet" 'in this sense.

But then he adds :

به جبریل امین هم داستانم
رقیب و قاصد و دربان ندانم
نهان تقدیرها در پردهٔ من
قیامت ها بغل پروردهٔ من
"مرا زین شاعری خود عار ناید
که در صد قرن یک عطار ناید"

I have a direct contact with Gabriel ;
I possess no rival, nor any watchman or messenger.
On my curtain are hidden destinies,
And many resurerrections emerge out of my creations.
'I am not ashamed of such poetry—
For such poets as 'Attar appear after a hundred decades.'[1]

Iqbal had experienced the storm and stress of life in all its intensity and his poetry was therefore a vehicle of the message which he wanted to deliver : it was a message of hope and everlasting life.

به جانم رزم مرگ و زندگانی است
نگاهم بر حیات جاودانی است

I have experienced in my self the struggle between Life and Death ;
My eye is cast on Life Eternal.

In *pauline*,one of the early poems of Browning, he similarly expresses the purpose of his poetry :

---

1. *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-jadid*,p. 204-5.

'T was in my plan to look on real life,
The life all new to me ; my theories
Were firm, so them left I, to look and learn
Mankind, its cares, hopes, fears, its woes and joys ;
And, as I pondered on their ways, I sought
How, best life's end might be attained—an end
Comprising every joy. I deeply mused.

And he never indulged in abstractions and generalities but concerntrated on typical individuals, men and women, and tried to mirror through them the problems of the common man. In his poems we do not meet with heroes like Alexander, Caeser and Napoleon ; he feels himself at home in the company of ordinary people. We meet with a Greek poet of the period of decadence—Cleon, through whose mouth he preaches the glorious message of hope and immortality just when people of his age most needed it ; with Rabbi Ben Ezra—the accursed member of the despised race of jews—through whose mouth Browning unfolds the problems of life and death ; a genious painter of the early 16th century—Andrea Del Sarto—who prostituted his genius for the sake of worldly wealth ; an embodiment of the spirit of Renaissance—the Grammarian—who made full use of his energy and died in the pursuit of his ideals.

According to Browning, life of man on this earth is characterised by imperfections and weakness and yet this is no drawback. It is this foil in man which, according to him, becomes the seed for the meeting of the finite and infinite in his life, Imperfections, unsuccessful strivings, failures and doubts are impediments in our way

but at the same time they light a spark in our earthly frame and serve to brighten our future path. The Rabbi says :

Rather I prize the doubt
Low kinds exist without,
Finished and finite colds, untroubled by a spark.

At another place he advises us to welcome all the vicissitudes of life, continual warfare between flesh and soul, pains and sorrows—for all these intimations of the 'divine' in man.

Then, welcome earth rebuff
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids, nor sit, nor stand, but go
Be our joys three-parts pain !
Strive, and hold cheap the strain ;
Learn, nor account the pang ; dare never grudge the throe.

Commenting on the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenaeur, Iqbal agrees with this attitude of Browning and by way of illustration gives a very beautiful story of two birds. While moving about in the garden, a bird was stung by a thorn. Disregarding the value of this pang, it at once began to utter complaints against the tyranny and cruelty of nature and fate. But another bird comes there and takes out the thorn with its beak and advises :

گفتش که سود خویش ز جیب زیاں بر آر
گل از شگاف سینه زر ناب آفرید

درماں ز درد ساز اگر خسته تن شوی
خوگر به خار شو که سرا پا چمن شوی

. . . . try to get your gain out of loss,
The flower created pure gold from out of its torn bosom

If you are weak and ailing in body, get medicine out of the malady,
Be familiar with the thorn so that you may become a blooming garden.

He is willing to welcome each rebuff and with Nietzche both say yes to life in spite of its miseries and pains and sufferings—in the face of which they preach the gospel of constant striving and continual work.

But what is the basic ideal for which Iqbal and Browning both preach this gospel of strenuous activity? The ideal is not extraneous; it lies in the very self of the individual who strives and attains, and fails and yet goes on in his unceasing attempt. The ideal lies in the very striving.

چیست حیات دوام ؟ سوختن نا تمام

What is immortal life ? It lie in continual and incomplete striving.

In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, he says in a similar vein :

مجو پایاں کہ پایانے نداری
بپاں تا رسی جانے نداری
بپایاں نا رسیدن زندگانی است
سفر ما را حیات جاودانی است
دما دم خویش را اندر کمیں باش
گریزاں از گماں سوئے یقیں باش

Do not seek end, for your life is without any,
For as soon as you reach the end of your journey, you lose your life.

Life exists in not reaching the end—
Immortal life lies in being always on the journey.
Lies constantly in ambush against yourself,
Fly from doubt to certitude.

But this activity can be fruitful only if it is in alliance with the spiritual background of life, is in tune with the Infinite. Cut off from this nourishing source, it loses its healthy influence and becomes poisonous for life. Iqbal's criticism of the Western culture is based mainly on this consideration, In *Pas Che Bayad Kard*, he says :

حکمت ارباب کیں مکر است و فن
مکر و فن ؟ تخریب جاں تعمیر تن
می شود در علم و فن صاحب نظر
از وجود خود نگردد با خبر
نقش حق را از نگین خود سترد
در ضمیرش آرزوها زاد و مرد

Wisdom of the people of malice is deceit and artfullness,
What is deceit and artfulness ? Death of soul and life of flesh,
Such a one acquires a penetrating eye in sciences and arts,
But is totally neglectful of his own self'
He removed the sign of the Lord from his signet ring,
Ideals appear in his heart but die there and then.

In Lectures, he says, "The nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it ; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity." Browning has depicted the life of a sixteenth century painter—

Andrea a consumate artist—who unfortunately got so much enamoured of a woman that he lost his touch with the spiritual and the result was a complete failure of his life and art. Choosing earth he lost heaven, while gaining 'the whole world' he lost 'his own soul.' Iqbal describes the same materialistic outlook in the life of a real Bondman who is moved by baser motives and worldly gains and is not enlivened by the divine spark.

هر زماں اندر تلاش ساز و برگ
کار او فکر معاش و ترس مرگ
از حد امروز خود بیروں نه جست
روز گارش نقش یک فردا نه بست
آه قومے دل ز حق پرداخته
مرد - مرگ خویش را نشناخته

He is always honkering after worldly goods;
His sole preoccupation is securing livelihood and fearing death.
He never overstepped the limits of 'today',
His life never saw the vision of one 'tomorrow'.
O for the people who turned their backs upon God
And died but did not feel it.[1]

On the other side of the picture, Browning gives us a glimpse of the life of a musician in *Abt Volger*. In him there is a harmonious blending of the ideal and the real, the human and divine, finite and infinite. When he moves his fingers over his instrument, producing 'out of three sounds not a fourth sound, but a star', he becomes unconscious of earth and art and

1. *Pas che Bayad Kard,* pp. 17-8.

law and, soaring into the highest heaven, sees God face to face. It is this vision of his that ennobles his art with which he serves the cause of humanity. Without vision life becomes narrow and self-centred ; and without the test and training ground of common duties the vision-seer would tend to become a mere visionary.

دلبری بے قاهری جادوگری است
دلبری با قاهری پیغمبری است

Vision without power is mere magic ;
Vision with power becomes prophetic.

This musician of Browning, Abt Volger, is an example of Iqbal calls by the general name of مرد حر , the Free Man, who, on account of his intimacy with the spiritual world, is able to achieve a harmony between vision and facts, ideal and the real.

مرد حر از لا اله روشن ضمیر
می نه گردد بندۂ سلطان و میر

سر دیں ما را خبر او را نظر
او درون خانه ما بیرون در

از نم او آتش از اندر شاخ تاک
در کف خاک از دم او جان پاک

The free-man receives illumination from none but God.

He is no salve to kings and nobles.
We only know but he sees spiritual realities ;
We sit outside while he belongs to the inner circle.
The branch of a tree gets spark through his breath,
The clod of earth is enlivened through his pure soul.

The moral is clear. According to both Iqbal and Browning a life of constant activity is

the highest but it must be linked with the spiritual background of life. In this context, they both are willing to allow the value of what ordinarily may be called a sinful act. Just as Iqbal would approve a wrong act provided it is creative.

تراش از تیشهٔ خود جادهٔ خویش
براه دیگران رفتن عذاب است
اگر از دست تو کار نادر آید
گناهے هم اگر باشد ثواب است

Cut with your own axe your path (through the mountains):
To walk on the treaded path is a torment.
If a truly creative act takes place at your hands,
It is praise worthy although sinful ;

so Browning in *The Statue and the Bust* develops the theme that activity of one sort or the other is far better than a life of hesitation and sloth. There is always hope for the man who dose what he has to do with a will, who spares no effort and spends himself courageously to fulfil his purpose. Whatever ideals a man may have, let them be preformed unflinchingly and uninterruptedly, daunted by no difficulties, but keen and vigorous to the end.

Let a man contend to the uttermost
For his life's set prize; be it what it will !

Discussing the potency of this pursuit after ideals, Iqbal states that the very life of man depends upon this creative activity; if this divine spark is extinguished he loses the very basis of his life and becomes a mere handful of clay to be buffetted on the waves of chance-winds.

زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است
آرزو را در دل خود زنده دار
تا نگردد مشت خاک تو مزار
چون ز تخلیق تمنا باز ماند
شهپرش بشکست و از پرواز ماند
زنده را نفیٔ تمنا مرده کرد
شعله را نقصان سوز افسرده کرد

Life is latent in seeking,
Its origin is hidden in desire.
Keep desire alive in thy heart,
Lest thy little dust become a tomb.
When it refrains from forming desires,
Its pinion breaks and it cannot soar.
Negation of desire is death to the living,
Even as absence of heat extinguishes the flame.[1]

And in this pursuit of the ideal, it may often happen that a man may go astray but this straying from the right path is implicit in the very freedom of the will enjoyed by man, Even his wrong steps will ultimately prove beneficial. So long as the spark of life is there, so long as the divine in man is alive and active, wrong steps taken here and there will ultimately contribute to his total wellbeing. Thus on the Day of Judgment Iqbal makes man express this defence for his sins :

گرچه فسونش مرا برد ز راه صواب
از غلطم در گذر عذر گناهم پذیر

Though its (world's) charms sometimes led me astray,
Accepy my apology and overlook my faults.

1. *Asrar-i-Khudi*, pp. 13-4.

For only so do men even in the midst of error stumble upon truth. Even a great crime may have an enlightening power and so this energy of crime may be preferrable to the slow suicide of a limp life. In *The Statue and the Bust* he says :

Oh, a crime will do
As well, I reply, to serve for a test.

And the story of Adam as interpreted by Iqbal brings out the same moral, One wrong step taken by Adam did not signify that he was to be condemned for ever. It served as a test— a test that Adam was now able to exercise his freedom of will in which lies the possibility of his future growth and development and the occurrence of any evil action would only serve to bring out his potentiality for good. In the words of Rumi, a meaningless act is better than sloth and sleep :

کوشش بیہودہ بہ از خفتگی

King Saul in Browning's poem *Saul* is all of a sudden overtaken by doubts and misgivings with the result that he gives himself up to total despair and refuses to perform even his daily duties—a token "that Soul and the Spirit have ended their strife and the monarch sinks back upon life." But then David the prophet-musician stealthily enters the tent of the king and slowly and steadily touches the hidden chords of the slumbering humanity.

How good is man's life, the mere living ! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses, for ever in joy !

The healthy, life-giving song of the prophet awakens Saul to a new realization of life's strength and vitality. David puts before him the acuteness of the problems of life in all their nakedness. There if not mere joy or happiness in life ; there is discord and disharmony, evil and vice, pain and misery and yet this life of ours is worth living and enjoying. The struggle between flesh and soul is the very spice of life.

> When the fight begins within himself,
> A man's worth something. God stoops o'er his head,
> Satan looks up between his feet—both tug—
> He's left himself, i' the middle : the soul wakes
> And grows.

And it is under the influence of this tug-of-war between the two contradictory forces that man rises into a new vision of life. After all, life is not to be judged by what it *is*, but what it is *becoming*. It was this confidence engendered by David in the heart of the king, who was beaten down by the opposing forces of life, that resolved all his conflicts and opened before him the great vision of eternal life here on this earth.

> Whrt stops my despair?
> This,—'tis not what man Does which exalts him, but what man Would do !

Man, in spite of his imperfections, is made to grow, Growth is life : stagnation is death. The same theme is elaborated by Iqbal in the story of a young man who went to seek advice and guidance from Ali Hajwari as related in *Asrna-i-Khudi*. Being oppressed by the darkness of

doubts, the young man complained to the saint that he was surrounded by enemies and was unable to find his way out. The saint advised him :

فارغ از اندیشهٔ اغیار شو
قوت خوابیده ای بیدار شو
سنگ چون بر خود گمان شیشه کرد
شیشه گر دید و شکستن پیشه کرد
تا کجا خود را شماری ماء وطین
از گل خود شعلهٔ طور آفرین

Be without fear of others !
Thou art a sleeping force ; awake !
When the stone thought itself to be glass,
It became glass and got into the way of breaking.
How long wilt thou regard thyself as water and clay ?
Create from thy clay a flaming Sinai ![1]

The 'flaming Sinai'—the divine spark, the mark of the great Infinite in the finite—can grow and become all-enveloping only when there is opposition, strife, struggle ; without it life's lamp is liable to be put out and thrown away ; with it, the lamp burns and spreads its glow all round, which lights the path of every stray wayfarer.

راست می گویم عدو هم یار تست
هستئ او رونق بازار تست
کشت انسان را عدو باشد سحاب
ممکناتش را بر انگیزد ز خواب
سنگ راه گردد فسان تیغ عزم
قطع منزل امتحان تیغ عزم

1. *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. 57.

The truth is: thine enemy is thy friend (in disguise);
His existence crowns thee with glory.
To the seed of man the enemy is as a rain-cloud :
He awakens its potentialities.
The sword of resolution is whetted by the stones in the way,
And to put proof by traversing stage after stage.[1]

Like the sinful aberrations and criminal straying, the presence of opposition and strife serves as a test by which the individuat is led on from one step to another on the path of progress. There may be imperfections, unsatisfied desires, thwarted ideals and yet it is on their foundations that the possibitity of man's ultimate perfection can be raised and built.

That imperfection means perfection hid,
Reserved in part, to grace the after-time. (*Cleon*)

But the perfections of 'the after-time' do not nullify the imperfections of the present : without the latter the former cannot be attained.

Man might live at first
The animal life : but *is there nothing more?*

Yes, indeed; there is much. He has risen from the state of animality and as such feels the limitations of his lower nature but there is in him the element of the divine that dose not let him rest on his oars. This 'flaming Sinai' in the 'body-clay' urges him on to higher planes of existence. Browning acceptes the doctrine of evolution and yet, due to his vitalistic outlook, is able to forego the pessimistic implications of the theory, about which Iqbal remarks, "The

1. *Asrar-i-Khud*, pp. 57-8.

formulation of the . . . view of evolution . . . in Europe had to the belief that 'there now appears to be no scientific basis for the idea that the present rich complexity of human endowment will ever be materially exceeded.' That is how the modern man's secret despair hides itself behind the screen of scientific terminology"[1] When Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published, Browning was fortsy-seven and relized the grim spectacle of universal despair that was expressed in the learned circles of the day. But to Browning this led to a totally different result. Like Rumi, he saw in it a tremendous chance "for the biological future of man." If man has developed out to animals, what of that? "Is there nothing more ?" Yes indeed, there is. Though originally animal he has the capacity to rise over brute's head and scale heights beyond the imagination and power of animals.

> In man there's failure, only since he left
> The lower and unconscious forms of life.
>
> . . .
>
> Man's spirit might grow conscious of man's life,
> And, by new lore so added to the old,
> Take each step higher over the brute's head.
>
> (*Cleon*)

Thus if man falters and falls, and then rises again with a buoyant faith, there is nothing amiss in it. Even failure may be held the badge of man's proudest heritage, the heritage of his humanity that alone can be and shall be increas-

1. *Lectures*, p. 187.

ingly linked with the divine. So Browning's optimism is based on his firm conviction that man's adverse circumstances need not and actually do not stand in the way of achieving success. Failure exists only to be conrerted into success, sin only to be changed into righteousness, imperfection only to lead in humility to that which is perfect.

In Taskhir-i-Fitrat (in *Piyam-i-Mashriq*) Iqbal stresses the same point. There is good as well as evil in the world but that does not mean that man should cease to strive. Even if his efforts may be pointless and bring no result, yet a life of activity in itself is worth pursuing. Sin and vice may lay their snares in our path and We may fall into them consciously or unconsciously, yet the value of life does not diminsh thereby. Iblis gives Adam the lesson which prophetmusician David gave to Saul and Hajwari to the young man Merv.

زندگئی سوز و ساز به ز سکون دوام
فاخته شاهیں شود از تپش زیر دام
زشت و نکو زادهٔ و هم خداوند تست
لذت کردار گیر کام بنه جوئے کام
قطرهٔ بے مایه ای گوهر تابنده شو
از سر گردون بیفت، گیر بدریا مقام
تو نه شناسی هنوز شوق بمیرد ز وصل
چیست حیات دوام؟ سوختن نا تمام

Life of strenous activity is far better then eternal peace.
Innocent dove becomes a bird of prey due to torment of the net.
Distinction of good and evil is the creation of your God

Enjoy the taste of deed and the fulfilment of work.
You are a worthless drop, be a shining pearl ;
Fall from the sky and take your place in the river.
You do not realise yet that desire dies with union.
What is eternal life ? It is strenuous striving !

And man accepts this role of imperfection and eternal striving which gradually become the seed-field of perfection.

همه سوز نا تمامم همه درد آرزویم
بگمان دهم یقین را که شهید جستجویم

In *Grammarian's Funeral*, Browning expresses the same undying thirst of man for search and activity. In him time and eternity meet, finite and infinite embrace in one creative act. Sceptics may raise doubts as to the end and ultimate purpose of human endeavour, but our life, enjoined to eternity as it is, own justification.

Others mistrust and say, "But Time escapes :
"Live now or never."
He said, "What's Time ? Leave Now for dogs and apes !
" Man has Forever. "

This capacity of buoyant faith in life here and hereafter is shared by both Iqbal and Browning. To them life does not mean only life here and now but extends beyond to eternity and so death, according to them, is only a passing phase, "the threshold of boundless life." Commenting on the pessimistic trend of his times, Browning once said. "Death, death, it is this harping on death that I despise so much, In fiction, in poetry, . . . in art and literature,

the shadow of death, call it what you will, despair, negation, indifference, is upon us. But what fools talk thus! Why, *amico mio*, you know as well as I, that death is life, just as our daily momenrarily dying body is none the less alive, and ever recruiting new forces of existence. Without death . . . there could be no prolongation of that which we call life. Never say ef me that I am dead. "

It was this undying faith in personal immortality and hence his optimism which grew out of it, that makes Browning one of the great poet-thinkers of the poet-Kantian period in England. His message of faith and cheerfulness was in reality a prohetic service performed at a time when belief in personal immortality "was decaying in Europe, and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale. "

But it is only the death of a great soul that becomes the threshold of a boundless life : not all men rise to such heighets of bliss. Iqbal and Browning both agree in this doctrine of conditional Immorality.[1] It is the eternal striving that keeps up the heart-best and which no death stop. Only 'dogs and apes' who live only in ' now ' die ; those whose strivings and ambitions have no end possess the bliss of ' Forever.' In *Grammarians' Funeral;* these two types of deaths are described.

---

1. For a detailed discussion of this, see chapter on Ward.

That low man seeks a little thing to do,
Sees it, and does it :
This high mad, with a great thing to pursue,
Dise ere he knowns it.

The 'Man' dies in the pursuit of his ideals and passing through the gateway of death continues his life's mission.

In *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, Iqbal refers to the two kinds of deaths :

ازان مرگے که می آید چه باک است
خودی چون پخته شد از مرگ پاک است
ز مرگ دیگرے لرزد دل من
دل من جان من آب و گل من
ز کار عشق و مستی بر فتادن
شرار خود به خاشاکے ندادن

Why fear that death which comes from without?
For when the 'I' ripens into a self
It has no danger of dissolution.
There is a more subtle inner death which makes me trouble!

This death is falling down from love's frenzy,
Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps af chaff.

Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), the great English dramatist, who contrary to the prevalent tendency in the West, emphasised the role of will in human life, has great affinities with Iqbal. Unlike Bergson and Schopenhaur to whom they are, no doubt, deeply indebted, they are interested in philosphy not as a mere academic study but as the background in the light of which they plan to raise and create a better social organisation which shall in turn

help in bringing about a better type of individual. They agree in subordinating art to the interests of life and therefore protest against what is usually called romantic art in which woman is assigned a predominant role in man's life, thouh Iqbal, deriving his inspiration from Islam, cannot agree with Shaw in relegating womanhood to mere playing a second fiddle to man.[1] While Shaw employed the medium of drama to preach his point of view about the problems of life, Iqbal used poetry to convey his message. It was mainly this theory of art which led Shaw to criticise Shakespears as a second-rate a artist—not because his technique was inferior but bécause he had no peculiar message to deliver. Iqbal's criticism of Hafiz was movtivated by a similar urge. He did not deny the artistic accomplishments of the great Persian lyricist; what he cavilled·at was the lack of any coherent and healthy of life in his beautiful poetry. Both criticised capitalism and Darwinism. Marxism and pseudo-liberalism, dogmatic religion and scientific exclusiveness. Both advocated the doctrine of Superman and presented a charming picture of the ideal man—'gentleman' of Shaw and 'free man' of Iqbal.

Early in his career Shaw wos engaged in fight against Capitalism in order to pave the way for Socialistic revolution. In this he was decidedly influenced by Marx, but he could not accept the historical inevitability inherent in Marxine philosophy. He wanted to leave a loophole for human will and effort. Opposing

determinism implied in the mataphysical system of Marx, he appealed to the freedom enjoyed by man to bring about a healthy change in social organisation so as to develop a stronger type of humanity which alone can successfully tackle the intriguing problems of modern civiliz-ation. A certain critic, Max Bear, while criticising Shaw from the Marxian point of view brings out Shavian emphasis on the role of the individual. He says, "Having no objective guide, no lead-ing principle to go by, Shaw necessarily arrives at hero-worship—at the hankering after a Superman to guide mankind .... Marxism is the antithesis of all that. It has a body of doct-rines ; it regards theory as the guide in practic-al life ; and it destroys all heroism in history. In the place of the heroic factor it sets material and economic factors as the motor power of histori-cal development."[1] As a matter of historical fact, it is evident that mere material and econo-omic factors were never adequate in making re-volutions ; it wes the presence of some man of great vision who moulded the situation of his ideal ends, thot determined the course of his-tory. We cannot go without the agency of man

---

1. Cf. the follwing line of Iqbal (Footnote p. 528)

ھند کے شاعر و تصویر گر و افسانہ نویس
بیچاروں کے اعصاب پہ عورت ہے سوار

But in *Ramuz* he givas a dignified position to women

پوشش عریانیٔ مرداں زن است حسن دلجو عشق را پیراھن مرد
نغمہ خیز از زخمۂ زن ساز مرد از نیازِ او دو بالا ناز است

1. Eric Bentley, *Bernard Shaw*, (U.S.A. 1937), pp.14-5.

and his will, the element of what Carlyle and Shaw call ' heroism ' and what Iqbal calls *fagr*. Superman represents freedom of human will ; while material faetors of Marxians imply determinism, dependence of men on external factors alone. Leadership dose play its part in the development of society.

Socialism that Shaw advocates is not scientific socialism but what some have seen fit to characterise as aristocratic in the tradition of Ruskin and Carlyle. For Shaw the contrast is not between the worker and the capitalist but between the worker and the idler. A good social order, according to him, is one in which every one works. This philosophy was beatifully summed up by Nietzche's *Zarathustra*. "I labour not for my happiness. I labour for my work." Ruskin remarked, "Life without work is robbery. Work without art is brutality." Such socialism is mainly etrical ? it caters not only to the material needs of men but also to their moral and spiritual ones. Iqbal agrees with Shaw in denouncing the materialistic determinism of Marx and the type of scientific socialism implied in it. Mere economic socialism is no solution of our manifold problemes : to be truly effective it must be economic as well as moral—the equality we need to be established must be not only material but also moral.

رنگ و بو از تن نگیرد جان پاک
جز به تن کارے ندارد اشتراک

دین آں پیغمبر حق ناشناس
بر مساوات شکم دارد اساس
تا اخوت را مقام اندر دل است
بیخ او در دل نہ در آب و گل

The soul does not get nourishment through bodily feeling.

Socialism concerns itself only with body.
The religion of that athiest prophet (*viz.* Marx)
Is based on the equality of stomachs.
Equality has its source in 'heart',
Its basis is in heart and not in body.

Addressing the Soviet Union, where society is being patterned after socialistic principles, he suggests that its merely economic outlook must be transcended so as to bring into fruitition the basic moral and spiritual needs of man.

کردہ ای کار خداوندان تمام
بگذر از لا جانب الا خرام
در گذر از لا اگر جوینده ای
تارهٔ اثبات گیری زنده ای

You have finished the landlords,
So pass from 'no' to 'yes'.
If you are in search of truth, pass beyond the 'no'.
You live if you traverse the path of 'Yes'.

Shaw, however, did not believe in the capacity of the ordinary man to progress and so it was for this reason that some critics have seen reason to call this type of socialism as aristocratic. Like Nietzsche, he looked upon the common run of people as unfit for higher responsibilities and would agree with Burke in calling them 'the swinish multitude.' According to him, the ordinary man does not need

freedom at all ; he needs discipline and craves a leader and master. Shaw's dislike for democracy was based on this conviction of his According to him, in the words of Joad, "Government of the people is necessary: government for the people possible : but government by the people . . . is a patent impossibility."[1]

Iqbal, however, seems to question this psychological analysis of Shaw and Nietzsche about the common man. Discussing this point in an article in 1916, he asks, "Is the plebian so absolutely hopeless ?" He answers in the negative and adds that democracy in Islam is "a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power."[2] Similarly the code of ethics prescribed in *Asrar-i-Khudi* (1915) does not make any distinction between man and man and he holds out the promise that if this discipline is strictly followed every man is capable of achieving the highest stage of being the true representative of ideal manhood.

But, is this a correct analysis of the situation? Theoretically, it may be true, but as a matter of actual fact it is hardly realisable. In spite of

———

1. Joad, *Shaw*, (London 1949), p. 160.

2. Footnote, p. xix, English Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self.*

our profession about the equality of man, there is no denying the fact that in actual life majority of men behave as if they are incapable of improvement by their own efforts. As such the indictment of men like Shaw and Nietzsche of the common people seemes to be valid and it is on the basis of the deficiency of the average man—whether congenital or otherwise is quite another point—that these thinkers have questioned the usefulness of democracy as the ideal form of government. It seemes that the common man is fascist by nature and is prone to put on the pedastal any one who rightly or wrongly claims his allegiance.

In *Piyam-i-Mashriq*, Iqbal seems to support this point of view. There is a dialogue between Lenin and Kaiser Wilhelm in which Lenin tells the monarch that the proletariat at last have succeeded in tearing to pieces the fabric woven by the capitalists imperialists and theologians combined.

غلام گرسنه دیدی که بر درید آخر
قمیص خواجه که رنگین ز خون ما بود است
شرار آتش جمهور کهنه ساماں سوخت
ردائے پیر کلیسا ، قبائے سلطان سوخت

You witnessed that the hungry slave sfter all tore into pieces
The shirt of the landlord which was stained with his blood.
The sparks from the fire of the proletariat burnt
The gown of the clergy and tke robe of the king.

To which Kaiser replies that amidst all these changes, however revolutionary they may look

outwardly, the one factor remains unchanged—*viz*, the desire of the common man to fashion idols for himself to be worshipped and adored. In spite of the change of time, the inner urge of man to create ever new 'heroes' to be obeyed and followed remains constant. "Adoration before the idol is in very nature of Brahmin.

دما دم نو خداوندان تراشد
که بیزار از خدایان کہن است
"نماند ناز شیریں بے خریدار
اگر خسرو نباشد کوهکن است"

He continually creates new gods.
He is sick of old ones.
The flirtations of Shirin have always their prey,
If it is not Khosro. then there is Farhad.

In *Man and Superman* (1903) Shaw raises the question : if the common man is not capable of improvement how can society be moulded into a better patern ? Or to put the question in another form, how to supersede the common man ? Plato advocated education of a particular type for the select few who would thus develop into what he calls the philosopher-kings. The general mass of mankind must obey the laws enacted by them. They are too stupid, too irrational, too subject to impulse, desire and appetite to be trusted to think and plan for themselves. Shaw accepted this point of view and held, in the worlds of Chesterton, "that ninety-nine hundredths of a man in a cave were the same as ninety-nine hundredths of a man in a suburban vila."[1] But he rejects the recipe of

1. Joad, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

Plato and adopts that of Nietzsche—the breeding of a superman. It seems that all thinkers who have given their serious attention to the problem of social reformation at one stage or other arrive at this conclusion, *viz.*, the necessity of some outstanding men to guide and direct the common man. Rumi in great exasperation cried for such a one :

زیں همر هاں سست عناصر دلم گرفت
شیر خدا و رستم یزدانم آرزوست

I am sick of these wear-kneed men,
I desire a Loin of God ('Ali) and Rustum.

And Iqbal raised his voice to welcome him :

اے سوار اشہب دوراں بیا اے فروغ دیدۂ امکاں بیا

Appear, O rider of Distiny !
Appear, O light of the dark realm of change !

But this superman is not to be looked upon as a species quite distinct from man as man is different from ape.[1] There is no doubt that the language used both by Nietzsche and Shaw implies as if they envisage a species different from man. What they really mean to convey by Supperman is nothing else than a man of the highest moral and intellectual stature. Like Nietzsche, Shaw looks upon Napolean and Caesar as the types of the ideal man. He is characterised by realism and sees things and events in their real perspective. "He is imaginative without illusions, and crative without religion, loyalty, patriotism or any of the

———

1. This problem has been fully discussed in chapter on Iqbal and Nietzsche.

common ideals."[1] Secondly, he possesses certainty of aim and fixity of purpose and thirdly, he has an extraordinary sustained power of work. Lastly, he is original in the sense that he can "estimate the value of truth, money, or success in any particular instance quite independently of convention and moral generalisations."[2] According to Shaw, the real gentleman or Superman is one who gives more to society than he takes. With all the benefits that he derives from his membership of the social organisation in which he is born and bred, he gives much more ; the society finds itself at a higher stage of culture due to him than what it had before he started his compaign of reformation. Such ideal type of man cannot flourish in a capitalistic society, for a capitalist always takes more and gives less; nor is it possible in a proletarian atmosphere, for a porletariat, according to Shaw, possesses no value at all. Only a truly socialistic society (and we have seen that, for Shaw socialism a without a moral and spiritual basis is no socialism) can produce men of this calibre. Thus the creation of Supermen—or in acceptable language, gentlemen—is the greatest task that lies ahead of us a longer and more arduous task then the socialistic revolution. He is a syntehsis of the democrat and the aristocrat, the follower and the leader, a symbol of the fact that aristocracy is not to be

1. Joad, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

2. Eric Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

superseded but to be incorporated in democracy. He is the golden mean between two rival types—the priest and the soldier, the Pope and the Emperor. Thus there is a remarkable affinity between the conception of Superman of Nitetzsche and Shaw, Rumi and Iqbal. To all the four the ideal type of manhood is a synthesis of physical prowess as well as intellectual stature, moral earnestness as well as spiritual idealism; one who in the words of Rumi combines in his person the moral excellence of Ali and the physical strength of Rustum.

نوع انسان را بشیر و هم نذیر
هم سپاهی هم سپه گر هم امیر

In *Back to Methuselah*, Shaw develops his theory of Creative Evolution and Life Force. The mechanistic interpretation of life and the monopoly of truth claimed by the advocates of science repélled Shaw and he used his bitter wit to pull down this idol of the 19th century from its high pedestal. In an age which prided itselt on its rationlism and enlightenment, which had discarded belief in religion as one would throw a false coin, Shaw with his usual hyperbolic boldness declared. "Science is always wrong and religion is always right," and "Impostor for impostor I prefer the mystic to the scientist." Nobody would accept these statements as they stand ; but Shaw was in the habit of over-emphasising the neglected aspect of the truth and so he wanted to bring to the notice of his contemporaries that they were wrong both in their estimate of the value of science and in

denouncing the efficiency of faith. If belief in religion is a superstition, then, he added, our faith in science is a grosser superstition. The modern scientist has so to say, assumed the role of a new priest who demands that his judgments must be accepted on authority. But this new priest, unlike the old, remarks Shaw, " has no help to offer either in morality or in that expansion and development of consciousness which is the fruit of 'religion experience.' "[1] Similarly he attacked the 19th century free-thought that boasted of its rationalism—the very thing Shaw chose to denounce. He asserted that man is primarily a willing and feeling, not a mere thinking, animal. Like Nietzsche, he accepted the lead of Schopenhauer in his 'irrationlism' or voluntarism. Both agreed with his contention that the Will is the main driving force of human existence and both rejected his pessimism which was the result of viewing Will as horrifying; to Shaw, on the other hand, this Will was most inspiring and helpful and on this basis he rejected Darwin's mechanical evolution. Discussing the role of Socialism in this context, he says, " In short we must mark a religion of Socialism. We must fall back on our will to Socialism, and resort to our reason only to find out the ways and means. And this we can do only if we conceive the will as a creative energy as Lamarck did; and totally renounce and abjure Darwinism, Marxism, and all Fatalistic, penny-

1. Eric Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

in-the-slot theories of evolution whatever."[1] Thus Shaw's attack against Darwin and Marx was in reality a defence of mind against body, free-will against determism, vitalism against mechanism. He did not deny the part played by Natural Selection in adapting life to our planet but, he adds, "it is Creative Evolution that adapts the planet to our continual aspiration to greater knowledge and greater power."[2] But in his emphasis on the role of freedom and will in our life, he even attacked the old-type Vitalists who with all their talk of will were still mechanistic in outlook. He took a bold step in affirming the reality of the Divine Idea to establish the reality of true freedom. He says, " The Vitalists, in postulating a Vital Force, were setting up a comparatively mechanical conception as against the divine idea of the life breathed into the clay nostrils of Adam, whereby he became a living soul."[3] This was Shaw's New Vitalism.

Iqbal agrees with this Shavian criticism of rationalism and science and vitalistic interpretation of the evolutionary process. But he could not accept his dualistic mataphysics according to which Life and Matter stand opposed to each other as twin realities. According to Shaw, the cosmic drama begins when life enters matter and assumes the familiar

---

1. Eric Bently, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 63.

shaqes of the vegetable, animal and human worlds. Ibqal, like Rumi and Ward is a spiritual Monist. To him the Ultimats Reality is one and it is Spirit, an Ego, and what we call matter is only a lower expression of the Life force, or as Iqbal puts it, "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order."[1] But Iqbal would agree with Shaw in conceiving the main purpose of life to win freedom from this enslavement to matter by conquering it. "Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its march by assimilating them . . . The greatest obstacle in the way of life is matter . . . In one world, life is an endeavour for freedom."[2] This freedom, according to Iqbal, can be attained by approaching the individual who is most free—God. But in Show's system, the place of God is not properly defined. For him the evolutionary process has no goal and so God for Show is as subject to this process as any other being. When Life at last succeeds in emancipating itself from the fetters of matter, it gets engulfed in the whirlpool of pure force and nothing remains of man and his glorious life of efforts and achievements. Shaw's philosophy thus provides no scope for man's aspiration towards the higher life in God and the craving for personal immortality. A mere extension of the life of man from threescore and ten to

1. *Lectures*, p. 106.

2. Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. xiv-xv.

three hundred will not bring any solace to the individual; it will only tend to prolong his agony. When there is no goal to the striving of life, no hope for personal immortality, no assurance of victory over the forces of evil, the whole system of Shaw defeats its purpose. A theistic pluralism of the type of James Ward and Iqbal alone can hope to solve these recurring problems of life.

## POSTSCRIPT

A detalied study of the thought of Iqbal versus different eminent representatives of the Voluntaristic movement in the West has clearly brought to the forefront the true position which he occupies in the context of modern philosophical speculation. This movement arose when Rationalism was found to be unsatisfactory in solving unaided the recurring problems of existence with which metaphysics deals. Kant's contribution in the evolution of this movement was only negative; he triep to explain the limitations within which reason works. As regards some fundamental ideas of thought, such as God, freedom of will and immortality, he showed that it was impossible to establish them with any reasonable conclusiveness. We have to fall back on some supra-rational faith. Since his time this tradition of voluntarism in its anti-intellectual aspect has become a characteristic of modern thought; including Existentialism. When the emphasis shifted from cold reason to active will, the view of life correspondingly changed. Man was no longer looked upon as a mere tool in the hands of relentless and will-less Nature, but as a centre of free and independent force (ego) which can work towards the reliza-

tion of ever-developing ideal ends ; he was no longer considerd to be a mere means for the welfare of collective whole but as an end in himself, possessing the power of changing what is into what ought to be. Thus Absolutism and pantheism which neglected the individual at the cost of One gave place to pluralism and theism which recognised and admitted the value both of Unity and diversity, One and Many.

What is the position of Iqbal in this respect ? It has been shown above that he is in total agreement with none of the individual thinkers we have discussed. He could not accept the position of Kant that the Ultimate Reality—the thing-in-itself—is beyond human knowledge. The difficulty arises, according to Iqbal, when the source of knowledge is confined to sense-perception and reason. Following the lead of the great mystics of Islam, he recognises that man can come into direct contact with Reality from within. The supra-sensuous intuitions open the window through which one can enjoy direct vision of the Ultimate Ego. He agreed with Nietzche in the dynamic view of life, in his attack against what he called slave-morality, against nationalism and racialism as well as the conception of the superman, but he could not accept the cyclic view of life, his atheism and dislike of true democracy and socialism, and the non-human, aggressive characterisation of the superman. He readily accepted the Bergsonian concepts of space and time but could not agree to his rejection of teleology.

With Ward's position he was in general agreement but here also he was unable to agree to his doctrine of universal immortality, for it was fundamentally against the dynamic and activist attitude of Iqbal towards life. Thus we see that in the context of modern thought Iqbal occupies a position which is unique in itself, which cannot be identified with any of the thinkers discussed above.

The reason is quite obvious. He approached the problems of life from an individual point of view which was based on the fundamental principles of Islam and coloured by the thought-pattern of Muslim culture. It would be perfectly fortuitous to argue that his system of thought is a mere hotch-potch of different ingredients taken sometime from this and at other times from another western thinker ; it is as a matter of fact a unified whole each part of which is organically related to the others as well as to the whole itself. Even most of the points in which he seems to agree with some of these thinkers had been thoroughly discussed and debated by our Muslim thinkers in the past, with this difference, of course, that with the accumulation of new evidence in the scientific field and the enrichment of thought by ever-increasing advance in the field of philosophy, better and more logical ways had been discovered to approach them. And the main contribution of Iqbal in this respect is that he assimilated all the wealth of modern scholarship in upholding a position in Muslim philosophy

which though in keeping with the fundamental spirit of Islam was being neglected and ignored due to lack of proper knowledge and training. He succeeded in evolving a system of throught which is unique and logically compact. Starting with the individual ego as a centre of will and energy, you can logically deduce Iqbal's conception of God, individual's freedom of will and his conditional immorality, his ability to trnscend the limitations of space and time, his relation to God and the universe.

But there is nothing final in human thought. According to Iqbal, "as knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and perhaps sounder views than that set forth in these lectures are possible," Man's understanding of Reality can never be complete and comprehensive. Hallaj is said to have once remarked that if the Unconditioned were to be within the mental grasp of the conditioned, he ceases to be Uncondtioned. It has been the constant confession of the Holy Prophet of Islam that we cannot comprehend God as he actually is. As the Quran says, "Say, if the sea were ink to describe the nature of my Lord, verily the sea would fail . . . " (18 : 109). There are thus many facets of Reality some of which we have been able to apprehend in our own limited way but there are many that still remain unexplored. With each advance in thought, we may be able to rise to further heights but there can be no end to this intellectual mountaineering, for

after conquering one peak after another, we find further peaks higher and still higher which are a challenge to man's insatiable urge to know and conquer. And it should be in the context of this universal demand of man that Iqbal's attempt to know and interpret the face of Reality can be properly judged and evaluated.

THE END